



# Ideational Dimensions of the Boko Haram Phenomenon

Temitope B. Oriola & Olabanji Akinola

To cite this article: Temitope B. Oriola & Olabanji Akinola (2018) Ideational Dimensions of the Boko Haram Phenomenon, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 41:8, 595-618, DOI: [10.1080/1057610X.2017.1338053](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1338053)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1338053>



Accepted author version posted online: 01 Jun 2017.  
Published online: 30 Jun 2017.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 1220



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 1 View citing articles [↗](#)



## Ideational Dimensions of the Boko Haram Phenomenon

Temitope B. Oriola<sup>a</sup> and Olabanji Akinola<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada; <sup>b</sup>Department of Political Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada

### ABSTRACT

This article draws on frame theory to explore the ideational dimensions of the Boko Haram phenomenon. Speech acts by Boko Haram's leaders are analyzed to interrogate how the organization conducts its three core framing tasks. The article argues that Boko Haram deploys three major master frames. These are *the return to true Islam frame*, *the injustice frame*, and *the war against the infidel frame*. Boko Haram's framing strategies draw on the social conditions and cultural reservoir in its domain of operations. This includes antipathy toward the West and Western education, patriarchal beliefs about gender roles and the "place" of women, and the contours of a widely popular Islamic movement that emerged in the early 1800s. Boko Haram's framing approach is also shaped by state repression and the post-9/11 cosmic war discourse. Overall, the article contributes to the limited literature on nonstructural aspects of Boko Haram's terrorist activities.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 28 February 2017  
Accepted 21 May 2017

Scholarly analyses of the Boko Haram phenomenon have produced important insights about the sociogenesis and mode of operation of the organization. Macro-level factors such as poverty and social inequality,<sup>1</sup> the failure of the Nigerian state,<sup>2</sup> Islamic fundamentalism,<sup>3</sup> trajectories of global religious terrorism,<sup>4</sup> and resistance against perceived Western cultural domination and wars in Muslim countries like Afghanistan and Iraq,<sup>5</sup> have garnered significant level of attention. Other factors such as financial benefits, and revenge for the July 2009 security crackdown by Nigerian security agents, during which Mohammed Yusuf, the founder and erstwhile leader of Boko Haram was murdered by the police after he was captured alive, have also received attention.<sup>6</sup>

Variables such as the motivation of Boko Haram's members to fight against social injustice<sup>7</sup> and the ideology of Boko Haram<sup>8</sup> are a few of the nonstructural factors used in investigating the activities of Boko Haram. However, an overarching focus on ideology is only a start in terms of understanding meaning construction and propagation by terrorist groups.<sup>9</sup> Ideology "tends to be reified and treated as a given rather than as a topic for analysis, and thus glosses over the discursive ideological work required to articulate and elaborate the array of possible links between ideas, events, and action."<sup>10</sup> Terrorists devote significant attention to framing the problem and creating meanings for members, sympathizers and broader audiences. Therefore, in spite of the utility of the broad ideology of a terrorist

organization, it is only a start in engendering understanding of the ideational framework of the organization.

The approach to scholarship on Boko Haram is structuralist in orientation.<sup>11</sup> While structural variables produce a fertile environment for the likelihood of collective action, mobilization requires more than the mere existence of a conducive socioeconomic and political climate.<sup>12</sup> The inattention to nonstructural variables has the potential to present a reductionist view of the full spectrum of the aetiology, motivation, mobilization, and mode of operation of Boko Haram's terrorist activities. This has implications for efforts by Nigeria, other Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Niger, and Chad) and their international partners to defeat Boko Haram.

There has been increasing focus on the *ideology* of Boko Haram without succinct attention to how the organization's meaning construction and the role that the cultural reservoir in its domain of operations play in the organization's framing. This article complements the existing literature by drawing on the social movement literature to investigate the framing strategies of Boko Haram. The modest aim of the article is to contribute to understanding the narratives and framing strategies of Boko Haram in the hope that policy and ideational frameworks may be devised to counter such narratives and frames.

## Frame Theory

Frame theory distills generations of work in the fields of cognitive psychology, hermeneutics, philosophy and phenomenology. The term *frame* was first used by Gregory Bateson in the paper "A Theory of Play and Fantasy."<sup>13</sup> Bateson's use of frame aligned with its subsequent refinement by Ervin Goffman.<sup>14</sup> In *Frame Analysis*, Goffman draws on W. I. Thomas, Alfred Schutz, Harold Garfinkel, and Gregory Bateson, among others, to articulate the idea of *frame*.<sup>15</sup>

A frame is "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment."<sup>16</sup> Frames are "ideational devices" that are produced within specific actor-level experiences and sociopolitical, economic, and cultural contexts.<sup>17</sup> Frame analysis attempts to understand how the human experience is rendered intelligible.<sup>18</sup> Framing complements structural explanations by focusing on the "rational signifying processes" involved in human actions such as movement mobilization.<sup>19</sup> It helps to mitigate structuralist bias and negation of human agency.

Exploring the meaning-production dynamics of a terrorist organization enables us to unpack the particularities of the constitutive elements of that which seems normal and widely accepted as the standard-bearer.<sup>20</sup> Investigating the framing architecture of Boko Haram may help to understand Boko Haram, its domain of operation and its archenemy, the Nigerian state. Terrorist organizations are constrained by factors that inform the trajectories of nonviolent social movements: Political opportunity structures, resources, and framing domain, among others.<sup>21</sup> For instance, political regime types shape the texture of movements—violent or nonviolent.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, the decision about whether or not to deploy violence is not made in a vacuum.<sup>23</sup> This means that political violence must be analyzed as a variant rather than aberrant of contentious politics; therefore, movement actors' rationale for adoption or rejection of violent repertoires also needs to be investigated.<sup>24</sup> Exploring the framing strategies of Boko Haram may help to shed light on its objectives and

how it rationalizes its actions. It also helps to understand how Boko Haram recruits, motivates and mobilizes its members.

## Data

Data for this article come from 20 speeches made by Boko Haram's leaders. Two speeches by the organization's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009, and 18 speeches by Yusuf's successor, Abubakar Shekau, between 2010 and 2016 are analyzed.<sup>25</sup> The emphasis on Shekau's speeches reflects the evolution of Boko Haram after Yusuf's death. The organization's global reputation coincides with Shekau's emergence in 2010 as Boko Haram's leader.<sup>26</sup> Most of the speeches were delivered in Hausa, Kanuri, and/or Arabic (all three were sometimes used with a few sentences in English). The article relies on English translations of the speeches as reported in the media. This presents a limitation to the study. However, the authors have attenuated this limitation by obtaining translations of each speech from multiple sources and cross-checking for consistency and accuracy.

The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the ascendance of Boko Haram. The second part focuses on Boko Haram's engagement with three core framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational.<sup>27</sup> The third section identifies and explicates the master frames used by Boko Haram. The article concludes by arguing for the need to treat ideology as something that must be unpacked to understand an organization's objectives, mobilization, and mode of operation. The policy imperative of robust engagement with Boko Haram's framing and meaning production is explicated.

## The Rise of Boko Haram

*The Jama'at ahlis Sunnah lid Da'wat wal Jihad* [People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad] or Boko Haram, is a Salafi Islamic fundamentalist group. Its terrorist activities have garnered global attention since 2009. Boko Haram was founded in the early 2000s, but became notoriously violent after the death of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, and the ascension of its leadership by Abubakar Shekau.<sup>28</sup> Following its capture of territory in parts of the northeast, Boko Haram declared a caliphate in Gwoza, Borno state Nigeria on 24 August 2014.<sup>29</sup> This marked a shift from its original reformist goal of influencing the practice of Islam in Nigeria based on its Salafist interpretation of the Quran.

Boko Haram spread from one state (Borno in the Northeast) to 17 states in 2014.<sup>30</sup> Until the first quarter of 2015, Boko Haram was believed to be in control of at least 14 local governments in three Nigerian states: Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno. Boko Haram kidnapped 276 high school girls in Chibok, Borno state in April 2014. Its campaign has been marked by mass killings, such as the murder of 59 high school boys in Buni Yadi, Yobe state in February 2014. These killings and kidnappings highlight the brazen attacks on children by Boko Haram.<sup>31</sup> Boko Haram has also exterminated over 20,000 people and injured thousands of others. In addition, over two million people are either internally displaced within Nigeria or have become refugees in neighboring countries.<sup>32</sup>

Although Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on 7 March 2015, and renamed itself the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP),<sup>33</sup> the level of interaction between ISIS and Boko Haram remains largely unknown. Nonetheless, there has

been a notable uptick in the sophistication of Boko Haram's propaganda and outreach following the pledge of allegiance. This has led to concerns amongst observers and security agencies in Nigeria and neighboring states over supranational ties and new sources of weapons.<sup>34</sup> It has calcified Boko Haram's position in global discourses on *jihadi* terrorism.<sup>35</sup>

However, the ISIS–Boko Haram relationship was strained in August 2016 when ISIS named Abu Musab al-Barnawi as its recognized “*Wali*” (custodian) of Boko Haram (ISWAP).<sup>36</sup> Abubakar Shekau disavowed the appointment through an audio statement.<sup>37</sup> It is worth noting that al-Barnawi promised to stop attacking Muslims in his first statement after his appointment. The public spat between al-Barnawi and Shekau over who is in charge of Boko Haram, and who has deviated from the course of Islamizing Nigeria, suggests a deep schism within the organization.<sup>38</sup>

The efforts of the Nigerian government under President Muhammadu Buhari, who narrowly escaped Boko Haram's assassination attempt in 2014, have helped to regain several territories from Boko Haram. Boko Haram now operates mainly around its base in the Sambisa forest. Negotiations brokered by the Red Cross, the Swiss government and Nigerian actors led to the release of 21 Chibok girls in October 2016. Despite ongoing negotiations to release more girls, and enhanced cooperation between the Nigerian military and those of neighboring countries,<sup>39</sup> especially in coordinating the attacks against the group in various border areas, Boko Haram continues to rely on asymmetrical warfare strategies: Suicide bombings by women and young girls, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and other guerrilla-style attacks that have proved difficult to effectively contain.<sup>40</sup>

### Nigeria's Islamic Movement and Boko Haram's Framing Strategies

Boko Haram depicts features of what Poletta calls “awkward” social movement organizations.<sup>41</sup> Awkward movements and organizations are those “whose composition, goals, or tactics make them difficult to study or theorize.”<sup>42</sup> These include organizations that are illicit, difficult to access, deploy violence, and whose ideologies are unappealing.<sup>43</sup> Such movements “represent an intersection of collective violence, social movement activity and contentious politics, and therefore are legitimate object for social movement research.”<sup>44</sup> This area of study until recently was accorded scant attention by social movement scholars.<sup>45</sup>

Is Boko Haram part of a specific social movement? Boko Haram is one of the newest and most lethal in a lineage of organizations within a broader movement aiming to achieve two major objectives in Nigeria: Introduction of a puritanical version of *Sharia* law, and the Islamization of Nigeria. The Fulani *jihad* that began in 1804 was the first of such efforts. Usman Dan Fodio organized an army of Fulani warriors with the support of the Hausa peasantry to defeat the ruling class in today's Northern Nigeria.<sup>46</sup> Keddie's analysis of the “revolt of Islam” indicates that Dan Fodio and his successors “created in the Sokoto caliphate a long-lived state unparalleled by any other West African jihad movement.”<sup>47</sup> The Fulani jihad deposed rulers who were accused of “un-Islamic observances” (i.e., adulterating Islam with their traditional religious practices).<sup>48</sup> The Fulani *jihad* was popular among the predominantly Hausa *talakawa* (the poor) because the “rulers imposed a non-Islamic cattle tax ... took bribes, and did not observe Islamic laws of inheritance and succession.”<sup>49</sup> The Sokoto Caliphate established by Usman Dan Fodio and nurtured to maturity by his son Muhammed Bello and his brother, Abdullahi, was once the largest state in Africa.<sup>50</sup> This politico-religious dynasty instituted extremely conservative Islam in Northern Nigeria.<sup>51</sup>

The interactions of the *Umma* with colonialist and neocolonialist states have led to concerns over perceived secularization in Northern Nigeria.<sup>52</sup> One such religious organization, Maitatsine, began to clash with the police in the 1980s. The group's leader Muhammed Marwa was concerned with the "purification of Islam. He believed that Islam had come under the corrupting influence of modernization."<sup>53</sup> Falola describes the leader of Maitatsine as "a Qur'anic teacher and preacher ... (who) rebelled against many popular opinions ... denouncing certain parts of the Holy Qur'an and even criticizing Prophet Mohammed. ... He was opposed to most aspects of modernization and to all Western influence."<sup>54</sup> The violence heralded by Maitatsine led to the death of 4,177 people during an 11-day clash between members of the fundamentalist group and state security forces in 1980.<sup>55</sup> Hundreds more lost their lives in similar clashes within a five-year period (1980–1985) after the main organization had been largely defeated by state forces.<sup>56</sup>

The 1980s also witnessed the rise of Sheik Abubakar Gumi. Gumi had a large followership and strong influence that helped to radicalize many northern Muslims. He promoted religious intolerance arguing that "once you are a Muslim, you cannot accept to choose a non-Muslim as a leader."<sup>57</sup> Fears of a religious war were confirmed when eight major churches were burned in Kano in October 1982.<sup>58</sup>

While clashes within and between Islamist groups, and between these groups and Nigerian security agencies are not uncommon, the return to democracy in 1999 after decades of military rule, ushered in an establishment-driven form of religious fundamentalism. This began with the introduction of *Sharia* law in 1999 by Ahmed Sani Yerima, the governor of Zamfara state. Other governors of Northern states felt compelled to introduce *Sharia* law as well. This is because the agitations that were fueled by missionaries sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and the greater latitude afforded to the federating units by the return of democracy, allowed state governments the opportunity to exercise authority over *Sharia* law in their states.<sup>59</sup> However, "the implementing of *Sharia* within a constitutional framework sets important limit or rules within which the *Sharia*-practicing states could act."<sup>60</sup> At the same time, as the different states sought to adapt *Sharia* to extant laws and exempt non-Muslims or those who do not choose to identify with *Sharia* courts in the adjudication of cases, the implementation of *Sharia* varied in practice in the twelve northern states where they were introduced.<sup>61</sup> Hence, even in states like Borno state where *Sharia* was introduced, and where Boko Haram members became active proponents and participants in its implementation, the introduction of *Sharia* involved a concerted effort to adapt to the extant laws within a federal constitutional framework. Nonetheless, successive organizations within the movements for Islamization in Nigeria (including the establishment variant) have enjoyed widespread public support.<sup>62</sup>

While the above analysis is not intended to cover the complex history of waves of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria (and is tangential to the purposes of this article), the idea is to suggest that the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram is merely a new trajectory of a long-standing issue. Therefore, acts such as destruction of religious sites, killing unbelievers, clashes with security forces, among others, are part of the "accumulated history"<sup>63</sup> of Northern Nigeria in the attempt to create an Islamized society. This is not the first piece to articulate a social movement perspective regarding Boko Haram.<sup>64</sup> Agbiboa argues that:

extremist Islamic movements in northern Nigeria should be considered a movement of restoration since their overriding goal continues to be the enforcement of *Sharia* in the spirit of earlier

times as inspired by Usman dan Fodio and the sharia-governed Sokoto Caliphate. Boko Haram ... is the latest and most violent manifestation of this restoration movement.<sup>65</sup>

So far, this section has demonstrated that Boko Haram is part of a wider social movement. The remaining parts of this section focus on how Boko Haram engages in framing its activities.

Following Snow and Benford, this section analyzes how Boko Haram conducts its core framing tasks vis-à-vis its battle against the Nigerian state.<sup>66</sup> It explicates Boko Haram's (1) *diagnostic framing* designed to identify the problem in the northeast of Nigeria and blame assignment; (2) Boko Haram's *prognostic framing* aimed at proffering solutions for solving the problem; and (3) its *motivational framing* used to encourage its followership to engage in violent acts against the state.<sup>67</sup> Understanding the narratives behind these three core framing tasks has potential to help in understanding the grievances of the organization, and how it recruits and mobilizes members.

### ***Diagnosing the Problem with (Northern) Nigeria***

Boko Haram mainly holds two categories of entities responsible for problems such as corruption, unemployment, poverty, and perceived secularization in Nigeria in general, and in northern Nigeria in particular. While the first category is internal to Nigeria, the second is external. The first category includes the political class, particularly elites governing northern Nigeria, the traditional and religious establishment, and entities representing Western education and democratic systems. The second category comprises the geopolitical West.

First, Boko Haram's framing of the problem with Nigeria hinges on the organization's perception of the country's governing elites as corrupt individuals whose exposure to an un-Islamic political system has contaminated their values. Boko Haram inveighs against all practices it deems un-Islamic, including working for the government.<sup>68</sup> For Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram's former leader, Nigeria's political elites, particularly those of the Muslim faith who work in government, are aiding the perpetuation of a secular system that defies the teachings of the Quran.<sup>69</sup>

Consequently, for Boko Haram, Nigerian political elites represent an apostate class of rulers whose participation in a secular state system impedes the actualization of an Islamic caliphate governed by *Sharia* law. This diagnostic framing on the role of northern elites in the Nigerian state resonated with many Muslims in the north who believe that the elites have engaged in corrupt practices (given the wide class disparities) to the detriment of the poor, and against the tenets of Islam. It endeared Yusuf to the masses who saw him as their champion.<sup>70</sup> Boko Haram has focused on assassinating Emirs and other leading traditional and religious leaders. One of those murdered was a first class traditional ruler, the Emir of Gwoza, Idrissa Timta on 30 May 2014.<sup>71</sup>

Second, Boko Haram defines itself as the only group truly committed to bringing about *jihad* against the ruling traditional and religious elites. This is interesting considering that there are other prominent Islamic fundamentalist groups like the Izala Movement and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria whose presence in northern Nigeria predates Boko Haram.<sup>72</sup>

Third, an anti-Western education narrative is central to Boko Haram's diagnostic framing. As is widely acknowledged, "Boko Haram" means Western education is forbidden in the Hausa language, and the name was coined by locals because of the organization's disdain for Western education. Boko Haram believes the knowledge provided through the Western

educational system is a major source of secularism in Nigeria. The group believes that this generates practices that breach the tenets of the Quran. For Boko Haram, such practices include co-education and teaching about evolution.<sup>73</sup> Its systematic attacks on students, teachers, and schools in Nigeria can, thus, be understood as fundamental to an objective—cleansing Islam from the pollution of Western education.

None of these is new. What has yet to be fully recognized is that suspicion and antipathy toward the West generally, and Western education specifically, is widespread in northern Nigeria. The suspicion and antipathy is particularly common among Islamic fundamentalists and their followers who often associate Western education with Christianity since it was introduced by European colonizers, and who believe that Western education promotes and supports equality for men and women. Therefore, Boko Haram's frame and fundamentalist stance in that regard aligns with such beliefs. More so, considering the highly patriarchal structures in northern Nigeria, such beliefs are also connected to cultural practices that often discriminate negatively against the education of the girl child; hence, the low opportunities for girls and women empowerment in the north. For instance, up to 75 percent of girls in rural parts of the Northeast and Northwest of Nigeria had never been to school prior to Boko Haram's attacks on schools.<sup>74</sup> When combined, Boko Haram's disdain for the West and Western-style education taps into (1) a cultural environment wherein the West and Western education have always been viewed with suspicion by many Islamic fundamentalists and nonfundamentalist Muslims; (2) the close association of Western education with Christianity; and (3) the residual animosity over the colonization of Nigeria by a putatively Anglo-Christian Britain.<sup>75</sup> The manipulation of these issues by political elites has further contributed to the resonance of Boko Haram's frames.

For instance, despite the prevalence of polio, political and religious leaders in Kano, Kaduna, and Zamfara states in Northern Nigeria campaigned against polio vaccination in 2003. The leaders argued that "the vaccine could be contaminated with anti-fertility agents (estradiol hormone), HIV, and cancerous agents."<sup>76</sup> This tapped into popular opinion in the North, which suggested that immunization of children was designed by the federal government and its international allies as a means of population reduction.<sup>77</sup> Datti Ahmed, the leader of the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN) also argued that polio vaccines were "corrupted and tainted by evildoers from America and their Western allies. ... We believe that modern-day Hitlers have deliberately adulterated the oral polio vaccines with anti-fertility drugs and ... viruses which are known to cause HIV and AIDS."<sup>78</sup> The statement by Datti Ahmed was particularly damaging to efforts at eradicating polio in the North as he was a well-respected physician in Kano. This suggests that Boko Haram's framing of education and science resonates in the north.

In addition, the influence of Western governments on the elites in Nigeria, and the perceptions of the hostility between Western governments and Muslims across the globe, have been used in framing Westerners as enemies. This provides a link between Boko Haram's internal and external diagnostic framing. Boko Haram is enraged that Western governments have been killing Muslims in various wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>79</sup> Local issues are framed as emblematic of a worldwide war against the *Ummah*.<sup>80</sup> Boko Haram believes that retaliation is a call to duty for all Muslims. For instance, while praising Al Qaeda in a video released in 2012, Shekau stated that: "We are with our mujahideen brothers in the Cause of Allah everywhere, in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Pakistan, Kashmir, Iraq, the Peninsula of Muhammad [Saudi Arabia], ... Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, and other places."<sup>81</sup> The wars in Muslim-dominated



countries have led to a feeling of “humiliation by proxy.”<sup>82</sup> This notion of vicarious victimhood is not unusual among Islamic terrorist movements around the world and non-networked “self-starter” cliques.<sup>83</sup>

Furthermore, while claiming responsibility for the bombing of the United Nations Office in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, in August 2011, Boko Haram argued that the attack was carried out because of the United Nation’s collaboration with the U.S. and the Nigerian government in persecuting Muslims.<sup>84</sup> Explosives were detonated by a suicide bomber who drove into the gate of the UN building. Twenty persons died and several others were injured in the attack. This was one of the first suicide bomb attacks by Boko Haram. Besides proving the organization’s ability to attack Western targets, the attack was framed as a symbolic rejection of the influence and presence of the West in Muslim countries at a time that Boko Haram’s ties to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was considered to be on the rise.<sup>85</sup>

### ***Boko Haram’s Prognostic Framing***

Boko Haram’s prognostic framing is increasingly global in orientation, even though its terroristic activities are so far confined to Nigeria and countries in the Lake Chad Basin. The texture of Boko Haram’s *jihād* is a combination of classical or territorial *jihād* and discursive alignment with global *jihād*. Unlike traditional *jihād* (*fard al kifaya*), which stipulates that the defense of Muslim territories is a collective responsibility of all Muslims and therefore not everyone was required to fight, classical or territorial *jihād* (*fard al ayn*) mandates individual duty rather than collective responsibility to join the struggle to remove an alien or apostate regime.<sup>86</sup>

Hence, the destruction of the Nigerian state by every true Muslim is central to the prognostic framing of Boko Haram. As such, through its recruitment efforts, as well as continuous showcasing of its victories over security agencies from Nigeria each time it captures new territories and/or successfully attacks security formations, Boko Haram constantly seeks to recruit more Muslims followers to its course. For instance, upon declaring its caliphate in Gwoza in 2014, Boko Haram began to emphasize its success in capturing vast territories, thereby signaling to its followers and audience that the end of the Nigerian state was imminent, and that the Nigeria and its international allies are incapable of stopping it from establishing a caliphate. Shekau argued that: “We are grateful to Allah for the big victory he granted our members in Gwoza and made the town part of our Islamic Caliphate. ... Who is America in the sight of Allah? ... Who is Israel in the sight of Allah?”<sup>87</sup> Boko Haram has consistently maintained that Nigeria is a country of unbelievers (*kafirs*), and that such *kafirs* (non-Muslims, Christians, and idolaters) must be brought under Islamic rule.

Boko Haram also construes itself as part of a broader global *jihadi* movement. While Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS in 2015 has generated huge attention, there is evidence demonstrating that Shekau actively sought to be “under one banner” with Al Qaeda.<sup>88</sup> This was soon after Shekau took over the leadership of Boko Haram, and before ISIS gained prominence in the Middle East. The emergence of Shekau as Boko Haram’s leader, and his desire to deepen its engagement with Al Qaeda, followed Boko Haram’s renewed determination to acquire external assistance in order to effectively wage its war against Nigeria after the death of Mohammed Yusuf. Shekau states in a letter that was recovered from bin Laden’s residence in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011 that “we have listened to your tapes and have heard your news, such as the tapes of al-Qa’ida and its shaykhs, like Usama Bin Laden ...

and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. ... But now what we have left is to learn about the system of the organization and how it is organized.”<sup>89</sup> Shekau indicated interest to speak with bin Laden’s deputy and strongly emphasized the need for “unification” and the imperative of “speaking with one voice.” While Shekau never publicly pledged allegiance to bin Laden or Al Qaeda,<sup>90</sup> his letter also demonstrates a keen interest in being part of a global *jihadi* movement. A global *jihadi* movement was a key objective of bin Laden as widely recognized.<sup>91</sup>

Boko Haram’s prognostic framing suggests that Muslims across the world must unite against their common enemies under a caliphate. This was accentuated in its pledge of allegiance to ISIS in 2015:

We call on Muslims everywhere to pledge allegiance to the caliphate ... as obedience to Allah. ... We pledge allegiance to the caliphate because of the interest of the Ummah in their religion and in their Dunya to have an Imam that looks after them according to Allah’s rule and fight the enemy of Islam and those who fight the rule of Allah....<sup>92</sup>

However, Boko Haram also accuses other Muslims of not being true believers and therefore should be treated as *Kafirs* or unbelievers. This includes killing such Muslims. Treating Muslims as *Kafir* is tied to the doctrine of “takfir” or ex-communication, the practice of labeling Muslims as apostates for whom punishment is death. Boko Haram justifies its attacks on Muslims as it does its attacks on Christians—a necessary step in creating a caliphate. Attacks on mosques and churches therefore fit into Boko Haram’s prognostic narrative. As earlier noted, whether or not Muslims would continue to be attacked remains to be seen in light of al-Barnawi’s promise to focus on attacking Christians. Nonetheless, Shekau’s faction continues to conduct attacks irrespective of religious affiliation.

Consequently, Boko Haram justifies its attacks on Muslims as it does its attacks on Christians—a necessary step in creating a caliphate. Attacks on mosques and churches, therefore, fit into Boko Haram’s prognostic narrative.

### ***Boko Haram’s Motivational Framing***

Motivational framing encompasses the “elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis or prognosis.”<sup>93</sup> Boko Haram’s motivational framing emphasizes factors that feed into its claim to being the real champion of *Sharia* law and true Islam. The debates surrounding the implementation of full *Sharia* in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era when the British colonized northern Nigeria and restricted the application of *Sharia* law to civil matters. The demand for *Sharia* restoration continues among Islamists who consider the British common law antithetical to Islam. In particular, the fact that the British prevented the application of the *hudud* penalties such as amputation of arms and death penalties for criminal offenses has remained a source of grievance and motivation for Islamists.<sup>94</sup>

Boko Haram’s motivational framing reflects this history of demand for *Sharia* law based on its Salafi ideology. Yusuf and Shekau have sought to motivate their followers by recalling the legacies of *Sharia* as laid down by earlier *jihadists* such as Uthman Dan Fodio. For instance, Shekau argues that sections of northern Nigeria “have betrayed Usman Dan Fodio and they must repent.”<sup>95</sup>

In addition, Boko Haram emphasizes the salience of true believers making clear their opposition to infidels by joining the struggle. Shekau argues that: "I am against the principle where someone will dwell in the society with the infidels without making public his opposition or anger against infidels publicly as it is stated in the Quran. Anyone doing such can't be a real Muslim."<sup>96</sup> Boko Haram attempts to make destroying the Nigerian state a religious obligation for Muslims. This is similar to how Iranians were motivated to join the 1979 revolution. The clerical leaders framed participation in "the protest a religious obligation by subjecting the political situation to religious definitions and interpretations."<sup>97</sup>

The credibility of framers is fundamental to ensuring frame resonance.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, following intense criticism of their mode of operation and killing of Muslims, and the formal split of Boko Haram, Shekau attempts to motivate his followers and assure the audience that his faction had not "derailed." He states that: "No matter what they call us, what we aspire is to justify our ideology in the Quran which is ultimate because we have not derailed."<sup>99</sup>

However, the literature appears to presuppose a voluntarist and agentic response to motivational framing by sympathizers or supporters of a movement. Boko Haram demonstrates that a movement or organization may engage in strategic motivational framing, while concurrently using coercive means for participant recruitment. For example, Boko Haram was initially widely popular among, and attracted, a lot of young men. However, "(a)s the group became more violent, it destroyed the support it once had among parts of the population. By the end of 2014, young men mainly joined Boko Haram because they had no other way to survive or because they were forced to."<sup>100</sup> Women and young girls have become central to Boko Haram's operations following a decline in male volunteers.

Women and young girls are used for purposes of procreation, killing machinery, domestic duties and human shield.<sup>101</sup> Boko Haram acquires women and young girls mainly through three ways: (1) systematic kidnapping, (2) gendered gifting of girls and women by their fathers or husbands, some of who are sympathizers of Boko Haram, and (3) female "volunteers" who join Boko Haram as a survival mechanism in an impoverished environment and to prevent victimization in the hands of state forces.<sup>102</sup> All of these avenues for acquiring women are arguably nonvoluntary.

Therefore, there is a need to pay close attention to the exact manner in which people are motivated and mobilized to become part of movements. There are instances where Boko Haram suicide bombers (mainly prepubescent girls) have refused to detonate their bombs and informed the authorities that they were forced to join the organization.<sup>103</sup> There have also been female suicide bombers who detonated their bombs with babies strapped to their backs.<sup>104</sup> There are widespread concerns that the women were forced to do so.

While Boko Haram continues discursive attempts to motivate its followers, it is concurrently undergoing both the first crisis and second crisis of modern *jihad*.<sup>105</sup> These crises respectively concern "credibility in the eyes of Muslims" and "recruitment problems."<sup>106</sup> Boko Haram has largely lost credibility in the eyes of majority of Muslims, and relies on conscription to secure recruits despite huge numbers of unemployed youth in its domain of operations.

## Boko Haram's Master Frames

Master frames provide a platform for action and render intelligible seemingly unconnected social situations.<sup>107</sup> The analysis of master frames has helped to illuminate various types of movements around the world.<sup>108</sup> Analyzing Boko Haram's master frames can help to unpack the organization's rationale for its actions. It also helps to illuminate how the organization "sells" its rebellion.

Boko Haram uses three major master frames. These are *the return to true Islam master frame*, *the injustice master frame*, and *the war against the infidel master frame*. These master frames draw on an assortment of Boko Haram's doctrinal beliefs and serve as signifying vehicles through which Boko Haram presents itself and interpellates the audience.

### The Return to True Islam Frame

The return to true Islam frame is the meta-narrative of the Boko Haram phenomenon. There are five intertwined dimensions of this master frame: (1) negation of democracy; (2) opposition to Western education; (3) ultra-conservative beliefs about gender relations, specifically the status of women; (4) construction of Christianity as "paganism"; and (5) establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. These five elements of the return to true Islam frame are tied to Boko Haram's prognostic framing and are explicated below.

Boko Haram believes that eliminating the current Western-style democratic system is necessary for true Islam to take hold in Nigeria. Democratic governance is perceived as inimical to the idea of an Islamic caliphate. Shekau argues that "(e)veryone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism."<sup>109</sup> Shekau's reaction to the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in France speaks to Boko Haram's perspective on democracy. Shekau stated that: "We are very happy with what happened at the heart of France. ... Oh you French people, oh you who follow the religion of democracy, between you and us is enmity to eternity."<sup>110</sup> The organization is critical of those who "think democracy is a religion."<sup>111</sup> Shekau's more recent warning to the government of Nigeria also indicates Boko Haram's view on democratic institutions:

To you, President Buhari, very soon you will see us inside your home the presidential palace. ... We will demolish (the) infidel and bring down the green white green and replace it with our flag. And under that flag, we shall worship Allah and we shall bring justice to all of you (Italics added).<sup>112</sup>

This frame is also tied to the failure of Nigeria's democracy to meet the needs of the masses. As Hansen and Musa observe, amongst Boko Haram members "Western secular democracy is seen as a grotesque illusion creating a narrow class of unconscionably bloated, consumption-addicted plutocrats perched atop the vast majority that is forced to live in grinding poverty and squalor while watching as the national patrimony is looted."<sup>113</sup>

In addition, Boko Haram uses the return to true Islam frame to support its strong opposition to Western education. Mohammed Yusuf revealed the stance of the group on Western education in an interview with the police shortly before his extrajudicial execution:

**Officer:** Why should you say Boko [Western education] is Haram (sinful)?

**Yusuf:** Of course it is Haram.

**Officer:** Why did you say that?

**Yusuf:** The reasons are so many...

**Officer:** The trouser you are wearing...

**Yusuf:** (cuts in) ... it is pure cotton and cotton belongs to Allah

**Officer:** But Allah said in the Qur'an iqra (reads), that people should seek knowledge...

**Yusuf:** *That's correct, but not the knowledge that contravenes the teachings of Islam. All knowledge that contradicts Islam is prohibited by the Almighty ... sihiri (sorcery or magic) is knowledge, but Allah hath forbidden it; shirk (Polytheism, sharing or associating partners to Allah) is knowledge, but Allah has forbidden it; astronomy is knowledge, but Allah has forbidden it...*

**Officer:** At your place we found computers, syringes ... are all that not products of knowledge?

**Yusuf:** They are purely technological things, not Boko ... and westernisation is different.<sup>114</sup> (Italics added for emphasis)

A movement may engage in “ideological maintenance” while confronting rather fluid and complex “strategic imperatives.”<sup>115</sup> This means that movement leaders in particular may be concerned with staying true to their ideology when faced with circumstances that challenge their beliefs. Mohammed Yusuf's comments above aimed to deflect seeming contradictions regarding his use of products of Western-style education, such as the computers in his home, vis-à-vis the doctrinal puritanism of his organization. Yusuf's insistence that “westernization is different” was an attempt to maintain narrative credibility and fidelity.

Schools are construed in Boko Haram's narrative as sites in which young minds are indoctrinated to reject Islam and pledge allegiance to another entity. Shekau argues that:

You teach your children the National Anthem in schools morning and evening which is a way of making them unbelievers from school. ... So also the National Pledge, that also is done morning and evening. They are made to pledge to something other than Allah. And that is not Islam.<sup>116</sup>

The third dimension of the return to true Islam master frame hinges on a fundamentally gendered ideological standpoint that draws on beliefs about gender roles and the place of women in society. Boko Haram's narrative emphasizes that women exist for purposes of procreation within the domestic sphere. Any deviation is considered a waste of women's reproductive energies.<sup>117</sup> For example, during an attack in a high school in 2014, the boys were killed while a Boko Haram operative ordered the girls “to go away and get married and to abandon their education.”<sup>118</sup>

Shekau's first video after the 14 April 2014 kidnapping of 276 high school girls in Chibok, Borno state, also reveals the place of women in the caliphate envisioned by Boko Haram. Shekau argues that: “I abducted your girls. I will sell them in the market, by Allah. ... There is a market for selling humans. Allah says I should sell ... I sell women.”<sup>119</sup> There is no evidence indicating that Boko Haram engages in similar transactions with males. This presumes second class status for women and girls in the event of a Boko Haram-led caliphate.<sup>120</sup>

The return to true Islam frame is also used to construe Christianity as idolatry. Shekau has been unequivocal in his denunciation of Christianity:

You Christians should know that Jesus is a servant and prophet of God. He is not the son of God. This religion of Christianity you are practicing is not a religion of God—it is paganism. God frowns at it. What you are practicing is not religion.<sup>121</sup>

This narrative is important given that there have long been concerns among *ihadists* in Nigeria over the spread of Christianity in northern cities like Kano.<sup>122</sup> The spread of Pentecostal Christianity and the fervor with which mega churches have increased have intensified grievances over the perceived takeover of whole cities and states by Christians. Delegitimizing Christianity is, thus, a basic prerequisite for laying the ideational foundations for Boko Haram's attacks against churches. Boko Haram's stance is unequivocal: "Our goal is to see only Koran being followed on earth. This is our focus."<sup>123</sup>

The return to true Islam master frame encapsulates the major grievances of Boko Haram: the corruption in the Nigerian democratic state, the decadence in society, the ostensible abhorrence of Christianity to Allah, the misuse of women's (re)productive energies, and the ills of Western education. This frame lays bare Boko Haram's *weltanschauung*, and its overarching goal—a caliphate governed by *Sharia* law.

### **The Injustice Master Frame**

The injustice master frame is deployed by groups comprising or representing the oppressed in society.<sup>124</sup> It involves defining a situation as "unjust"<sup>125</sup>; developing a new "political identity"<sup>126</sup> and "agency."<sup>127</sup> The latter means the "consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action."<sup>128</sup> The injustice frame also accentuates what entity is responsible for the unjust conditions.<sup>129</sup> This speaks to an "adversarial component."<sup>130</sup>

The injustice frame is a staple of nonviolent protest movements. Nonetheless, organizations deploying violent tactics may also draw on the injustice frame to explicate their turn to violence. For instance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan executes *ihad* against the Uzbek government partly because of perceptions of, and experiences with, social injustice.<sup>131</sup> In addition, one of the Al Qaeda operatives in the 7 July 2005 bombings in England, Mohammad Sidique Khan, claimed that he was motivated to act because of "atrocities against my people all over the world" by Western governments.<sup>132</sup> These examples demonstrate that perceptions and/or experiences with injustice are often construed as rationale for violence by actors engaged in terrorist activities. Experiences of injustice when properly articulated "breeds life" to such organizations.<sup>133</sup>

Boko Haram's grievances over injustices against the organization have evolved from structural issues of socioeconomic injustices to killings by state agents. In particular, the death of Yusuf and hundreds of Boko Haram members in the hands of security agents during and after the July 2009 crackdown is considered an injustice that must be avenged. Following days of violent confrontations between Boko Haram and Nigerian security agents over issues bordering on violation of state laws by Boko Haram members, President Umaru Yar'Adua ordered the Nigerian army and police to dislodge Boko Haram members from their main base in Maiduguri. The Nigerian army captured Mohammed Yusuf and subsequently handed him over to the Nigerian police. However, a few hours later, the police announced that he was dead and showed his bullet ridden body to the public. The police claimed he was shot while trying to escape from custody. However, Yusuf's death was largely seen by the public as deliberate extrajudicial murder. In addition, use of extreme force against the group by security agents led to high numbers of casualties, especially on the part of Boko Haram. This solidified the surviving members' determination to avenge the death of their leader and members. There is consensus in scholarly literature and popular discourse that state repression has played a major role in Boko Haram's terroristic acts.<sup>134</sup> This has led

to local and international condemnation of the highhandedness of the Nigerian security agencies. For instance, 21 U.S. academics whose works focused on Nigeria wrote to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 21 May 2012 to urge the U.S. government not to designate Boko Haram a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO). They argued that:

An FTO designation would ... increase the risk that the US becomes linked—whether in reality or perception—to abuses by the security services. ... (It) would effectively endorse excessive use of force at a time when the rule of law in Nigeria hangs in the balance. There is already evidence that abuses by Nigeria’s security services have facilitated radical recruitment.<sup>135</sup>

One of the co-signers of the report also stated in a private correspondence that they were concerned that the “FTO designation would strengthen the hand of the hardliners” within Boko Haram. He argued that

at the time some parts of the leadership were reaching out to the government, the Sultan, NGOs, and others (like Buhari)<sup>136</sup> to ask them to mediate a solution. We felt that it was important for those talks to go ahead so that the government could pull away the “doves” in the movement, and isolate the hardliners, and that the FTO designation would just give the hardliners an additional tool to consolidate their hold.<sup>137</sup>

State repression eliminated any hope that Boko Haram could be persuaded to eschew violence, and therefore, silenced some of the leaders of Boko Haram who were publicly calling for mediation to end the crisis between 2011 and 2012.

Boko Haram uses the injustice frame in four major dimensions. These are to (1) challenge the image of an irrational and blood-thirsty terrorist entity; (2) portray the Nigerian state as an aggressor that has killed innocent preachers; (3) assure the Ummah that Boko Haram is merely avenging attacks against fellow Muslims; and (4) garner public sympathy. Shekau’s narrative in a January 2012 video embodies Boko Haram’s use of the injustice frame:

No, we’re not cancer, neither are we evil. ... Everyone knows what happened to our leader. Everyone knows what wickedness was meted out to our members and fellow Muslims in Nigeria from time to time in Zango kataf, Tafawa Balewa, Kaduna villages, Langtang, Yelwa shendam. Different things were meted out to Muslims in this country.<sup>138</sup>

Through such narratives, Shekau asserts that Boko Haram is the victim of injustices perpetrated by the Nigerian state. The locales mentioned by Shekau (Zango kataf, among others) are reputed for ethno-religious clashes. Opinions are often divided on the causes of the conflicts, the main aggressor, or the actual targets.<sup>139</sup> The fact that a Muslim president has been elected has not necessarily assuaged Boko Haram. President Buhari and the security apparatus are considered “enemies and infidels.”<sup>140</sup>

Such was Boko Haram’s sense of injustice that when there were suggestions about the possibility of granting state pardon to its operatives in 2013; Boko Haram responded that they had done nothing wrong and the state needed to seek their organization’s forgiveness.<sup>141</sup> Boko Haram uses the injustice frame to create a narrative that construes the Nigerian state as fundamentally unjust. Boko Haram emphasizes that:

We have stopped everything apart from saying we should stay on the path of truth and peace and live right in the sight of God. There, we will have peace and that is what we have been preaching and because of that they said we should be killed and our mosques destroyed.<sup>142</sup>

Boko Haram underscores its perceived “victimhood” by reminding the public about its mosques and other properties that were destroyed by Nigerian security agents. “(I)hadjists

need stories of injustice and repression to convince themselves and others of the legitimacy of the battle and to keep their supporters motivated and loyal.<sup>143</sup> Framing the issue through an injustice lens is also intended to assure Muslims that: “This path we’re taking is God’s path. Fellow Muslims, understand us! Our objective is not to kill or humiliate or steal.”<sup>144</sup>

The incarceration of several Boko Haram operatives and their families by the Nigerian government is also portrayed as a major injustice. The release of 566 wives (including widows) and children of Boko Haram members<sup>145</sup> by the Nigerian army on 16 September 2016 appears to support this claim—unlawful detention of supposedly innocent persons by a state that purports to uphold the rule of law. Such an incident helps Boko Haram’s frame to resonate among those who are sympathetic to its cause and human rights advocates who do not necessarily support Boko Haram. Incarcerating the offspring of Boko Haram’s members also affects a strategic plan of the organization—producing huge numbers of progeny who can sustain the cause.<sup>146</sup>

### **The War Against the Infidel Master Frame**

Boko Haram’s use of violence in its pursuit of Islamizing Nigeria has so far surpassed other Islamic fundamentalist groups in post-independence Nigeria. One of the most telling illustrations of Boko Haram’s violence can be gleaned in the lethality of the organization’s attacks when juxtaposed with ISIS. For instance, while on average 15 persons are killed in each of Boko Haram’s attacks, each ISIS’s attack kills seven persons.<sup>147</sup> Between 2009 and 2014, Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria were primarily targeted at (a) private citizens and properties (35 percent; 429 events) and (b) the police (17 percent; 213 events).<sup>148</sup>

Boko Haram frames its violent acts as part of a broader cosmic war against infidels. There are five major aspects of Boko Haram’s use of the war against infidel master frame. These are (1) the war is a defensive war; (2) the war is intended to propagate Islam; (3) purification of Islam from within; (4) elements of Manicheanism; and (5) predestined victory.

For Boko Haram, actions by the Nigerian state represent the war of the infidels against the faithful—the antithesis of *bellum romanum*.<sup>149</sup> Therefore, they believe their actions constitute the inevitable reaction of the faithful. Boko Haram construes itself as waging a defensive rather than an offensive war against the Nigerian state. Shekau argues that “(w)e decided to defend ourselves.”<sup>150</sup> His narrative illuminates how Boko Haram construes its war:

I have no objective than to help the religion of God. ... We serve God and we do not harm anybody, but anybody that looks for our trouble, we will face such person or persons! We follow the tenets of the Quran and anybody that thinks he can fight God shouldn’t think his prayer or praying in the mosque can save him! Any Muslim that cheats and hides under the cloak of religion, if we know such person, we won’t hesitate to eliminate him. ... We follow the teachings of the Quran.<sup>151</sup>

Boko Haram construes attacks on Muslims as a necessary step to ensure that the body of believers is cleansed. This means eliminating any Muslim who fails to adhere to their version of Islam. Shekau has warned people in Muslim-dominated cities about their Islamic religious practices: “The people of Kano you are in trouble. The Sokoto people have betrayed Usman Danfodio and they must repent. People of Kaduna and El-Zakzaky [detained IMN Shiite leader in Nigeria], you should repent. And all of you, the followers of Tijjaniya, you should repent.”<sup>152</sup> Muslims who do not subscribe to the Salafist doctrine are not considered



authentic Muslims. This has fractured the organization as stated earlier. Therefore, Shekau's Boko Haram uses this frame to address concerns over its killing of Muslims.

Boko Haram believes that its destruction of churches, kidnapping, rape, and forced marriage of women and girls, including the predominantly Christian girls kidnapped from Chibok, are intended to propagate Islam. This is similar to how ISIS constructs the rape of Yazidi women and girls by its soldiers—"to make them Muslim."<sup>153</sup> Shekau states that: "Don't you know the over 200 Chibok schoolgirls have converted to Islam? They have now memorised two chapters of the Koran. ... *Girls from Chibok confessing Islam is the true religion!* (Italics added).<sup>154</sup>

In addition, there are Manichean overtones in Boko Haram's war against the infidel master frame. These draw on the post-9/11 universe of discourse. Boko Haram construes itself as the defender of Islam against the incursion of Christianity. Therefore, despite the schism over the selection of a replacement for Shekau, there is an implicit agreement between the factions that Christians are legitimate targets. Shekau argues that:

*In every nation, every region, there is a decision to make. Either you are with us. I mean real Muslims who are following Salafism or you are with Obama, François Hollande, George Bush, Clinton. ... And any unbeliever kill, kill, kill. This war is against Christians* (Italics added).<sup>155</sup>

This frame is similar to President George Bush's following 9/11. Bush's "zero sum thinking" is reflected in his statement that: "*Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists*" (Italics added).<sup>156</sup> This suggests a co-constitutive discursive battlefield in which the framing approaches of terrorist groups and state agents draw on the diction and imageries of each other.

Similarly, Boko Haram uses the war against infidel frame to accentuate its perceived pre-ordained victory against the infidels. This narrative is used to assure the world that despite what it calls the "evil planning" by the United States, Israel, and the United Nations, Boko Haram cannot be defeated as it is supported by an otherworldly power. Shekau argues that "Allah has proved too difficult for the infidel. ... Allah has proved too difficult for the United States, Allah has proved too difficult for a plane called drone. ... Allah is mightier than everyone."<sup>157</sup>

## Conclusion

Ideology is neither textually constant nor invariant.<sup>158</sup> Snow and Byrd have warned that "the use of the concept of ideology is often encumbered by two misguided tendencies: the first is to view ideology in a homogenized, monochromatic manner; the second is to conceptualize it as a tightly coupled, inelastic set of values, beliefs, and ideas. Both of these tendencies cloud our understanding of social movements in general and terrorist movements in particular."<sup>159</sup> Ideology shapes frames, but frames reflect a far more immediate and pragmatic response to the external environment and internal dynamics of an organization. Frames have immediacy and urgency that ideology may not fully address in specific contexts. This article has attempted to unpack the content of Boko Haram's ideology by examining the organization's framing of opponents, issues, and actions.

Understanding the frames deployed by a terrorist organization has policy benefits. Demant and de Graaf's analysis of the deradicalization policy of the Dutch government vis-à-vis Moluccan and Islamic radicals demonstrate that "not only governmental interventions, but

also *the discourse that is produced or reinforced through these interventions*, have a profound effect on processes of deradicalization” (italics added).<sup>160</sup> In dealing with Boko Haram, authorities need to enact and implement policies imbued with *narratives* or *frames* to counter the frames of Boko Haram. These discourses must also recognize the salience of historical and cultural factors and the opacity of the organization’s commitment to Islam. For instance, raids on Boko Haram’s camps have led to discovery of items such as solar panels, condoms, cannabis, sexual performance enhancement drugs, and voodoo.<sup>161</sup> Such items can be effectively utilized in the battle for hearts and minds.

However, promoting appropriate discourses would be futile without major efforts to improve the socioeconomic conditions in Nigeria in general and the North in particular. The economy as widely recognized has created a condition wherein young men and women are willing and able (or unable to be unwilling) to join any organization that meets their basic needs. Improving the economy would help to further diminish the flow of volunteers to Boko Haram. It is also important to minimize repressive actions by state agents. Repressive actions generally provide signifying “injustice stories”<sup>162</sup> that may be embellished and used for recruitment and mobilization of supporters and sympathizers.

This article engages with the three core framing tasks and master frames of Boko Haram. It demonstrates that Boko Haram’s framing strategies draw on the social conditions and cultural reservoir in its domain of operations. This includes antipathy toward the West and Western education, patriarchal beliefs about gender roles and the “place” of women, and the contours of a widely popular Islamic movement that emerged in the early 1800s. Boko Haram’s framing is also shaped by state repression and the post-9/11 cosmic war discourse. Overall, this article contributes to the literature on nonstructural aspects of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities.

## Notes

1. Olabanji Akinola. “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Between Poverty, Politics and Islamic Fundamentalism,” *African Security* 8(1) (2015), pp. 1–29; Daniel Agbibo. “Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37 (1) (2014), pp. 41–67.
2. Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, “The Boko Haram Uprising: How should Nigeria Respond?,” *Third World Quarterly* 33(5) (2012), pp. 853–869.
3. Roman Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria,” *Africa Spectrum* 2/3 (2012), pp. 137–155.
4. Simon Gray and Ibikunle Adeakin, “The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Missionary Activism to Transnational Jihad and the Failure of the Nigerian Security Intelligence Agencies,” *African Security* 8(3) (2015), pp. 185–211.
5. Hakeem Onapajo and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, “Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the State and the International System,” *African Security Review* 21(3) (2012), pp. 24–39.
6. Human Rights Watch, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria,” 2012. Available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence-0> (accessed 11 July 2014); Abimbola O. Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Responses of the Nigerian State,” *Africa Today*, 57(4) (2011), pp. 98–119.
7. Jessica Stern. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Ecco, 2003).
8. Freedom C. Onuoha, “The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained,” *African Security Review* 19(2) (2010), pp. 54–67.

9. David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements," *Mobilization* 12(1) (2007), pp. 119–136.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
11. Jan Sändig, "Framing Protest and Insurgency: Boko Haram and MASSOB in Nigeria," *Civil Wars* 17(2) (2015), pp. 141–160; Portia Roeflofs, "Framing and Blaming: Discourse Analysis of the Boko Haram Uprising, July 2009," in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics and the State in Nigeria* (Ipskamp Drukkers, Enschede, Netherlands: African Studies Centre and IFRA, West African Politics and Society Series, vol. 2., 2014), pp. 110–131.
12. Irena L. Sargsyan and Andrew Bennett, "Discursive Emotional Appeals in Sustaining Violent Social Movements in Iraq, 2003–11," *Security Studies* 25(4) (2016), pp. 608–645.
13. Gregory Bateson, "A Theory of Play and Fantasy: A Report on Theoretical Aspects of the Project of Study of the Role of the Paradoxes of Abstraction in Communication," *Psychiatric Research Reports* 2 (1955), pp. 39–51.
14. Ervin Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (London: Harper and Row, 1974).
15. *Ibid.*
16. David Snow and Robert Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in A. Morris and C. Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 133–155; at p. 137.
17. Sändig, "Framing Protest and Insurgency," p. 147.
18. Goffman, *Frame Analysis*, p. 11.
19. David L. Westby, "Strategic Imperative, Ideology, and Frame," *Mobilization* 7(3) (2002), p. 287.
20. Francesca Polletta, "Mobilization Forum: Awkward Movements," *Mobilization* 11(4) (2006), p. 476.
21. Albert Bergesen, "Introduction: Researching Terrorism," *Mobilization* 12(2) (2007), pp. 109–110.
22. Dawn Wiest, "A Story of Two Transnationalisms: Global Salafi Jihad and Transnational Human Rights Mobilization in the Middle East and North Africa," *Mobilization* 12(2) (2007), pp. 137–160.
23. Jeff Goodwin, "'The Struggle made Me a Non-Racialist': Why There was so Little Terrorism in the Antiapartheid Struggle," *Mobilization* 12(2) (2007), pp. 193–203.
24. Jeff Goodwin, "Introduction to a Special Issue on Political Violence and Terrorism: Political Violence as Contentious Politics," *Mobilization* 17(1) (2012), pp. 1–5.
25. Arthur Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1984); and on the significance of leaders' speeches for recruitment, mobilization and identification with the cause, see Boas Shamir, Michael Arthur, and Robert House, "The Rhetoric of Charismatic Leadership: A Theoretical Extension, A case study and Implications for Research," *Leadership Quarterly* 5(1) (1994), pp. 25–42.
26. Temitope Oriola, "Unwilling Cocoons: Boko Haram's War against Women," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40(2) (2017), pp. 99–121.
27. David Snow and Robert Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in A. Morris and C. Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 133–155.
28. Bukola A. Oyeniyi, "One Voice, Multiple Tongues: Dialoguing with Boko Haram," *Democracy and Security* 10(1) (2014), pp. 73–97. Details on the death of Muhammed Yusuf and exacerbation of violence by Boko Haram are provided later in the article.
29. "Boko Haram declares 'Islamic state' in Northern Nigeria," *BBC News*, 25 August 2014. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28925484> (accessed 29 April 2017).
30. Oriola, "Unwilling Cocoons."
31. *Ibid.*
32. Wisdom E. Iyekepolo, "Boko Haram: Understanding the Context," *Third World Quarterly* 37(12) (2016), pp. 2211–2228.
33. "Nigeria's Boko Haram Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State," *BBC News*, 7 March 2015. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31784538> (accessed 29 April 2017).

34. Omar S. Mahmood, "Boko Haram, Islamic State, and the Underlying Concerns for West African," *African Arguments*, 27 April 2016. Available at <http://africanarguments.org/2016/04/27/boko-haram-islamic-state-and-the-underlying-concerns-for-west-africa/> (accessed 1 May 2017).
35. John O. Voll, "Boko Haram: Religion and Violence in the 21st Century," *Religions* 6 (2015), pp. 1182–1202. doi:10.3390/rel6041182
36. Michaelle Faul and Maggie Michael, "ISIS Names New Leader for Boko Haram Amid Uncertainty over Fate of Former Chief Abubakar Shekau," *Independent*, 3 August 2016. Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-boko-haram-new-leader-uncertainty-over-fate-of-abubakar-shekau-a7170781.html> (accessed 19 September 2016).
37. "Boko Haram: Abubakar Shekau Says He is 'Still Around,'" *Aljazeera*, 4 August 2016. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/boko-haram-abubakar-shekau-160804070145823.html> (accessed 9 August 2016).
38. "Boko Haram's Shekau, Group's New Leader, al-Barnawi, in War of Words," *Premium Times* 5 August 2016. <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/208113-boko-harams-shekau-groups-new-leader-al-barnawi-war-words.html> (accessed 21 September 2016).
39. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) was set up under the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). It was designed to combat security issues in the West African sub-region, particularly those in the Lake Chad Basin. The MJTF is the main regional response to combat the fluid and transnational threats posed by Boko Haram. For instance, Boko Haram kidnapped the wife of Cameroun's vice prime minister in July 2014. For more on the MJTF, see William Assanvo, Jeanine Ella A. Abatan and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, "West Africa Report: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram," Institute for Security Studies. Issue 19 (2016). Available at <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf> (accessed 24 December 2016)
40. Mia Bloom and Hilary Matfess, "Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram's Terror," *PRISM*, 6(1) (2016), pp. 105–121; Samuel Osborne, "Islamist Terror Groups in Nigeria are Now Using Babies in Suicide Bombing Attacks, Say Officials," *Independent*, 24 January 2017. Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/islamist-terror-groups-nigeria-using-babies-suicide-bombing-attack-boko-haram-madagali-a7543861.html> (accessed 29 April 2017); John Sawicki, "A Tragic Trend: Why Terrorists Use Female and Child Suicide Bombers," *Health Progress*, 97(4) (2016), pp. 38–42.
41. Francesca Polletta, "Mobilization Forum: Awkward Movements," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 11(4) (2006), pp. 475–500, at p. 475.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. Bergesen, "Introduction: Researching Terrorism," p. 109.
45. Goodwin, "Introduction to a Special Issue"; but see two collections (17[1] 2012 and 12 [2] 2007) in *Mobilization*.
46. Nikki Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 36(3) (1994), pp. 463–487; Murray Last, "The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria," *Africa* 78(1) (2008), pp. 41–63.
47. Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam," pp. 463, 480.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 479.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 479–480.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Raymond. Hickey, "The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings in Nigeria: A Note," *African Affairs* 83(331) (1984), pp. 251–256; The Sokoto Caliphate succumbed to British forces in 1903.
52. Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 1998); Daniel Agbiboa. "The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the State," *Stability, International Journal of Security & Development* 2(3) (2013), pp. 52, 1–18.
53. Daniel Agbiboa, "Living in Fear: Religious Identity, Relative Deprivation and the Boko Haram Terrorism," *African Security* 6(2) (2013), pp. 153–170.
54. Falola, *Violence in Nigeria*, p. 146.

55. Agbiboa, "Living in Fear."
56. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
57. Jude C. Aguwa, "Religious Conflict in Nigeria: Impact on Nation Building," *Dialectical Anthropology* 22(3–4) (1997), p. 338. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006866525049>
58. Agbiboa, "Living in Fear."
59. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
60. Rotimi Suberu, "The Sharia Challenge: Revisiting the Travails of the Secular State," in Wale Adebani and Ebenezer Obadare, eds., *Encountering the Nigerian State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 227.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram."
63. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Boulder, CO & London: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), p. 57.
64. Agbiboa, "Living in Fear"; Sändig, "Framing Protest and Insurgency."
65. Agbiboa, *ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
66. David Snow and Robert Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1(1) (1988), pp. 197–217.
67. *Ibid.*
68. John Azumah, "Boko Haram in Retrospect," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relation* 26(1) (2015), pp. 33–52.
69. *Ibid.*
70. Sändig, "Framing Protest and Insurgency."
71. "How the Emir of Gwoza was Murdered in Open Street by Boko Haram," *Sahara Reporters*, 30 2014. Available at <http://saharareporters.com/news-page/how-emir-gwoza-was-murdered-open-street-boko-haram> (accessed 1 June 2014).
72. While there are several Islamic groups in Nigeria, the Jama'at Izalat al-Bid'a wa Iqamat as Sunna, popularly known as Izala, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), are often regarded as reformist groups that offer a different interpretation of the Quran, and are opposed to the interpretation offered by the dominant Sufi brotherhoods: the Qadirriya and the Tijaniyya. Although the Izala mainly opposes the doctrines, practices, and interpretations of the two dominant Sufi brotherhoods, and often accuses these brotherhoods of engaging in un-Islamic practices, the IMN opposes the activities and beliefs of the Izala and the two Sufi brotherhoods. The IMN is a Shiite group that draws inspiration from the Iranian revolution, as well as support from Islamic groups based in Iran. For a discussion of the creation and evolution of both the Izala and the IMN, see Roman Loimeier, "Nigeria: The Quest for a Viable Religious Option," in William F. S. Miles, ed., *Political Islam in West Africa: State-Society Relations Transformed* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 44–60. For a brief discussion of Boko Haram's evolution in the context of Islamic fundamentalism in relation to the presence of the Islamic groups, especially the IMN and Izala, see Jonathan N. C. Hill, *Nigeria since Independence: Forever Fragile?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 26–29.
73. Iyekekpolo, "Boko Haram: Understanding the Context"; "Boko Haram in Retrospect"; Oyeniyi, "One Voice, Multiple Tongues."
74. Annabel Erulka and Mairo Bello, "The Experience of Married Adolescent Girls in Northern Nigeria," 2007. Available at [www.ohchr.org](http://www.ohchr.org) (accessed 20 November 2015). Available schools in urban centers record low enrollment of young girls while rural areas have limited access to schools. Therefore, the figures reflect both a rejection of education and a lack of opportunity.
75. Andrew E. Barnes, "The Colonial Legacy to Contemporary Culture in Northern Nigeria: Islam and Northern Administrators 1900–1960," in Toyin Falola and Salah M. Hassan, eds., *Power and Nationalism in Modern Africa: Essays in Honor of Don Ohadike* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2008), pp. 251–280; Last, "The Search for Security."
76. Ayodele Jegede, "What Led to the Nigerian Boycott of the Polio Vaccination Campaign?" *PLoS Medicine* 4(3) (2007), p. e73. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040073
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*, p. 418.

79. The war in Iraq is believed to have contributed to resistance against polio immunization in the North. See Daniel Pipes, "A Conspiracy Theory Spreads Polio," *New York Sun*, 24 May 2005. Available at <http://www.danielpipes.org/2644/a-conspiracy-theory-spreads-polio> (accessed 1 February 2017).
80. David Malet, "Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 27(3) (2015), pp. 454–473.
81. Bill Roggio, "Boko Haram Emir Praises al Qaeda," *Long War Journal*, 30 November 2012. Available at [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/boko\\_haram\\_emir\\_prai.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/boko_haram_emir_prai.php) (accessed 27 September 2016).
82. Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 155.
83. Aidan Kirby, "The London Bombers as 'Self-Starters': A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30(5) (2007), p. 415.
84. Ndahi Marama, "UN House Bombing: Why We Struck—Boko Haram," 19 August 2011. Available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/un-house-bombing-why-we-struck-boko-haram/> (accessed 27 September 2016).
85. Sean M. Gouley, "Linkages Between Boko Haram and al Qaeda: A Potential Deadly Synergy," *Global Security Studies* 3(3) (2012), pp. 1–14.
86. Marco Nilsson, "Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad: Interview Evidence from Swedish Jihadists," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38(5) (2015), p. 345.
87. "In New Gruesome Video, Boko Haram Declares Caliphate, Shows Scenes of Fleeing Soldiers, Civilian Massacres," *Sahara Reporters*, 24 August 2014. Available at <http://saharareporters.com/2014/08/24/new-gruesome-video-boko-haram-declares-caliphate-shows-scenes-fleeing-soldiers-civilian> (accessed 27 September 2016).
88. Abubakar Shekau, "Praise be to God the Lord of All Worlds" (undated). Available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Praise%20be%20to%20God%20the%20Lord%20of%20all%20worlds.pdf> (accessed 7 February 2017).
89. Shekau, "Praise be to God."
90. Thomas Joscelyn, "Osama Bin Laden's Files: Boko Haram's leader Wanted to be 'Under One Banner,'" *Long War Journal*, 4 March 2016. Available at <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/osama-bin-ladens-files-boko-haram-leader-wanted-to-be-under-one-banner.php> (accessed 7 February 2017).
91. Nilsson, "Foreign Fighters," p. 346. See also Alex P. Schmid, "Al-Qaeda 'Single Narrative' and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge," ICCT Research Paper (2014). Available at <https://www.icct.nl/download/file/Schmid-Al-Qaeda's-Single-Narrative-and-Attempts-to-Develop-Counter-Narratives-January-2014.pdf> (accessed 1 November 2016).
92. Njadvara Musa, "Anxiety over Boko Haram's Pledge of Allegiance to ISIS," *Guardian*, 9 March 2015. Available at <http://guardian.ng/lead-story/anxiety-over-boko-haram-s-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isis/> (accessed 27 September 2016).
93. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance," p. 202.
94. Suberu, "The Sharia Challenge: Revisiting the Travails of the Secular State," pp.217–241.
95. Mohammed Lere, "Full Transcript: Chibok Girls, El-Zakzaky and other Things Shekau Said in New Video," *Premium Times*, 5 September 2016. Available at <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/211234-full-transcript-chibok-girls-el-zakzaky-things-shekau-said-new-video.html> (accessed 26 September 2016).
96. Cited in Jola Sotubo, "Transcript of Boko Haram Leader's Latest Audio Message," 5 August 2016. Available at <http://pulse.ng/local/shekau-read-transcript-of-boko-haram-leader-s-latest-audio-message-id5341170.html> (accessed 19 October 2016).
97. M. M. Salehi, "Radical Islamic Insurgency in the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979," in Christian Smith, ed., *Disruptive Religion* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 51.
98. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance." See also Holly McCammon, "Discursive Opportunity Structure," *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). doi:10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm180

99. Ibid. The comment is also a subtle criticism of the ISIS leader who appointed a new Wali for Boko Haram.
100. Amnesty International, “*Our job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill: Boko Haram’s Reign of Terror in North-East Nigeria* (London, UK: Amnesty International, 2015), p. 14. Available at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/our-job-is-to-shoot-slaughter-and-kill-boko-haram-s-reign-of-terror> (accessed 5 August 2015).
101. Oriola, “Unwilling Cocoons.”
102. Ibid., pp. 105–109.
103. See Oriola, “Unwilling Cocoons.”
104. Kieran Guilbert, “With Baby Strapped to Back, Woman Suicide Bomber Strikes Nigerian Market: Government Official” (2017). Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKBN1582OT> (accessed 1 February 2017).
105. Nilsson, “Foreign Fighters.”
106. Ibid., pp. 346–347.
107. Snow and Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.”
108. Lynn R. Horton, “Defenders of Nature and the Comarca: Collective Identity and Frames in Panama,” *Mobilization* 15(1) (2010), pp. 63–80; Temitope Oriola, *Criminal Resistance? The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013).
109. Mustapha Mohammed, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Leader Applauds Charlie Hebdo Attackers,” *Bloomberg News*, 14 January 2015. Available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/boko-haram-leader-shows-solidarity-with-charlie-hebdo-attackers-i4wjhkm> (accessed 23 September 2016).
110. Mohammed, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Leader.”
111. Lere, “Full Transcript.”
112. Abdulkareem Haruna, “In New Video, Boko Haram Leader, Abubakar Shekau, Threatens to Attack Buhari in Presidential Villa,” *Premium Times*, 8 August 2016. Available at <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/208260-new-video-boko-haram-leader-abubakar-shekau-threatens-attack-buhari-presidential-villa.html> (accessed 23 September 2016).
113. William Hansen and Umma Musa, “Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 48(3) (2013), p. 287.
114. “Transcript of Muhammad Yusuf Interrogation Before he was Summarily Executed by Members of the Nigeria Police,” *Naijainfoman*, 11 December 2012. Available at <https://naijainfoman.wordpress.com/2011/12/11/transcript-of-muhammad-yusuf-interrogation-before-he-was-summarily-executed-by-members-of-the-nigeria-police/> (accessed 18 February 2017).
115. Westby, “Strategic imperative, Ideology, and Frame,” p. 292.
116. Lere, “Full Transcript.”
117. Oriola, “Unwilling Cocoons.”
118. “Nigeria School Raid in Yobe State Leaves 29 Dead,” *BBC News*, 25 February 2014. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26338041> (accessed 23 September 2015).
119. “Boko Haram Leader: ‘We Will Sell the Girls on the Market’—Video,” *The Guardian UK*, 6 May 2014. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/may/06/boko-haram-sell-girls-market-video> (accessed 18 February 2017).
120. Men and young boys have either been summarily executed or conscripted into Boko Haram’s fighting forces (see, Amnesty International, “*Our Job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill*”).
121. See “VIDEO: Boko Haram leader Imam Abubakar Shekau Message to President Jonathan,” *Sahara Reporters*, 12 January 2012. Available at <http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/12/video-boko-haram-leader-imam-abubakar-shekau-message-president-jonathan> (accessed 2 September 2016).
122. Agbiboa, “Living in Fear.”
123. Ola’ Audu, “Full Transcript of Shekau’s Latest Video on Ceasefire Deal, Chibok Girls,” *Premium Times*, 1 November 2014. Available at <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/170441-full-transcript-of-shekaus-latest-video-on-ceasefire-deal-chibok-girls.html> (accessed 23 September 2016).
124. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

125. Ibid., p. 51.
126. Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), p. 82.
127. William A. Gamson, "Injustice Frames," in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements* (2013), p. 2. doi:10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm110
128. Ibid., p. 2.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid., p. 2.
131. Snow and Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes." See also Michael Page, Lara Challita, and Alistair Harris, "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(2) (2011), pp. 150–172.
132. Ibid., p. 158.
133. Ibid., p. 159.
134. Sändig, "Framing Protest and Insurgency."
135. Letter to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 May 2012.
136. Former military Head of State and current civilian president of Nigeria.
137. Personal correspondence with Darren Kew, University of Massachusetts, Boston.
138. "VIDEO: Boko Haram leader 'Imam Abubakar Shekau' Message to President Jonathan," *Sahara Reporters*, 12 January 2012. Available at <http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/12/video-boko-haram-leader-imam-abubakar-shekau-message-president-jonathan> (accessed 22 September 2016).
139. However, available evidence suggests that most of the casualties in some of the regular inter-religious religious clashes in northern Nigeria are often Christians even though Boko Haram has increased attacks on Muslims.
140. Haruna, "In New Video."
141. "Nigeria's Boko Haram Rejects Jonathan's Amnesty Idea," *BBC*, 11 April 2013. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22105476> (accessed 27 October 2016).
142. "Video: Boko Haram Leader Imam Abubakar Shekau Message to President Jonathan," *Sahara Reporters*.
143. Froukje Demant and Beatrice de Graaf, "How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (5) (2010), p. 409.
144. Ibid.
145. "Nigerian Army Releases 566 Boko Haram Family Members to Borno State Government," *Sahara Reporters*, 16 September 2016. Available at <http://saharareporters.com/2016/09/16/nigerian-army-releases-566-boko-haram-family-members-borno-state-government> (accessed 23 September 2016).
146. Oriola, "Unwilling Cocoons."
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., pp. 100–103.
149. Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 283.
150. "VIDEO: Boko Haram leader Imam Abubakar Shekau Message to President Jonathan," *Sahara Reporters*.
151. Ibid.
152. Lere, "Full Transcript."
153. Atika Shubert and Bharati Naik, "ISIS Soldiers Told to Rape Women 'to make them Muslim,'" *CNN*, 8 October 2015. Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/08/middleeast/isis-rape-theology-soldiers-rape-women-to-make-them-muslim/> (accessed 26 September 2016).
154. Audu, "Full Transcript of Shekau's Latest Video."
155. Ibid.
156. Debra Merskin, "The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush," *Mass Communication & Society* 7(2) (2004), p. 170.
157. Audu, "Full Transcript of Shekau's Latest Video."



158. Snow and Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes."
159. *Ibid.*, pp. 132–133.
160. Demant and de Graaf, "How to Counter Radical Narratives," p. 423.
161. Ludovica Laccino, "Nigeria: Cannabis, Condoms and Sex Drugs 'Found in Boko Haram Camps' Says Army," *IB Times*, 9 September 2015. Available at <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-cannabis-condoms-sex-drugs-found-boko-haram-camps-says-army-1519046> (accessed 10 February 2017).
162. Demant and de Graaf, "How to Counter Radical Narratives," p. 409.