other. But at the same time, they narrate interminably (it goes on murmuring endlessly) the expectation of an impossible presence that transforms into its own body the traces it has left behind. These quotations of voices mark themselves on an everyday prose that can only produce some of their effects—in the form of statements and practices.

Chapter XII Reading as Poaching

> "To arrest the meanings of words once and for all, that is what Terror wants."
> Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Rudiments païens*

SOME TIME AGO, Alvin Toffler announced the birth of a "new species" of humanity, engendered by mass artistic consumption. This species-in-formation, migrating and devouring its way through the pastures of the media, is supposed to be defined by its "self mobility."[1] It returns to the nomadic ways of ancient times, but now hunts in artificial steppes and forests.

This prophetic analysis bears, however, only on the masses that consume "art." An inquiry made in 1974 by a French government agency concerned with cultural activities[2] shows to what extent this production only benefits an elite. Between 1967 (the date of a previous inquiry made by another agency, the INSEE) and 1974, public monies invested in the creation and development of cultural centers reinforced the already existing cultural inequalities among French people. They multiplied the places of expression and symbolization, but, in fact, the same categories profit from this expansion: culture, like money, "goes only to the rich." The masses rarely enter these gardens of art. But they are caught and collected in the nets of the media, by television (capturing 9 out of 10 people in France), by newspapers (8 out of 10), by books (7 out of 10, of whom 2 read a great deal and, according to another survey made in autumn 1978, 5 read more than they used to),[3] etc. Instead of an increasing nomadism, we thus find a "reduction" and a confinement: consumption, organized by this expansionist grid takes on the appearance of something done by sheep progressively immobilized and "handled" as a result of the growing mobility of the media as they conquer space. The consumers settle down, the media keep on the move. The only freedom

supposed to be left to the masses is that of grazing on the ration of simulacra the system distributes to each individual.

That is precisely the idea I oppose: such an image of consumers is unacceptable.

The ideology of "informing" through books

This image of the "public" is not usually made explicit. It is nonetheless implicit in the "producers'" claim to *inform* the population, that is, to "give form" to social practices. Even protests against the vulgarization/vulgarity of the media often depend on an analogous pedagogical claim; inclined to believe that its own cultural models are necessary for the people in order to educate their minds and elevate their hearts, the elite upset about the "low level" of journalism or television always assumes that the public is moulded by the products imposed on it. To assume that is to misunderstand the act of "consumption." This misunderstanding assumes that "assimilating" necessarily means "becoming similar to" what one absorbs, and not "making something similar" to what one is, making it one's own, appropriating or reappropriating it. Between these two possible meanings, a choice must be made, and first of all on the basis of a story whose horizon has to be outlined. "Once upon a time. . . ."

In the eighteenth century, the ideology of the Enlightenment claimed that the book was capable of reforming society, that educational popularization could transform manners and customs, that an elite's products could, if they were sufficiently widespread, remodel a whole nation. This myth of Education[4] inscribed a theory of consumption in the structures of cultural politics. To be sure, by the logic of technical and economic development that it mobilized, this politics was led to the present system that inverts the ideology that formerly sought to spread "Enlightenment." The means of diffusion are now dominating the ideas they diffuse. The medium is replacing the message. The "pedagogical" procedures for which the educational system was the support have developed to the point of abandoning as useless or destroying the professional "body" that perfected them over the span of two centuries: today, they make up the apparatus which, by realizing the ancient dream of enclosing *all* citizens and *each one* in particular, gradually destroys the goal, the convictions, and the educational institutions of the Enlightenment. In short, it is as though the *form* of Education's establishment had been too fully realized, by eliminating the very *content* that made it possible and

which from that point on loses its social utility. But all through this evolution, the idea of producing a society by a "scriptural" system has continued to have as its corollary the conviction that although the public is more or less resistant, it is moulded by (verbal or iconic) writing, that it becomes similar to what it receives, and that it is *imprinted* by and like the text which is imposed on it.

This text was formerly found at school. Today, the text is society itself. It takes urbanistic, industrial, commercial, or televised forms. But the mutation that caused the transition from educational archeology to the technocracy of the media did not touch the assumption that consumption is essentially passive—an assumption that is precisely what should be examined. On the contrary, this mutation actually reinforced this assumption: the massive installation of standardized teaching has made the intersubjective relationships of traditional apprenticeship impossible; the "informing" technicians have thus been changed, through the systematization of enterprises, into bureaucrats cooped up in their specialities and increasingly ignorant of users; productivist logic itself, by isolating producers, has led them to suppose that there is no creativity among consumers; a reciprocal blindness, generated by this system, has ended up making both technicians and producers believe that initiative takes place only in technical laboratories. Even the analysis of the repression exercised by the mechanisms of this system of disciplinary enclosure continues to assume that the public is passive, "informed," processed, marked, and has no historical role.

The efficiency of production implies the inertia of consumption. It produces the ideology of consumption-as-a-receptacle. The result of class ideology and technical blindness, this legend is necessary for the system that distinguishes and privileges authors, educators, revolutionaries, in a word, "producers," in contrast with those who do not produce. By challenging "consumption" as it is conceived and (of course) confirmed by these "authorial" enterprises, we may be able to discover creative activity where it has been denied that any exists, and to relativize the exorbitant claim that *a certain kind* of production (real enough, but not the only kind) can set out to produce history by "informing" the whole of a country.

A misunderstood activity: reading

Reading is only one aspect of consumption, but a fundamental one. In a society that is increasingly written, organized by the power of modifying

things and of reforming structures on the basis of scriptural models (whether scientific, economic, or political), transformed little by little into combined "texts" (be they administrative, urban, industrial, etc.), the binominal set production–consumption can often be replaced by its general equivalent and indicator, the binominal set writing–reading. The power established by the will to rewrite history (a will that is by turns reformist, scientific, revolutionary, or pedagogical) on the basis of scriptural operations that are at first carried out in a circumscribed field, has as its corollary a major division between reading and writing.

"Modernization, modernity itself, is writing," says François Furet. The generalization of writing has in fact brought about the replacement of custom by abstract law, the substitution of the State for traditional authorities, and the disintegration of the group to the advantage of the individual. This transformation took place under the sign of a "cross-breeding" of two distinct elements, the written and the oral. Furet and Ozouf's recent study has indeed demonstrated the existence, in the less educated parts of France, of a "vast semi-literacy, centered on reading, instigated by the Church and by families, and aimed chiefly at girls."[5] Only the schools have joined, with a link that has often remained extremely fragile, the ability to read and the ability to write. These abilities were long separated, up until late in the nineteenth century, and even today, the adult life of many of those who have been to school very quickly dissociates "just reading" and writing; and we must thus ask ourselves how reading proceeds where it is married with writing.

Research on the psycho-linguistics of comprehension[6] distinguishes between "the lexical act" and the "scriptural act" in reading. It shows that the schoolchild learns to read by a process that *parallels* his learning to decipher; learning to read is not a *result* of learning to decipher: *reading* meaning and *deciphering* letters correspond to two different activities, even if they intersect. In other words, cultural memory (acquired through listening, through oral tradition) alone makes possible and gradually enriches the strategies of semantic questioning whose expectations the deciphering of a written text refines, clarifies, or corrects. From the child to the scientist, reading is preceded and made possible by oral communication, which constitutes the multifarious "authority" that texts almost never cite. It is as though the construction of meanings, which takes the form of an expectation (waiting for something) or an anticipation (making hypotheses) linked to an oral transmission, was the initial block of stone that the decoding of graphic

materials progressively sculpted, invalidated, verified, detailed, in order to make way for acts of reading. The graph only shapes and carves the anticipation.

In spite of the work that has uncovered an autonomy of the practice of reading underneath scriptural imperialism, a *de facto* situation has been created by more than three centuries of history. The social and technical functioning of contemporary culture hierarchizes these two activities. To write is to produce the text; to read is to receive it from someone else without putting one's own mark on it, without remaking it. In that regard, the reading of the catechism or of the Scriptures that the clergy used to recommend to girls and mothers, by forbidding these Vestals of an untouchable sacred text to write continues today in the "reading" of the television programs offered to "consumers" who cannot trace their own writing on the screen where the production of the Other—of "culture"—appears. "The link existing between reading and the Church"[7] is reproduced in the relation between reading and the church of the media. In this mode, the construction of the social text by professional intellectuals (*clercs*) still seems to correspond to its "reception" by the faithful who are supposed to be satisfied to reproduce the models elaborated by the manipulators of language.

What has to be put in question is unfortunately not this division of labor (it is only too real), but the assimilation of reading to passivity. In fact, to read is to wander through an imposed system (that of the text, analogous to the constructed order of a city or of a supermarket). Recent analyses show that "every reading modifies its object,"[8] that (as Borges already pointed out) "one literature differs from another less by its text than by the way in which it is read,"[9] and that a system of verbal or iconic signs is a reservoir of forms to which the reader must give a meaning. If then "the book is a result (a construction) produced by the reader,"[10] one must consider the operation of the latter as a sort of *lectio*, the production proper to the "reader" ("*lecteur*").[11] The reader takes neither the position of the author nor an author's position. He invents in texts something different from what they "intended." He detaches them from their (lost or accessory) origin. He combines their fragments and creates something un-known in the space organized by their capacity for allowing an indefinite plurality of meanings. Is this "reading" activity reserved for the literary critic (always privileged in studies of reading), that is, once again, for a category of professional intellectuals (*clercs*), or can it be extended to all cultural consumers?

Such is the question to which history, sociology, or the educational theory ought to give us the rudiments of an answer.

Unfortunately, the many works on reading provide only partial clarifications on this point or depend on the experience of literary people. Research has been primarily concerned with the teaching of reading.[12] It has not ventured very far into the fields of history and ethnology, because of the lack of traces left behind by a practice that slips through all sorts of "writings" that have yet to be clearly determined (for example, one "reads" a landscape the way one reads a text).[13] Investigations of ordinary reading are more common in sociology, but generally statistical in type: they are more concerned with calculating the correlations between objects read, social groups, and places frequented more than with analyzing the very operation of reading, its modalities and its typology.[14]

There remains the literary domain, which is particularly rich today (from Barthes to Riffaterre or Jauss), once again privileged by writing but highly specialized: "writers" shift the "joy of reading" in a direction where it is articulated on an art of writing and on a pleasure of re-reading. In that domain, however, whether before or after Barthes, deviations and creativities are narrated that play with the expectations, tricks, and normativities of the "work read"; there theoretical models that can account for it are already elaborated.[15] In spite of all this, the story of man's travels through his own texts remains in large measure unknown.

"Literal" meaning, a product of a social elite

From analyses that follow the activity of reading in its detours, drifts across the page, metamorphoses and anamorphoses of the text produced by the travelling eye, imaginary or meditative flights taking off from a few words, overlappings of spaces on the militarily organized surfaces of the text, and ephemeral dances, it is at least clear, as a first result, that one cannot maintain the division separating the readable text (a book, image, etc.) from the act of reading. Whether it is a question of newspapers or Proust, the text has a meaning only through its readers; it changes along with them; it is ordered in accord with codes of perception that it does not control. It becomes a text only in its relation to the exteriority of the reader, by an interplay of implications and ruses between two sorts of "expectation" in combination: the expectation that

organizes a *readable* space (a literality), and one that organizes a procedure necessary for the *actualization* of the work (a reading).[16]

It is a strange fact that the principle of this reading activity was formulated by Descartes more than three hundred years ago, in discussing contemporary research on combinative systems and on the example of ciphers (*chiffres*) or coded texts: "And if someone, in order to decode a cipher written with ordinary letters, thinks of reading a B everywhere he finds an A, and reading a C where he finds a B, and thus to substitute for each letter the one that follows it in alphabetic order and if, reading in this way, he finds words that have a meaning, he will not doubt that he has discovered the true meaning of this cipher in this way, even though it could very well be that the person who wrote it meant something quite different, giving a different meaning to each letter. . . ."[17] The operation of encoding, which is articulated on signifiers, produces the meaning, which is thus not defined by something deposited in the text, by an "intention," or by an activity on the part of the author.

What is then the origin of the Great Wall of China that circumscribes a "proper" in the text, isolates its semantic autonomy from everything else, and makes it the secret order of a "work?" Who builds this barrier constituting the text as a sort of island that no reader can ever reach? This fiction condemns consumers to subjection because they are always going to be guilty of infidelity or ignorance when confronted by the mute "riches" of the treasury thus set aside. The fiction of the "treasury" hidden in the work, a sort of strong-box full of meaning, is obviously not based on the productivity of the reader, but on the *social institution* that overdetermines his relation with the text.[18] Reading is as it were overprinted by a relationship of forces (between teachers and pupils, or between producers and consumers) whose instrument it becomes. The use made of the book by privileged readers constitutes it as a secret of which they are the "true" interpreters. It interposes a frontier between the text and its readers that can be crossed only if one has a passport delivered by these official interpreters, who transform their own reading (which is *also* a legitimate one) into an orthodox "literality" that makes other (equally legitimate) readings either heretical (not "in conformity" with the meaning of the text) or insignificant (to be forgotten). From this point of view, "literal" meaning is the index and the result of a social power, that of an elite. By its very nature available to a plural reading, the text becomes a cultural weapon, a private hunting reserve, the pretext for a law that legitimizes as "literal" the interpretation given by *socially* authorized professionals and intellectuals (*clercs*).

Moreover, if the reader's expression of his freedom through the text is tolerated among intellectuals (*clercs*) (only someone like Barthes can take this liberty), it is on the other hand denied students (who are scornfully driven or cleverly coaxed back to the meaning "accepted" by their teachers) or the public (who are carefully told "what is to be thought" and whose inventions are considered negligible and quickly silenced).

It is thus social hierarchization that conceals the reality of the practice of reading or makes it unrecognizable. Formerly, the Church, which instituted a social division between its intellectual clerks and the "faithful," ensured the Scriptures the status of a "Letter" that was supposed to be independent of its readers and, in fact, possessed by its exegetes: the autonomy of the text was the reproduction of sociocultural relationships within the institution whose officials determined what parts of it should be read. When the institution began to weaken, the reciprocity between the text and its readers (which the institution hid) appeared, as if by withdrawing the Church had opened to view the indefinite plurality of the "writings" produced by readings. The creativity of the reader grows as the institution that controlled it declines. This process, visible from the Reformation onward, already disturbed the pastors of the seventeenth century. Today, it is the socio-political mechanisms of the schools, the press, or television that isolate the text controlled by the teacher or the producer from its readers. But behind the theatrical décor of this new orthodoxy is hidden (as in earlier ages)[19] the silent, transgressive, ironic or poetic activity of readers (or television viewers) who maintain their reserve in private and without the knowledge of the "masters."

Reading is thus situated at the point where *social* stratification (class relationships) and *poetic* operations (the practitioner's constructions of a text) intersect: a social hierarchization seeks to make the reader conform to the "information" distributed by an elite (or semi-elite); reading operations manipulate the reader by insinuating their inventiveness into the cracks in a cultural orthodoxy. One of these two stories conceals what is not in conformity with the "masters" and makes it invisible to them; the other disseminates it in the networks of private life. They thus both collaborate in making reading into an unknown out of which emerge, on the one hand, only the experience of the *literate* readers (theatricalized and dominating), and on the other, rare and partial, like bubbles rising from the depths of the water, the indices of a *common* poetics.

An "exercise in ubiquity," that "impertinent absence"

The autonomy of the reader depends on a transformation of the social relationships that overdetermine his relation to texts. This transformation is a necessary task. This revolution would be no more than another totalitarianism on the part of an elite claiming for itself the right to conceal different modes of conduct and substituting a new normative education for the previous one, were it not that we can count on the *fact* that there *already* exists, though it is surreptitious or even repressed, an experience other than that of passivity. A politics of reading must thus be articulated on an analysis that, describing practices that have long been in effect, makes them politicizable. Even pointing out a few aspects of the operation of reading will already indicate how it eludes the law of information.

"I read and I daydream. . . . My reading is thus a sort of impertinent absence. Is reading an exercise in ubiquity?"[20] An initial, indeed initiatory, experience: to read is to be elsewhere, where *they* are not, in another world;[21] it is to constitute a secret scene, a place one can enter and leave when one wishes; to create dark corners into which no one can see within an existence subjected to technocratic transparency and that implacable light that, in Genet's work, materializes the hell of social alienation. Marguerite Duras has noted: "Perhaps one always reads in the dark. . . . Reading depends on the obscurity of the night. Even if one reads in broad daylight, outside, darkness gathers around the book."[22]

The reader produces gardens that miniaturize and collate a world, like a Robinson Crusoe discovering an island; but he, too, is "possessed" by his own fooling and jesting that introduces plurality and difference into the written system of a society and a text. He is thus a novelist. He deterritorializes himself, oscillating in a nowhere between what he invents and what changes him. Sometimes, in fact, like a hunter in the forest, he spots the written quarry, follows a trail, laughs, plays tricks, or else like a gambler, lets himself be taken in by it. Sometimes he loses the fictive securities of reality when he reads: his escapades exile him from the assurances that give the self its location on the social checkerboard. *Who* reads, in fact? Is it I, or some part of me? "It isn't *I* as a truth, but I as uncertainty about myself, reading these texts that lead to perdition. The more I read them, the less I understand them, and everything is going from bad to worse."[23]

This is a common experience, if one believes testimony that cannot be quantified or quoted, and not only that of "learned" readers. This experience is shared by the readers of *True Romances*, *Farm Journal* and *The Butcher and Grocery Clerk's Journal*, no matter how popularized or technical the spaces traversed by the Amazon or Ulysses of everyday life.

Far from being writers—founders of their own place, heirs of the peasants of earlier ages now working on the soil of language, diggers of wells and builders of houses—readers are travellers; they move across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across fields they did not write, despoiling the wealth of Egypt to enjoy it themselves. Writing accumulates, stocks up, resists time by the establishment of a place and multiplies its production through the expansionism of reproduction. Reading takes no measures against the erosion of time (one forgets oneself *and* also forgets), it does not keep what it acquires, or it does so poorly, and each of the places through which it passes is a repetition of the lost paradise.

Indeed, reading has no place: Barthes reads Proust in Stendhal's text;[24] the television viewer reads the passing away of his childhood in the news reports. One viewer says about the program she saw the previous evening: "It was stupid and yet I sat there all the same." What place captivated her, which was and yet was not that of the image seen? It is the same with the reader: his place is not *here* or *there*, one or the other, but neither the one nor the other, simultaneously inside and outside, dissolving both by mixing them together, associating texts like funerary statues that he awakens and hosts, but never owns. In that way, he also escapes from the law of each text in particular, and from that of the social milieu.

Spaces for games and tricks

In order to characterize this activity of reading, one can resort to several models. It can be considered as a form of the *bricolage* Lévi-Strauss analyzes as a feature of "the savage mind," that is, an arrangement made with "the materials at hand," a production "that has no relationship to a project," and which readjusts "the residues of previous construction and destruction."[25] But unlike Lévi-Strauss's "mythological universes," if this production also arranges events, it does not compose a unified set: it is another kind of "mythology" dispersed in time, a sequence of temporal

fragments not joined together but disseminated through repetitions and different modes of enjoyment, in memories and successive knowledges.

Another model: the subtle art whose theory was elaborated by medieval poets and romancers who insinuate innovation into the text itself, into the terms of a tradition. Highly refined procedures allow countless differences to filter into the authorized writing that serves them as a framework, but whose law does not determine their operation. These poetic ruses, which are not linked to the creation of a proper (written) place of their own, are maintained over the centuries right up to contemporary reading, and the latter is just as agile in practicing diversions and metaphorizations that sometimes are hardly even indicated by a "pooh!" interjected by the reader.

The studies carried out in Bochum elaborating a *Rezeptionsästhetik* (an esthetics of reception) and a *Handlungstheorie* (a theory of action) also provide different models based on the relations between textual tactics and the "expectations" and successive hypotheses of the receiver who considers a drama or a novel as a premeditated action.[26] This play of textual productions in relation to what the reader's expectations make him produce in the course of his progress through the story is presented, to be sure, with a weighty conceptual apparatus; but it introduces dances between readers and texts in a place where, on a depressing stage, an orthodox doctrine had erected the statue of "the work" surrounded by consumers who were either conformers or ignorant people.

Through these investigations and many others, we are directed toward a reading no longer characterized merely by an "impertinent absence," but by advances and retreats, tactics and games played with the text. This process comes and goes, alternately captivated (but by what? what is it which arises both in the reader and in the text?), playful, protesting, fugitive.

We should try to rediscover the movements of this reading within the body itself, which seems to stay docile and silent but mines the reading in its own way: from the nooks of all sorts of "reading rooms" (including lavatories) emerge subconscious gestures, grumblings, tics, stretchings, rustlings, unexpected noises, in short a wild orchestration of the body.[27] But elsewhere, at its most elementary level, reading has become, over the past three centuries, a visual poem. It is no longer accompanied, as it used to be, by the murmur of a vocal articulation nor by the movement of a muscular manducation. To read without uttering the words aloud or at least mumbling them is a "modern" experience, unknown for

millennia. In earlier times, the reader interiorized the text; he made his voice the body of the other; he was its actor. Today, the text no longer imposes its own rhythm on the subject, it no longer manifests itself through the reader's voice. This withdrawal of the body, which is the condition of its autonomy, is a distancing of the text. It is the reader's *habeas corpus*.

Because the body withdraws itself from the text in order henceforth to come into contact with it only through the mobility of the eye,[28] the geographical configuration of the text organizes the activity of the reader less and less. Reading frees itself from the soil that determined it. It detaches itself from that soil. The autonomy of the eye suspends the body's complicities with the text; it unmoors it from the scriptural place; it makes the written text an ob-ject and it increases the reader's possibilities of moving about. One index of this: the methods of speed reading.[29] Just as the airplane makes possible a growing independence with respect to the constraints imposed by geographical organization, the techniques of speed reading obtain, through the rarefaction of the eye's stopping points, an acceleration of its movements across the page, an autonomy in relation to the determinations of the text and a multiplication of the spaces covered. Emancipated from places, the reading body is freer in its movements. It thus transcribes in its attitudes every subject's ability to convert the text through reading and to "run it" the way one runs traffic lights.

In justifying the reader's impertinence, I have neglected many aspects. Barthes distinguished three types of reading: the one that stops at the pleasure afforded by words, the one that rushes on to the end and "faints with expectation," and the one that cultivates the desire to write:[30] erotic, hunting, and initiatory modes of reading. There are others, in dreams, battle, autodidacticism, etc., that we cannot consider here. In any event, the reader's increased autonomy does not project him, for the media extend their power over his imagination, that is, over everything he lets emerge from himself into the nets of the text—his fears, his dreams, his fantasized and lacking authorities. This is what the powers work on that make out of "facts" and "figures" a rhetoric whose target is precisely this surrendered intimacy.

But whereas the scientific apparatus (ours) is led to share the illusion of the powers it necessarily supports, that is, to assume that the masses are transformed by the conquests and victories of expansionist production, it is always good to remind ourselves that we mustn't take people for fools.

Part V
Ways of Believing

Chapter XIII Believing and Making People Believe

> I like the word *believe*. In general, when one says "I know," one doesn't know, one believes.
> Marcel Duchamp, *Duchamp du signe* (Paris, Flammarion, 1975, p. 185)

Jews, Léon Poliakov once said, are French people who, instead of no longer going to church, no longer go to synagogue. In the comic tradition of the *Hagadah*, this joke referred to past beliefs that no longer organize practices. Political convictions seem today to be following the same path. One is a socialist because one *used to be* one, no longer going to demonstrations, attending meetings, sending in one's dues, in short, without paying. More reverential than identifying, membership is marked only by what is called a *voice*, (*voix*: a voice, a vote) this vestige of speech, one vote per year. Living off a semblance of "belief," the party carefully collects the relics of former convictions and, given this fiction of legitimacy, succeeds quite well in managing its affairs. It has only to multiply the citation of these phantom witnesses by surveys and statistics, to re-cite their litany.

A rather simple technique keeps the pretense of this belief going. All that is required is that the surveys ask not about what directly attaches its "members" to the party, but about what does not attract them elsewhere—not about the energy of convictions, but their inertia: "If it is false that you believe in something else, then it must be true that you are still on our side." The results of the operation thus count (on) vestiges of

the "psychischen Apparat." The expression "theoretische Fiktion" refers particularly to "the fiction of a primitive psychical apparatus."

20. See Katherine S. Dreier and Matta Echaurren, "Duchamp's Glass 'La Mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même'. An Analytical Reflection," (1944) in *Selected Publications*, III: *Monographs and Brochure* (New York: Arno Press, 1972).

21. Alfred Jarry, *Les Jours et les nuits* (1897).

22. Jean-Claude Milner, *L'Amour de la langue* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 98–112.

23. Michel Sanouillet, in Marcel Duchamp, *Duchamp du signe. Ecrits*, ed. M. Sanouillet (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 16.

24. See Jean-François Lyotard, *Les Transformateurs Duchamp* (Paris: Galilée, 1977), 33–40.

11. *"Quotations of Voices"*

1. "Vox" (in praise of the voice) in the collecion of poems entitled *Ingenii Familia*, which includes "Ingenium," "Liber," "Vox," "Memoria," and "Oblivio," in Gabriel Cossart, *Orationes et Carmina* (Paris: Cramoisy, 1675), 234.

2. Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 162.

3. On this aspect of myth, see Claude Rabant, "Le Mythe à l'avenir (re)commence," *Esprit*, April 1971, 631–643.

4. See above, Chapter X, p. 133.

5. See Michel de Certeau, *L'Ecriture de l'histoire*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 197–203.

6. See M. de Certeau et al., *Une politique de la langue* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 82–98, 110–121.

7. F. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, ed. Tullio de Mauro (Paris: Payot, 1974), 30.

8. Tullio de Mauro's note, ibid., 420.

9. Ibid., p. 138–139; and also Cl. Haroche et al., "La Sémantique et la coupure saussurienne: Langue, langage, discours," *Langages*, No. 24 (1971), 93–106.

10. See D. Bertaux, *Histoires de vies ou récits des pratiques? Méthodologies de l'approche biographique en sociologie* (Paris: CORDES, 1976).

11. Louis Hjelmslev, *Prolégomènes à une théorie du langage* (Paris: Minuit, 1968), 139–142; *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, trans. F. J. Whitfield (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).

12. Marguerite Duras, *Nathalie Granger* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 105; and the interview by Benoît Jacquot, in *Art Press*, October 1973.

13. Pierre Jakez Helias, *Le Cheval d'orgueil* (Paris: Plon, 1975), 41 and 27.

14. Ibid., 54.

15. Ibid., 55.

16. Ibid., 69–75.

12. *"Reading as Poaching"*

1. Alvin Toffler, *The Culture Consumers* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), 33–52, on the basis of Emanuel Demby's research.

2. *Pratiques culturelles des Français* (Paris: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Culture, S. E. R., 1974, 2 vols.

3. According to a survey by Louis–Harris (September–October 1978), the number of readers in France grew 17% over the past twenty years: there is the same percentage of people who read a great deal (22%), but the percentage of people who read a little or a moderate amount has increased. See Janick Jossin, in *L'Express* for 11 November 1978, 151–162.

4. See Jean Ehrard, *L'Idée de nature en France pendant la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: SEPVEN, 1963), 753–767.

5. François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Lire et écrire. L'Alphabétisation des Français de Calvin à Jules Ferry* (Paris: Minuit, 1977), I, 349–369, 199–228.

6. See for example J. Mehler and G. Noizet, *Textes pour une psycholinguistique* (La Haye: Mouton, 1974); and also Jean Hébrard, "Ecole et alphabétisation au XIXe siècle," Colloque "Lire et écrire," MSH, Paris, June 1979.

7. Furet and Ozouf, *Lire et écrire*, 213.

8. Michel Charles, *Rhétorique de la lecture* (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 83.

9. Jorge Luis Borges, quoted by Gérard Genette, *Figures* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 123.

10. Charles, *Rhétorique de la lecture*, 61.

11. As is well known, "lector" was, in the Middle Ages, the title of a kind of University Professor.

12. See especially *Recherches actuelles sur l'enseignement de la lecture*, ed. Alain Bentolila (Paris: Retz CEPL, 1976); Jean Foucambert and J. André, *La Manière d'être lecteur. Apprentissage et enseignement de la lecture, de la maternelle au CM2* (Paris: SERMAP OCDL, 1976); Laurence Lentin, *Du parler au lire. Interaction entre l'adulte et l'enfant* (Paris: ESF, 1977); etc. To these should be added at least a portion of the abundant American literature: Jeanne Sternlicht Chall, *Learning to Read, the Great Debate . . . 1910–1965* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); Dolores Durkin, *Teaching Them to Read* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970); Eleanor Jack Gibson and Harry Levin, *The Psychology of Reading* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1975); Milfred Robeck and John A. R. Wilson, *Psychology of Reading: Foundations of Instruction* (New York: John Wiley, 1973); *Reading Disabilities. An International Perspective*, ed. Lester and Muriel Tarnopol (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1976); etc., along with three important journals: *Journal of Reading*, since 1957 (Purdue University, Department of English), *The Reading Teacher*, since 1953 (Chicago International Reading Association), *Reading Research Quarterly*, since 1965 (Newark, Delaware, International Reading Association).

13. See the bibliography in Furet and Ozouf, *Lire et écrire*, II, 358–372, to which we can add Mitford McLeod Mathews, *Teaching to Read, Historically Considered* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). Jack Goody's studies

(*Literacy in a Traditional Society* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968] and *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977], etc.) open several paths toward an ethnohistorical analysis.

14. In addition to statistical investigations, see J. Charpentreau et al., *Le Livre et la lecture en France* (Paris: Editions ouvrières, 1968).

15. Roland Barthes, of course: *Le Plaisir du texte* (Paris: Seuil, 1973), *The Pleasure of Text*, trans. R. Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), and "Sur la Lecture," *Le Français aujourd'hui*, No. 32 (January 1976), pp. 11–18. See, somewhat at random, in addition to the works already cited, Tony Duvert, "La Lecture introuvable," *Minuit*, No. 1 (November 1972), 2–21; O. Mannoni, *Clefs pour l'imaginaire* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), 202–217; Michel Mougenot, "Lecture/écriture," *Le Français aujourd'hui*, No. 30 (May 1975); Victor N. Smirnoff, "L'Oeuvre lue," *Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse*, No. 1 (1970), 49–57; Tzvetan Todorov, *Poétique de la prose* (Paris: Seuil, 1971), 241 et seq.; Jean Verrier, "La Ficelle," *Poétique*, No. 30 (April 1977); *Littérature*, No. 7 (October 1972); *Esprit*, December 1974, and January 1976; etc.

16. See, for example, Michel Charles' "propositions" in his *Rhétorique de la lecture*.

17. Descartes, *Principia*, IV, 205.

18. Pierre Kuentz, "Le tête à texte," *Esprit*, December 1974, 946–962, and "L'Envers du texte," *Littérature*, No. 7 (October 1972).

19. Some documents, unfortunately all too rare, shed light on the autonomy of the trajectories, inerpretations, and convictions of Catholic readers of the Bible. See, on the subject of his "farmer" father, Rétif de la Bretonne, *La Vie de mon père* (1778) (Paris: Garnier, 1970), 29, 131–132, etc.

20. Guy Rosolato, *Essais sur le symbolique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 288.

21. Theresa de Avila considered reading to be a form of prayer, the discovery of another space in which desire could be articulated. Countless other authors of spiritual works think the same, and so do children.

22. Marguerite Duras, *Le Camion* (Paris: Minuit, 1977), and "Entretien à Michèle Porte," quoted in *Sorcières*, No. 11 (January 1978), 47.

23. Jacques Sojcher, "Le Professeur de philosophie," *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles*, No. 3–4 (1976), 428–429.

24. Barthes, *Le Plaisir du texte*, 58.

25. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La Pensée sauvage* (Paris: Plon, 1962), 3–47; *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). In the reader's "*bricolage*," the elements that are re-employed, all being drawn from official and accepted bodies of material, can cause one to believe that there is nothing new in reading.

26. See in particular the works of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht ("Die Dramenschliessende Sprachhandlung im Aristotelischen Theater und ihre Problematisierung bei Marivaux") and of Karlheinz Stierle ("Das Liebesgeständnis in Racines *Phèdre* und das Verhältnis von (Sprach-)Handlung und Tat"), in *Poetica* (Bochum), 1976; etc.

27. Georges Perec had discussed this very well in "Lire: Esquisse sociophysiologique," *Esprit*, January 1976, 9–20.

28. It is nonetheless known that the muscles that contract the vocal cords and constrict the glottis remain active in reading.

29. See François Richaudeau, *La Lisibilité* (Paris: Retz CEPL, 1969); or Georges Rémond, "Apprendre la lecture silencieuse à l'ecole primaire," in Bentolila, *La manière d'être lecteur*, 147–161.

30. Barthes, "Sur la lecture," 15–16.

13. *"Believing and Making People Believe"*

1. Jorge Luis Borges and Adolfo Bioy Casares, *Crónicas de Bustos Domecq*; *Chronicles of Bustos Domecq*, trans N. T. di Giovanni (New York: Dutton, 1976), in particular the chapter "Esse est percipi" ("To exist is to be seen").

2. See W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian's remarks in *The Web of Belief* (New York: Random House, 1970), 4–6.

3. On this subject, see Jaakko Hintikka, *Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969); Rodney Needham, *Belief, Language and Experience* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972); Ernest Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); John M. Vickers, *Belief and Probability* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976); *Languages*, No. 43 (September 1976); etc.

4. See, for example, R. S. Peters and Peter Winch, "Authority," in *Political Philosophy*, ed. Anthony Quinton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 83–111.

5. Pierre Legendre, *L'Amour du censeur* (Paris: Seuil, 1974), 28.

6. See, for example, Dale Carnegie, *Public Speaking and Influencing Men in Business* (New York: Association Press, 1931), and especially Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

7. See Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir* (Paris:Gallimard, 1975); *Discipline and Punish*, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977); etc.

8. Kamata Satoshi, *Toyota, l'usine du désespoir* (Paris: Editions ouvrières, 1976): a still "paleotechnical" system in which it is a question of regulating all activities, and not yet of attaching them by means of values whose goal is to produce believers. See Miklos Haraszti, *Salaire aux pièces* (Paris: Seuil, 1976).

9. In local administration and especially in the urban sub-system, as Pierre Grémion stated it, there is no longer any legitimating mechanism: *Le Pouvoir périphérique. Bureaucrates et notables dans le système politique français* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), 416 et seq.

10. See M. de Certeau, *La Culture au pluriel* (Paris: UGE 10/18, 1974), 11–34. From a logical point of view, it is precisely to these displacements of belief from statement to statement that Quine and Ullian devote their first analyses (*The Web of Belief*, 8–9).