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Coleridge's Dread Book of Judgement: A Memory for Life

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I

A number of writers in several quite unconnected fields have expressed a strong but odd conviction. They have asserted that all conscious experience is recorded by the memory: no moment of waking perception is ever forgotten. Authors as diverse as the poet Coleridge and the neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield have offered evidence in support of this contention. I shall trace some of the appearances of this idea, describing the evidence and analysing certain of the difficulties inhering in it. As will become plain, even at its first appearance in Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*, the idea offers more than a psychological curiosity: it implies a major ethical reevaluation of the nature of memory. Perhaps there is material here for a new psychological ethics, which has yet to be written. Coleridge, who often mentioned the idea, might have turned his speculative mind more firmly in this direction: as I shall show, he possessed all the elements of a systematic presentation of the idea; but here, as in so many other matters, what Coleridge left is a set of intriguing but undeveloped fragments. It is Coleridge, however, who expressed most forcibly the significance of a complete and permanent memory: thus it is with his writing that I start.

Coleridge's lengthy philosophical disquisition in the first book of the *Biographia Literaria* has gained him little credit. It has long been noticed that substantial sections imitate Schelling, while more recently Norman Fruman showed that the substance of the argument on associationism, in which Coleridge vindicated Aristotle at the expense of Hartley, was derived from Maass.¹ Towards the end of this plagiarized passage in chapter VI, however, Coleridge breaks off the argument that true associationist thought would amount to mere delirium, to offer an original anecdote in support of his contention. "A case of this kind occurred ... at Göttingen", he begins, and he then tells a story of an uneducated German servant girl who was mysteriously able to recite long passages of Latin, Greek and Hebrew while delirious in a nervous fever. The local doctors gave it as their opinion that she was possessed by a very learned devil.

It has not been noticed by his critics, however, that Coleridge's interpretation of his anecdote flatly contradicts the argument on

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associationism which was the only reason for introducing it. The German girl, it was eventually discovered, had once been in the service of an old Protestant minister. She had often sat in the kitchen while the Minister walked up and down in an adjacent passage reading aloud from his favourite books, which were in Hebrew, Greek and Latin. Somehow these recitals, which the girl had no way of understanding, were impressed on her memory so that she was able to reproduce his words a number of years later under the stimulus of the fever. This case proves, says Coleridge, returning to the argument, "that reliques of sensation may exist for an indefinite time in a latent state, in the very same order in which they were originally impressed". The point that Coleridge intended to make by his anecdote was that such temporally ordered relics of sensation only repossess the mind to produce a state like delirium. If the mind possessed *no more* than such re-activated sequences, as the associationist theory suggested, then all our waking experience would amount to delirium. But the fascination of his own story led Coleridge in a different direction, and he forgot to say this. He saw another implication in the case. As the fever acted as a stimulus to the brain, "this fact ... contributes to make it even probable, that all thoughts are in themselves imperishable...". Were we differently constituted, he added, it would be possible "to bring before every human soul the collective experience of its whole past existence".²

The story reminded Coleridge, in fact, of an idea he had had long before. As far back as 1799 Coleridge remarked on the apparent permanence in memory of all that has been thought. Finding forgotten memories aroused by his second view of a certain picture when re-visiting the Hutchinsons, he noted in his pocket book, "O God! when I now think how perishable Things, how imperishable Ideas — what a proof of My Immortality — What is Forgetfulness?—" He found the notion of sufficient importance to expand the note in another entry four years later, where he added, "Renew the state of affection or bodily Feeling, same or similar — sometimes dimly similar/and instantly the trains of forgotten Thought rise from their living catacombs!"⁴

So that Coleridge misled himself when¹ came to write chapter VI. The setting of his anecdote of the German girl is an argument on the passivity of associationist trains of thought. While the story of delirium in itself admirably serves this purpose, Coleridge's ensuing remarks shift their ground from *passive* to the implications of a register of *active* thought. Not only are all impressions recorded, but so too is every *act* originating in the individual's freewill. The brief reference to "My Immortality" in the note of 1799 is here made explicit. This record of one's whole experience, he says,

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this, perchance, is the dread book of judgement, in whose mysterious hieroglyphics every idle word is recorded! Yea, in the very nature of a living spirit, it may be more possible that heaven and earth should pass away, than that a single act, a single thought, should be loosened or lost from that living chain of causes, to all whose links, conscious or unconscious, the free-will, our only absolute *self*, is co-extensive and co-present.

The claim that Coleridge is now making, then, is that the individual's memory for his experience assumes a moral form, because the memory record is co-extensive with the operations and results of freewill. Whether or not this claim is tenable is not further investigated, but the anecdote of the German girl does not support it. Her delirious ravings reproduced only long passages of (to her) unintelligible language, and contained no record of any act or thought revealing moral choice. The memory stimulated in her by fever showed no more morality than a tape-recorder.

The main theme of Coleridge's next chapter is that associationism cannot account for the will; the mechanisms of associationism inevitably exclude morality and judgement. It only appears to explain them from the assumption

that the will and, with the will, all acts of thought and attention are parts and products of this blind mechanism, instead of being distinct powers, whose function it is to control, determine, and modify the phantasmal chaos of association.⁵

Clearly, the moral contours of a life cannot be shaped only from the memory record of associationist experience.

And yet Coleridge seems to have found the notion that all thought and experience is somehow recorded in the memory very impressive, even though the anecdote of the fever provided such incomplete evidence. Coleridge drew a conclusion so profound, indeed, that he seems to have become alarmed, and he broke off the discussion to quote Plotinus on the propriety of speaking on such a subject only to those whose ears are already attuned. In his subsequent writings on religious topics he never returned to the subject. There can be few readers of chapter VI who are not struck with awe at the possibility that the memory record constitutes "the dread book of judgement" — which may explain why the contradiction in Coleridge's argument at this point has passed unnoticed. In this paper I shall explore the nature of that contradiction a little further. I look at other evidence that has been cited in support of a memory so extensive as to comprise every moment of experience; and I

explore the connection between memory and judgement implied in Coleridge's remarkable claim.

II

Elsewhere in Coleridge's writings there are very few explicit references to the special moral form of memory record that is described in chapter VI. But it would be possible, for example, to extend the discussion along two avenues suggested by chapter VI, those of delirium and the judgement. One might ask what else Coleridge had to say on such matters, and whether he provided a theoretical framework within which to relate them. In other places, for example, Coleridge compared associationist trains of thought to delirium or dreaming,⁶ but with no suggestion either of a moral shaping to such experience or of its recording by memory; on the contrary, Coleridge blamed the lack of volition of himself and his son Hartley on "the streamy nature of the associating Faculty" which is particularly strong in them, and a source of "moral Evil".⁷ This link between a permanent memory record of all experience and the passivity of delirium or dream states is made by other writers I shall mention, and is notable precisely because it perpetuates the contradiction over interpreting the meaning of such a memory which we have seen in Coleridge. If a form of judgement is to be attributed to such a permanent memory then the passivity of the mind — characteristic of other evidence for it besides Coleridge's case — is a serious deficiency; it does seem to rule out acts of moral choice, which must form part of any account of *judgement*.

But certain other references of Coleridge's make the same link. In his diary for 1819 Coleridge's friend Henry Crabb Robinson lamented his inability to remember much about his past life, putting this in a moral context with Coleridge's help. The idea "often recurs to me", said Crabb Robinson,

that it seems difficult to reconcile responsibility with utter oblivion. Coleridge has the striking thought that possibly the punishment of a future life may consist in bringing back the consciousness of the past.⁸

Similarly, in a more melodramatic fashion, Coleridge conceived of memory in a notebook entry of 1806 as "a wan misery-Eyed Female", who often "attempted to tear off from her forehead a seal, which Eternity had placed there; and instantly she found in her Hand a hideous phantom of her own visage, with that seal on its forehead...".⁹ The note of violence in this allegory parallels the altered states of being shown in

Coleridge's other observations I have quoted: only in such states does the permanent record of experience become available, such as during a fever or after death. The notebook entry of 1803 referred to above ascribed the same effect to opium, which "in a large Dose, or after long use, produces the same effect on the *visual*, and *passive* memory...".

These further remarks of Coleridge add nothing in the way of evidence, but each emphasizes that the memory record is unavailable to normal consciousness. Coleridge is not the only author of this period to speak of such a memory. Other references also place it in some hidden or phantom part of the self, inaccessible to the view of any mortal eye. In "the land of death eternal", which Los surveys in Blake's *Jerusalem*,

everything exists and not one sigh nor smile nor tear,
One hair nor particle of dust, not one can pass away.

As Los again tells Blake in *Milton*,

The generations of men run on in the tide of Time,
But leave their destin'd lineaments permanent for ever & ever.¹⁰

Shelley elaborated a comparable myth in *Prometheus Unbound*. Earth declares to Prometheus that all that we think or imagine constitutes a kind of phantom of the self which we shall rejoin at death. In that underworld beneath the grave, inhabited also by Demogorgon, are:

Dreams and the light imaginings of men,
And all that faith creates or love desires,
Terrible, strange, sublime and beauteous shapes.
There thou art, and dost hang, a writhing shade,
'Mid whirlwind-peopled mountains....¹¹

While both poets were dependent on Neoplatonic ideas on how the soul is located in the world, such allusions to a personal memory of all experience show rather than new awareness of unconscious processes of thought, characteristic of the Romantic writers. This awareness reaches its fullest development with De Quincey.

For De Quincey the stimulation of the memory record was a familiar experience. It was numbered among the effects of opium in the *Confessions*. "The minutest incidents of childhood, or forgotten scenes of later years, were often revived", he said, and being "clothed in all their evanescent circumstances and accompanying feelings, I *recognized* them instantaneously". It is evident that he had been reading chapter VI in the *Biographia*, as he went on to draw the same conclusion in almost the same words: "that the dread book of account, which the Scriptures speak of, is, in fact, the mind itself of each individual."¹² The problem with this

conclusion — how the memory record can take a moral shape — arose more explicitly with De Quincey when he returned to the subject in the papers intended to supplement the *Confessions*. Defending his assertion that all experience is recorded, he used the analogy of a palimpsest. The human brain is a palimpsest: “Everlasting layers of ideas, images, feelings, have fallen upon your brain softly as light. Each succession has seemed to bury all that went before. And yet, in reality, not one has been extinguished.” De Quincey’s analogy is an unfortunate one: like Locke’s *tabula rasa*, it pictures the brain as a purely passive recorder of experience. In a true palimpsest, moreover, the successive layers of writing have no connection, as De Quincey takes pains to point out. Their contiguity is purely accidental. Such a picture misrepresents what De Quincey felt of the unconscious processes which organize experience, so that he was obliged to add “that in our own heaven-created palimpsest, the deep memorial palimpsest of the brain, there are not and cannot be such incoherencies”. De Quincey asserted the *unity* of human experience: there are “organising principles which fuse into harmony, and gather about fixed predetermined centres, whatever heterogeneous elements life may have accumulated from without...”.¹³ But what these principles are he did not say.

The memory record is evidently remote from normal conscious recollective processes, since it requires a powerful stimulus to bring it to consciousness. To the two causes already mentioned by Coleridge, opium and fever, De Quincey was able to add a third, the sudden proximity of death, which can stimulate a memory flashback approaching completeness. There is independent evidence of all three types of stimulus producing such an effect. Several types of drug beside opium are said to enhance the power of recollection. One author, writing of the effects of marijuana, for example, says that recall of eidetic integrity may occur, and that “images which are like playbacks of the original perceptual experience may become accessible at will to conscious attention”.¹⁴ The effect of fever on Coleridge’s German girl is also not an isolated instance. A nineteenth-century Edinburgh doctor, John Abercrombie, collected a number of examples of such cases in which long forgotten memories were aroused during illness; several involved the patient speaking in a strange tongue, to the mystification of attendants, which was later discovered not to have been spoken or heard by the patient since early childhood.¹⁵ Anecdotes of memory flashbacks at the point of death are also very numerous, and a case mentioned by De Quincey is entirely typical. It concerned a girl of nine who fell into a river. Before being rescued from drowning “she saw in a moment her whole life, clothed in its forgotten incidents, arrayed before her as in a mirror, not

successively, but simultaneously...".¹⁶ Many similar anecdotes were collected by Robert Crookall, all reported by people who survived near-fatal accidents or illnesses.¹⁷

Crookall's cases, and his observations upon them, raise the same problem that besets the interpretation of all the other material I have mentioned. The subject is merely a spectator of his own reproduced experiences. The sudden revealing of the memory record at the point of death is said to be in the form of visual imagery; reports mention *seeing* or *watching* the memories — some describe it as like watching a film. Crookall's phrase, characterising the phenomenon as "of an impersonal, non-emotional and non-responsible nature"¹⁸ emphasizes that it is devoid of any moral shaping. The same phrase is applicable to every other type of experience of the memory record. Where emotions are felt they are those that accompanied the original moment of perception; they are not current emotions of response to or judgement of the moment presented.

III

A considerable body of more modern evidence has also been offered in support of the view that all experience is recorded in memory, but this also fails to resolve the problem first raised by Coleridge's contradiction. Other types of stimulus to the brain have been studied. Memory phenomena were often noted by the neurophysiologist Hughlings Jackson, for example, as forming part of the "intellectual aura" preceding an epileptic seizure.¹⁹ One patient, urged to speak about what he felt during his paroxysms, said that he "began to think of things years gone by", "things intermixed ... with what had occurred recently", "things from boyhood's days". One of his descriptions spoke of "peculiar sensations passing through his memory and appearing before his eyes". In another case reported by Hughlings Jackson, that of a "highly educated medical man", the patient reported the suspension of all active powers of mind following a seizure. His mental state during an attack included "a feeling of Recollection", although he was unable to say afterwards what specific memories occurred: the return of normal consciousness was "gradual, and it is hard to say when it is complete, as it almost always leads up to a passive and non-critical mental attitude, in which I feel no originative mental impulse". He was unable to turn round and analyse what his mental state had just been; generating the impulse to do so was impossible. It seems from this instance that reception of the memory record requires the suspension of the active, judgemental processes of thought, as if the two types of brain process were mutually

exclusive.

The findings of the neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, who operated directly on the exposed brains of epileptic patients, support this conclusion. Penfield would explore the temporal cortex of the patient with a stimulating electrode in order to discover the focus of his epileptic disturbances, and while doing so frequently caused vivid memory hallucinations in the patient (who was conscious during the operation and able to describe what he experienced). Brief strips of some past sequence of time would unroll like a film strip in the patient's mind which, however, he never confused with his immediate situation: one patient said, "I see the people in this world and in that world too at the same time".²⁰ To the patient's perception, the memory received is not willed; it comes while he is passive, and he dissociates it from his sense of self.

As was the case with the content of the other memory experiences described earlier, Penfield's electrode stimulated only a certain type of memory, mainly experiences of seeing or hearing something; absent are taste or smell, memories of speaking or writing, or bodily experience (although body position might be recalled). The sensations of willing or making up one's mind do not appear in the record elicited by stimulation. The record, in the words of Coleridge's note, consisted of "the *visual*, and *passive* memory...". This alone, then, cannot be "the dread book of judgement".

Further evidence for the existence of a permanent record of experience comes, finally, from the case of the mnemonist studied by A. R. Luria. This was a man for whom the permanent record of memory was always available — so insistently, in fact, that he appeared to have little else. A stimulus needed only to be impressed clearly on his consciousness for him to be able to recall it at any time, immediately and without error, up to a decade or more later.²¹ In this way he recalled strings of complicated formulae, sequences of numbers or words which might mean nothing to him. He spent much of his adult life demonstrating this prowess in order to earn a living. His memory for such material was of unlimited capacity, as far as Luria could establish.

This case points to the evident necessity of a barrier between the permanent record in memory and normal consciousness: such continual access to the record overwhelms the mind with a flood of details and seems for all normal purposes worse than useless. The mnemonist's experience of waking life is strongly reminiscent of the delirium which Coleridge compared to pure associationist thought; his imagery was so persistent and so frequently aroused that he is described as living half in a kind of fantasy world or waking dream.²² The normal mind, by contrast,

clearly economizes immensely by organizing experiential data into general concepts; with these we are able to recall in a controlled way such material from the past as is relevant to present purposes, while the permanent memory record itself remains inaccessible.

Luria provides a brief account of the effects of the mnemonist's unusual powers on his personality, but does not otherwise discuss the implications of the case for the theory of memory; he offers neither a cognitive nor a neurophysiological explanation of the phenomenon. In general students of memory in academic psychology have ignored the evidence for a permanent record of experience, and no explanatory theory is available. Ulric Neisser, for example, acknowledging the existence of cases such as Luria's mnemonist, remarks: "I can offer no useful theoretical account of them."²³ The attitude of psychologists from the first towards the possibility of such a memory seems sufficiently indicated by William James, who cited Coleridge's account of the German girl and some other evidence but declared that it gave "no countenance ... to the extravagant opinion that nothing we experience can be absolutely forgotten". There is no argument apart from a transcendental one, he added, "none certainly of a physiological sort".²⁴

Besides the evidence of Penfield's work, however, which James could hardly have anticipated, arguments for our possession of such a memory record flow from several different and independent kinds of evidence: from its manifestation during fever, under the influence of opium or marijuana, at the point of death, in the epileptic seizure, and in the extraordinary capacity of the mnemonist. It is clear that there is a case to investigate. How is this record of experience to be related to normal cognitive faculties, and how, in particular, to the faculty of judgement? How, in short, is one to make theoretical sense of such a memory?

IV

Coleridge introduced the story of the German girl to illustrate the state of associationist thought. If the associationist state of thought were really to possess the mind it would correspond to a state "of complete lightheadedness".²⁵ In several other places such thought is compared to delirium, dreams, or the state of childhood. Perhaps the chief difficulty with this view is that it supposes that judgement is not operative in such states. Of childhood, for example, Coleridge asserted that "in the infancy and childhood of individuals ... the first knowledges are acquired promiscuously", that the objects presented to children come "by the volatile and desultory activity of their attention", and that "This is the happy delirium, the healthful fever of the physical, moral and intellectual being...".²⁶ Coleridge was not alone in comparing by implication the

memory for immediate experience with dreams or childhood. Bergson contrasted the memory employed during action with the spontaneous memory gained from our moment by moment experience, also claiming that all such experience is recorded. We hardly notice our possession of this kind of memory because it is constantly pushed aside by our need to act. In childhood, however, the spontaneous memory is much richer: "The extraordinary development of spontaneous memory in most children is due to the fact that they have not yet persuaded their memory to remain bound up with their conduct." And this state was, again, associated by Bergson with dreaming: "it had at first the facility of the memory of dreams, but then it was actually dreaming."²⁷

But the implication that judgement is absent from dreaming or from childhood experience may be an error. A re-examination of the memories elicited from the permanent record suggests that judgement is not absent, although its operations are covert. Speaking of the childhood memories which came to him under opium, De Quincey noticed that they were placed "before me in dreams like intuitions, and clothed in all their evanescent circumstances and accompanying feelings...".²⁸ With Penfield's cases too the electrode stimulating a specific memory also activated "the emotional tone or feeling that belonged to the original experience".²⁹ Thus, while the observer watching his own memory record may do so in an impersonal and passive manner, the memory itself can be imbued with feeling. It is through the feelings that our less conscious judgements are registered: judgement may be operative in the permanent record of experience, therefore, and the feelings that De Quincey or Penfield's patients mention would represent its surviving traces.

It is a common experience, for example, when first meeting a stranger immediately to feel liking or disliking, warmth or caution — a feeling which determines our attitude towards the person; later knowledge may confirm this by adding conscious reasons for that initial response. The immediate feeling must depend on our previous experience with various types of character, according to which the stranger is assessed and judged. The feeling is thus the immediate representative of our existing structure of judgements.

Such feelings do not remain in isolation: among other functions, they may help recall an earlier memory or idea. Coleridge, speaking of how his previous thoughts now "rise from their living catacombs", explained the cause as lying in a renewal of "the state of affection or bodily Feeling". As he wrote elsewhere, in a well-known letter to Southey rejecting Hartley's associationism, "I almost think, that Ideas *never* recall Ideas, as far as they are Ideas — any more than leaves in a forest create each other's

motion — The Breeze it is that runs thro' them / it is the Soul, the state of Feeling..."³⁰

Through the agency of the feelings it is possible to see not only how single judgements are expressed, but — if Coleridge was right — how judgements might cohere and develop. Penfield's meditations on the use that a permanent record of experience might be to the organism led him to suggest a brain mechanism that could serve this process. He found that his electrode stimulated not only memory experiences but also (moving to a different part of the temporal region) sensations of familiarity or unfamiliarity. Putting these two observations together, he concluded:

In ordinary life, the automatic signal that informs one that present experience is familiar comes to all of us, I suppose. If it is accurate, and it usually is, one must be using an automatic mechanism that can scan a record of the past, a record that has not faded but seems to remain as vivid as when the record was made.³¹

The memory record is not in the temporal cortex itself, but in the diencephalon (the higher brain-stem); access to the record is via the hippocampus, since surgical removal of the hippocampus in both halves of the brain was found to prevent retrieval of past experience, either by voluntary means or for the interpretation of the present.³² In Penfield's words, the hippocampus therefore provides "keys of access" to the record of experience.

Penfield found during stimulation of the temporal cortex that similar memory experiences were generally obtained from different points in the same small cortical area. If access to the record is routed via the hippocampus, this suggests that some sort of classification of experiences takes place in the hippocampus. As experience of a particular type is accrued the "key of access" to memories of this type in the record would develop new links. The "key" to the stranger whom we have just met, for instance, would be much simpler than after several years during which the person has become a close friend.³³ The hippocampus may therefore contain the register of judgements, grouping together experiences according to the similarity of feelings which attended them, but a register which continues to develop or change as each day's new experience is added to the record.

As a result, it may be deduced that memory in the individual exists in two forms: experience in its original form is preserved unchanged in the record of all experience in the diencephalon; but the memories available for conscious retrieval change as the keys of access develop, and are therefore subject to distortion and change (a phenomenon first studied

in detail by Frederic Bartlett³⁴). This paradox is present in De Quincey's palimpsest analogy, as I noticed, with De Quincey's assertion that the successive layers of memory preserved in the brain nevertheless form a unified whole. It was also noticed by Freud, who frequently commented on the fact that unconscious material was for all intents and purposes timeless and unchanging. In a footnote to *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* he described the paradox to which this gives rise. Observing that it can be verified that repressed memory traces "suffer no changes even in the longest periods", he added:

The most important as well as the strangest characteristic of psychical fixation is that all impressions are preserved, not only in the same form in which they were first received, but also in all the forms which they have adopted in their further developments.³⁵

Freud's later attempt to represent this state of affairs through an image of Rome in its successive archaeological stages runs into absurdity, as he admits, since one must imagine, for instance, the Roman temple in its original form existing on the same piece of ground as the church that succeeded it, seeing both at once.³⁶

The problem that both De Quincey and Freud tried to picture, finding that two forms of memory co-exist, is resolved once it is seen that the two might relate and cohere through the register of judgements. Immediate judgements structuring response to present experience are informed by the judgements preserved in the record of past experience; access to the record, following Penfield's argument, would be through the continually developing, daily updated, keys of the hippocampus. In this sense the individual's book of judgement *is* the form taken by his memory of all experience, but it is a book in constant use, subject to continual revision.

Important problems remain in the evidence to support such a view. Why is it that the known experiential record, as revealed in Penfield's cases and many other examples, is constituted by "the *visual*, and *passive* memory" alone?³⁷ Perhaps the enactment of a judgement, as opposed to the registering of one, leaves a different kind of record. As we are presently constructed it is perhaps impossible to obtain a reflex view of the form of our judgements as a whole; perhaps the operation of a judgement, to borrow the words of Kant (when speaking of the application of concepts to instances), "is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze".³⁸

That much of the decisive and determining part of our thought takes place below consciousness was, of course, often noticed by Coleridge.

His perception that moral judgements can originate in the unconscious does, I feel, give him the advantage over Freud in this area. He frequently contrasted this hidden self with the thought available to consciousness, figuring it in the relation of substance to shadow. For example:

All our Thoughts all that we abstract from our consciousness and so form the Phaenomenon Self is a Shadow, its whole Substance is the dim yet powerful sense that it is but a Shadow, and ought to belong to a Substance/ but this Substance can have no marks, no discriminating Characters....³⁹

Such a sensitivity to unconscious processes of thought undoubtedly accounts for the contradiction that Coleridge allowed to pass in his remarks on the German girl. For him the case provided a window, however narrow, on that hidden self. In another notebook entry he had already ascribed the main movements of memory in man to that same "incommunicable part of his Being".⁴⁰

Coleridge's remark on judgement in the *Biographia* could be correct therefore: if this "substance" self ever stood revealed to the gaze its contours of memory would declare themselves to be our "book of judgement". This conclusion would have interesting moral implications. It is also an odd historical phenomenon that the same idea recurs in a number of unrelated places. The possibility that we possess a permanent record of all experience, constituting at the same time our individual book of judgement, might also be profitably considered by cognitive science. With Coleridge's help it may offer a more accurate and productive theory of cognitive structure and process in the individual than the predominantly semantic theories of the structure of knowledge currently being devised.⁴¹

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 35. *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. by James Strachey, vi (London, 1960), 275.
 36. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, *Standard Edition*, xxi (1961), 70-71.
 37. As Penfield noted: Penfield and Perot, "The Brain's Record" (ref. 20), 688.
 38. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1933), 183.
 39. Coleridge, *Notebooks*, ii, 3026.
 40. Coleridge, *Notebooks*, iii, 3692.
 41. Gordon Bower, one of the main architects of such systems, has now incorporated emotion as a separate organizing principle: see G. H. Bower and P. R. Cohen, "Emotional Influences in Memory and Thinking: Data and Theory", in M. S. Clarke and S. T. Fiske, *Affect and Cognition: The 17th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition* (Hillsdale, N. J., 1982), 329.