

## Chapter 13

- Gendler starts out by giving a definition of alief, which is a term that she created herself.
- Alief is: a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective, and behavioral. In other words, a mental state whose content is linked to each other and co-activated – the concepts do not stand alone. This content represents a number of concepts, objects, ideas etc. they affect your emotional state, and incline you towards certain behaviors.
- In a footnote, she says that she is using it in an idiosyncratic way, in want of a better term. This content contains propositions, emotions, and behavior
- Slightly different than her Chapter 14 def, but this is the one she uses for now.
- Alief can be activated consciously or unconsciously
- Can be activated by features of the subjects internal, mental world, or her external environment. I think both of these ideas about alief – that they are unconscious/conscious and internal/external become kind of problematic as she goes on to talk about them later, but for now, this is just an overview.
- Example of external world – overlooking a large cliff, being in a scary movie etc. Example of being activated internally – superstition?
- Gendler wants us to have the term alief so that we can explain strange phenomenon (like people saying they believe one thing and acting another) without relying on belief and imagination.
- She thinks alief is important because it is more primitive than either belief or imagination because it effects our behavioural responses directly. She isn't saying it is the behaviour, but that it makes one inclined to do a certain behaviour. I am unsure how this can be so primitive if one is conscious of it. does it just mean conscious but unable to control?
- This reminds me of the levels of thought that we talked about a long time ago how intuition is the first level, and then it can move up through reasoning etc. how does alief relate to intuition? Is it the same?
- So because alief plays a large role in causing behaviour, she thinks that it can be used to explain the effectiveness and limitations of example-based reasoning. Does this mean thought experiments? Also, alief can be applicable to our moral lives because she thinks it is what is really at the core of habit-based ethics, which she talks about more in Chapter 14
- She will often be contrasting alief with belief, and in the footnotes, she discusses that she does not really give a concrete definition of what she thinks belief is. She claims that belief is not as straightforward as “holding proposition one thinks to be true”. She says there is an occurrence, traditional view of belief: to believe a proposition is to be in a mental state with introspection available). To know you are believing something – you must be aware of it. There is a dispositional, modern view of belief: to believe a proposition is to be disposed to act in a certain way. Gendler says she leaves it undefined, but she seems to use aspects of both in her essay. Thoughts?
- **Four opening examples**

- The first example is of the Skywalk over the Grant Canyon. It's a U-shaped glass walkway that extends 70 feet over the Grand Canyon. Gendler sites a news article saying how so many people are afraid to walk across of it, even though they believe that it is safe. You can get a souvenir picture that says "I Did It" on it. Gendler thinks this is ironic because it isn't unsafe in anyway and no-one who actually walked on it would believe it was unsafe.
- Gendler also says that everyone will understand the fear of those walking on the Skywalk, even though everyone also believes it to be safe – it was properly engineered, thousands of people have already gone on it, etc.
- This is what Gendler finds strange: that while people profess to have a believe that it is safe – which they must believe it to be safe otherwise they would not walk on it – there is a gut-feeling (which she says is alief) that tells the person to be afraid, to hesitate. (I like her wording of the alief thoughts going on - they sound primitive, caveman like.)
- She says this is confusing that people would be so scared of it if they truly believed it were safe.
- Do people really believe it is safe? I don't know if I truly would and that's why I would be scared. What do you guys think?
- Her second example that has a bunch of examples in it – the juice from the bedpan, the rubber vomit etc – and I find some more convincing than others.
- These experiments were done by a psychologist Paul Rozin who thought they showed a tendency for Western educated adults to still adhere to something called the "law of sympathetic magic". This is the idea that there is a permanent transfer of properties from one object to another by brief contact, and the actions taken on one object can affect similar objects. So if we associate object A with Object B and we don't like object A, we won't like object B. So she gives several examples: we don't want juice that's had a dead sterilized cockroach stirred in it, we don't want to wear the laundered shirt of our enemy (is this true?), we don't want to eat soup from a bed pan, don't touch rubber shaped vomit, don't want fudge in the shape of dog feces, don't want to throw darts at the faces of people you like.
- She thinks that for all of these, we rationally believe we are not actually doing something harmful, but we alieve that we are and we cannot control that feeling
- They all seem slightly different: the cockroach in juice, rubber vomit, and fudge one all seem somewhat evolutionary and for our own health, while the shirt one seems different. Gendler says later that although they may be slightly different, they all fall under alief. What do you think?
- Third example: she knows that she has left her wallet behind, but she is searching for it anyway. Believes that she has left it behind, but alieves she has not. I don't think this one is good
- Fourth example: someone watching a horror movie and being terrified and screaming. They don't leave the theater because they clearly believe they are safe and green slime is going to come out and get them, but they alieve that they are, and that's why they are scared.
- **Introducing Alief**

- So through the examples, Gendler hoped to demonstrate alief versus belief – a subject can believe one thing, yet alieve another and the alieve can affect behavior ( i.e., someone refusing to eat the fudge). In other words, someones beliefs will not be always accompanied by belief-appropriate behavior and attitude. The reluctance to walk across the skywalk, eat the fudge, is what Gendler calls a belief-behavior mismatch, caused by alief.
- She anticipates that some people will argue that the belief-behavior mismatch is caused by several other things:
  - Deliberate deception: this is a case when belief and behavior are not matched up, such as when you're playing poker – poker face. However, this is not what is happening in the above situations because the behavior is not being controlled – the subject cannot help feeling scared about the skywalk even though she knows it is safe. She is not trying to trick herself into being scared
  - Self-deception: the subject truly endorses her beliefs and then acts another way.
  - Doubt: Gendler thinks that doubting the safety of the skywalk, or the real fudgeness of the fudge is off, but I don't think so for all situations. That's why I would be scared of the skywalk – because I would doubt that it could actually hold. Although, for the horror movie example, doubt would not work. I would never doubt that a scary monster would stay on the screen.
  - Forgotten their belief: she argues that people don't hesitate to eat the fudge, or walk on the skywalk because they cant remember if its real, or if its sturdy
- Gendler finally gives an answer as to why there could be a belief-behavior mismatch. She says the reason “ of course” is that each scenario activates a set of affective, cognitive and behavioral association patterns that do not necessarily fit with what we believe. In other words, what the subject is seeing and hearing affect behavior in a certain way that she cannot control. Gendler gives the example of walking on a wooden porch rather than walking on the Skywalk. So before walking on the porch, the subject has the conscious belief that it will be safe, because its wooden, in the past its been safe etc. When she steps outside onto it, her vision verifies her belief that it is safe, which puts into motion activities (walking) across it. these motor routines match her desire to walk across the solid porch, so there is no belief-behavior mismatch.
- on the other hand, when the subject goes to walk on the glass platform with the conscious belief that it is solid, her visual input tells her she is stepping off a cliff. This creates anxiety, which pauses motor movements, and creates dizziness and fear. These compete with the desire to walk across, and therefore she has belief-behavior mismatch.
- When there is a belief-behavior mismatch, Gendler says this is because of belief-discordant alief. Alief that doesn't match our conscious beliefs. Although she says that aliefs can be conscious. How do this work?

- So the representational – affective – behavioural content for the Skywalker is the vision and all around scenario of the Skywalker are taken in by the subject which affects her emotions and her behaviors. The vision of the cliff evokes fear, which causes her to pause or retreat.
- **Characterization of Alief**
- she gives many characteristics of alief, which conveniently, all start with “a”. she also gives a more in-depth explanation of these in chapter 14 so I will just outline them briefly here
- associative: there is a group or cluster of concepts that trigger one another
- action-generating: largely responsible for behaviors
- affect-laden: effect emotions
- arational: they are neither rational nor are they irrational – they do not depend on reason at all
- automatic: they are not controlled by the will
- agnostic with respect to its content: doesn’t care whether what it is, is true or false
- shared with non-human animals
- developmentally and conceptually antecedent to other cognitive attitudes: more primitive than belief or imagination or desire.
- Is this intuition?
- Gendler admits that she may have made mistakes in her characterization of alief, but she still wants to attempt to give the definition of a paradigmatic alief: a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affect and behavioral that activated consciously or non-consciously by features of the external or internal environment. Aliefs may be occurrent or dispositional. This is essentially the same definition as before, but now she goes over each part of this definition.
- Alief is a mental state: According to Gendler, this is also a physical state in the brain of a conscious subject ( this seems not overly helpful but that’s ok). This mental state occurs as a result of her (or her genetic ancestors) undergoing certain experiences that result in creation of clusters of associations with representational, affective, behavioral content. In other words, they are possibly genetic, evolutionary, or habit. This is not an attitude because an attitude seems more consciously willing. These are somehow within us. She talks about the difference between habit and innate aliefs in Chapt. 14 more.
- Associatively linked content: cluster of content that is co-activated: wood porch: hardy, sturdy safe. Or evolutionary: bush rustling, large lion, run
- An activated alief has 3 parts: representational, affective, behavioral. We have been over this before: an alief contains a representation of an object, concept, situation etc. it also includes an emotional state. And it also affects behavior.
- She says that not all alief states have this same sort of cluster, but doesn’t really develop this further so I don’t know what she could mean by that.
- Alief is a mental state with behavioral content: alief involves behaviors activation, but not the actual movements because alief is mental. (this

somewhat reminds of Descartes how the mind affects the body). The activation makes it likely that the behavior will happen.

- Alief may be occurrent or dispositional: subject has an occurrent alief with RAB content when a clusters of dispositions to simultaneously entertain R thoughts, experience emotions and engage in behaviour are either consciously or unconsciously activated by a subjects internal or external environment. In other words, the alief is present and functioning in the moment.
- A dispositional alief with RAB content is when there is potential internal or external stimulus that could cause her to believe RAB. In other words, it is lying dormant. It is unactivated, waiting to become occurrent. If it is just lying wait, how could we know what this is? As soon as we bring it to our attention, it is occurrent. Potentiality – is this kind only unconscious or conscious. What do you guys think?
- Alief content is either activated consciously or unconsciously – it is problematic she says activated – if it is functioning consciously, then that means we can see its there but have no control over it. activating something consciously seems to have the implied idea that its somewhat controlled. But Gendler says someone can occurrently believe something with or without being aware of being in that state. They wouldn't know how they feel? Or they wouldn't realize its against their belief?
- Could we test alief? How could people answer the question?
- So she says that someone being disgusted by the plastic vomit is occurrently believing something that is belief-discordant. Anyone who thinks they would do the same thing is dispositionally believing it – is this how dispositional alief works?
- **Aliefs and Other Attitudes**
- Alief is diff. from imagining and believing in important ways. Belief is truth-dependent and imagination is not. Belief is reality sensitive, and imagination is explicitly not – that's the point of imagination. So while we can imagine anything (although apparently not things we take to be morally deviant), we can only believe what we take to be true.
- Alief is completely different than those two because she thinks that believing and imagining are propositional attitudes where believing is not. Believing "P" doesn't mean accepting that "P" is part of one's real or imagined environment. Alief does not involve acceptance of a situation to have an alief about it anyway.
- She uses an example to prove this. She gives the example of people seeing sugar being poured out of the same bag into two bottles, and then they themselves applied a label to each – one said sugar and the other said cyanide. Even though people clearly knew it was sugar in both, they still showed a reluctance to drink out of the cyanide bottle. This shows that people are really weird. Gendler thinks the occurrent alief in this situation is that as soon as one sees the word "cyanide" we automatically think it is bad, do not drink.

- She then gives an example that says that people did the same thing with the sugar, but this time the labels said “not poison” and “sugar” and people were still reluctant to drink the one that said “not poison”.
- She says that alief must be making these people hesitate, not believing that there might be poison in one, or imagining that there is.
- Although I am kind of unclear of the persuasiveness of this argument, she seems to be saying that even if we do not accept that in a situation there is cyanide present, or accept that a situation is truly dangerous, our aliefs still come into play.
- Confusion....
- She thinks that it is not important that one has a certain attitude to the content of the representations, because alief just involves a reaction of an association chain. We don't have to have a specific attitude towards the thing. Especially because alief can happen unconsciously, and therefore we could not have any attitude towards the thing.
- Alief contexts are hyperopaque. They don't permit salva veritate substitution even of expressions that the subjects recognizes as related. Even if you hold two saying to be synonymous, the aliefs activated by each could be quite different. So they don't allow substitutions of meanings for expressions they take to be the same. So “Not poison” and “sugar” aren't taken to have the same meaning. Which is very valid. Something not being poison doesn't mean its good.
- Gendler goes on to talk about how even though aliefs are not controlled by the will, if action is supposed to be in response to reality, and alief leads to behavioral movements, then the well-functioning person is one whose aliefs and beliefs coincide.
- How is this possible if its not controlled by the will, and is not reality sensitive like beliefs supposedly are?
- She says that we are unconstrained in which aliefs we render occurrent, but can't control which dispositional aliefs we have in the first place. Is this true? Can we control how scared we are of the movie? This seems not correct and against what she says before. If someone has a dispositional fear that they will be scared of the Skywalk, they still can't control their occurrent belief once they are there.
- Do we only know we had those beliefs as dispositional once we activate them? How can we choose among them then? Can we will our occurrent ones by thought?
- **Alief and Behavior**
- Velleman thinks that belief is connected to action. To believe P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one's desires in a world in which P was true.
- Gendler thinks this is not quite true, and gives two types of scenarios where believing P does not lead to such behavior, making one doubt the definition of action tied to belief only.

- 1) the subject believes P, but where this belief doesn't bring with it the disposition to act in P concordant ways because of some feature of the subject (someone who is permanently paralyzed)
- 2) subject believes P, but the belief doesn't have any behavioral implications. Such as a really random belief like believing in causally inert goblins is the example she gives
- 3) subject acts in the requisite way, but fails to believe P. so someone acts in an egalitarian way, but is really a huge racist.
- She thinks that Velleman's idea of belief only motivating behavior is too simplistic because it leaves out many reasons why someone may have P-concordant behavior: imagination, acceptance, etc. (and she will say ultimately, alief)
- She explores a way that Velleman could use in order to try and keep a belief-behavior model. This is the idea of a half-belief that people hold sometimes, except in special circumstances. So a man usually is superstitious and avoids walking under ladders, except on this certain day when he is in a rush to get to work, and must go under a ladder to get there quickly. So a half-belief is something that is thrown off when circumstances alter.
- Gendler thinks this doesn't work in all cases, because alief cannot be thrown off. If our child was on the other of the Skywalk, she thinks that we would still hesitate. This is alief in action. If alief becomes too strong and takes over, does this become belief?
- **Automaticity**
- Gendler gives examples of psycho experiments that show that alief plays a large role in people's behavior that they are not aware of.
- In one experiment, there are three groups of subjects. The first is asked to unscramble rude words to form a sentence, the other group is given neutral words, and the third is given polite words. After this task, they were supposed to inform the researcher who would be standing in the hall, talking to someone, either until they interrupted, or until 10 minutes passed. The test was to see if the subjects would interrupt the researcher talking. Those people who had the rude association words interrupted in most times before ten minutes, the neutral words interrupted in less than half, and those people who had had polite words almost never interrupted. This is for good value in parenting, childhood surrounding.
- Gendler thinks that alief shows this best – this experiment introduces into the different sets different occurrent aliefs (which means they must have had them before dispositionally?). the experiment clusters pre-conscious activation of the cluster of affective tendencies and behaviors associated with rudeness, and how they would behave in the presence of rudeness. In other words, people's aliefs were activated by different things they normally associated with rudeness or politeness, thus affecting their behavior in that situation.
- She has other examples such as the old person – walking slow example, or being shown a picture of a library and being quiet. The old person example seems insane

- Another experiment she discusses is the correlation between special distances and emotional distances. Psychologists posited that the farther apart someone drew points on a paper, the farther removed they would be from a disturbing story. People who drew dots far apart were less disturbed by a story called “Loving a Larger Woman”. However, when people drew dots close together and read a story about a man beating his brother with a rock after a car crash were more disturbed.
- This seems to me comparing these two is ridiculous because the second story is clearly more disturbing!
- In these cases, belief and imagination don’t make sense because the priming occurs on a very subconscious level. They activate a low level cluster of associations that affect the behavior.
- **Alief, Persuasion, and Habit**
- Gendler thinks that there are many historical examples of philosophers being sensitive to the ways that contemplation of an imaginary scenario can have different effects than if one were to just listen to an abstract situation (The Allegory of the Cave, Ring of Gyges)
- Hume gives the example of the Athenians who rejected a plan to burn Grecian fleets to give them an advantage in war. The strategist argued that he did not want to tell them the plan, but simply do it, but they forced him to tell them, and ultimately rejected it.
- Hume thinks that they rejected such an advantageous idea because they weren’t moved by the idea because it was presented so abstractly – there was less influence on their imaginations.
- I don’t think that this really shows the power of alief as much as it does the power of imagination.
- This seems to speak more to the power of showing over saying – Wittgenstein.
- However, Gendler thinks that this example just shows that people can be governed as much by alief as by belief. They may have abstractly believed it was good, but alieived that fire was always bad. Does this mean the alief became a belief?
- As she said before, if much of our actions are governed by alief, we should agree with Aristotle that through developing our inner habits we can live a good life – essentially, by maintaining good aliefs.
- The question is how? How can we form them if they aren’t always conscious?

#### **Chapter 14**

- In this chapter, there is definitely a lot of overlap with Ch. 13, but she also introduces a bunch of new and slightly different terms.
- She has changed her definition of alief slightly: alief is an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a certain way. This seems to give more of an evolutionary thrust to the definition – we cannot control our aliefs.
- Similarly to Ch. 13, Gendler says that understanding alief provides a framework for understanding reactions governed by non-conscious



- mechanisms (even though in Ch. 13 she said that aliefs sometimes could be conscious), and for seeing what is the proper role of reactions governed by the will. Alief can help explain superstitions, fictional emotions, residual racism ect. (although this seems to somehow say that racism is built into us).
- She also says that by discussing that which is governed by habit, we can gain more of an appreciation of ancient and early modern philosophy.
  - Drawing on her naturalist, evolutionary stand, she starts off with a quote from Charles Darwin. He says that certain actions are introduced under certain states of mind and situations, and whenever the same state of mind is present, the same behavior will be performed, even if its not right for the situation.
  - Gendler again gives examples of belief-discordant alief – frog thinking that a BB is fly and trying to eat it, someone in a horror movie. Her whole definition of alief here, especially the frog example, is like Dretske’s ideas of belief, and brings up questions about her belief/alief split in animals. Can it be that much of a split for animals if they cant be reflexive about their beliefs? Or how can we talk about it in animals?
  - Gendler thinks these alief responses are violating a norm, or a should. The frog shouldn’t snap at the BB and the person shouldn’t be scared of the movie. When aliefs go against what the subject should do (seemingly because the alief is wired in), they are giving a norm-discordant responses - which is very similar to belief-discordant behavior, and I don’t fully understand the need to have two different definitions. The Ch. 13 is focused on going against beliefs and Ch 14 is more focused on how you should act?
  - Gendler discusses that there are a couple kinds of alief: some result from innate propensities – I take these to be the genetic evolutionary kind like the frog, and the second result from aquired habit – always avoiding going under ladders perhaps
  - Gendler will also discuss norm-concordant and norm-discordant aliefs, as opposed to belief-discordant aliefs in the previous chapter. She explains the aliefs concerning norms as when a subjects enviro is stable, typical, and desirable, and the subject is attentive to these relevant features, her salient occurant aliefs will largely match up with occurant reality-reflective attitudes. These attitudes can be belief in human, or teleofunctional in animals. In other words, if everything is working, aliefs should work for us – kind of an adaptation, survival of the fittest. This must be concerning those that are innate
  - However, when an enviro is different or a subject is not paying attention to it, her occurant aliefs will be discordant. Sometimes we want this to happen, like when we go on a rollar coaster, but sometimes we don’t, like when we have a phobia.
  - Gendler acknowledges that alief isn’t a fundamental mental category, but we must use something to appeal to perplexing phenomena. Something that is between pure reason and pure physicality.
  - Gendler again goes through many examples that show discordant aliefs, and says that although they seem like they would have different reasoning behind

- them, instinct, habit ect, they are all actually due to alief. She says that the idea that they are all due to a different mental procedure is called the classic cognitivist picture. She thinks it is incorrectly sensitive to differences between them, but ignores the important similarities between them.
- So again, she says that alief is to have an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a similar way. 13's definition is that alief is mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective, and behavioral. Do we think they are too similar? Different? I think taken together they are best.
  - Again, she says that it's a state we share with animals, its arational and its antecedent to other cognitive states. Again, intuition
  - Again, alief is associative: it encodes patterns of response to particular internal or external mental images. I see B, therefore I do C. If something triggers a B-like affect, I want to do C.
  - Automatic: though you can become aware of your aliefs, they operate without intervention of conscious thought.
  - The rest of the – a – attributes are still the same.
  - Traditional propositional attitudes usually have 2 components: A subject believes B and then the subject desires B. There is the mental action, and the thing it is directed towards
  - In alief, the relationship between the subject and the cluster of association is not just with the representational content, but also with the emotions and behavioral propensities – alieves many things at once.
  - For example frog with the BB alieves small round object, appealing as food, moves tongue
  - **Alternative Explanations**
  - As in Ch. 13, she argues against people giving differing explanations – such as the classic cognitivist account – to account for discordant alief
  - She gives two caveats against objections that could be made towards her argument. The first is that she admits there is no easy classification or taxonomy of mental states, so it is somewhat difficult to classify this as desire, or this as belief. Which is think is helpful to her argument if she wants to argue for a broader umbrella term of alief. Second, she says that although belief and desire can play some role in cases such as the Skywalk or horror movie case, by now allowing that alief is a possibility for these situations, she thinks we are giving an incomplete definition.
  - **Appeals to belief that she will end up arguing against**
  - She discusses Hume's thought experiment of the man in the iron cage that is suspended in the air. The man is trembling, as he is scared of falling, yet his experience with the sturdy iron bars tells him he will not. Hume says this is because the reason and passions pull in opposite directions
  - Traiger gives 2 examples of explanation of this mans trembling that attribute it to belief that Gendler does not agree with. He says the mans trembling could be because the emotional mechanism can lead to beliefs that are so strong we must embrace, but are incompatible with our beliefs from causal reasoning – ie, the bars are strong enough to hold him and believes this. Or, it

could be because affective mechanisms make it impossible to form beliefs that would have been arrived at if it weren't for the emotions. So in the first case, he says emotions overwhelm our rational capacity. The trembling shows us that the man believes he will fall, while also not believing it as he reassures himself. Or, the behavior reveals belief. and in the second one, he says they block our rational beliefs – the trembles show he really doesn't believe he is safe – hesitation precludes belief. The tension between the two blocks the rational belief.

- Gendler thinks this is mistaken because it appeals to belief, and because it puts the man's reaction to the real and his reactions to the merely apparent content on par. They are able to override one another. The first view has the subject treat each conflicting view equally. The second shows the tendency to be in fear is stronger than the reasoned belief.
- Why does Gendler spend so much time disavowing the belief account of these strange cases? She thinks that other people put a lot of import on belief! And she explains why people think it makes so much sense. She says that people intend to infer intention from action, even when intention is clearly not/cannot be there. So we say things like "my computer is being a jerk" if it is not giving us the answer we want. We attribute an intention that a human could have to something that we know could not have it. In the example Gendler gives, the picture of the of the triangle "blocking" another one.
- When subjects recognize patterns of motion that they have in the past been known as intentional action, they respond as if that action is intentional, even if it is not. They have occurrent beliefs that they are in a circumstance that includes intention
- Since attributing intention to something regularly backfires, she says that we cannot say that if something looks like it is behaving intentionally, it must have a belief about something. The examples she gave are of machines, and drawings. What about humans who look like they are intentional but aren't. Is this trickier? Poker? Hypnotized?
- So from this, can we say there is a necessary connection between belief and behavior? She says that an attitude's tendency to cause behavior is thus conceived as belief itself
- (Is she saying this in general, or just that we must not make it for every case?)
- She says that this idea, that an attitude that causes certain behavior is enough to make it a belief, is wrong because belief-desire should rationalize intentional actions – not behaviors. Is this being overly picky? Is this being the reason/intention behind the behavior?
- She says that in order to see the mistake behind the belief interpretation we must recognize that belief is normatively governed by the fact that belief aims to track truth. Belief is subject to immediate revision in the face of changes in evidence. Really? Do we think this is true? Are beliefs this fluid? She says a change in our world will create a change in our beliefs
- Before when Gendler talked about it being a mistake that our responses to the real and our responses to the merely apparent concept, this is now

relevant. Because our beliefs are affected by changes in the world, they cannot be on par with just apparent content because only the real is evidence sensitive.

- Gendler sums this up very simplistically – belief changes in response to changes in evidence, aliefs change in response in changes to habit. (What about those innate ones?)
- Gendler agains drums it into us that alief isn't belief. She thinks that neither account of belief for the man in the cage really gets at why he is trembling – she thinks it is alief. If we are going by the RAB of Ch 13, it would be that his vision sees the enormous height, he feels fear, and he trembles. He cannot control this. The emotions and behaviors that go along with them are triggered by stimuli. These alief generated behaviors are read as belief incorrectly. It incorrectly treats that which is a general indicator of belief as a necessary and sufficient correlate of belief.
- She also thinks that imagination is a wrong way of looking at the issue. So some people may say that while the subject believes one thing, she imagines another. The imagined content oins with an imaginary desire to act in accord with that imaginaed content, and behavior results. So in the horror movie, she would know she is safe, but imagines she is in danger.
- Gendler shows this is wrong by talking about voluntary pretense vs. involuntary imagining. So voluntary pretending she calls “make-believe”, like someone is make believing that a banana is a phone and ordering pizzas on it. this is deliberately done, and the persons body and all the props work within the realm of pretend. So she thinks that the behavior represents the content in question rather than manifesting it – and this isn't the same as being scared in a movie.
- She then talks about involuntary imagining which is more difficult and may in some way relate to alief. She says that imagination does play a role in some aliefs, but when it does it violates a norm of imagining. I feel like this goes against some of our notions of imagining.
- But she says that imagining is governed by quarantining – what happens in imagination stays in imagination because I suppose we know it is imagining. Our real world is supposed to be guided by real action
- So while some behavioral responses may be traced to imagining, alief isn't the same thing as imagining. She says that imagination gives rise to behavior via alief. Confused? Isn't alief lower?
- **Appeals to Habit and Instinct**
- Some aliefs are acting through hard-wiring, biological (vertigo, frog)
- Some are acting through habit
- Some are less able to control than others (although none of them can be willed?)
- Historically, philosophy has given the distinction between innate and habit – Malebranch gives the example of fear of heights being drilled into us for our well being.
- Malebranch says that the connections that are not hardwired into us should be broken and made malleable because they are not good in all

- circumstances. He says in animals there should be connections of traces at all levels of malleability.
- Gendler takes this “connection of traces” to be aliefs, and that we have different levels of them.
  - Thinks that although there are differences between habits and innate qualities, they are all still on the spectrum of aliefs
  - The difference shouldn’t be important because if we want to try and regulate them, we must think of them the same way
  - They are more similar than they are different.
  - **Norm-concordant and Norm-discordant**
  - Several things can activate behavioral propensities: aliefs, beliefs, desires, and teleofunctional analogues (in animals)
  - When the alief behavior propensity pulls in the opposite direction of the belief behavior propensities, the subjects of belief-discordant behavioral tendencies are governed by norm-discordant aliefs
  - When the alief and belief behavior propensities coincide, the subjects belief-concordant behavior may be consciously regulated by beliefs, or norm concordant aliefs.
  - So aliefs can be belief-discordant and norm-discordant. Kind of confused why there needs to be a distinctio
  - There will always be discordant aliefs and beliefs because aliefs do not respond to things/changes in the world such as beliefs do. They are insensitive to how things are
  - Beliefs are considered and rational (Really?? Aliens? Gettier?)
  - So humans will often have belief-discordant aliefs and animals will have teleofunctional discordant aliefs – a bird hitting a window
  - So a simplistic way to think about this is that teleofunctional discordant aliefs predispose humans and animals to behave in ways that violate self interest.
  - Belief-discordant aliefs (norm-discordant) predispose humans to behave in ways that violate their intention to regulate their behavior according to some norm.
  - They usually aren’t wanted, although things like horror movies, therapy, roller coasters, exploit them for our benefit
  - She thinks that Plato’s idea of the well-functioning soul with all parts in line represents this idea
  - However, as nice as it would be to have all our soul parts in line, Gendler realizes this is not possible
  - **Regulating Unwanted Discordant Alief**
  - Says that the ancients/early moderns have many examples for regulating alief. Is it really alief? Isn’t it more so the “passions”?
  - Two traditional methods are:
    - 1) cultivating norm-concordant habits through rehearsal – so not affecting those innate ones? Moreso about habits?
    - 2) regulate otherwise occurrent norm discordant aliefs with focused attention and imagination.

- Aristotelian ethics is an example of the first one. We become a certain way as we act that way more and more. The behavior becomes habit
- Hopefully the concordant ones will eventually outweigh the discordant ones
- Malebranch and Descartes use the second option to control (what Gendler thinks) are aliefs. They urge us to resist their influence
- In contemporary contexts, it is important to talk about controlling aliefs such as getting rid of racist alief
- Gendler says that many American Whites are avowed anti-racists who consciously endorse equal values, but who have negative feelings towards another racial group, even though they are hidden from awareness
- She thinks that the legacy of living in a society where there is hierarchical structure leaves its mark. So she does not think that racism is innate, but habitual?
- Some research examples are that people primed with images of Black faces are quicker to think that a tool is a gun, "Black" names on resumes get less call backs
- She thinks that we must get rid of enormously deep seated habits to overcome racism
- Stereotypes exist from very early childhood where we cannot be reflexive about them, and are thus more deep seated than beliefs. Breaking them is like breaking a bad habit
- However, experiments have shown that training can start to weaken negative stereotypical responses. In one experiment, the subjects were given two tasks. In the first, subjects were trained either against stereotypes, or for them. Those trained against stereotypes were given a situation where they answered "No" to stereotypic traits, followed by category representations, and "Yes" to non-stereotypic associations.
- By responding neg to stereotyped assumptions and positively to non-stereotype combos, the presentation of the categories wouldn't have the same automatic association affects.
- This showed the students who had the anti-stereotype training had reduced stereotyped activation.
- I wish she had given more examples of what "reduced activation" actually means but this is still interesting.
- The same type of experiment was done on ideas of women. When people were prepped with an idea of a strong woman, and then tested on a measure of automatic gender stereotypes, they showed less stereotypical responses
- This is very important for schools, families, etc. how could this work?
- **Final: Cost of Disharmony**
- This happens when our ideals and social reality come apart, and she says this is costly for our cognition
- She gives the example of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). It tests peoples associations between black and white faces, and positive and negative reactions. So subjects are asked to put the images into one of two distinct categories, "good" or "bad".

- Students are faster to put “white-or-positive” or “black-or-negative” together. She asks does this measure indiv racism, or cultural associations with blacks and negative attitudes. (Either way it is troubling)
- Either way, it is troubling because aliefs are behind both
- Even people who are avowed anti-racists can have negative aliefs
- She says there is a cognitive cost of racist alief. There is a further step to this test. After the test, each student interacted with a same or different race confederate, then they did an unrelated Stroop colour test to see how well they did – this test usually measures executive control
- Interracial stress was present. Whites did worse on the test after interacting with a Black person. The more racist the white person was who interacted with the black person, the worse they did
- What about how Black people did?
- So subjects whose occurrent racist beliefs were out of line with trying to be non-racist expended a lot of energy in this test trying to act this way.
- Living in a society that violates ones normative ideals has cognitive consequences
- Either you must work hard to ignore your occurrent aliefs that are out of line with society, or you must agree with aliefs and be racist
- This is a sad note she leaves the paper on.

### Questions

1. do you think she needs a more concrete idea of what belief is?
2. Are you convinced by all of her arguments for alief? Even in cases that seem very different – throwing the darts at the picture vs. the frog and BB
3. Do you think it is possible to control habitual aliefs? Innate aliefs?
4. Do you find a problem with occurrent aliefs and dispositional aliefs?
5. How does this argument relate back to her argument last week about fictional deviant stories?