ABSTRACTS

Western Canadian Philosophical Association

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University of Alberta

Author-Meets-Critics Panel

Cressida Heyes, *Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies*

Critics:

1. Catherine Kellogg (Department of Political Science, University of Alberta)
2. Kimberly Leighton (Department of Philosophy, George Mason University, USA)
3. Dianna Taylor (Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, USA)

Respondent: Cressida J. Heyes (Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta)

Summary:

In *Self-Transformations* (Oxford University Press, 2007), Cressida Heyes argues that we live in an age of somatic subjects, whose authentic identity must be represented through the body. When a perceived mismatch between inner self and outer form occurs, technologies can step in to change the flesh. Drawing on Wittgenstein's objections to the idea of a private language, and on Foucault's critical account of normalization, Heyes shows how we have been led to think of ourselves in this way, and suggests that breaking the hold of this picture of the self will be central to our freedom. How should we work on ourselves when so often the kind of self we are urged to be is itself a product of normalization? This question is answered through three case studies that analyze feminist interpretations of transgender politics, the allure of weight loss dieting, and representations of cosmetic surgery patients. Mixing philosophical argument with personal narrative and analysis of popular culture, Heyes moves from engagement with Leslie Feinberg on transliberation, to an auto-ethnography of Weight Watchers meetings, to a reading of Extreme Makeover, to her own practice of yoga. Heyes concludes by arguing that Foucault's last work on ethics provides untapped resources for understanding how we might use our embodied agency to create new forms of freedom.

Catherine Kellogg works in contemporary continental philosophy and in feminist and critical theory. She is currently working on a project connecting political critique and political hope. **Kimberley Leighton**'s current research examines the ways self-knowledge is operative in some of the key concepts of contemporary and modern political theory (e.g., agency, identity, autonomy, and authenticity). **Dianna Taylor** is the editor of *Feminism and the Final Foucault*, as well as of a forthcoming collection of essays on key concepts in Foucault. She works in continental and feminist philosophy.

Symposium

Explanation and Conceptual Change in Evolutionary Biology

Presentations:

1. Alan Love (University of Minnesota, USA): "Rethinking Conceptual Change in the Context of Evolutionary Developmental Biology"
2. Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto): "Drift and 'Merely Statistical' Explanation"
3. Frédéric Bouchard (Université de Montréal): "Why Thinking about Variation Should Not Depend on Darwinian Populations of Replicators"

Organizer: Ingo Brigandt (University of Alberta)

Summary:

Theory structure, explanation, and conceptual change are central issues in philosophy of science and have also been widely discussed in the context of evolutionary biology. The Darwinian revolution of the 1860s, the modern evolutionary synthesis (neo-Darwinism) of the 1940s, and the explosion of molecular biology over the past several decades provide ample material for philosophers of biology to study the problem of conceptual change. Philosophical reflection on theory structure and explanation emerges naturally from the fact that the modern synthesis related different biological fields and explained evolutionary change in terms of a diversity of factors (mutation, natural selection, random drift, migration).

This symposium revisits philosophical questions about explanation and conceptual change based on two novel issues in evolutionary biology: (1) the recent advent of evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) as an attempt to unite different biological fields and kinds of explanations; and (2) current debates about the nature of populations and statistical explanations in evolutionary theory and the role of random drift.

Alan Love's talk uses the emergence of evolutionary developmental biology to reconfigure past philosophical accounts of conceptual change. While previous debates on incommensurability have focused on reference, Love argues that a neglected epistemological issue is the lack of a common measure between problems, methods, or criteria of explanatory adequacy. This illuminates explanatory integration because evo-devo is explicitly attempting to bridge different research traditions. **Mohan Matthen** offers a new interpretation of the nature of statistical explanation in population genetics and evolutionary biology. In contrast to many earlier accounts, he argues that it is a mistake to regard the prominent idea of random drift as an evolutionary cause or an explanatorily relevant construct. Furthermore, Matthen controversially maintains that drift and natural selection cannot be coherently construed as population-level causes. **Frédéric Bouchard** continues this discussion on the nature of evolutionary explanation with his talk on the role of populations. He suggests a novel notion of population that can in fact figure in evolutionary explanations, by attempting to find a middle way between purely mathematical-statistical explanations where ecological properties of populations are abstracted away, and an organismal view of populations that is too restrictive about what can count as a member of a population.

Symposium

Lies and Deceit

Presentations:

1. Jack MacIntosh (University of Calgary): "Augustine and Aquinas on Lying: What is a Lie and Why is Lying (Always?) Wrong?"
2. Mark Migotti (University of Calgary): "Trust, Truth, and Honesty"
3. Tim Kenyon (University of Waterloo): "Against Sincerity as Artlessness"

Organizer: Mark Migotti (University of Calgary)

Summary:

Augustine noted that while the question, "Is lying always wrong?" is as important as it is interesting, there is a prior question that philosophers should attend to, namely, "What *is* lying?" He offered a spectrum of answers, including the suggestions that someone is lying if they utter a falsehood with intent to deceive, and that someone is lying if they indulge in "speech contrary to the speaker's mind."

In answer to the question, "What is a lie?", philosophers tend to split into two main groups, with members of both groups agreeing that, centrally, someone is lying if three main points are satisfied: (a,b) someone utters, intentionally, a falsehood, and (c) by uttering the falsehood they intend to deceive. However, at this point, some splintering occurs, for any number of philosophers (Aquinas and Donald Davidson, to pick two at random) believe that *lying* is the correct term for the activity even in a number of cases where no falsehood is involved, as long as the utterer has *intended* to utter a falsehood. Others focus on the utterance rather than the intention.

Jack MacIntosh looks at a pair of saintly discussions of the issue, and suggests that while we may want to insert some correctives, Augustine and Aquinas have interesting and still relevant points to contribute. **Mark Migotti** discusses more fully the two ways of looking at the issue, and notes that the crucial difference between a trust-focused and a truth-focused account of the wrongness of lying is that on the former view mendacity is fundamentally a social violation, an impediment to fruitful cooperation; however, when the accent is reversed, it is first and foremost some other kind of violation, an offence somehow against truth and assertion themselves perhaps, or against oneself, or one's rational nature or something like that. On the former conception, mendacity is *essentially* a threat to cooperation; on the latter it threatens cooperation only *per accidens*. **Tim Kenyon** looks in depth at what is involved in the notion of a sincere utterance, and argues against Bernard Williams's suggestion that "sincerity basically involves a certain kind of spontaneity." Not so, says Kenyon. Spontaneity, openness, or lack of adjustment are typically considered to be equivalent in these contexts, but they are not equivalent, and none of them is the correct account of what is important when sincerity is at issue.

Symposium

Natural Kinds in Biology

Presentations:

1. Paul Thompson (University of Toronto): "Darwin's Argument on Natural Kinds in *The Origin*"
2. Marc Ereshefsky (University of Calgary): "The New Biological Essentialism"
3. Ingo Brigandt (University of Alberta): "Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: From Metaphysics to Epistemology"

Organizer: Ingo Brigandt (University of Alberta)

Summary:

Three decades ago, the notion of *natural kinds* gained prominence in philosophy, due to the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam in philosophy of language. Ever since, it has enjoyed widespread acceptance and continuing reflection, particularly in metaphysics (and also in epistemology in the context of induction and projectable properties).

Within *philosophy of biology*, however, the situation has been more twisted. Philosophers not acquainted with the philosophy of biology still take species and higher taxa to be a prime example of natural kinds. However, in the 1970s this assumption has been challenged on the grounds that a natural kind is defined by an essence and thus cannot exhibit variation or undergo change—a central feature of species. An *individual* is the kind of metaphysical entity that has a history and changes, so that the idea that species are not kinds but individuals became popular among philosophers of biology, and is nowadays the dominant view among biologists. Yet in the last decade, Richard Boyd's suggestion that a natural kind is to be (re)construed as a so-called homeostatic property cluster (HPC kind) received agreement from several—though not all—philosophers of biology, as it promises a notion of natural kind that is consistent with the variation and heterogeneity of biological kinds, including species.

As a result, in philosophy of biology there are diverging views about which of the various biological things are natural kinds, what notion of 'natural kind' is appropriate for biological kinds, and the relation to kinds studied by other sciences (including the social sciences). This symposium contributes to this ongoing philosophy of biology debate on a notion of general philosophical importance.

Paul Thompson's talk introduces the issue of natural kinds in biology historically, by discussing how in his defence of the evolutionary origin of species, Darwin succeeded in removing the assumption that species were immutable kinds. **Marc Ereshefsky** criticizes the recent philosophical trend of construing species and higher taxa again as kinds, and the way the notions of essence and HPC kind are employed in this trend. **Ingo Brigandt** briefly replies to Ereshefsky, but primarily attempts to broaden the perspective of the debate by discussing how the notion of an HPC kind is to be applied to other examples and by adding epistemological considerations to the hitherto metaphysical debate about kinds vs. individuals.

Symposium

Philosophy and Climate Change

Presentations:

1. Thomas Heyd (University of Victoria): "Philosophy and Climate Change: *And Yet It Moves*"
2. Kent Peacock (University of Lethbridge): "The Case for Environmental Realism, and a Recursive Model of Decision-Making for Environmental Remediation Based Upon It"
3. Bruce Morito (Athabasca University): "Ethics of Climate Change: Adopting an Empirical Approach to Moral Concern"
4. Martin Schönfeld (University of South Florida, USA): "The Heuristic Impact of Climate Change on Philosophy"

Organizer: Thomas Heyd (University of Victoria)

Summary:

How to think about climate change philosophically? This is the question posed by this symposium. The answer seems both straightforward as well as rather unclear. It would seem straightforward, insofar as we may claim that the usual philosophical methods of analytical rigour and reflective exploration should apply anywhere. It is unclear insofar as, throughout the past history of philosophy, there has been no interest in climate change, though there has been some in the relation of climate to human capacities and characteristics at various times since antiquity. Climate as such, moreover, does not seem to set the types of conceptual, epistemological, aesthetic or ethical questions that philosophers generally are attuned to. The lack of precedents, moreover, makes it difficult to settle on a *matter* to discuss philosophically.

Present popular awareness of climate change indeed has provoked a flurry of interest by some applied ethicists, but the question is, is climate change—or should it be—a focus for much more sustained philosophical discussion, given the present outlook painted by the World Metereological Association, the IPCC and various other scientific bodies? It is under these conditions that we invite fellow philosophers to engage in discussion and reflection on the interplay between philosophy and of climate change.

Thomas Heyd proposes to open up the question how we conceive climate change in relation to the categories of weather and climate. Since these are categories whose meanings have a large experiential component, he suggests that we ask how climate change can be conceived so that it goes beyond mere abstraction. **Kent Peacock** follows suit taking his clue from the contemporary ecological crisis and the crisis heralded by the imminent depletion of fossil energy sources. He argues for environmental realism and a recursive model for decision making as key to managing these issues. **Bruce Morito** suggests that climate change actually challenges the usual modes of ethical deliberation and theorising, insofar as the complexity of the problems that need to be addressed does not fit into the traditional models. His call for reconsideration of traditional parameters in applied ethics draws on his involvement in an empirical research project across national and climate barriers. **Martin Schönfeld**, finally, takes climate change as the fulcrum for a reassessment of the contrasting pair, analytical and postmodern philosophy, in order to show how much they share in their oversights in engagement with the real world we all live in. This evaluation of their respective alienations from the world serves as the launching site for his call for a general reorientation of philosophy as a discipline.

Symposium

Philosophy, Eugenics, and Disability in Alberta and Places North

Presentations:

1. Dick Sobsey (University of Alberta): "Varieties of Eugenics Experience in the 21st Century"
2. Simo Vehmas (University of Jyväskylä, Finland): "Preventing Disability: Nordic Perspectives"
3. Martin Tweedale (University of Alberta): "Ethical Dilemmas in Eliminating the MacEachran Prizes in Philosophy"
4. Rob Wilson (University of Alberta): "Building Inclusive Communities Through Practices of Collective Memory: The Case of Eugenic Sterilization in Alberta"

Organizer: Rob Wilson (University of Alberta)

Summary:

The Sexual Sterilization Act of Alberta was law from 1928 until 1972. During this period, the rate of eugenic sterilization in Alberta was one of the highest in any jurisdiction, especially after 1945. Most of what is known here came to light through the legal case of Muir vs The Queen, including the decision handed down by Madam Justice Veit. In the 1990s, the Scandinavian countries engaged in a sustained, public exploration of their own history of eugenic and other sterilization practices, resulting in the book *Eugenics and the Welfare State: Sterilization Policy in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland* (1996, reissued 2005). Two aspects of Alberta's history of eugenic sterilization relevant for this symposium are that (a) the head of the Eugenics Board for 45 years was the founding chair of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology at Alberta, John MacEachran; and (b) in the wake of the Muir trial, the Department of Philosophy, on the recommendations in the "MacEachran report" of a subcommittee, acknowledged the role of philosophy—disciplinarily and institutionally—in the history of eugenic sterilization, and in contemporary reflections on that history. In this symposium, past will meet present, with local twists to general issues.

Dick Sobsey will begin with underlying assumptions of the eugenics movement and how they led to distinct practices of selective population control, including sterilization, incarceration, selective abortion, and extermination. Dick will argue that compulsory sterilization has been identified as the hallmark of negative eugenics simply because it has been difficult to justify by any other rationale, while other eugenic practices have dual effects. **Simo Vehmas** will describe and analyse from an ethical viewpoint the attempts to prevent disability in the Nordic countries. **Martin Tweedale** will focus on the Philosophy Department's decision over whether to continue its association with the prizes in the name of John MacEachran, summarizing the factors considered in the deliberations, and exploring the extent to which the decision taken was rationally demanded by those considerations. **Rob Wilson** will deliver part interim report, part philosophical reflection, on his work on building alliances both across disciplines, and between university researchers and community activists, to explore the Alberta's eugenics history.

Abstracts of Individual Papers

Was "Pluto is a Planet" Ever True?
Peter Alward (University of Lethbridge)

In this essay, I argue that prior to the decision of the International Astronomical Union to adopt of definition of 'planet' which excluded Pluto, it was true to say "Pluto is a planet": by their action, the IAU changed the meaning of the term. I defend a version of Putnam's exemplar-SameLness theory of referring for natural kind terms. And I argue that prior to the IAU decision, Pluto was an exemplar of the term 'planet'.

A Simple Account of the Permissibility of Following Orders in an Unjust War
Marcus Arvan (University of British Columbia)

David Estlund recently argued that under the right conditions, a soldier can be morally obligated to follow orders in an unjust war. I argue in this paper that Estlund's argument faces three fatal problems, and I defend an alternative account, based upon Bernard Williams' well-known distinction between "internal" and "external" reasons, of when, and why, it is morally permissible for soldiers to follow orders in an unjust war.

Non-Essential Necessary Connections
Roberta Ballarin (University of British Columbia)

Naming and Necessity is the classical text of contemporary essentialism. Yet N&N does not present one unified interpretation of necessity. I argue that Kripke's argument in footnote 56 for the necessity of origin embodies an anti-essentialist, combinatorial interpretation of necessity. The most plausible reconstructions of Kripke's argument must implicitly assume a Compossibility premise, according to which distinct possibilities must be compossible. I connect the basic idea behind such Principle of Compossibility to two anti-essentialist views: (i) a *generalized* Humean framework, and (ii) maximal model theoretic constructions. When conflicts arise between the Humean denial of necessary connections between things and the maximalist principle of recombination of distinct possibilities, the preferred combinatorial strategy eliminates possibilities, because Compossibility embodies the spirit of the combinatorial interpretation of necessity at a deeper level than Hume's recombination of distinct existences, insofar as it defines possibilities themselves, rather than objects, as fundamentally independent from one another.

Particularism and Semantic Normativity
Anna Bergqvist (University of Reading, UK)

This paper critically examines Daniel Whiting's recent defence of the received 'generalist' view that semantic normativity and linguistic competence with terms requires mastery of rules governing their correct standard employment, which he offers in response to Jonathan Dancy's outline of a rival 'particularist' account of such matters. Whiting's aim is to show that the arrival of particularism in the field of semantics does nothing to undermine the default status of

generalism, since the positive considerations Dancy adduces in favour of the alternative view are inconclusive. I argue that Whiting fails to establish this claim, since his generalist reply to Dancy is off the mark. I then proceed to provide independent support for the particularist thesis that what the competent speaker knows, in knowing the meaning of a term, cannot be captured in a specifiable rule.

Correspondence and Aristotle's Syllogistic: the Resolution of Negation
Richard Bosley (University of Alberta)

In composing the *Prior Analytics* Aristotle sustains a distinction between terms (*horoi*, i.e. A, B, C) and their relations, i.e. A belonging to B, A being necessary for B or A being contingent for B, on the one hand, and, on the other, linguistic expressions, 'A' whereby the term A can be indicated and premises formed from subject- and predicate-expressions. My paper takes it to be Aristotle's view that every underlying grid of terms and relations contains two intervals and a concluding interval defined by the conclusion of the syllogism. To diagram the intervals I introduce the resolution of negation, a method which aids an account of syllogisms on their original figures without reducing syllogisms on last two figures to the first figure. The project of the paper is to demonstrate what shape syllogisms take with the resolution of negation.

Permutation Invariance and the Epistemology of Logic
David Boutillier (University of Calgary)

Abstract: The goal of the paper is to outline a strategy for explaining how basic logical laws are justified. The strategy that I present begins by transforming the problem of the justification of basic logical laws into the problem of explaining the origin logical concepts. Then explanation of the origin of logical concepts is sketched. It makes use of a philosophical analysis that claims that logical concepts are given to us as objects that are invariant under suitable transformations. This analysis, in turn, enables the problem of explaining the origin of logical concepts to be transformed into the more tractable problem of the origin of objects and properties.

Luck, Modality and Practical Interests
Ken Boyd (University of Toronto)

Theories of epistemic luck have become too narrow in their focus. In this investigation I examine one particular contemporary theory, Duncan Pritchardís modal account put forth in his book Epistemic Luck, and argue that his criteria are neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful definition of luck. Furthermore, I claim that a thorough investigation of harmful epistemic luck can benefit from attention to factors not typically considered by contemporary theories, specifically the extra-epistemological practical interests of the agent.

Constructivism and Self-Knowledge
Darren Bradley (University of British Columbia)

It is widely accepted that our knowledge of our own thoughts is directly accessible to us in a way that knowledge of the external world is not. It is also widely accepted that some of our concepts

are individuated in part by the external world. But there is a tension between these two positions. How could we have direct knowledge of what we are thinking if what we are thinking depends on what the external world is like? Accordingly, incompatibilists claim that direct self-knowledge and semantic externalism conflict. Compatibilists claim that they do not. I will argue that there is an ambiguity in the knowledge claims at issue, such as `S knows what he is thinking aboutY.' Such knowledge claims should be understood relative to some contrast class of what S is not thinking about. With this distinction in place, the disagreement between the incompatibilist and compatibilist dissolves.

Two Dimensional Time and Positive Freedom
Bryson Brown (University of Lethbridge)

Libertarians have often emphasized the negative in their approach to freedom. That is, they have focused on arguing that determinism is incompatible with free will. Logical work from this point of view has led to 'branching time' logics, which provide simple models of indeterministic histories. However, the need for a positive account of freedom remains acute, since the failure of determinism is acknowledged to be insuffcient for freedom: a 'pure chance' model of choice-making is (at best) no more satisfying to the libertarian than a deterministic one. Something has to justify the attribution of actions (and their consequences) to the agent. For the libertarian, of course, these grounds of attribution must not lead back to a deterministic account of choice-making. In this essay I offer libertarians a metaphysical account of positive freedom, although I hope that they will look beyond it to a different understanding of the tension between freedom and responsibility and descriptive accounts of human behaviour.

Learning that We See the Light: Colour Constancy and Illumination-Dependent Colour
Derek Brown (Brandon University)

Colour objectivists routinely appeal to colour constancy to support their thesis that colours are illumination-independent. I argue that the plausibility of this claim rests on a superficial and inaccurate conception of colour constancy. In particular, constancy cases routinely involve perceived variations in illumination, variations that themselves are described as involving changes in colour. In such cases an illumination-*de*pendent colour is reported *in addition to* a constant, illumination-independent one. The inference from colour constancy to the illumination-independence of colour is invalid, constancy instead supports a dual-referent approach to colour theory. Various objections are considered, including ones from the computational approach to colour constancy and recent work by David Hilbert.

S knows p rather than q. S knows p rather than not-p. S knows p
Joel Buenting (University of Alberta)

Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation "S knows p rather than q". I argue that "S knows p rather than q" is often equivalent to "S knows p rather than not-p" and hence equivalent to "S knows p." The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.

Normativity and Correctness
Andrei Buleandra (University of Alberta)

In this paper I will present and evaluate Anandi Hattiangadi's arguments for the conclusion that meaning is not intrinsically normative or prescriptive. I will argue that she misconstrues the way the thesis that meaning is normative is presented in the literature and that there is an important class of semantic rules that she fails to consider and rule out. According to Hattiangadi, defenders of meaning prescriptivity argue that speaking truthfully is a necessary condition for speaking meaningfully. I will maintain that this is not how prescriptivity is construed by 'normativists' such as Kripke, Hacker and Baker, Brandom and Millar. I think that Hattiangadi misconstrues the prescriptivity thesis because she does not distinguish between the general notion of correctness of use and the specific notion of correctness of application. In other words, she does not distinguish between using a term correctly and applying it truthfully. In addition, I submit that there is an important class of semantic rules determining correct use that Hattiangadi does not consider. Following the later Wittgenstein, Hacker and Baker argue that accepted explanations of the meanings of words have the function of semantic rules.

Do Natural Kinds Violate Naturalism?
Mary Butterfield (Vanderbilt University, USA)

Since the publication of W.V. Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" there has been an explosion of naturalistic approaches to epistemology. Quine's project represented an attempt to move our theorizing about knowledge from the conceptual or abstract realm into the natural world. To do so would mean that knowledge was no longer the object of inquiry for armchair philosophers, but the job of scientists. According to Quine, in order to study knowledge we cannot decide the parameters of the concept in advance of empirical investigation. My purpose in this paper is to assess the claim of naturalist Hilary Kornblith that knowledge is a natural kind. I consider two objections to this view.
The first is drawn from evolutionary biologists Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould, and questions whether knowledge is tenably understood as a natural kind. Secondly, using the feminist naturalized epistemology of Lynn Hankinson Nelson, I argue that Kornblith's assertion of knowledge as a natural kind violates the spirit of epistemology as naturalized.

Consensus and Social Stability
Mark Capustin (University of Manitoba / University of Winnipeg)

In *Political Liberalism*, John Rawls argues that an overlapping consensus on the fundamentals of justice is the best foundation for social stability and unity. I will argue that there are alternatives to a Rawlsian overlapping consensus as viable bases for social stability and unity. While I cannot demonstrate that an overlapping consensus is not possible, given the kinds of disagreements that persist regarding matters of fundamental justice, there is reason to be doubtful. Even if a Rawlsian overlapping consensus is not feasible, it is, I will argue, possible to have a thin consensus on matters of principle in which there is incomplete agreement that overlaps and intersects in complex ways, and this thin consensus can contribute to social stability and unity.

Moderate Composition Without Vague Existence
Chad Carmichael (Stanford University, USA)

David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur the connection between composition and existence that Lewis assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague composition, there is an object, colocated with the relevant borderline parts, about which it is vague whether those borderline parts compose it.

Fictional Contingencies
Gemma Celestino (University of British Columbia)

I argue that fictional contingencies, such as the one that, in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, Anna Karenina might not have fallen for Vronsky pose a serious problem to a view of fiction such as the one defended by David Lewis and Gregory Currie. Their view cannot account for the fact that in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, it is Anna Karenina herself who contingently falls for Vronsky. In Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, Anna Karenina falls for Vronsky in the actual world but she fails to fall for him in some other possible world.

Inside the Outside: The Hold of Aristotelian Topos
Christopher Cohoon (Stony Brook University, USA)

In this paper, which ventures a close reading of Aristotle's notoriously slippery treatise on place (*Physics* IV.1-5), I pursue two primary aims. First, I attempt to show that Aristotle's account is not as slippery as it initially appears. Aristotle's derivation of the "what" (*ti estin*) of place can be made more tangible, I argue, by referring to his position on the void and to his reliance upon the limit/limited dichotomy. Second, having established that the account of place is not prohibitively slippery, I attempt to show that it is not perfectly comprehensible either, and that the resistance of place to being fully grasped is perhaps not due to any flaw in Aristotle's account, but rather to the strange nature of place itself. As evidence, I draw out four aporias – unrecognized by Aristotle – that I hope will collectively point toward a fresh understanding of Aristotelian *topos*.

Meaning is Normative: A Response to Hattiangadi
James Connelly (Trent University /York University)

Against a broad consensus within contemporary analytic philosophy, Hattiangadi (2006, 2007) has recently argued that linguistic meaning is not normative, at least not in the sense of being prescriptive. She maintains, more specifically, that standard claims to the effect that meaning is normative are usually ambiguous between two readings: one, which she calls *Prescriptivity*, and another, which she calls *Correctness*. According to Hattiangadi, though meaning is normative in the uncontroversial sense specified in the principle *Correctness*, it is not normative in the sense specified by *Prescriptivity*. In this paper, I try to show instead that meaning is normative in the sense of being prescriptive. My argument for this claim takes the form of a classical disjunctive syllogism. I argue that *Correctness* implies (because it presupposes) *Prescriptivity*, or

linguistically meaningful items are 'intrinsically intentional.' But linguistically meaningful items are not intrinsically intentional, and thus *Correctness* implies (because it presupposes) *Prescriptivity*.

The Normativity of Freedom in Kant's Ethics: A Problem from Kant's Nachlass
Gordon Davis (Carleton University)

In some of Kant's published works in ethics, there is a foundational problem lurking beneath the surface, concerning the relative normative importance of reason and freedom. But in Kant's *Nachlass*, there are signs of his grappling openly with this problem, and eventually signs of his concluding that freedom has foundational priority as the normative factor that confers value on reason (which in turn yields the categorical imperative). In light of all this, we can read Kant's published works in a new light, and locate fresh resources for countering some recent critiques of Kantian ethics.

The Craft Model of Virtue in Plato's Euthydemus and Stoicism
Dimitrios Dentsoras (University of Manitoba)

This essay examines the Stoic description of virtue as a craft that governs the proper use of one's possessions, drawing some parallels between the Stoic craft model of virtue and its Socratic antecedents. Both models are intended as an argumentative strategy for demonstrating virtue's necessity and sufficiency for happiness. Socrates' model fails to do so, and I believe the Stoics tried to amend its weak points. I focus on three such corrections. The first is the Stoic view that the possessions virtue uses never become goods, even when properly used by the virtuous. The second is the claim that virtue can produce some benefit out of the use of any external indifferent, and not only some appropriate preferable possessions. The third is the view that the virtuous person can use her own virtuous thoughts and dispositions in order to produce some benefit, and, is, therefore, not constrained by the lack of any external possession. I conclude that the Stoic craft model is an improvement over Socrates' in arguing for virtue's necessity and sufficiency for happiness.

The Conceivability Argument against Behaviourism and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)

The phenomenal concept strategy is one of the most attractive responses to the so-called conceivability arguments. A crucial step in these arguments is the inference from conceivability to possibility. The phenomenal concept strategy attacks this inference from conceivability to possibility: they argue that there is an alternative explanation of the conceivability of zombies, which does not involve the possibility of zombies. This alternative explanation appeals to special features of phenomenal concepts in order to explain the conceivability of zombies. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that if the phenomenal concept strategy was a good strategy against the conceivability argument against physicalism, it would also be a good strategy against the conceivability argument against behaviourism. But he claims that the latter conceivability argument is sound, and therefore the phenomenal concept strategy cannot be correct. In this paper I show how the phenomenal concept strategy can respond to this objection.

Minimalist Semantics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism
William Dunaway (University of Southern California, USA)

It has been suggested in the literature on Expressivism that Expressivists need not disagree with anything Realists say. The motivating thought behind this view is Simon Blackburn's suggestion that Expressivists can take Realist-sounding sentences, and interpret them so that they don't say anything that is inconsistent with Expressivism. In a recent paper, James Dreier worried about the consequences of Expressivists carrying out such a project, since it would be unclear how to say what the difference between meta-ethical Expressivism and Realism is. In this paper, I argue that Blackburn's project cannot be carried out. I present a set of sentences that meta-ethical Realists can accept, and argue that there is no Expressivist-friendly interpretation scheme on which they all come out true. If this is right, then Expressivists cannot claim certain theoretical advantages that Blackburn wished to claim, and Dreier's worry about stating the difference between the two views does not arise.

Opacity and Reciprocity in Character Ethics
Ami Harbin (Dalhousie University)

In this paper, I make two critical, interconnected points regarding Kantian normative theory: one about opacity, and the other about reciprocity. My broader project is to work toward a robust analysis of our capacities to help each other clarify and develop our characters, and of the responsibilities we have to do so. My goal in this paper is to consider one facet of this larger project, by revisiting and revising Kantian claims regarding a) our characters as opaque to us and others, and b) the reciprocity necessarily at work within responsible relationships. I offer an account of necessarily asymmetrical responsibilities and relations which highlights the promising roles others can play in clarifying and developing our characters with us, and sometimes (healthily, legitimately, generously) for us.

Nativism: In Defense of the Representational Interpretation
Glen Hoffmann (Ryerson University)

Linguistic competence, in general terms, involves the ability to learn, understand, and speak a language. Nativism holds that linguistic competence is explained primarily by an innate faculty of linguistic *cognition*. In this paper, close scrutiny is given to nativism's fundamental commitments in the area of metaphysics. In the course of this exploration it is argued that any minimally defensible variety of nativism is, for better or worse, married to two theses: linguistic competence is grounded in a faculty of linguistic cognition that is (i) *embodied* and (ii) whose rules are *represented* in the brains of human language users.

Fiction, Truth, and Inference: A Critique of Woods's Stipulationist Account
Jillian Isenberg (University of British Columbia)

In the recent literature, Woods advocates stipulationism; the view that truth in fiction arises through the author's creative act of stipulation. I argue that while stipulationism itself is an attractive theory, the conclusions that Woods draws from it are not. Particularly problematic is his claim that there are fictional truths to which we have no epistemic access. If, as Woods

claims, all that is true in a fiction are the stipulated facts together with those conclusions that we can validly draw from them, then there can be no fictional facts that we cannot, in principle, access.

Naturalization and Natural Deduction
Herbert Korté (University of Regina)

A simplified and improved system of natural deduction for predicate logic is presented. The inference rules of existential instantiation EI (□ E) and universal generalization UG (□ I) are not employed in this system. Except for universal instantiation of an individual constant and existential generalization, quantifiers are neither eliminated nor introduced in any proof procedures. A proof-theoretic role for the quantifier is introduced in the form of a commonizing quantifier. It is argued that this proof-theoretic role of the commonizing quantifier exemplifies one of Frege's basic insights, by making explicit in the context of natural deduction, the fundamental difference between the semantics of proper names and expressions of single or multiple generality. Arbitrary-object semantics, which is customarily used to justify the restrictions placed on the inference rules EI and UG, and to provide the truth conditions for these rules, is discussed and criticized. Since the notion of an arbitrary object can be entirely dispensed with, it is argued that, apart from considerations of simplicity, elegance, and parsimony, philosophical considerations decidedly favour the naturalized natural deduction system presented here.

The Riddle of Ambiguity: Existential Ethic or Ontological Catch-22?
Christinia Landry (Wilfrid Laurier University)

I argue that both Simone de Beauvoir's success and ultimate failure in formulating a plausible existential ethics lies in her distinct understanding of transcendence as an upsurge of being which originates in and necessitates bodily immanence. For Beauvoir, transcendence can be ethically conscientious if and only if it revels in immanence, a gesture that puts oneself at risk toward the Other. Unfortunately, this putting oneself at risk is the only way to generate an authentic, ambiguous and non-conflictual relationship with the Other. Given the weight of situation this existential ethic is doomed to fail.

Knowledge and Credit
Christopher Lepock (University of Toronto)

According to the credit theory of knowledge, to attribute knowledge to a believer is to credit them for having a true rather than false belief. Jennifer Lackey has argued that the credit theory cannot account for testimonial knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the problem for the credit theory runs deeper than just accounting for one source of knowledge. In ordinary attributions of credit, we deny credit to agents for successful outcomes when the fact that they were able to make use of their abilities is due to luck or others' efforts. We do not, however, deny agents knowledge in corresponding circumstances. This divergence between attributions of credit and knowledge undermines the power of the credit theory to explain the nonaccidentality and value

of knowledge. I suggest, however, an avenue that may yield an alternative account with the explanatory power for which credit theorists have called.

Counting the Consequences: Examining the Impersonal Standpoint of Consequentialism
Johnathan Matheson (University of Rochester, USA)

In this paper I want to focus on three consequences that have been claimed to make a difference in the value of an act's consequences: that the act was performed, that the act was performed by the agent who performed it, and that the act was performed by an agent who had some relevant property. In particular, I will examine whether any of these consequences can aid the invariant act consequentialist in responding to objections stemming from the claim that her thesis is 'too impersonal': Williams' integrity objection, and the objection that consequentialism cannot distinguish the moral difference between doings and allowings. I find that while consideration of such consequences may help the consequentialist in answering Williams, it only makes matter worse regarding the objection from doing and allowing.

The Mysterious μ: An Argument Against Epistemic Vagueness
David McElhoes (University of Maryland, USA)

Of all the existing theories of vagueness, Timothy Williamson's epistemicism is rather unpopular: most find it difficult to believe that there is a "magic number" of hairs that sharply divides the class of people into those who are bald and those who are not. In this paper I defend popular opinion. I attack Timothy Williamson's epistemicism on the grounds that it can be used to derive a contradiction. To derive the contradiction I first present an argument that the epistemicist is compelled to accept since it seems that its soundness relies only on classical reasoning – the sort of reasoning that is embraced by the epistemicist. The problem is that, when combined with Williamson's central epistemicist principles, the conclusion of this argument can be used to derive contradictions. Ultimately, I suggest that Fregean Nihilism might be our best option given Williamson's powerful arguments against his competitors.

Fundamental Laws and Counterfactual Stability
Patrick McGivern (University of Alberta)

I examine a recent account of the distinction between the 'fundamental' laws of physics and the 'non-fundamental' laws of the special sciences. Marc Lange (2004, 2005) has defended an account of the distinction between the laws of physics and those of the special sciences based on the concept of counterfactual stability. Very roughly, a true generalization is stable if it would remain true across a range of counterfactual situations. Lange uses this concept not only to describe the distinctive counterfactual behavior of the fundamental laws of physics but also to explain how laws from other sciences can be autonomous from the fundamental laws of physics and of independent explanatory value.
I criticize this account of the laws of physics and argue that they are not stable in the sense Lange describes. I then assess the sense of autonomy Lange's account gives the laws of the special sciences, and argue that it is of dubious explanatory value.

Moral Nativism and Poverty of Stimulus Conditions
Steve McKay (Cépeg de Sherbrook)

Recently researchers have argued for the existence of an innate faculty for moral judgment that is analogous to the Language Faculty. The case for such a faculty is strengthened if the development of moral competence takes place in poverty of stimulus conditions (henceforth, POSC) similar to what is observed during language acquisition. In what follows, I argue that moral development occurs in POSC. I conclude that the normal development of moral competence is impossible without positing the existence of an innate moral faculty providing a type of "moral grammar".

Towards a Kantian Anthropology: The Question of Human Being in Kant's Groundwork and Second Critique
Alan McLuckie (Stanford University, USA)

Kant repeatedly claims that the question "What is the human being?" is *the* driving question behind his philosophical vision. Nevertheless, Anglophone scholarship on this central issue for Kant's philosophy remains surprisingly sparse, focusing instead almost exclusively on Kant's more formal and technical writings. Such readings, however, neglect Kant's own insistence that his critical writings are only part of the picture and that a sustained inquiry into the nature of the human being is required to bring his philosophical venture to completion. My paper explicates the role of anthropology and education for Kant's philosophical project as presented in the *Groundwork* and second *Critique*. I argue that, although these works are explicitly concerned with the *formal* elucidation of the principle of morality entirely *a priori* without regard for particular human beings or human nature more generally, the central focus of these critical writings nevertheless is the embodied and socially embedded agent.

Sum Res Volans: the Centrality of Willing for Descartes
Andreea Mihali (Wilfrid Laurier University)

In this paper I argue that for Descartes willing is as much part of the essence of the mind as is awareness. Because the cogito, perceiving anything clearly and distinctly, the arguments for God's existence and the proofs for the existence of sensible things depend on the will's contribution, Descartes could not separate willing from himself no matter how hard he tried. Descartes, and us if we follow him by engaging in Cartesian meditation, is as much a res volans as a res cogitans.

Fodor's Against Darwinism
Taylor Murphy (University of Alberta)

In October 2007, Fodor wrote that he felt that the theory of natural selection was flawed. His view has attracted a fair amount of attention, and in February 2008 Fodor had a paper published detailing his reasoning, along some responses. Fodor's issue springs from the disjunction problem; a theory of evolution must not only the notion of the organisms being selected, but their being specifically selected for their phenotypic traits, and Fodor does not think that natural selection can differentiate between selection for coextensive traits. In my paper, I aim to do three

things; firstly, I will give an explanation of Fodor's main argument; secondly, I will offer a critical discussion of Fodor's thesis; and finally, I will attempt to clarify who the target of Fodor's argument is (it isn't at all clear who or what it is). In my conclusion, I outline some other reasons for doubting Fodor's argument.

Knowledge Ascriptions, Thoughts of Error, and Cognitive Bias
Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)

Thinking about the possibility of error tends to increase the stringency of our ascriptions of knowledge. When the description of a subject's predicament includes mention of some error or deception to which he might have been prone, it is harder to see him as having knowledge rather than mere belief, even if it is stipulated that his predicament involved no actual error. Contextualists and skeptics consider this increased stringency appropriate; non-skeptical invariantists disagree, but they need to explain why we are gripped by it. Recently John Hawthorne and Timothy Williamson have suggested that the inclination towards greater stringency might be explained away as a product of the availability heuristic, a bias known to distort our estimations of probability. This paper offers both empirical and conceptual arguments against the availability explanation of increased stringency, and offers a rival explanation of what happens to us psychologically when possibilities of error are mentioned.

Taking Symbiosis Seriously
Kent Peacock (University of Lethbridge)

In this paper I argue that the notion of symbiosis has not been taken seriously enough by philosophers of biology and many evolutionary biologists. I explicate the notion of symbiosis and critique remarks by Dawkins who expresses very typical objections (in the context of a discussion of the Gaia hypothesis) to the notion that natural selection could support the evolution of symbiotic associations. I argue that in the case of symbiotic associations the genome of the entire complex can be the "unit of selection;" evolution of such associations can also occur in a piecemeal way, as component organisms within the whole adjust to selective pressures imposed by the organism as a whole and its larger environment. All of this implies a much richer picture of how evolution can occur, a picture in which, as Lynn Margulis has argued, the formation of symbiotic associations plays a central role.

Personal Autonomy and Prudential Value: The Inherency Thesis
Mark Piper (St. Louis University, USA)

The principle of respect for autonomy is usually given a Kantian grounding. But given that personal autonomy differs in fundamental ways from Kantian autonomy of the will, what normative grounds do we have for accepting a principle of respect for personal autonomy? One promising way to address this question is to discern the kind of value that is primarily instantiated in the fulfillment of autonomous choice. In this paper I argue for what I call 'the inherency thesis': the thesis that an autonomous choice that succeeds in expressing an agent's authentic identity is inherently prudentially valuable for the choosing agent. Moreover, I argue that no such inherent relation exists between fulfilled autonomous choice and the exemplification of moral, aesthetic or perfectionist value. These conclusions suggest that accounts of the

normativity of personal autonomy should focus on the notion that the principle of respect for personal autonomy is grounded on the demand to promote the prudential value – and hence well-being – of others.

On the Concept of Translations between Logics: Some Considerations
Giovanni Queiroz (Federal University of Paraiba, Brazil / Universita degli Studi di Siena, Italy)

The concept of translations between logic is taken into consideration. Several papers and works are examined. A general concept based on adjunctions is proposed. With this new concept is possible to understand why certain translations from the literature work in appropriate sense whereas the other concepts do not.

Pouring Cold Water on HOT-Theory
Paul Raymont (Ryerson University)

After briefly summarizing David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, I consider difficulties that arise for such accounts from the possibility of an 'empty HOT', a HOT that occurs in the absence of the mental state that it purports to represent. I argue that the difficulties that derive from the possibility of such misrepresentation are fatal for HOT-theory. I argue also that the lesson of the failure of HOT-theory is that we should adopt the view that has recently been proposed by Uriah Kriegel and others, according to which conscious states are self-representing states.

Assessing Priest's Dialethic Response to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference
Gareth Reeves (University of Victoria)

In this paper I discuss Graham Priest's response to the paradoxes of self-reference and argue that it is inadequate by employing two arguments. The first, argues that Priest's arguments for the Existence condition in his inclosure schema do not effectively motivate the realisation of Existence in any specific case. In light of this I claim that it is exactly existence which we should deny in the face of paradoxes satisfying his inclosure schema. The second argument demonstrates that Priest's Dialethic response to the paradoxes is unacceptable, even if all of his arguments hold, because the heterological paradox can be shown to lead to triviality, a condition which is lethal to almost any philosophical position.

The Case for a New Contractualism
Travis Rieder (University of South Carolina, USA)

T.M. Scanlon tells us that the wrongness of an action is due to the fact that others could reasonably object to it – or, more precisely, that others could object to the principles that would allow it. I find this to be an eminently plausible basis for a moral theory. However, in working out the details of such an account, Scanlon devises a unique theory of practical reasoning that I find more difficult to accept. According to this theory, reasons are 'primitive' notions, which cannot be helpfully or non-circularly defined; a reason is merely "that which counts in favor of something." Against the orthodox, 'Humean' account of reasons, this more 'Kantian' theory of

practical reasoning allows Scanlon to account for a widely-held intuition concerning the categorical nature of moral commands. Scanlon's picture of reasons seems to me to be wrong, but I will not here argue for this position. To do so is an extensive project in itself, and has been done by others. Instead, I will here simply assume a Humean theory of reasons in the interest of asking whether the attractive elements of Scanlon's moral theory can be retained when his foundational account of reasons is jettisoned. I argue that it can, and that the modified theory which results is plausible.

Desert versus Entitlement
Brooke Roberts (University of California Davis, USA)

Desert is an important philosophical concept. It plays a determinant role in our moral and practical thinking. Regrettably the literature on desert has made only modest attempts to separate desert from a related but importantly different concept, entitlement. While at first blush the two concepts may seem so similar that they are fully interchangeable, I argue that they are not and that attention to this detail can provide extremely fruitful data for moral theorizing. I explore the differences and similarities between them by focusing on critical examples and determining one area in which the two notions differ: their relationship to social rules.

Raz on Authority and Democracy
David Rondel (McMaster University)

In this paper I argue that Joseph Raz's "service conception of authority," while laudable in a number of other respects, cannot convincingly account for the nature and source of democratic authority. It cannot explain (a) why decisions made democratically are more likely to be sound than decisions made non-democratically, and therefore, (b) why democratic decisions should be understood as constituting moral reasons for action and compliance. My argument is that democratic authority cannot be explained, as the service conception would have it, completely in terms of the truth or soundness of the outcomes it tends to lead toward. A defensible conception of democratic authority must involve non-instrumental values about the caliber of democratic procedures.

Life, Dignity, and Leisure
Alex Sager (University of Calgary)

Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay." Many have found the idea of a *human right* to leisure preposterous raising various objections. I argue that these objections fail and there is a strong case for considering a right to leisure among the human rights.

Student Prize Essay:
HOT Theory: Not So Hot? Autism and Rosenthal's Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness
Lee-Anna Sangster (University of Western Ontario)

In this paper I draw on clinical studies of autism to suggest that severely autistic individuals may be counterexamples to Rosenthal's Higher-order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness. Specifically, I argue that because severely autistic individuals fail false belief tests yet are still able to report their intentional states, Rosenthal's requirement of 'theory of mind'-like conceptual sophistication as criteria for intentional state consciousness may be too strong. I also argue that Leslie's (1987) theory of the underlying causes of autism suggests that autistic individuals may not be capable of the second-order thoughts Rosenthal requires in the first place, regardless of their level of conceptual sophistication. Thus I conclude that Rosenthal's theory does not seem to stand up to the emerging empirical evidence on autism. Although it may be satisfying philosophically, Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness seems to be empirically unsound.

A Defense of AI-Functionalism Against Brandom's Arguments from Holism and the Frame Problem
Reiner Schaefer (University of Guelph)

Brandom argues that functionalism must ultimately fail because it will not be able to explain how we holistically update our beliefs solely in terms of abilities possessed by nonlinguistic things. The sort of holism that language users encounter is supposedly unique to language users and therefore only language users will have the abilities needed to overcome the problems (such as the frame problem) that arise from this holism. In this paper I will argue that nonlinguistic things do in fact engage in a sort of holistic updating that is closely analogous to the holism involved in belief updating. Therefore, any difficulties relating to holism that must be overcome by linguistic things must also be overcome by nonlinguistic things. And this means that functionalists should be able to appeal to this nonlinguistic holistic updating when explaining reasoning and language use. Along the way I also hope to demystify holism and de-intellectualize reasoning/language use.

Reductio ad absurdum? Contesting Reductionist Accounts of Personhood and Personal Identity
Ulla Schmid (University of Edinburgh, UK)

Locke influentially distinguished between the identity of persons and human beings, viz. animals over time, i.e. their temporal persistence. In particular, three elements of his analysis have been seized upon in further discussion, namely (1) the dependence of personal identity on the nature of persons, (2) the stipulation of a person's consciousness as her differentia specifica, (3) the interpretation of personhood as 'forensic', i.e. normatively relevant term. I will discuss the reductionist accounts of personhood given by Derek Parfit and Carol Rovane, who both follow Locke's distinction aiming at describing personhood in an impersonal way (claim 1) by giving a criterion in purely psychological terms (claim 2). By taking them as extreme consequences of Locke's enterprise, I will argue that if we accept (3), we have to give up (1) for circularity and (2) for insufficiency. Therefore, personhood will be interpreted as depending on personal identity and not vice versa and Locke's distinction will finally turn out to be misleading.

Universalizability and Uniformity: Sentiments and Standards in Hume's Judgment of Taste
Amy Schmitter (University of Alberta)

Hume locates both the origins and the normative character of our moral and aesthetic judgments in sentiment. But does this mean that he jettisons some features of normativity, in particular those that require that what is normatively binding be universalizable and a "reason" for everybody? I argue Hume keeps some aspects of universalizability, while giving up others. I also argue that this gives us an attractive picture of the normativity in judgments of taste, one that allows that there may be divergence and irreducible diversity among even good aesthetic judgments. (Moral judgments, however, may be another matter.)

Appropriate Anthropocentrism: the Role of Place in Environmental Aesthetics
Nola Semezyszyn (University of British Columbia)

In this paper I examine the beginning assumptions of Environmental Aesthetics and argue that one of the most popular accounts of appreciation of the natural world, scientific cognitivism, does not stand alone as a theory of appreciation. The attempt to provide a theory of appreciation that is ecocentric and appropriate cannot come from mere scientific knowledge. I examine problems with some key concepts of scientific cognitivism, namely 'nature', and 'wilderness' and argue that these are inadequate to get Environmental Aesthetics off the ground. As an alternative I suggest that the geographical concept of 'place' makes for a better conceptualization of the environment and allows for an anthropocentric version that is still appropriate and cognitively rich.

On Being an Individual: Is Bundle Theory Still Alive?
Andrew Stumpf (University of Waterloo)

Every philosopher has heard of the theory that objects are nothing more than bundles of properties. Most are also aware that Bundle Theory (BT) has some serious problems. What people might not be aware of is that some fairly sophisticated versions of the bundle theory avoid most, if not all, of the standard objections. After noting the standard objections, I explicate the most prominent version of BT, which is due to Peter Simons – the Nuclear Trope Bundle Theory – according to which objects consist of a core of essential tropes along with a periphery of accidental tropes. I explain why Simon's theory is powerful and appealing – especially if we clarify his distinction between substantial and qualitative parts. But in the end I argue that there are still good reasons for rejecting it. I conclude by drawing a lesson for ontology.

A Problem for Fitting Attitudes Accounts of Intrinsic Value
Ryan Tanner (University of Calgary)

According to "fitting-attitudes" (FA) accounts of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. The most recent applications of this idea are found in Thomas Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, and Michael J. Zimmerman's analysis of intrinsic value. One objection that has been raised against buck-passing accounts is that there often seem

to be reasons to have a favorable attitude toward what seem to be utterly bad things. Until now, however, Zimmerman's account has been thought to be immune to these so-called "wrong kind of reasons" (WKR) problems. Using a Kavka-style deterrence dilemma I argue that this is not actually the case. I then close with some comments about buck-passing accounts and why I think at least one promising solution to the WKR problem must fail.

Dis-Unified Pluralist Accounts of Causation
Jason Taylor (University of Alberta)

One way of assessing the philosophical literature on causation is to consider how each author views the nature of causal relation. Early theorists, like David Lewis and David Fair, were 'monists': these theorists take there to be only one real relation in the world. More recent theorists, however, have turned to pluralist views which hold that the causal relation can only be accurately captured by two or more relations. I argue that one way of being a pluralist – the way which takes there to be exactly two types of causation – will undermine itself when central intuitively causal examples are examined carefully. Though there are multiple ways of illustrating this point, I proceed with the use of neuron diagrams (as introduced by David Lewis 1973).

The Baby, the Bathwater and some Truly Social Kinds: Literate Technologies of the Mind as Technologies of Language
Manuela Ungureanu (University of British Columbia)

While literacy as a topic of psychological research has been forcefully stimulated by the development of cognitive sciences, the advent of new communication technologies has inspired cultural theorists to consider writing as a technology of the mind, with far-ranging influences over both individual abilities and the growth of social systems. But many social scientists insist that ethnographic variation in the practices of literacy undermines the quest for generalizations here. Collins, Street, Bloch and Finnegan claim that the distinction between oral and literate cultures cannot be captured in a sound manner, and recommend simply bypassing it. I argue that the distinction between oral and literate societies is amenable to philosophical elucidation. Ideas and arguments from the metaphysics of social kinds and philosophical linguistics contribute to conceptual clarification of what counts as a practice with texts, while escaping the pitfalls of the traditional approach to literacy as a technology of the mind.

Hume and the Prince of Thieves
Jennifer Welchmann (University of Alberta)

Hume’s readers love to hate the Sensible Knave. But hating the Knave is like hating a messenger with bad tidings. The Knave points out lacunae in our natural and moral obligations to justice. But it isn’t the Knave’s *character* that is to blame, for virtually the same problem arises when we turn our attention to the Knave’s alter ego, Robin Hood, the benevolent ‘prince of thieves.’ When we do, we see that not only does benevolence pose as serious a challenge to Hume’s account of justice as self-interest, the challenge benevolence presents is in fact the more serious of the two.

Sleep Bad?
Bryan Wiebe (University of Saskatchewan)

Is sleep itself bad? I argue that Thomas Nagel's account of the badness of death in his well-known article, "Death," can also be applied to sleep. Doing so results in the conclusion that sleep is bad. In an attempt to avoid this conclusion I consider the differences between sleep and death. The differences turn out not to be useful in preventing this conclusion. I argue that reasoning in the other direction, from sleep's lack of badness to death's lack of badness, is less problematic. Further, one need not assume that sleep always lacks badness, which allows one to conclude that death is at least sometimes bad. Ultimately, I take the implication that sleep is bad to be a reductio ad absurdum for Nagel's account of the badness of death.

Guantanamo and the Rule of Law
Arthur Yates (University of Western Ontario)

This paper assesses two acts passed by the U.S. Congress regarding the commission of the Navel Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sections of The Military Commissions Act and The Detainee Treatment Act repeal the reach of judicial jurisdiction to Guantanamo. At issue is whether such acts of legislation extend beyond the bounds of legality; in particular, whether such acts passed by Congress are compatible with its legislative role. This paper argues that such legislation violates a number of principles derivative of the rule of law by virtue of resigning its legislative authority. A corresponding question of legal sufficiency confronts Legal Positivism's account of legality. The case of Guantanamo exposes a deficiency in Positivism's source requirement for legality. This paper reveals an extra constraint on what, qua legitimate legal source, counts as law – an extra constraint not encompassed by proponents of Natural Law's concerns for the moral content of law.

The Ontology of Music: A Pseudo-Problem in Philosophy
James O. Young (University of Victoria)

A bewildering array of accounts of the ontology of musical works is available. We have been told that works of music are sets of performances, abstract, eternal sound-event types, initiated types, compositional action types, compositional action tokens, ideas in a composer’s mind and continuants that perdure. I maintain that questions in the ontology of music are, in Rudolf Carnap´s sense of the term, pseudo-problems. That is, there is no alethic basis for choosing between rival musical ontologies. While we have no alethic basis for choosing any ontology of music, pragmatic reasons can be given for favouring certain ontologies of musical works over others.

How to Exorcise the Cartesian Demons from Your Intellectual Character
Mark Young (University of Ottawa)

Within contemporary virtue epistemology some philosophers have offered Cartesian Demon style arguments to dismiss the claim that the intellectual virtues are truth-conducive. Two philosophers specifically, James Montmarquet and Jonathan Kvanvig, have offered such

arguments. In this presentation these arguments will be summarized, as well as the reformulated positions concerning the intellectual virtues offered by both philosophers. An attempt will then be made to defend the claim that the intellectual virtues should still be identified as truth-conducive. It will be proposed that the possibility of a Cartesian Demon does initiate scepticism, but that this scepticism is directed toward those traits we identify as intellectual virtues and not toward the claim that the intellectual virtues are truth-conducive. Thus, we can maintain the claim that the intellectual virtues are truth-conducive, and do not have to accept either of the reformulated positions offered by Montmarquet and Kvanvig.