I mainly work on metacognition - the monitoring and control of cognitive processes - and its implications for epistemology, especially virtue epistemology.  In my dissertation (with the entirely unobvious title Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue) I argue that intellectual virtues should be understood as metacognitive control capacities.  There are two broad lines of argument for this.  First, what distinguishes an ordinary perceiver from somebody like a reliable clairvoyant appears to be metacognitive control.  (See my draft "Metacognition and Epistemic Virtue" for a less compressed argument.)  Second, high-level virtues like "conscientiousness" or "humility" can be analyzed as properties of one's metacognitive capacities.  For instance, humility is a broad-ranging ability to prevent belief-formation from being led astray by concerns with status or dominance.

The next step is to try to understand better how metacognition is involved in the production of knowledge, and in particular, to what extent typical knowers are really capable of avoiding relying on untrustworthy processes in belief-formation, especially in the case of knowledge derived from testimony.   

I'm also working on epistemic value, trying to find a suitable framework of epistemic desiderata for virtue epistemology. 

Finally, I work on logics for vagueness.  I'm mainly interested in understanding the conceptual differences between degree theories on the one hand and supervaluationist or epistemic approaches on the other, and how to give a formal treatment of vague identities.

I'm currently teaching philosophy at the University of Alberta.  In September I take up a SSHRC postdoctoral fellowship with Jennifer Nagel at the University of Toronto.

For more about me, see my curriculum vitae.

Materials from past courses are here.

Some publications of mine:

Lepock, C. (2006) “Adaptability and Perspective”.  Philosophical Studies 129:2, pp. 377-91.

Lepock, C., and F. J. Pelletier (2005) “Fregean Algebraic Tableaux: Automating Inferences in Fuzzy Propositional Logic”.  G. Sutcliffe and A. Voronkov, eds.  Short Paper Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning, pp. 43-48.

Some unpublished drafts:

"Metacognition and Epistemic Virtue". 
A selection from my dissertation.  I argue that intellectual virtues should be analyzed as capacities for metacognitive control.  In this selection, I examine what I call "epistemic" virtues, or virtuous processes that yield knowledge, and I show how this analysis works for this category of virtues.   

"The Structure of Intellectual Virtue".
Another selection from my dissertation; here, I extend the analysis to cover the "high-level" intellectual virtues (like open-mindedness, conscientiousness, and so forth).  These are praiseworthy traits of intellectual character that can be manifested without the resulting belief being known.

"Levels of Reliabilist Appraisal: How to Make the Generality Problem Work for You". 
Reliabilist theories of knowledge face the “generality problem”; any token of a belief-forming processes instantiates types of different levels of generality, which can vary in reliability. I argue that we exploit this situation in epistemic discourse; we appraise beliefs in different ways by adverting to reliability at different levels of generality. We can detect at least two distinct uses of reliability, which underlie different sorts of appraisals of beliefs and believers.

"Two Faces of Vagueness". 
Vagueness occurs when a term has 'blurred boundaries', to use Crispin Wright’s term.  There is no immediate reason that blurred boundaries can come about in only one way; it is possible that very different features of language can give rise to vagueness.  Examining artificially constructed vague terms allows us to isolate two logically distinct phenomena that lead to 'blurred boundaries': fuzziness and multi-order indeterminacy, or MOI. Fuzziness is best treated in infinite-valued logic; MOI, by supervaluations or epistemic theories of vagueness.  This result suggests that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, as is usually thought; rather, they appear to be complementary parts of a complete account of vagueness.

The baby in the picture is our son Milo.  For some slightly out-of-date pictures of his older sister, see my partner's Flickr site.