ANALYSIS

April 28, 2001

Analyzing the Political Upheaval in Ukraine

By David Marples

On 26 April, the fifteenth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the Ukrainian parliament dismissed Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. Western observers (Associated Press, Reuters, The New York Times) have hailed his departure as a blow to democracy in Ukraine, pointing out that Yushchenko is the most democratically minded and popular politician in the country. But is it? One can argue otherwise.

Clearly, the forces that chose to remove Yushchenko would not appear to have Ukraine’s best interests in mind. The Prime Minister was formerly Chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine, a reformist, and a man who had taken a notably independent stance during the Gongadze affair, when tapes produced by a former bodyguard of the president, implicated the latter in the murder of an opposition journalist and led to mass demonstrations against President Leonid Kuchma.

Yushchenko was also notably restrained during the government’s arrest and re-arrest of the former Deputy Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, ultimately halted by the Ukrainian Supreme Court. Tymoshenko, a former ally of another ex-prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, had made a fortune through gas profits, but had subsequently fallen afoul of Kuchma and joined the opposition.

Yushchenko’s removal was widely expected, since he has never been slow to speak his mind and he is unpopular both among the "oligarchs" who control Ukrainian business and the Communists, whose power base lies in the eastern cities. Parliament voted 263-69 to remove him, as a result of support for the motion from a variety of political groups embracing the Communists, Labour Ukraine, the Greens, the United Social Democratic Party, the Popular Democratic Party, and the Democratic Union.

Paradoxically, the combination of votes (and however foolish and self-serving the motives) is an indicator that democracy is alive in Ukraine. In no other post-Soviet country excluding the Baltic States could the Parliament have used such authority. The president is almost certain to agree to the decision, which will lead to a caretaker government for 60 days until a new Prime Minister is appointed. Thus a certain balance of power has been maintained between the government and the legislature.

Though this demonstrates the limited power of the presidency, it also reflects the changing nature of the Parliament. It need not be perceived as entirely retrogressive or—as suggested by western observers—a stronghold of the Communists. The latter belief is simply untrue. The Communists have the largest party but are nowhere close to a majority. They have formed only a temporary working alliance that would not operate if directed toward a broader purpose, such as a return to more state control over industry, for example, or subsidizing unprofitable companies.

Further, the removal of Yushchenko simplifies the situation for the Ukrainian opposition. No longer need it weigh the odds of removing an obviously corrupt government that includes a reformist and much respected Prime Minister. Within the government, Yushchenko was obliged to remain silent on key issues, most notably the Gongadze affairs and the government’s attacks on demonstrators, particularly students. In opposition, he is likely not only to be an effective voice, but a genuine and realistic contender for president in 2004.

In turn, President Kuchma will not be aggrieved to see the removal of his greatest rival, and through events that appear to absolve him of any collusion. The president was visiting the Chernobyl region when the news arrived, and a more poignant setting for his expressions of regret could hardly have been imagined. The oligarchs who control the only vibrant part of the economy have been satiated, and a more compliant government should now emerge.

And yet in the long term, the removal of Yushchenko can only weaken the Kuchma regime. Its already diminishing credit in the eyes of the West, particularly the United States, the European Union and the IMF, has surely expired completely; the opposition now has a focal figure around which to express its dissatisfaction; and the forces in favour of a market-oriented economy are divided.

On the one hand are those who have benefited from privatization and particularly control over resources or conveyances (such as pipelines for oil and gas) and wield power from bases in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv, and on the other are those who seek to reduce the power of the oligarchs, led by Yushchenko and the allegedly reformed Timoshenko, but are nonetheless even more distant from the Communists and their allies who would like to return to a state-run economy and greater distance from the West. It is like the removal of a particularly obtuse puzzle on a chessboard. The players can now see more clearly the possible moves ahead. And that is not a bad thing.