Information Bulletin

NUMBER 157 • APRIL 2012

TACKLING COMPLEX POLICY CHALLENGES:
STRATEGIES TO COORDINATE POLICIES ACROSS ALBERTA GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES

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(Information bulletin ; no. 157)
Includes bibliographical references.
Electronic monograph issued in PDF format.
Also issued in print format.

1. Interagency coordination--Alberta. 2. Public administration--Alberta. 3. Alberta--Politics and government--1971-. I. University of Alberta. Western Centre for Economic Research. II. Title. III. Series: Information bulletin (University of Alberta. Western Centre for Economic Research : Online) ; no. 157

JL329.5.P64H53 2012 351.7123 C2012-903532-7
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Introduction

By the time this paper is published, the Alberta provincial election of Monday, April 23, 2012, will have given Alberta a new government. No matter the results, inherent in the ensuing transition will be a new opportunity for those elected to solve an old problem: how best to coordinate policies. To be clear, Alberta attempts vertical policy coordination, which is when it pursues a shared goal together with a different level of government, such as a municipal or federal department, from time to time. But the Province is more often faced with the need for horizontal policy coordination, which is when different ministries within the Alberta government should team up to tackle an issue (Lyall & Tait, 2005). Accordingly, horizontal policy coordination is the focus of this case study.

Different academics and public service practitioners have ascribed various definitions to terms like consultation, collaboration, coordination, and integration. In this Alberta-focused analysis, coordination is the preferred word and a single definition applies. Namely, coordination describes multiple ministries within the Alberta government aligning or combining their policies and, as a result, their legislation and regulations, programs, and services, all in the pursuit of a single and shared goal articulated by the government (Boston, 1992). The benefits of coordination include increasing efficiency by resolving overlapping regulations and decreasing vulnerability through presenting a unified position to other governments, industry, and interest groups. While these gains are valuable, Alberta, like public administrations around the world, is driven by an even greater motivation: they must get their ministries to work as one if they are to address today’s most complex public policy challenges.

Alberta has achieved coordination on occasion. One instance was the Alberta Children and Youth Initiative, which required collective policy change and program adjustment in the ministries of Children’s Services, Health and Wellness, and Learning to provide continuity in health services for children. Another occasion was the Safe Communities Initiative, which required the ministries of Health and Wellness, Human Services, Justice, and Solicitor General to adjust their policies and programs to take an integrated approach to dealing with high-risk-to-reoffend individuals.

But Alberta has also failed at times. One of these times was the launch of the Alberta Corporate Service Centre, which struggled for several years before finally being supported across government. Another example was the first review of the Province’s regulatory system for the exploration, development, and transportation of oil and gas. Vance MacNichol, retired Chief Deputy Minister, was retained to recommended changes to address criticisms that the Government’s policies overlapped, duplicated, and contradicted one another (A
Proposal for Regulating Resource Development, 2002). He did this, delivering a report dated December 2, 2002, but the Government didn’t publish his findings or implement his recommendations. Furthermore, in the winter of 2010 - 2011, a task force examining that same regulatory system recommended similar changes to align or combine the many policies governing the Province’s natural resources (Enhancing Assurance, 2010). The fact that, eight years later, largely identical recommendations needed repeating is evidence that Alberta must revise its approach to achieving policy coordination. Likewise, analysis of Alberta’s sporadic success suggests that coordination requires different strategies, as well as more practices in support of each strategy, and it requires that those practices be sustained over time. Indeed, Alberta’s future health and prosperity depend on a long-term commitment to a few well-chosen strategies designed to foster policy coordination. The first strategy must be assigning responsibility and accountability for cross-ministry initiatives. Thereafter, Alberta should supplement that strategy with two other strategies, one that pairs structures and processes, and one that prompts cultural shifts.

Assigning Responsibility and Accountability

The first and most important strategy is to assign responsibility and accountability for any given coordination effort that has been initiated to achieve a government policy goal. In other words, Alberta needs to create a system or standard to identify the minister or ministers responsible for each cross-ministry initiative and define the limits of each participant’s authority and accountability. The challenge is that any solution must respect the Westminster parliamentary model’s underpinning principle of ministerial responsibility. Namely, each minister is assigned a portfolio, such as agriculture, education, or health, with specific responsibilities, and each minister is given authority to act on those responsibilities through legislation, regulation, and business plan and budget approvals. Furthermore, each minister is held accountable by the legislature, via public accounts and question period, for his or her performance in carrying out those responsibilities. This system works well when government policies affect only one sector and sit within only one minister’s portfolio but when an issue or initiative requires coordination, questions arise. Does any one minister have the authority to compel his or her peers to create, revise, fuse, or remove policies, and does any one minister have the expertise needed to endorse and defend the work of various ministries? Consequently, can any one minister be held accountable for a group effort?
The answer is multifaceted. The ministers and top public servants tasked with leading policy coordination should be assigned clear responsibility for leading the coordination effort and should be held accountable for ensuring that coordination occurs. At the same time, to protect the principle of ministerial responsibility, the lead ministry cannot assume the authority to compel other ministries to participate. It must rely on team-building and facilitation skills to encourage participation, though this can be supported, when necessary, by pointing out to peers that they are acting on the authority of the premier who assigned them the lead role, and, when absolutely necessary, by calling on the premier to intervene. In addition, those leading coordination cannot be responsible for ensuring that the policies adjusted within other ministries are the appropriate ones and that the revisions are of the highest possible quality. Each minister and deputy pairing must be held accountable for their individual contribution and only the premier is positioned to do that. In other words, the premier need not independently choose and lead every effort, nor does he or she need to personally dole out all rewards and punishments to cross-ministry initiative participants. But he or she is responsible at each step: leading the caucus and cabinet process to choose the most appropriate challenges to address via coordination; championing and enlisting cabinet members in the push to achieve coordination wherever it is appropriate; tracking and periodically taking stock of progress; and, holding to account, or empowering his or her chief of staff and chief deputy to hold to account, all chosen leaders and participants.

So, first, the premier is responsible for designing and overseeing a strategic framework, which is any consistent means that a government uses to choose, communicate, and evaluate its goals and efforts toward realizing those goals. This is important because goals, complete with targets and performance measures, are essential for keeping governments focussed on policy coordination (Peach, 2004). With a strategic framework in place, shared objectives are more likely to be priorities and ministries are more likely to adjust their approach as needed to contribute to the overall government’s success.

To Alberta’s credit, the Province has consistently set clearly articulated goals and targets in its strategic plans and rolling three-year business plans. It has also regularly reported its progress on achieving those goals through Measuring Up, which is the Alberta Government’s annual report. Policy coordination efforts, including the successful Alberta Children and Youth Initiative and Safe Communities Initiative, have benefited from this strategic framework. At the same time, progress on several coordination efforts, such as revamping the regulatory system for oil and gas, has suffered because they were not identified as priorities in the Government’s strategic plan, where goals and targets would have been articulated and published.
Next, while the premier need not lead each effort, the need to have him or her act as a champion for coordination is clear. The Alberta Children and Youth Initiative was a success in part because the Premier’s wife, Colleen Klein, agreed to be a spokesperson for components, such as the Children’s Forum and Children’s Promise. Even though the ministers and deputy ministers of Children’s Services and Learning were officially leading the initiative, Mrs. Klein’s commitment communicated to all parties that the initiative had the Premier’s support and attention. Similarly, the Safe Communities Initiative was successful in part because the Premier identified the initiative as a priority in the mandate letters to the lead minister, the Minister of Justice, and each participating minister.

In contrast, the Alberta Corporate Service Centre failed in part because the idea originated with the Chief Deputy Minister: the many deputies asked to participate didn’t know whether the project was a priority for their ministers, let alone the Premier. Likewise, the 2002 call to coordinate polices concerning oil and gas went unheeded in part because the three sustainable resource and environmental management or SREM ministries, lacking direction from the Premier’s office, reached a stalemate: Alberta Energy, hearing concerns from industry, pushed for regulatory system changes; Alberta Environment, anticipating that these changes may make it more difficult for it to achieve its business plan goals, participated reluctantly; and, Alberta Sustainable Resource Development, anticipating opposition from its stakeholders, resisted action.

Finally, just as the premier need not lead every effort, only champion it, he or she need not dole out every reward and punishment for positive and poor performances by cross-ministry initiative participants: the premier need only empower others to do so. In fact, the Province’s political chief of staff and the Alberta Public Service’s top deputy minister have a responsibility to promote policy coordination with elected members and public servants respectively, and, with the premier’s permission, these two individuals can reward those who work collaboratively and reprimand those who do not. Of course, the two chief executives need to act in tandem; if one wavers, the other cannot succeed. Likewise, both ministers and their deputies take their cue from the premier, whose commitment to policy coordination is largely proven through his or her willingness to reward, or have his or her top people reward, participants for satisfactory and extraordinary performance on cross-ministry initiatives.

Unfortunately, Alberta’s leaders have meted out consequences inconsistently, and they have also often chosen insufficient awards and penalties. For example, performance pay for public service managers was instituted in 1998 and for several years ministry allocations were subject to a rating of progress on cross-ministry initiatives by a panel of non-government community leaders. However, the difference that achieving coordination made to performance pay was often
only one or two per cent of an individual’s salary and the total amount of performance pay available to any individual ranged from only three to seven per cent. Over time, the eligible employees realized that enticement was small in relation to the large amount of effort required to coordinate policies and the program had less and less influence on behaviours. It was revised in 2005 to pay larger sums, with a larger differential between satisfactory and extraordinary performance, but the program was suspended in 2009 to reduce expenditures. Despite the flaws in the experiment with performance pay, and the fact that a parallel practice at the political level is unlikely given the controversy around compensation for elected members, the premier must find concrete means like this to reward those that work together on policy and reprimand those that do not. Furthermore, both public servants and politicians must see that the premier is behind those consequences.

With all of this in mind, it’s clear that practices chosen as part of the strategy of assigning responsibility and accountability for policy coordination must communicate political and public service executive support for cross-ministry initiatives while moving coordination efforts through the following stages:

- the premier, together with his or her caucus and cabinet, is responsible for creating a strategic framework and identifying each policy goal that requires a cross-ministry effort;
- the premier, with cabinet support, is responsible for championing those efforts;
- the minister and deputy pairing assigned to lead an effort are responsible for getting all partners together;
- the premier is responsible for tracking and periodically taking stock of progress;
- the ministers and deputies named as partners are responsible for participating fully and contributing expert and quality work; and
- the premier, through his or her political and public service chiefs of staff, is responsible for insisting on consequences, whether punishments for those who failed to contribute to the collective goal or rewards for those who succeeded and even exceeded expectations.

Again, if Alberta is to address the complex challenges citizens care about, it will need to achieve policy coordination. That will require a few well-chosen strategies and a host of long-term practices. The first strategy must be assigning responsibility and accountability. Likewise, the first practice should be establishing a strategic framework that helps identify each policy challenge that requires a cross-ministry effort. Furthermore, the strategic framework should initiate those cross-ministry efforts by articulating and communicating clear goals, targets, and performance measures. At the same time, when government decides it is necessary to take a cross-ministry approach, the premier must be
clear that he or she expects policy coordination to occur, that those tasked with leading the effort must employ team-building and facilitation skills to bring all relevant parties together, and that those leaders and participants will be held accountable for their individual contributions and collective performance.

**Enabling Coordination by Pairing Structures and Processes**

While assigning responsibility and accountability drives policy coordination, structures and processes facilitate it. This is especially true when structures and processes are paired strategically. In other words, while most governance structures can be helpful, almost all have inherent pitfalls; governments must put processes in place to shore up the structures they want to aid in coordination. Accordingly, Alberta’s second strategy in support of coordination should be choosing a suite of structures paired with processes. The following examples suggest processes for already popular structures.

First, cabinet committees can coordinate policy efforts prior to review by the full cabinet. In Alberta, these committees have been created periodically in response to specific policy challenges. A caution with cabinet committees is that decisions are made by a small group of people and the results are not always adequately communicated to others in the cabinet, caucus, and beyond (Peters, 1998). Accordingly, cabinet committees are most effective in conjunction with annual or semi-annual planning sessions for caucus and cabinet. These sessions should be premier-led, consensus-based, well documented, and well communicated. The agenda would be to determine the government’s policy development priorities, identifying which ones require a cross-ministry approach. Furthermore, for each of those, planning session participants should agree on the ministries that need to be involved, the goal, targets, and performance measures, as well as an initial timeline. Experience suggests this will work for Alberta. For a period starting in the early 2000s, cabinet annually chose four cross-ministry initiatives to pursue in the year ahead. The Alberta Children and Youth Initiative, one of the Province’s coordination successes, emerged from that process.

Central agencies, such as a policy coordination unit reporting to the chief deputy minister in the premier’s office, can support cross-ministry initiatives. These agencies not only have expertise to offer ministries, their direct connection to the premier’s office can motivate ministries to participate fully in any coordination effort. Alberta is currently creating a policy management office to ensure the integration of natural resource policies as recommended by the Regulatory Enhancement Project Task Force, which is the government’s latest
effort to address the problems with its regulatory system for oil and gas. However, instead of making this new unit part of the premier’s office and the existing policy coordination unit housed there, the new policy management office is set to report to the ministers and deputies of the three SREM ministries. That decision may have been intended to avoid a common pitfall: central agencies can prevent ministries from finding more inventive and knowledge-based solutions. However, after almost a decade of failing to make progress toward coordination, the three ministries may need a more prescriptive approach driven from the premier’s office. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the director of a new policy management office, without the authority of a link to the premier through the chief deputy minister, will be able to motivate the ministries to work together.

Fortunately, there are processes that can help any policy management office steer clear of the above pitfall, as well as this related problem: central agencies have great power, which can stir resentment in ministries (Peters, 1998). The processes all stem from charging staff at any policy management office with facilitating and supporting coordination, with resisting taking on ownership, and with making clear that responsibility and accountability for coordination results remain with the ministries and their ministers. In other words, skilled employees in a policy coordination unit, ideally with the obvious and inarguable backing of the premier through a tie to his or her office through the chief deputy minister, are part of a powerful structure and yet are most effective when they facilitate coordination with processes that empower ministries and continue to hold their ministers accountable.

Another central agency, the Alberta Treasury Board, is a structural unit with great potential to incent policy coordination. In addition to allocating annual funding to ministries, it has the ability to fund cross-ministry efforts. However, funding has rarely been earmarked for policy coordination in Alberta and it is likely that the Treasury Board underestimates the cost: “Working horizontally is a very time and resource consuming activity” (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006, p. 21). Furthermore, when the Treasury Board chooses not to fund coordination, or includes funds for coordination within larger ministry allocations, they position the Province near a common pitfall. Namely, when public service leaders must withdraw coordination resources from the pool that, from their perspective, is to pay for the ministry-specific priorities they are expected to achieve, they are understandably reluctant to contribute to cross-ministry initiatives (Meijers & Stead, 2004). To avoid this pitfall, the Treasury Board should allocate funds specifically for coordination.

To Alberta’s credit, the Province has experimented with this from time to time. The Alberta Children and Youth Initiative and the Safe Communities Initiative are examples. However, the Treasury Board has had concerns with the
process: it had difficulty determining the relative merits of funding requests made by ministries planning to participate in a coordination effort; likewise, it had difficulty determining whether those ministries awarded funds were using them as stated. Furthermore, the new process did not safeguard allocations for cross-ministry initiatives: when ministries were directed to reduce spending, some reduced their spending on coordination efforts in favour of the ministry-specific projects identified in their business plans. Given these challenges, Alberta, like many other jurisdictions, has been reluctant to implement a consistent, long-term process to allocate and protect funding for policy coordination (Peters, 1998). However, the ability of targeted funding to incite policy coordination is so great that Alberta ought to address its concerns with this practice.

Junior ministers and parliamentary assistants can coordinate specific policy challenges and in Alberta they have been used to lead cross-ministry initiatives. But junior ministers often lack sway with the ministers of the ministries they are meant to engage (Peters, 1998). One process to empower them is to provide them with mandate letters that specifically identify which of the assigned initiatives require policy coordination and which ministries are expected to participate. In other words, it must be clear to all what specific outcome is expected. Furthermore, it must be clear that the junior minister or parliamentary assistant has the support of the premier, and that the premier will be holding that individual and all ministers meant to participate accountable for achieving coordination. The task force that recently made recommendations toward revamping Alberta’s regulatory system for oil and gas was comprised of the three parliamentary assistants assigned to each of the three SREM ministries. All three had mandate letters empowering them to review the system and make recommendations. While it is too early to tell if Alberta will succeed in coordinating its natural resource policies, the Government’s decision to implement the parliamentary assistants’ recommendations suggests that this structure and process can work for Alberta. Indeed, the Province is close to addressing the need for coordination that it failed to face following the regulatory system recommendations of 2002.

Super ministries co-locate a number of interconnected ministries, divisions, and branches with the expectation that policy coordination and streamlined service delivery will be easier when the various entities report to one minister through one deputy minister. For example, in October 2011, Alberta Human Services was created, amalgamating two large ministries and parts of two others. In addition to several major reporting agencies, this new super ministry has thirteen assistant-deputy-minister-run divisions. Ian Peach and other analysts point out the pitfalls of such super ministries (2004). One is that, given the significant sub-ministerial structure, the challenges of coordination do not
disappear: they are merely moved into the ministry. Another is that, due to the size of super ministries, the number of issues to be brought to the minister’s attention can become overwhelming and public servants are put in the position of making policy decisions that should reach the minister or cabinet. While charging public servants with producing a unified policy position may appear to be a solution to impasses, such as the stalemate reached by the three SREM ministers, it creates the danger that political decisions will be absorbed into the purview of the public service. Explicitly stating the coordination need that the super ministry is to address and outlining the different expectations the Province has of its public service leaders on the one hand and the minister and cabinet on the other would partly address these pitfalls.

Interdepartmental committees link ministries with a shared interest and have been struck in Alberta on a regular basis. They have long been important to the success of cross-ministry work on a variety of policy, administration, and service delivery challenges. However, interdepartmental committees are only as effective as their most committed members (Peters, 1998). A process that ensures more members are committed is the requirement that interdepartmental committees seek signoff by senior staff and the ministers of all ministries whose policies or programs may be affected before they submit proposals for cabinet consideration. Alberta has used this approach for many years but has failed to implement it rigorously. The cabinet decision document known as a Minister’s Report is to be signed by all ministers meant to participate in a cross-ministry initiative, but this report has been forwarded to cabinet on occasion without a full set of signatures. Insisting on this signing process has the power to solidify each minister’s support for the policy recommendation and coordination work ahead. Indeed, insisting on this signing process has the power to make interdepartmental committees a more effective structure toward achieving policy coordination.

Finally, stakeholder advisory committees or task forces, guiding or providing input into the cross-ministry policy development process, can advance policy coordination. However, it is never clear whether their advice represents the views of all stakeholders and the general public. For that reason and others, these structures are often ineffective: government rarely accepts all of their recommendations. However, the above pitfall can be avoided when stakeholder advisory committees and task forces are encouraged to engage interest groups and the general public, or when government seeks to confirm or supplement advisory committee and task force reports with engagement processes. Interest groups, especially those with political power, can bring an issue to the forefront and establish consensus on the need for action (Peach, 2004). Furthermore, advisory committees, task forces, interest groups, and even individuals can be astute at identifying any ministries that are not participating cooperatively in a
cross-ministry initiative. As well, they are often skilled at bringing this to the premier’s attention or otherwise motivating those ministries to return to the fold.

In Alberta, stakeholder and public engagement processes have long been part of policy development or coordination and appear to have contributed to successes. For example, the Alberta Children and Youth Initiative and the Safe Communities Initiative sought stakeholder input and public perspectives. Another example is the coordination of natural resource policies that affect the oil and gas industry. A decade ago, stakeholders and members of the public had few opportunities to share ideas on improving Alberta’s regulatory system so there was no agreement on the need to make changes. By contrast, the task force that recently made recommendations on the subject used stakeholders to help distinguish between genuine concerns raised by staff in the SREM ministries and those concerns driven by a desire to maintain the status quo. The task force achieved consensus with stakeholders on much of its report before submitting it. That agreement on the need to make changes positioned the government to tackle the issue.

Governments have many structures, most of which are useful, but they aid in policy coordination only when paired with processes to ensure they encourage cross-ministry efforts.

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**Enabling Coordination with Cultural Shifts**

The final strategy to aid in achieving policy coordination is to shift the culture within government.

The predominant culture in the public service is one that focuses on short-term ministry-specific issues and views most government policies as belonging to one ministry or another. This is not a culture that lends itself to policy coordination. However, its roots are understandable. When the government sets its priorities, legislative agenda, and budget, it pushes ministries into competition for attention and resources. Furthermore, when those resources grow scarce and workloads increase, public servants focus on their immediate ministry-specific responsibilities and reduce their contributions to anything they view as extracurricular which, unfortunately, often includes cross-ministry efforts. To successfully coordinate policies, the public service requires a change of corporate culture to one that focuses first on broad government goals and views all relevant policies as cross-ministry concerns. Consider practices that could overpower the systemic and historical habit of competition and bring about such a change. There are many possibilities: a unified government vision communicated to all public service professionals; a set of public service values...
that promote trust and teamwork; training, when necessary, to develop additional teamwork skills (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006); and, rewards and recognition for advancements in cross-ministry work.

On this front, Alberta has not been idle. Furthermore, it has certainly progressed from the era when deputy ministers were discouraged from meeting, let alone working together to help the government address a policy challenge that crossed the boundaries of their ministries. However, the collegial one-government outlook that is promoted at the deputy ministers’ table has not trickled down into every ministry. Accordingly, the Province needs to sustain and supplement its best efforts: investments in training and development to increase policy capacity across the public service, and to facilitate staff mobility across ministries; a one-government, one-employer approach to the recruitment and promotion of public service leaders, all of whom should be committed to values-based management; and, reward and recognition programs that celebrate accomplishments achieved through teamwork. For example, since the time of the Alberta Children and Youth Initiative, there has been an effort to promote coordination thorough the Premier’s Awards of Excellence which recognizes teamwork within and across ministries.

Of course, a parallel culture change may be needed at the political level. Members compete to be elected to the house, compete to be appointed to cabinet, compete for budget allocations, and compete for the recognition that will help them be re-elected and even run for the leadership of the party. Many, and especially new ministers, lack experience collaborating with their colleagues to coordinate policies and achieve a broader government goal. However, just as good working relationships between public servants are essential to coordination, so too are good relationships between ministers (Boston, 1992). The premier can set the expectation that ministers work together but to ensure their success he or she should also support ministers with practices similar to those identified above for public servants, from promoting teamwork to recognizing strong performances on cross-ministry efforts.
Conclusion

When realizing a broad government goal requires multiple ministries to align or combine their policies, and consequently their legislation and regulations, programs, and services, this is a call for policy coordination. The benefits of coordination include increasing efficiency by resolving overlapping regulations and decreasing vulnerability by presenting a unified position to other governments and sectors. While these gains are valuable, governments around the world are discovering an even greater motivation: they must get their ministries to work as one if they are to address today’s most complex public policy challenges.

Alberta has had mixed success in achieving coordination. It has made the least progress when it wandered far from the strategies outlined here, most notably in terms of the premier’s leadership in assigning responsibility and accountability. Likewise, the Province occasionally forfeited its progress toward coordination when the practices it put in place were not sustained, as with inconsistent funding for cross-ministry initiatives. Meanwhile, Alberta has made the most progress when the premier was involved in coordination, even peripherally, as with the Alberta Children and Youth Initiative and the Safe Communities Initiative. Accordingly, it is clear that the premier’s leadership is essential, though he or she need not independently lead any one coordination effort. His or her role is to champion coordination, enable others, and hold them accountable in a way that does not undermine the principle of ministerial responsibility. In other words, he or she should make a long-term commitment to a few well-chosen strategies designed to foster policy coordination. The first strategy must be assigning responsibility and accountability for cross-ministry initiatives. That strategy will lead to a practice, or several practices, which serve as a system for government to regularly identify which policy challenges to address using a cross-ministry approach. Furthermore, for each of these challenges, the government must articulate a goal or goals, targets, and performance measures. Likewise, the premier and his or her team must be clear on the responsibility and accountability of every necessary participant. The second strategy should be pairing structures and processes, and the third strategy should be to prompt cultural shifts.
Recommendations

Choose a few strategies to aid in policy coordination. For each strategy, commit to long-term practices.

1. **Strategy: Assign Responsibility and Accountability**
   - Chose practices that communicate political and public service executive support for cross-ministry initiatives.

   These practices should serve to move any coordination effort through the following stages:
   - the premier, together with his or her cabinet, is responsible for creating a strategic framework and/or conceiving of the right cross-ministry effort with clear goals, targets, and performance measures;
   - the premier is responsible for championing the effort;
   - the minister and deputy pairing assigned to lead the effort are responsible for getting the partners together;
   - the premier is responsible for tracking and periodically taking stock of progress;
   - the other ministers and deputys named as partners are responsible for participating fully and contributing expert and quality work; and
   - the premier, through his or her political and public service chiefs of staff, is responsible for insisting on consequences, whether punishments for those who failed or rewards for those who succeeded and even exceed expectations.

2. **Strategy: Enable Coordination by Pairing Structures and Processes**
   - Chose structures that can be paired with processes to address any inherent pitfalls.

   The resulting practices could include some or all of the following:
   - forming cabinet committees to coordinate specific cross-ministry initiatives identified and tracked through annual or semi-annual planning sessions;
o enabling central agencies like policy units to support coordination by having them report to the Office of the Premier through the chief deputy minister;
o funding cross-ministry initiatives independently of any ministry’s budget;
o charging junior ministers and parliamentary assistants with leading cross-ministry initiatives through mandate letters in which the premier delegates the authority necessary to pursue policy coordination and clearly defines the coordination goal;
o defining the policy coordination goals behind the creation of any super ministries and reiterating the distinct roles of public service leaders on the one hand and the minister and cabinet on the other;
o requiring all appropriate ministers to sign off on interdepartmental committee policy proposals; and
o empowering advisory committees and task forces to engage interest groups, stakeholders, and the general public in the policy coordination process.

3. **Strategy: Enable Coordination with Cultural Shifts**

- Choose practices that will change the corporate culture of the public service from one in which ministries are competitors to one in which they are encouraged to work together and coordinate their policies as appropriate.

Such practices could include some or all of the following:
- communicating to all public service professionals a unified government vision;
- modelling a set of public service values that promote trust and teamwork;
- investing in training and development, when necessary, to increase policy capacity, enable staff mobility across ministries, and develop additional teamwork skills;
- taking a one-government, one-employer approach to recruitment and promotion; and
- celebrating teamwork through rewards and recognition programs.

- Choose similar practices to prompt this same shift from competition to cooperation at the political level.
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