RESEARCH UPDATE

April 14, 2000

Ukraine: NATO Relationship

Taras Kuzio for Oxford Analytica

Ukraine’s relations with NATO are the most advanced of any of the international organisations that it co-operates with. This is a strategic relationship that has advantages for both sides. For the USA, the major country in NATO, Ukraine guarantees that there will be no reversal of the benefits it accrued from the end of the Cold War when it became the only superpower. For Ukraine, which had initially looked upon the CIS as a "civilised divorce" and then became a reluctant "participant" (but still not member) under President Kuchma from 1994, co-operation with NATO is important to buttress Ukraine’s security vis-à-vis Russia. While economically dependent upon Russia, particularly in the energy field, Ukraine has therefore sought to co-operate politically and militarily with NATO in a multilateral forum and bilaterally with key Western countries such as the USA and UK.

Ukraine was the first CIS state to join Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995 and has remained an enthusiastic member ever since. Since 1995 Ukraine has been one of the most active participants in PfP and within programmes "in the spirit of PfP" organised by individual NATO member states. Military cooperation within "the spirit of PfP" have been very extensive with the UK and USA in naval, peacekeeping, army, counter-terrorism and airborne exercises.

During 1995-1997 Ukraine’s foreign policy tilted increasingly westwards after Kuchma found that Russia was disinterested in "normalising" relations by signing a treaty with Ukraine that recognised its borders. Fearing that its policies were backfiring and pushing Ukraine away from it, Russia changed track. During this period Ukraine had deliberately sent out signals that it was interested in NATO membership and Russia was afraid that the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 would include Ukraine within the first group of new members.

Although this was never likely the potential threat was sufficient to bring President Borys Yeltsin to Kyiv in late May 1997, two months prior to the NATO summit. The Russian press admitted that the treaty which both presidents signed was more difficult for Russia to digest than the agreement it had signed with Chechnya and its own Founding act with NATO that same month. For Ukraine the signals were clear: - its flirtation with NATO had paid off and it would continue to use NATO to give itself added leverage when dealing with the more powerful Russia. The treaty signed at the executive level was finally ratified by both houses of the Russian parliament in December 1998 and February 1999.

At the Madrid NATO summit Ukraine signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, a document that it does not have with any other international organisation. The Charter provides room for an expansion of ties between both parties in any of the areas it covers. These include joint co-operation in economic security, co-operation in conflict prevention, crisis management, military reform, democratic control over the armed forces, non-proliferation, arms control, technology transfers, combating drugs and organised crime, science and the environment. Over 500 Ukrainian scientists, for example, have taken part in NATO funded research projects.

Ukraine had wanted to sign a similar treaty as the Charter with the EU at its December 1999 Helsinki summit but the EU refused. Instead the EU agreed, under US pressure, to adopt a Common Strategy on Ukraine. The document declares that the EU acknowledges Ukraine's "European aspirations" and welcomes Ukraine's "pro-European choice", but most importantly, the EU declared that the door for Ukraine was not closed. The rather vague objectives outlined in the Common Strategy's include support for democracy and the economic transition process, security and meeting common challenges on the European continent, and support strengthened co-operation between the EU and Ukraine within the context of EU expansion. The Common Strategy set in motion a regular dialogue between EU institutions and Ukraine (by way of the Ombudsman) and between Ukraine and the Troika,. However, the Common Strategy was viewed by Ukrainian officials as very disappointing because Ukraine was not included on either the fast or slow track lists of future EU members. EU and NATO policy to Ukraine do nt therefore operate together as part of a co-ordinated Western policy; instead they contradict each other because Western Europe has different strategic objectives to the USA, the dominant member of NATO, towards Ukraine.

Ukraine and NATO jointly hold annual exercises under PfP and organised by individual countries, especially the USA, in "the spirit of PfP". Although Russia continues to apply pressure on Ukraine for greater military co-operation it has been less interested in participating in joint exercises with Russia on strategic and financial grounds and has instead prioritised PfP. The Yavoriv military training ground in Western Ukraine, one of the largest in Europe, is leased by NATO for PfP exercises. NATO also encourages bilateral military co-operation between Poland and Ukraine, which is supported by the UK, in the creation of a joint peacekeeping battalion. The battalion was sent in March to serve in Kosovo under NATO command. Since May 1997 there has been a NATO Information and Documentation Centre and from March 1999 a Military Liaison Office in the Ministry of Defence in Kyiv.

The NATO-Ukraine Charter does not provide security guarantees for Ukraine (this is similar to the declaration made in December 1994 by the five declared nuclear powers of the UN Security Council). Nevertheless, it does support security for Ukraine in four areas. Firstly, the Charter is psychological (as well as more concrete financial-political) support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. It sends a signal to Moscow that Ukraine, like the three Baltic states, are off limits and cannot be included within any Russian sphere of influence in the CIS.

This reflects a US policy outlined in 1994 by former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski of not backing Russia exclusively but instead promoting "geopolitical pluralism" in the former USSR. Support provided by the US and NATO for Ukraine and "geopolitical pluralism" is very different to that followed by the EU for whom the CIS does not fulfil membership criteria. Ukrainians are therefore more concerned by the enlargement of the EU than of NATO because after Poland is inside the EU the eastern border of "Europe" will be western Ukraine. Secondly, it allows both sides to develop and expand their relationship beyond the confines of the Charter. This was the aim of the extensive and all-embracing November 1998 Ukrainian government programme for co-operation with NATO until 2001 (the first of its kind for a non-NATO member).

Thirdly, the nature of NATO and the interests of new members, like Poland, allow Ukraine to develop a degree of co-operation with NATO that blurs the differences between being a member and being outside (this is not possible with the EU). Ukrane’s government programme of co-operation with NATO aims to blur the dividing line between members and non-members. Finally, it is an "insurance policy" for Ukraine in the event that relations with Russia became very strained. In such an eventuality Ukrainian leaders have openly stated that they would have no choice but to strive to join NATO. A crisis consultative mechanism through the Ukraine-NATO Commission exists that would allow Ukraine to raise with NATO any threats to its security. Ukrainian leaders therefore have a stake in the continued progress of democratisation and state building in Russia.

Ukraine’s example of successfully dealing with Russia by utilising co-operation with the West and NATO spurred the creation of the pro-NATO regional group GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) in 1997. Two years later at the NATO anniversary summit in Washington D.C., during the Kosovo conflict, Uzbekistan joined changing the regional groups name to GUUAM.

GUUAM has altered the balance of power in the CIS by dividing it into two equal groups six countries centered on Russia and GUUAM plus neutral Turkmenistan centered on Ukraine. Initially concerned with only energy questions, it has also focused on other issues such as security co-operation, increasing military-political co-operation with NATO and Western governments, taking the question of resolving ethnic conflict away from Russia and placing it in the hands of international organisations and lobbying for a weak CIS with no supra national structures. GUUAM has again bolstered Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis Russia and has led to increased interest by the West and NATO in supporting pro-Western states such as Georgia.

Although the Kosovo conflict was the first serious crisis in Ukrainian-NATO relations this did not have long lasting effects. For the parliamentary majority NATO, regardless of Kosovo, will remain the cornerstone of its attempts to balance Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. Rada chairman Pliushch recently spoke of NATO as the main body guaranteeing Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and her integration into the Trans-Atlantic and European political-economic space.

With the EU more lukewarm Ukraine has little option but to enhance its ties with NATO.

In early March 2000 a meeting of the highest body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which brings together Ambassadors from all member states, was held in Kyiv. This, the first meeting of NAC outside NATO member states, was a clear signal to Russia on the eve of its presidential elections that Ukraine’s continued independence was of strategic importance to NATO and the West. All of Ukraine’s elite’s took part in meetings with NAC and the Ukraine-NATO Commission that was also held at the same time. In addition, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Tarasiuk believed the visit of NAC was a, "clear political sign of support for Ukraine’s strategic course of integration into the European-Atlantic structures". On the eve of the NAC visit the Rada finally, after many years delay under its previous left wing leadership, ratified treaties giving legal rights to foreign servicemen serving in exercises on Ukrainian territory and allowing foreign aircraft to fly over Ukrainian territory and inspect military assets. As Russian has noted, these flights will also now be able to monitor Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

On a visit to Tbilisi in March President Kuchma told his Georgian host that "there is no question of Ukraine joining NATO today since this issue is extremely complex and has many angles to it". Nevertheless, Ukraine, Kuchma said, would continue to be interested in developing its relationship and co-operating with NATO. Russia sees NATO policy as aiming to develop Ukraine into a "buffer" and "strategic counterbalance" to itself. Kuchma defines Ukraine in a less antagonistic way as a "bridge" between Europe and Russia.

Whether as a "buffer" or "bridge" Ukraine has few options but to continue to expand and deepen its co-operation with NATO. Whether it cashes in on its "insurance policy" or not in the near future depends on two factors - the policies adopted by newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin and a generational change in Ukrainian politics. The generation represented by Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and Foreign Minister Tarasiuk are more enthusiastic and less cautious about joining NATO than current President Kuchma.