ANALYSIS

October 15, 2000

Ukraine and NATO

Taras Kuzio

Ukraine’s relations with NATO are the most advanced of any of the international organisations that it cooperates with (see JIR, vol.7(9), September 1995 and vol.9(7), July 1997). This is a strategic relationship that has advantages for both sides. For the USA, the major country in NATO, Ukraine guarantees that there will be no reversal of the benefits it accrued from the end of the Cold War when it became the world’s only superpower.

NATO member Poland is also a key ally of Ukraine. Marek Siwiec, chief of the State Protection Office, admitted that his country was very grateful to Ukraine for its stance on NATO enlargement which ran counter to Moscow’s views. In April 2000 the Polish State Protection Office warned that any change to Ukraine’s pro-Western foreign policy (e.g. if it joined the Russian-Belarusian union) would be considered a direct threat to Polish security. In such an eventuality both Poland and Hungary have warned that they would ask for NATO nuclear weapons to be installed on their territories.

Ukraine initially looked upon the CIS as a ‘civilised divorce’ but became a reluctant ‘participant’ (but still not legal member) under President Kuchma from 1994 of the CIS. For Ukraine co-operation with NATO is important to buttress Ukraine’s security vis-a-vis Russia and as part of the process of re-integrating with European and Trans-Atlantic structures. While economically dependent upon Russia, particularly in the energy field, Ukraine has therefore sought to co-operate politically and militarily with NATO in a multilateral forum and bilaterally with key Western countries such as the USA and UK.

NATO’s Contribution to Ukrainian Security

During 1995-1997 Ukraine’s foreign policy tilted increasingly westwards after Kuchma found that Russia was disinterested in ‘normalising’ relations by signing a treaty with Ukraine that recognised its borders. Fearing that its policies were backfiring and pushing Ukraine away from it, Russia changed track in 1997. During 1995-1997 Ukraine had deliberately sent out signals that it was interested in NATO membership and Russia was afraid that the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 would include Ukraine within the first group of new members.

Although this was never likely the potential threat was sufficient to bring President Borys Yeltsin to Kyiv in late May 1997, two months prior to the NATO summit. Two Russian security policy specialists, Konstantin Zatalin and Andranik Migranyan, commented that the Russian-NATO Founding Act and the Ukrainian-Russian treaty both signed in May 1997 were ‘the greatest strategic defeats of Russian foreign policy in recent years’. For Ukraine the signals were clear — its flirtation with NATO had paid off and it would continue to use NATO to give itself added leverage when dealing with its more powerful Russian neighbour. The treaty signed at the executive level in 1997 was only finally ratified by both houses of the Russian parliament in December 1998 and February 1999.

Ukraine’s example of successfully dealing with Russia by utilising co-operation with the West and NATO spurred the creation of the pro-NATO regional group GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) in 1997. Two years later at the NATO anniversary summit in Washington D.C., during the Kosovo conflict, Uzbekistan joined GUAM and the name of the regional group changed to GUUAM. GUUAM has altered the balance of power in the CIS by dividing it into two equal groups ñ six countries centered on Russia and GUUAM plus neutral Turkmenistan centered on Ukraine. Initially concerned with only energy questions, it has also focused on other issues such as security co-operation and increasing military-political co-operation with NATO and Western governments. GUUAM has also raised the question of resolving ethnic conflict away from Russia and placing it in the hands of international organisations and lobbying for a weak CIS with no supra national structures.

GUUAM has again bolstered Ukraine’s position vis-a-vis Russia and has led to increased interest by the West and NATO in supporting pro-Western states such as Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaidzhan.

At the Madrid NATO summit Ukraine signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, a document that it does not have with any other international organisation. The Charter provides room for an expansion of ties between both parties in any of the areas it covers. These include joint co-operation in economic security, co-operation in conflict prevention, crisis management, military reform, democratic control over the armed forces, non-proliferation, arms control, technology transfers, combating drugs and organised crime, science and the environment. Over 500 Ukrainian scientists, for example, have taken part in NATO funded research projects.

The NATO-Ukraine Charter does not provide security guarantees for Ukraine and is therefore similar to the security assurances provided in December 1994 by the five declared nuclear powers of the UN Security Council in return for Ukraine ratifying the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Nevertheless, it does support security for Ukraine in four areas.

Firstly, the Charter is psychological (as well as more concrete financial-political) support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. It sends a signal to Moscow that Ukraine, like the three Baltic states, are off limits and cannot be included within any Russian sphere of influence in the CIS. This reflects a US policy outlined in 1994 by former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski of not backing Russia exclusively but instead promoting ‘geopolitical pluralism’ in the former USSR. Support provided by the US and NATO for Ukraine and ‘geopolitical pluralism’ is very different to that followed by the EU for whom CIS states do not fulfill membership criteria. Ukrainians are therefore more concerned by the enlargement of the EU than of NATO because after Poland is inside the EU the eastern border of ‘Europe’ will be western Ukraine.

Secondly, it allows both sides to develop and expand their relationship beyond the confines of the Charter. This was the aim of the extensive and all-embracing November 1998 Ukrainian government programme for co-operation with NATO until 2001, the first of its kind for a non-NATO member (see later).

Thirdly, the nature of NATO and the interests of new members, like Poland, allow Ukraine to develop a degree of co-operation with NATO that blurs the differences between being a member and being outside. Such a blurring of those in and those outside is not possible with the EU. Ukraine’s government programme of co-operation with NATO therefore aims to blur the dividing line between members and non-members.

Finally, it is an ‘insurance policy’ for Ukraine in the event that relations with Russia became very strained. In such an eventuality Ukrainian leaders have openly stated that they would have no choice but to strive to join NATO. A crisis consultative mechanism through the Ukraine-NATO Commission exists that would allow Ukraine to raise with NATO any threats to its security. Ukrainian leaders therefore have a stake in the continued progress of democratisation and state building in Russia to prevent them from cashing in this insurance policy.

Ukraine had wanted to sign a similar treaty as the Charter with the EU at its December 1999 Helsinki summit but the EU refused. Instead the EU agreed, under US pressure, to adopt a Common Strategy on Ukraine. The document declares that the EU acknowledges Ukraine’s ‘European aspirations’ and welcomes Ukraine’s ‘pro-European choice’, but most importantly, the EU declared that the door for Ukraine was not closed.

The rather vague objectives outlined in the Common Strategy’s include support for democracy and the economic transition process, security and meeting common challenges on the European continent, and support strengthened co-operation between the EU and Ukraine within the context of EU expansion. The Common Strategy set in motion a regular dialogue between EU institutions and Ukraine (by way of the Ombudsman) and between Ukraine and the Troika. However, the Common Strategy was viewed by Ukrainian officials as very disappointing because Ukraine was not included on either the fast or slow track lists of future EU members.

EU and NATO policy to Ukraine do not therefore operate together as part of a coordinated Western policy. Instead, they contradict each other because Western Europe has different strategic objectives to the USA, the dominant member of NATO, towards Ukraine.

Ukraine was the first CIS state to join PfP in February 1995 and has remained an enthusiastic member ever since. Since 1995 Ukraine has been one of the most active participants in PfP and within programmes ‘in the spirit of PfP’ organised by individual NATO member states. In 1999 Ukraine took part in 200 PfP events and 12 drills. Military cooperation within ‘the spirit of PfP’ have been very extensive with the UK and USA in naval, peacekeeping, army, counter-terrorism and airborne exercises. During the 1996-2000 period Ukraine was the country with whom the UK had the largest bilateral military programme in Europe. 90 activities were conducted each year with military, border troops and national guards forces. The US organises annually ‘Sea Breeze’ exercises in Odesa that attract upwards of ten NATO and PfP countries. US and Ukrainian National Guards troops have also undertaken joint ‘Guard-Partnership’ exercises in Ukraine and the US.

Ukraine and NATO jointly hold annual exercises under PfP and organised by individual countries, especially the USA, in ‘the spirit of PfP’. The first Ukrainian-British peacekeeping exercises ‘Cossack Express’ took place at the Yavoriv training ground in western Ukraine in September 1999 and earlier joint British-Ukrainian-Polish exercises ‘Cossack Steppe’ have taken place at the Stanford training area, Norfolk, England.

Although Russia continues to apply pressure on Ukraine for greater military co-operation it has been less interested in participating in joint exercises with Russia on strategic and financial grounds and has instead prioritised PfP. The Yavoriv military training ground in Western Ukraine, one of the largest in Europe, is leased by NATO for PfP exercises.

The largest naval, air and amphibious exercise yet conducted by NATO in the former USSR took place in the Black Sea in June 2000 entitled ‘Cooperative Partner-2000'. Ten NATO member states and six partner countries took part in the exercise (Russia declined an invitation to take part). Fifty naval ships, including those from the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and from NATO’s newly created Maritime Mine Countermeasure Force Mediterranean (MCMFORMED), as well as thirty aircraft, forty armoured vehicles and 5,500 personnel took part. 900 Ukrainian marines were involved in the exercises. ‘Cooperative Partner-2000' is designed to promote common understanding of NATO Peace Support Operations doctrine and training, practice the planning of operations by multinational staffs of allied and partner countries, assimilate command, control and communications procedures, and advance the interoperability of maritime and amphibious NATO and partner forces.

Annual ‘Peace-Shield’ PfP exercises also take place in Ukraine.

‘Peace-Shield 2000' took place at Yavoriv in July attended by 1400 military personnel from 20 NATO and PfP members. The exercises focused on practicing common procedures for the conduct of UN-authorised, NATO led peacekeeping missions. Yavoriv is Europe’s largest military training area and is the first military facility to be leased by NATO in the former USSR since 1999.

NATO also encourages bilateral military co-operation between Poland and Ukraine, which is supported by the UK, in the creation of a joint peacekeeping battalion. The battalion was sent in March to serve in Kosovo under NATO command and represents its first mission abroad. The only other analogous unit in the former USSR is a Polish-Lithuanian battalion. The Ukrainian element in the unit includes 270 army and 20 internal troops. Polish Defence Minister Bronislaw Komorowski and Ukraine Defence Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk outlined a three fold purpose of the unit. Firstly, it contributes to European security, forms a link between Ukraine and NATO and provides training for Ukraine’s troops within NATO’s military reform aid programme. Ukrainian and Polish troops are also to be deployed side by side on the Lebanese-Israeli border as part of UNIFIL. The 650-strong Ukrainian contingent is made up of engineer troops.

Although the Kosovo conflict was the first serious crisis in Ukrainian-NATO relations this did not have long lasting effects. President Leonid Kuchma warned against severing relations with NATO as this would simultaneously cut Ukraine’s ties to the EU. As Defence Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk commented, ‘The bloody events in Yugoslavia have not had an effect on Ukraine’s attitudes towards cooperation with NATO’. This was because Ukraine’s foreign policy was independent of political developments in Russia or geopolitical events in the Balkans and based on the strategic goal of integration into Western structures. Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk dismissed suggestions that after Kosovo Ukraine would downgrade its relations with NATO: ‘We are very pleased with our cooperation with NATO and would like to develop it’.

While Ukraine’s elites have not changed their views on NATO after the Kosovo crisis the public perception of NATO has worsened, according to a poll conducted in mid 2000 by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies. During the last three years the number of Ukrainians considering NATO an aggressive military bloc has tripled and more than half think that Ukraine should never join it. NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo even increased anti-NATO feelings in western Ukraine, a region which used to be solidly pro-NATO. After Kosovo Western Ukrainians now have as negative a view of NATO as Crimeans.

The Ukrainian parliament, then led by anti-Western left-wingers, pushed through a motion that both condemned NATO’s ‘violent act’ in Yugoslavia as ‘unjustified’ and ‘inhumane’ as well as ‘ethnic purges’ ‘wherever they take place’. Ukraine took the middle ground in the conflict, condemning the violation of human rights in Kosovo while opposing the use of force without a UN mandate. ‘We understand NATO’s motives, but we believe that the Kosovo crisis should be approached from the position of international law’, Foreign Minister Tarasiuk argued. Centre-right MP’s also used the occasion to point to the folly of a neutral state, such as Ukraine, allowing a foreign navy to be based in Sevastopol as the Black Sea Fleet had set sail to the Adriatic during the conflict. Russian attempts to intensify naval cooperation with Ukraine are seen as an attempt to forge a united anti-NATO front that could drag Ukraine into a future conflict.

For the reformist parliamentary majority NATO, regardless of Kosovo, will remain the cornerstone of its attempts to balance Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. Parliamentary chairman Ivan Pliushch, a member of the pro-presidential People’s Democratic Party, recently spoke of NATO as the main body guaranteeing Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and her integration into the Trans-Atlantic and European political-economic space. With the EU more lukewarm towards Ukraine’s integration it has little option but to therefore enhance its political-security ties with NATO.

In May 1997 there has been a NATO Information and Documentation Centre was established in the Institute of International Relations, Kyiv University, which has full diplomatic status (something its analogue in Moscow, established in 1995, does not have). In March 1999 a Military Liaison Office was established in the Ministry of Defence in Kyiv and is led by a British naval officer. Ukraine has a military mission at NATO HQ and two officers seconded to SACLANT, Norfolk, USA and AFSOUTH, Naples, Italy.

An extensive ‘National Programme of Cooperation Between Ukraine and NATO until 2001 was signed into law by presidential decree in November 1998. It outlines Ukraine’s activities with NATO in the spheres of foreign policy, military security, airspace control, information technologies, research and industry, space exploration, nuclear non-proliferation, the environment, standardisation, civil emergency planning, and the combating of terrorism and drug trafficking.

The Ukrainian Interdepartmental State Commission on Cooperation with NATO is chaired by Yevhen Marchuk, secretary of the National Security and Defence Council. At a July meeting to review progress in the Ukrainian government programme the Commission resolved to draw up a state programme for 2001-2004. In December 1999 Ukraine and the US signed a plan of military cooperation at NATO HQ. The programme includes reciprocal visits of military personnel, the training of Ukrainian pilots and officers in the US, the closing down of military bases, military medicine and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On-going military cooperation seeks to make Ukrainian military equipment produced by its military industrial complex according to Western standards.

In early March 2000 a meeting of the highest body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which brings together 19 Ambassadors from all member states, was held in Kyiv. A greeting was read out to the meeting by President Leonid Kuchma that described NATO as the most influential security organisation in the world and a defender of political and economic achievements. Ukraine’s integration with Western structures, according to Kuchma, is closely tied to its internal reforms. This, the first ever meeting of NAC outside NATO member states, was a clear signal to Russia on the eve of its presidential elections that Ukraine’s continued independence was of strategic importance to NATO and the West. All of Ukraine’s elite’s took part in meetings with NAC and the Ukraine-NATO Commission that was also held at the same time. In addition, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Tarasiuk believed the visit of NAC was a, ‘clear political sign of support for Ukraine’s strategic course of integration into the European-Atlantic structures’. On the eve of the NAC visit the Ukrainian parliament finally, after many years delay under its previous left wing leadership, ratified treaties giving legal rights to foreign servicemen serving in exercises on Ukrainian territory and allowing foreign aircraft to fly over Ukrainian territory and inspect military assets. As Russia has noted, these flights will also now be able to monitor the Crimean naval port of Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea Fleet based there.

On a visit to Tbilisi in March President Kuchma told his Georgian host that ‘there is no question of Ukraine joining NATO today since this issue is extremely complex and has many angles to it’. Nevertheless, Ukraine, Kuchma said, would continue to be interested in developing its relationship and co-operating with NATO. Russia sees NATO policy as aiming to develop Ukraine into a ‘buffer’ and ‘strategic counterbalance’ to itself. Kuchma defines Ukraine in a less antagonistic way as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Russia.

Asked when Ukraine would apply for NATO membership the head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press service, Ihor Hrushko, replied ‘When the time comes and the circumstances are favourable’. Nevertheless, in the interim Ukraine has few options but to continue to expand and deepen its co-operation with NATO. Whether it cashes in on its ‘insurance policy’ or not in the near future depends on two factors—the policies adopted by newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin and a generational change in Ukrainian politics. The younger generation represented by Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and Foreign Minister Tarasiuk are more enthusiastic and less cautious about joining NATO than current President Kuchma. NATO remains committed to an open door policy for all aspiring countries, regardless of demands by Russia for the former USSR to be off limits to future NATO enlargement. Future membership is dependent upon further progress on military reform and modernisation supported by an adequate defence budget, public relations work to overcome Soviet stereotypes of NATO and the political intent of the Ukrainian leadership to join. If these three factors are fulfilled NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said ‘we see nothing impossible down the road’.

Submitted to Jane's Defence Weekly