tuitionist would probably say that unless Körner's proposed calculus is nothing more than a heuristic device, it is a useless appendage. He would certainly claim that the use of the term "replace" is little more than a verbal trick to gloss over the fact that what is done in "applications" is not "mathematics."

Such objections may not be entirely a result of prejudice. As soon as Körner draws his "line" between the exact and the inexact, the question arises concerning the status of the concept defining the "line." If it is exact, the inexact loses its value. If it is inexact, the value of the exact is lost. If it is neither, what new concept is generated? A basic choice is involved here like that between necessity and contingency (or another modality). If distinctions are made in terms of necessity, the balance is weighted in favor of rationalism. If they are made in terms of contingency, the balance moves toward empiricism. If the balance is not used at all, the demand for a careful explanation is especially justified. Judging from what is often done in making such choices, we find Hume not far wrong in claiming, " 'Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy." The essential problem is how to put together or make use of what has been torn apart, and Körner's appeal to "replacement" remains as mysterious as Planck's quantum-jump across a no man's land. Closely related is Körner's proposal for a general logical calculus designed to embrace both exact and inexact concepts. If the calculus is formal, it is difficult to keep it consistent by including both the exact and the inexact. If it is not formal, it is doubtful whether a calculus is relevant. Judgment must remain suspended until the calculus is shown. Finally, we encounter little more than silence from Körner regarding the nature of the mathematical infinite. On the basis of observations such as these, it seems safe to conclude that the present volume will not cause the Sphinx to hurl herself into the abyss, but it will undoubtedly serve to keep the Sphinx very much alive.

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WORDS AND THINGS: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY AND A STUDY IN IDEOLOGY. By ERNEST GELLNER. Boston, Beacon Press, 1960. Pp. 265. $4.95.

Mr. Gellner perceives in the present philosophical scene a movement of thought which he calls "linguistic philosophy," and in this polemical

book he endeavors to expose and attack its underlying ideas. Linguistic philosophy, he says, had its primary source in the later views of Wittgenstein and has been dominant in British universities and particularly at Oxford since the Second World War. In the movement he includes—in addition to Wittgenstein—Gilbert Ryle, J. O. Urmson, A. G. N. Flew, John Wisdom, G. J. Warnock, J. L. Austin, and many others. He does not include logical positivists, though he maintains that their criteria of cognitive significance are hidden ingredients of linguistic philosophy. Nor does he include Bertrand Russell, who lends his authority to this book in an Introduction; nor (apparently) G. E. Moore—"G. E. Moore, who greatly influenced the movement and is jointly with Wittgenstein its chief patron saint, though not himself strictly a linguistic philosopher [he practiced it so well that he evaded this label]. . . ." Although the philosophers Gellner does include in the movement seem to differ on a number of points, he contends that certain views about language, the nature of philosophy, the world, and the self "underlie" and are "essential to Linguistic Philosophy"; and he is concerned in this book to bring these views to the surface and also to criticize them.

He begins with what he takes to be the linguistic philosophers' notion of language. According to Gellner, they "see it naturalistically" as a kind of activity analogous to moves made in games; and implicit in their notion are "Four Pillars of Linguistic Philosophy." The first pillar is the "Argument from the Paradigm Case"; for example, since there are paradigm cases for the use of expressions like "of his own free will" (for instance, smiling bridegrooms), it follows necessarily that there is freedom of the will. The second pillar Gellner calls the "Generalised Naturalistic Fallacy." This, he says, is an argument from the actual use of a term to its valid use. (I have had trouble distinguishing these pillars.) Third, there is the "Contrast Theory of Meaning," according to which a term that is used "without antithesis" is meaningless. Finally, linguistic philosophers ascribe to a view or rather two views about the complexity of language. They hold that there is no single criterion or set of criteria for the use of a term. This view Gellner calls "internal Polymorphism." The second view, "external Polymorphism," is that uses of terms are various and irreducible. The notion of language made explicit in these pillars, Gellner maintains, "entails or insinuates" views about the nature of philosophy, the world, and the self. About the nature of philosophy there is admittedly some disagreement among linguistic philosophers. Yet they agree that philosophy is an activity and not a doctrine, that it is or should be

concerned with linguistic or conceptual investigations, and that it is not the job of philosophers to provide general theories about the world. Contrary, however, to the linguistic philosophers' professed restriction of the province of philosophy, they do in fact have a world view. This, Gellner says, is a "camouflaged Naturalism" with a new linguistic twist. They also propose or "insinuate" a theory about the mind or self; namely, a form of behaviorism. All these views, he finds, are absolutely essential to linguistic philosophy.

In several places Gellner expresses his conviction that to show what is going on among linguistic philosophers is enough to discredit the movement. He also raises or suggests a variety of objections. Four general criticisms are reiterated: (1) Linguistic philosophy is evasive and inconsistent (pp. 21, 52-53, 78, 86, 113-119, 147-150, 159 ff., 166 ff., 174-176, 183-184, 186-189, 253, 258, 263-264). According to Gellner, philosophers of this persuasion refuse to state the general theories or fundamental views to which they are committed. When one of these views is pointed out and criticized, they evade the objection by disowning the view imputed to them or by claiming to hold a qualified and weaker version to which the objection does not apply. Gellner, who appears to have been influenced by Stephen Potter, calls these evasive tactics "Who Ever Said This?," "the Indian Rope Trick," "the Full Circle ploy," "the Two-tier Doctrine," "the Delphic Insight," and "the art of Hedging One's Bets." The price of evasion is, he says, inconsistency; for the arguments and views that are qualified or disowned are in fact essential to linguistic philosophy. (2) Linguistic philosophy is circular (pp. 26, 52, 61, 84-85, 105, 123 ff., 162, 210-211, 263-264). It makes use of certain standards of what is clear and of what makes sense, and these standards "incapsulate" views about the world. Accepting these standards, we must indeed accept the views they incapsulate. But, Gellner claims, linguistic philosophers offer no independent reasons for accepting these standards; and, arguing against opposing views on the ground that they are senseless or obscure, linguistic philosophers beg the question. (3) Linguistic philosophy is also conservative (pp. 43-44, 51, 59 ff., 83, 105, 112-113, 120, 153, 195 ff., 205 ff., 221-225, 249-250, 264-265). Arguing from the actual use of a term to its valid use, linguistic philosophers commit themselves to the accepted, common-sense views embodied in ordinary language. They work on the assumption that, if a view is not expressed in ordinary terms or if it cannot be translated into ordinary terms, it is unintelligible. Using this Philistine standard of intelligibility, they dismiss attempts to criticize or revise existing conceptual systems, and they

rule out the possibility of conceptual innovation. Finally, (4) linguistic philosophy is unproductive and trivial (*passim*). According to Gellner, it has failed, as at first it promised, to provide us with a way of solving or dissolving all philosophical problems. What little it has accomplished is ephemeral, namely, the refutation of a few idiosyncratic views of the kind Wittgenstein expressed in the *Tractatus*. At present, Gellner reports, linguistic philosophers are primarily concerned with exegesis of the nuances of ordinary usage. So occupied, they ignore important problems arising in the natural and social sciences, and they also neglect the fundamental problems of philosophy. Their work is, consequently, trivial and dreary.

There is very little in this book with which I can agree. I believe Gellner is right in thinking that common interests, common influences, and even common idioms tend to distinguish the philosophers whom he calls "linguistic philosophers" from others, for instance, Heidegger or Carnap. In this sense of "movement of thought," he is right in speaking of a movement of thought. I can also agree that it is of interest to point out similarities of views and arguments within a movement of thought and that it is worth while probing for sensitive areas—in Collingwood's terms, for absolute presuppositions. In a investigation of this kind, however, it is important to give clear and accurate accounts of the views and arguments, to provide adequate evidence in support of generalizations, and to guard against exaggerating similarities and continuity to the neglect of differences and change. Judged on these standards, Gellner's book is unsatisfactory.

His accounts of what philosophers have said are slovenly and often inaccurate. For example, comparing Russell's and Strawson's views about referring expressions, he says that Russell's theory "offered a translation of expressions such as 'the present King of France' or 'The Golden Mountain'" (p. 178). This is of course false; and the sentence shows carelessness if not misunderstanding. Gellner's deficiencies as an historian are egregious, however, when he contends that certain views "underlie" and are "essential to Linguistic Philosophy." Using terms like "basic," "underlying," "central," and "essential," he suggests or implies that many if not most of all the philosophers over whom he raises the umbrella "Linguistic Philosophy" accept the views in question; and the reader is encouraged to believe that, concerning these views, there is, if not unanimity of opinion, considerable agreement. With respect to some of the allegedly "essential" views, this is clearly not the case. By Gellner's own admission some of these views are "crude," and he is aware that a number of admittedly "linguistic"

philosophers have explicitly repudiated them. In the face of this apparent counterevidence, he is singularly undisturbed. (See especially pp. 113-119 and 166-169.) The views that have been repudiated, he claims, are none the less the essential ones; and the more sophisticated theories that have replaced them are "parasitic on," or stand in a "symbiotic relationship" with, the earlier cruder views. It is not clear how we are to cash these metaphors. It seems that the sins of the fathers are to be visited on the sons and that linguistic philosophers may be guilty by association. Gellner does, however, attempt to defend his seemingly perverse procedure and to explain in what sense a view can be "essential to Linguistic Philosophy" even though a number and perhaps many linguistic philosophers reject it.

On pages 30-31 he maintains that "the Argument from the Paradigm Case is absolutely essential to Linguistic Philosophy: it pervades it and it is presupposed without qualification, denials notwithstanding." He refers to J. O. Urmson's paper "Some Questions concerning Validity" and to A. G. N. Flew's "Philosophy and Language," and his contention appears to be that Urmson and Flew accept another view which entails the one they repudiate and that in this sense the repudiated view is "essential," their "denials notwithstanding." In the following passage he argues in support of this contention:

> The APC [Gellner's abbreviation of "Argument from the Paradigm Case"] is essential to Linguistic Philosophy because it is merely the explicit formulation of the procedural rule underlying the use of the notion of language games, and of the appeal to use and usages in the solving of philosophical arguments. The whole idea of language games is used to convey that words mean what they mean in the given context of the language game currently employed; hence that there is no other meaning they could have, to which one could appeal, and in terms of which one could contradict the use implicit in that particular game. And although one can reform current usage this, they hold, is philosophically irrelevant! This, even more than Professor Flew's admission of its past pervasiveness, shows the impossibility of jettisoning it without jettisoning the method and outlook as a whole [pp. 36-37].

Much is unclear here, but the gist of the argument appears to be this. The allegedly "essential" view about the "APC" is a part of, or an immediate implication of, a more general view about language ("the whole idea of language games"). Since Urmson and Flew accept this theory about language, they are logically committed to accepting the view they repudiate, and so the repudiated view is in this sense "essential."

The argument is, I believe, exceedingly weak. To make his point,

Gellner would have to show that Urmson and Flew do accept "the whole idea of language games" and also of course that the view they repudiate is a part or a consequence of this theory. (It would seem to be logically impossible to accept "the whole idea of language games" and at the same time to reject a part of this idea. But let that pass.) No evidence is given, however, that they do accept the theory he describes; and indeed, as he describes it, it seems most unlikely that they or any of the "linguistic philosophers" have accepted it. A part or a consequence of the theory is that "a meaningful term . . . must have cases where it *does* apply" (p. 41, author's italics). From this it seems to follow that no negative existential statement could be both meaningful and true. I doubt that many philosophers would fail to spot this rather obvious and regrettable consequence, and I doubt that many have accepted a theory of language of which it is a consequence.

As for Gellner's criticisms of "Linguistic Philosophy," the proportion of vituperation to argument is high. Too often it is not clear whose view or what argument he is attacking. For instance, discussing the "APC," he says, "everyone knows that individual things which have expressions referring to them, and are supposed to exist, often turn out not to exist at all, to have been misinterpreted, to be in fact something else under suitable guise" (p. 35). This and many other remarks are muddy. About his general criticisms, I shall limit myself to the charge (number 4) that linguistic philosophy is unproductive and trivial. On occasion Gellner acknowledges, though in a left-handed way, that there have been a few accomplishments. On page 212, he says,

> Its empiricism has achieved nothing except the eradication of one or two misunderstandings—the view that there is a rigid logical skeleton underlying our discourse, and the theory that our knowledge is literally built up from little atoms.

He goes on to ask, "How many people have seriously suffered from these misunderstandings?" and he seems to think that these "misunderstandings" have been limited to a few philosophers in the twentieth century. I believe that views like those to which Gellner refers have been more pervasive than he thinks. If "Linguistic Philosophy" has in fact "eradicated" them, this is no mean achievement.

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