Transnational regulation of professional services: Governance dynamics of field level organizational change

Roy Suddaby a,*, David J. Cooper b, Royston Greenwood a

a Department of Strategic Management and Organization, 3-23 Business Building, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2R6
b Department of Accounting and Management Information Systems, 3-23 Business Building, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2R6

Abstract

This paper examines the role of large accounting firms in the emergence of a transnational regulatory field in professional services. We use neo-institutional theory to illuminate the process by which new fields are created. We observe a shift in the structural boundaries of professional regulation to include new actors, specifically Big Four accounting firms and non-governmental organizations. We also observe a shift in regulatory logics in which historical efforts to separate professional practice from commercial interest are embraced rather than suppressed. New logics also include pressures to adopt new occupational identities. Finally we describe a shift in institutional power structures from coercive structures of domination to inclusive power structures of membership and identity.

© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

The accounting profession has been heavily involved in processes of globalization (Arnold, 2005; Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Neu, Ocampo Gomez, Graham, & Heincke, 2006). Reciprocally, globalization is changing the institutions of accounting (Caramanis, 1999, 2002), generating considerable tensions within accounting organizations (Cooper, Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1998), between professional service firms and their clients, and between professions (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). The impact of such tensions is manifest in the collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen, accounting and audit abuses and the ensuing debate about the failure of the accounting profession to effectively monitor conflicts of interest, ethics and professional independence in conglomerate accounting firms (Zeef, 2003a, 2003b).

In addition to the dramatic personal and financial tragedies represented by the demise of Andersen, the firm’s fall also represents a dramatic
failure in the professional project of accountancy. Government oversight of the accounting profession has intensified, as reflected in the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, and the largest accounting firms have dramatically circumscribed their scope of practice, most notably by removing their highly profitable management consulting practices. The shocking absence of independence, and the apparent inability of even elite members of the profession to self-regulate, made evident in the events surrounding Enron, has initiated an era of critical self-appraisal amongst accountants.

At the core of this debate are questions about the future of professional regulation. While such debates in earlier eras largely focused on the nexus between professional associations and states (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, & Nahapiet, 1980; Halliday, 1987; Sikka & Willmott, 1995; Tinker, 1984), contemporary debates focus more explicitly on globalization (Dezalay, 1995; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006). There is an increasing awareness that, as professional services increase in scale and scope, conglomerate professional firms have become less the subject and more the site of professional regulation (Cooper & Robson, 2006). Not only do such firms defy the geographical boundaries of existing regulatory structures, they also challenge our understandings of inter-professional rivalry and jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988; Dezalay, 1995). For example, the site of inter-professional competition may now be within a firm as well as between professional associations (Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg, 2003; McVea, 2002).

This paper seeks to understand the implications of the emergence of transnational professional service firms for professional regulation. We contend that the relationship between professions and the state is changing, influenced by shifting understandings of the appropriate structure of regulation, the meaning of professionalism and what the appropriate object of regulation is (Held, 2000; Meyer, 2000). The emergence of intergovernmental trade groups, international trade organizations and conglomerate accounting firms, whose scale and scope surpasses many states, has redefined the transnational arena of global professional business, threatening the legitimacy of traditional professions and state governments in defining market relations. Our central proposition is that the historical regulatory bargain between professional associations and nation states is being superseded by a new compact between conglomerate professional firms and transnational trade organizations. We further observe shifts in the regulatory logic of this new compact, from one based on normative principles of professional elitism to one based on neo-liberal principles of market economics (Puxty, Willmott, Cooper, & Lowe, 1987), dramatically affecting the production, consumption and control of professional expertise.

We use institutional theory to make sense of these events. Institutional theory is an appropriate lens for a number of reasons. Foremost, institutional theory acknowledges the prominent role that professions play in both processes of isomorphic reproduction of existing social structures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional accounts depict a powerful role for the interaction of professions and the state in processes of institutional change (Montagna, 1974; Willmott, 1986) and the creation of new social structures (DiMaggio, 1991; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). Indeed, the co-evolution of professions and state may be considered one of the primary engines of institutional change (DiMaggio, 1991). Secondly, institutional accounts are increasingly used to understand the dynamics of globalization (Guillen, 2001; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). While some of these approaches have focused on the processes by which dominant cultural templates are diffused globally (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997), others focus on the processes by which dominant templates are translated or adapted to local contexts (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Djelic & Quack, 2003). Both approaches, however, share a focus on understanding how newly formed networks of actors coalesce to create transnational structures of governance.

As such, institutional theory offers a valuable theoretical framework to analyze the profound shifts in the regulatory structure of professional business services. We present an analysis of this transformation, grounded in debates about the nature and dynamics of field level change. The field
is a unit of analysis central to institutional theory, describing clusters of actors that cross traditional industry boundaries and which interact ‘frequently and fatefuly’ with one another (Scott, 1994). An organization field consists of “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148).

Although the field construct enjoys growing popularity, its precise definition remains elusive, and is often used interchangeably with constructs it was deemed to replace, such as industry or population. Critics have observed that the construct is improperly used to analyze changes within a single form or a single population of organizations and ignores questions of how new fields and organizational forms emerge and co-evolve and how the boundaries of extant fields shift over time (Dacin, Goldstein, & Scott, 2002, p. 50; Oakes et al., 1998). That is, institutional research has failed to provide coherent accounts of field structuration.

A related gap in our knowledge of field level change is the important role of governance structures or institutional logics. While there is a growing awareness that field boundaries are constructed around common meaning systems (Hoffman, 1999) and that changes in field boundaries are accompanied by shifts in the dominant logics that organize fields (Thornton, 2002) such studies have focused narrowly on local governance mechanisms. As Dacin et al. (2002, p. 51) observe, however, “wider society level (and even trans-societal) systems shape and interpenetrate field level systems in complex and changing ways, affecting the structuration of a field itself as well as attempting to influence and control the behavior of specific organizations.” While Oakes, Townley, and Cooper (1998) do link field and societal changes in their analysis of museums and cultural organizations in Alberta, most field level accounts do not adopt a wider perspective, and none seem to consider a transnational perspective.

Empirical studies of organizational fields also suffer from a lack of attention to the role of power. That is, while there is an understanding that fields operate to reproduce the power and privilege of incumbent groups (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein, 1997), most empirical studies of organizational fields do not specifically identify central versus peripheral players, elite or marginal actors or dominant and subservient classes of organizations. While there are some exceptions to this (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Oakes et al., 1998), most field studies overlook the role of power because one of the consequences of institutionalization is a tendency to ‘naturalize’ the institutional structures that populate our environment so that power differences become apparent only to outsiders (Fligstein, 1997; Zucker, 1991).

This paper seeks to redress these oversights. Through an examination of the emergence of a transnational field for professional services, we illustrate the process by which an organizational field emerges. We argue for four elements of field structuration; boundaries, logics, identity and power. First, the key structural boundaries of the organizational field of professional business services have shifted from the state-profession level of analysis to the transnational level. Second, the introduction of new actors has been accompanied by the introduction of new ideas. The shift in ideological boundaries involves a change in logics by which the dominant institutional logic has moved from one based on professional trusteeship to one based on a commercial exchange of expertise. Third there has been a distinct shift in identification in which efforts have been made to draw a boundary between the occupational identity of elite and traditional professionals. Fourth, the shift in field structure and boundaries has been accompanied by a shift in power, from ‘hard’ actors (i.e., nation states and professional associations) wielding coercive power to ‘soft’ actors (transnational agents and conglomerate professional service firms) that rely on normative power and the ability to shape interests and identities (Nye, 1990). These shifts in boundaries, logics, identity and power have occurred simultaneously with the emergence of transnational professional service firms as a distinctly new organizational form.
Methods and objectives

Our objective is to construct a coherent historical account of the ongoing structuration of an emerging organizational field that will permit a rich theoretical understanding of the processes by which structuration occurs. Our empirical narrative focuses on four elements of the structuration of an emerging organizational field; structural boundaries, ideation, identity and power. Our primary unit of analysis is the field of professional business services, by which we mean the ensemble of actors and institutions engaged in the production, consumption and interpretation of professional services for the world’s largest commercial organizations. As the transformation of the field has centrally involved the accounting profession, our discussion will focus primarily on accounting firms.

We use several data sources. The historical account of the growth of large accounting firms is drawn from archival documents and from the accounting literature. Our analysis is also based on manifest and latent content analysis (Berg, 2004) of key public debates surrounding the expansion of the accounting profession, both in geographical scale and in the scope of services. Specifically, we examined transcripts of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Public Hearings on Auditor Independence and the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. The SEC hearings centered on proposed new rules that threatened to severely curtail the multidisciplinary aspirations of the Big Five. The SEC hearings generated approximately five hundred pages of documentary evidence, including transcripts from 93 witnesses and supporting historical materials and reports. The ABA commission was established in August 1998, largely in response to the perceived encroachment of large accounting firms on the professional jurisdiction of law. Because its primary mandate was to study and report on the regulatory issues presented by the growth in scale and scope of the Big Five professional service firms, the ABA commission offers a comprehensive data source of key debates relating to transnational regulation of professional services. Between 1998 and 2000 the Commission heard from 173 witnesses, including representatives of law firms, all the multinational accounting firms, other accounting firms, consumer groups, corporations, regulators and other individuals, generating over eight hundred pages of testimony.

We supplement the statistical and archival data with semi-structured participant interviews with key informants in the accounting profession, including state regulators and managing partners of Big Five accounting firms. Such interviews were not used as primary data sources, but rather to confirm the accuracy of the authors’ interpretations of the archival data.

We analyzed the archival data using a modified form of content analysis. The first stage focused on the manifest content or those elements of the narrative that are “physically present” (Berg, 2004, p. 269). Our initial objective was to establish the sequence of growth of large accounting firms, identify major actors in the emerging transnational regulatory field and to understand their general role in shaping new regulatory structures or maintaining ties to old ones. This stage was devoted to identifying and describing the changing structural boundaries of a changing organizational field by examining relational ties that link elements of a given social structure (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002). The second stage of analysis focused on the latent content of the data. Here we were concerned with capturing the implicit categories of meaning adopted by each of the actors in the emerging field. The research objective was to capture, “relevant features of shared understandings, professional ideologies, cognitive frames or sets of collective meanings that condition how organizational actors interpret and respond to the world around them, to measure essential properties of these ideational systems and to use them to explain the strategies and actions of individuals and organizations” (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002, p. 819).

Our overall objective was to take seriously the notion of the field as both a construct and a methodology (Washington, Ventresca, & Suddaby, 2006).

The paper is organized in three further sections. In the next section we describe the erosion of traditional professional governance in the accounting
profession resulting from the growth of large accounting firms. These processes of erosion are a form of deinstitutionalization (Oliver, 1992) where traditional institutions of professional regulation are weakened. In section four we describe and analyze the emerging transnational field of professional business services and elaborate four processes of field level institutional change; the shift in boundaries from the state to the transnational, the emergence of new actors, the emergence of new institutional logics of regulation and the changing power relations in the field. The concluding section summarizes these findings and discusses the implications for our knowledge of organizational fields, globalization and professions.

**Shifting governance: from local monopoly to global cartel**

Previous research in the sociology of the professions demonstrates a close relationship between professions and state authorities (Burrage & Torstendahl, 1990; Caramanis, 1999, 2002; Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 2002; De Beelde, 2002; Halliday, 1987; Johnson, 1972, 1982; Miller, 1990; Powell, 1985; Puxty et al., 1987; Ramirez, 2001). The interdependence between state and professions has been described as a ‘regulative bargain’ in which the state grants professions autonomy and a monopoly over a defined jurisdiction in return for self-regulation and reciprocal assistance in maintaining state authority (Cooper, Puxty, Robson, & Willmott, 1994; Robson, Willmott, Cooper, & Puxty, 1994). The strength of the state/profession relationship is evidenced in the regulatory structure of the North American professions in which state authorities retain residual control over the professions, but, in practice, grant considerable autonomy to professional associations to regulate their members (Halliday, 1987; Powell, 1988; Previts & Merino, 1998). Delegation of regulatory authority to professional associations is a central feature of self-regulation and provides one of the defining characteristics of professionalism (Abbott, 1988; Friedson, 2001). Self-regulation is the ability of professional associations to “set educational standards, regulate admission to practice, prescribe ethical codes and discipline deviant practitioners” (Powell, 1985, p. 281).

The historical relationship between the state and professional associations established a form of social control that we term professional governance. Professional governance is grounded in a “a set of interconnected institutions providing the economic support and social organization that sustains the occupational control of work” (Friedson, 2001, p. 2). Professional governance is normative in nature, although it is backed by the coercive power of the state. Behavioral expectations are collected in ethical codes and sanctions are rarely administered. Indeed, a common criticism of traditional professions is the unwillingness of associations to discipline their members (Bedard, 2001; Friedson, 2001). The ultimate sanction, expulsion from the profession, is rarely used, creating the impression that professions are more interested in self-preservation than in protecting the public interest.

Another important characteristic of professional governance is the myth of separating professional practice from commercial interest. Friedson (2001) argues that professionalism is a logic of social control that is independent from both bureaucratic managerialism and economic logic. Larson (1977) suggests that the ideology underpinning this logic is based on professions successfully espousing anti-market principles (e.g., that professions are a ‘calling’ rather than an occupation and that professionals are intrinsically motivated) while aggressively pursuing economic monopolies. Radcliffe, Cooper, and Robson (1994), in their analysis of the role of UK accountants in financial services, illustrate how such myths can impede professionals in their attempts to open up new markets and disrupt their claims to self-regulation.

Nonetheless, the pervasiveness of the notion of the professional as a trustee of higher social principles embedded within the logic of professional governance is shown in a series of institutionalized practices that suppress overt market competition within the professions (Hanlon, 1994; MacIntosh & Shearer, 2000; Willmott & Sikka, 1997). For much of the twentieth century, for example, most professionals were prohibited from advertising their services. Similarly, professions were protected from competition from outside the profession by
state regulation. And professional associations were, historically, exempt from regulations that prohibited restraint of trade; professional associations were allowed to set tariffs and to discipline members who deviated from them (Stager & Arthurs, 1990). The result was that, at least during the ‘golden age’ of professions, from about the turn of the century to the early 1980s (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Previts & Merino, 1998), professions, with the sanction of the state, enjoyed a monopoly over the external market for their services and relative autonomy in their internal affairs.

Two points bear emphasis. First, the primary actors on behalf of the professions have been professional associations and the primary actors on behalf of the state have been national and regional state governments. Second, the logic of professional governance, based on assumptions of the primacy of trusteeship and ethics over economic gain, became the dominant logic of professional regulation (Brint, 1994; Friedson, 2001). These taken-for-granted assumptions about the appropriateness and expression of professional controls provided powerful pressures that defined the form of professional service provision, the suppression of intra-professional competition and the assumed necessity of keeping intact the institutional and practical ethics of professional practice.

**Erosion of professional governance**

In accounting, the challenge to professional governance came from within the core of the profession – from the largest and most powerful accounting organizations. A subset of these firms, described over time as the Big Eight, then the Big Six, the Big Five and now the Big Four\(^1\) outgrew the regulatory boundaries established by the state/profession compact in accounting. They outgrew the regulatory boundaries in a geographic sense – by becoming multinational and increasingly integrated in their managerial practices, if not their legal structures (Greenwood, Cooper, Rose, Hinnings, & Brown, 1999; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Although international accounting associations were created, such as the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), these were relatively weak and dependant upon national bodies.

The Big Five also outgrew their regulatory boundaries in a disciplinary sense – by engaging in work falling outside the jurisdictional boundaries of any professional association. Perhaps most significantly, the Big Five outgrew the logic of professional governance as they, increasingly, provided services to a subset of large and powerful corporate clients. If there was control of the accounting profession, it was often through capital market regulators, rather than from within the profession. But even that control was weak and often incestuous, as capital market regulators relied on accounting firms for personnel and even subcontracted much work to the Big Five. Critically, the metamorphosis of large accounting firms not only solidified the erosion of national professional governance in accounting, it also raised the level of analysis for professional regulation to the global sphere. In this section we briefly recount the process by which this metamorphosis occurred.

**Growth in size**

Two factors account for the growth in scale and scope of accounting firms; the maturation of the audit market, and the global expansion of their client base (Boyd, 1999). The elite grouping of the Big Eight accounting firms was identified as early as 1932 (Fortune, 1932). Even by today’s standards, these were large firms. Price Waterhouse & Co. employed over a thousand accountants and had gross annual revenues of over six million (US) dollars. By 1980, Ernst & Whinney was the largest of the Big Eight with revenues of $500 million and 14,000 employees. Through mergers and internal growth, Ernst & Whinney would nearly double in size over the next decade and its annual revenues

\(^1\) The “Big Four” refers to the four largest international accounting firms in the world and consist of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG. In 1970 there were eight such firms but mergers in 1989 created the “Big Six”. The 1997 merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers Lybrand reduces this to the “Big Five” and the demise of Arthur Andersen has left the “Big Four”. For most of the material presented in this paper the term “Big Five” is most appropriate and will be used except where context requires a more appropriate reference.
would increase nearly five fold (Table 1). By comparison, the annual revenues of General Motors would increase only twofold in the same period and its employee base would actually shrink.² In 1999 PricewaterhouseCoopers was the largest of the (then) Big Five with annual revenues that would place it, were it a publicly traded corporation, in 85th position in the Fortune 500 list of the world’s largest firms.

The Big Eight also became international enterprises, often more ‘international’ than many of the corporations they audited. By 1988 KPMG had 641 offices in over 130 countries, and over 1000 offices by 1995. This is a greater global spread than its largest audit clients, including Coca-Cola and General Motors. Pastra (2004) estimates that Ernst & Young had 676 offices in 130 countries in 1997, and that Price Waterhouse had 414 offices in 121 countries. By 1999 more than 65% of the Big Five’s overall revenue was derived from non-US countries³ (White, 1999). Table 2 demonstrates the global expansion of these firms. This massive increase in scale and scope both reflected and reinforced an increasing saturation of the domestic North American and global audit market by this cluster of elite firms. Increasingly, the world’s largest corporate clients were served by progenitors of the Big Four. A 1995 study of global audit concentration found that the (then) Big Six audited all of the companies in the world with assets over $5 billion, all but

² Between 1980 and 1990 General Motors’ annual revenue increased from just over $66 billion to $126 billion and its total employee population dropped from 853,000 to 775,000 (Fortune, May 5, 1980, p. 277 and April 23, 1990, p. 347).

³ This is an estimate drawn from data compiled and presented by Accountancy International, August 1999, p. 8 and October 1999, p. 8.
three companies with assets between $1 and $5 billion, and all but nine of those with assets between $0.5 and $1 billion (Doogar & Easley, 1995). Table 3 shows the growing domination and saturation of the global market for audit services by the multinational accounting firms.

Growth in scope

As the large accounting firms grew in size, so too did they expand the range of services provided. Once the market for traditional audit services became saturated, firms became increasingly reliant on new services to maintain revenue (and profit) growth. The bulk of new services came from the provision of general management consulting services. Tables 4A and 4B track the changing proportion of profits derived from audit, tax and management consulting services in multinational accounting firms. The shift is more pronounced in some firms, particularly Arthur Andersen, where, by 1999, nearly seventy percent of revenue came from non-audit services. Zeff (2003b) shows that even after Accenture (formerly Andersen Consulting) split from Arthur Andersen, the ‘accounting firm’ generated 57% of its revenues from non-accounting audit work, similar to the split in the other Big Five firms.

Unlike accounting, management consultancy has never had the regulatory oversight that comes with professional status. Although there have been many attempts to create a ‘professional project’ in management consulting (McKenna, 2001), none has successfully achieved the jurisdictional protection or ‘social closure’ of more traditional professions. In many cases, the move to consulting involved the re-characterization of traditional and regulated audit work as many aspects of ‘strategic audits’ involved unregulated consultancy services (Bell, Marrs, Solomon, & Thomas, 1997). As noted below, professional controls were further diluted by internal competition, in which audit managers felt pressure to match the profit levels of consultants. Technical expertise was no longer the primary criterion for promotion within the Big Five. Rather, the ability to sell new services or cross-sell audit and other services became the fast track to the top (Wyatt, 2004).

The shift to non-audit services changed the internal composition of Big Four firms. Prior to the 1980s, they tended to hire young graduates, train them in audit and taxation and shift a small proportion of them to management consulting. The process ensured that accountants received what was considered to be appropriate socialization and acceptance of professional norms and values (Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 1998, 2002; Covaleski, Dirsmit, Heian, & Samuel, 1998; Wyatt, 2004). Common socialization routines are perhaps the most salient means by which
professional institutions are reproduced (Becker, Greer, Hughes, & Strauss, 1961). Once the Big Five became multidisciplinary they began to hire people in a wide variety of specialties with a preference for experienced personnel over new graduates. The presence of such heterogeneous professional and disciplinary backgrounds created cultural divisions within the firms, disrupted the uniformity of socialization efforts (Toffler, 2003; Wyatt, 2004) and occasionally lead to highly public disputes (Whitford, 1997). Coval- eski et al. (1998) discuss the struggles in accounting firms over appropriate control systems and discuss the implications for the unstable identity of these firms. Anderson-Gough, Grey, and Rob- son (2001) describe how the socialization practices in the UK offices of the international accounting firms led to junior accountants and auditors developing allegiance to their firm rather than the profession.
Throughout the 1980’s, mergers and acquisitions among the world’s largest corporations reduced the number of large audit clients for Big Five firms and encouraged the Big Five to grow their revenue base by expanding the range and depth of services to a shrinking number of very large clients. In doing so, the Big Five entered into an increasingly interdependent relationship with their largest corporate clients. Such interdependence was reflected in an increasing erosion of the boundaries between professional service firm and client as evidenced by the creation of joint committees, the movement of key employees from professional service firm to client (either through temporary secondments or permanent employment) and the creation of common technological and communication platforms.

An important consequence of the growing intimacy between professional service firms and their corporate clients was a displacement of the traditional power relationship between the provider and consumer of professional services. When professional work is consumed primarily by individuals, professionals enjoy a degree of asymmetry of power because of their superior expertise and social position (Sharma, 1997). Corporate consumers of professional services, however, use a variety of devices, such as internal auditors and related experts, to monitor, evaluate and control the power asymmetry that arises between professional and client. The heightened status and power of corporate clients, along with their ability to control the timing, delivery and cost of professional work, has been termed “client capture” (Leicht & Fen nell, 2001).

Client capture can occur through historical and anticipated personnel flows between professional service firms and their clients. If, for example, the internal auditors of a corporate client are former employees of the external auditor, pre-existing personal relationships may impair objectivity. Similarly, if audit personnel view their corporate client as a potential future employer, it may compromise the exercise of professional independence and judgment (Macey & Sale, 2003). This element of client capture is illustrated by the flow of personnel between Waste Management and its auditor, Arthur Andersen. Waste Management had a long history of moving key audit personnel from Andersen into key executive positions in Waste Management’s finance department. Until 1997 every Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Audit</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Consulting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Audit</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Consulting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Audit</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Consulting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Audit</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Consulting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Audit</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Consulting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Audit</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Consulting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Public Accounting Report, various years and Fortune.
Officer hired by Waste Management had worked previously at Andersen. In total, fourteen former Andersen senior auditors worked for Waste Management during the 1990s (Schneider, 2002). Enron also hired extensively from Arthur Andersen. Richard Causey, Enron’s CAO, was a senior audit manager at Andersen and, according to estimates, more that 300 accounting and finance positions at Enron were staffed by ex-Andersen employees (Macey & Sale, 2003).

Client capture can also occur when, because of the increasingly intimate relationship between professional and client, professionals begin to adopt the commercial values and logic of their client at the expense of the traditional values and logic of their profession. Arthur Wyatt, former managing director of accounting principles at Arthur Andersen, observed that the need to increase revenue from the audit side of practice meant that auditors experienced pressure to acquiesce to client demands if they wanted to keep the client:

“The leaders of the audit and tax practices felt increasing pressure to grow revenues rapidly and, more importantly, to grow profit margins in their service areas. Those with a facility to sell new work advanced more rapidly. Cross-selling a range of consulting services to audit clients became one of the important criteria in the evaluation of audit partners.....Primarily commercial interests had undermined the core values of the professional firm” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 50).

Client capture may also occur when a professional derives the bulk of their income from a single client. Macey and Sale (2003) observe that in the case of Enron, the lead partner devoted one hundred percent of his and his team’s time to the Enron account. Even though Arthur Andersen had 2300 other audit clients (making the Enron account only one percent of the firm’s overall revenue), individual professionals and audit units within the firm relied exclusively on a single client placing them in an extremely vulnerable economic position and offering a prima facie explanation for the lack of professional judgment regarding Enron.

Professional firms, thus, became increasingly dependant on their corporate clients. The clients, in turn, introduced formal and informal mechanisms that reduced the traditional power and informational asymmetries between professionals and clients. The net result was a significant diminution in the independence and autonomy of professionals and professional service firms from their clients.

Deinstitutionalization of self-regulation

These trends contributed to the deinstitutionalization of professional governance. Oliver (1992) identifies three categories of pressures for deinstitutionalization: structural–functional, political and social pressures. Each of these categories is reflected in our account of the erosion of professional governance in accounting.

Oliver (1992, p. 571) observes that structural–functional deinstitutionalization can occur when the “social and economic criteria of success begin to conflict significantly with one another”. In a functional sense, the largest accounting firms simply outgrew their regulatory structures. They physically outgrew the geographic reach of state and provincial regulatory associations. More significantly, perhaps, the migration of Big Five firms away from their core functional areas of audit, assurance and taxation and toward the more lucrative practice of management consulting created a rift between the social criteria of success, i.e., professional audit practice, and an emerging economic criteria of success, management consulting.

Oliver also points to political pressures as a source of deinstitutionalization. Such political pressures arise when changing conditions, both inside an organization and outside, in the broader organizational field, create mounting performance conditions that challenge taken for granted practices. The rapid expansion of the largest accounting firms, and their growing dependence on large multinational clients, created a context in which traditional services were provided as an economic “loss leader” for more lucrative consulting services (Wyatt, 2004). Oliver (1992, p. 569) suggests that such conditions cause organizational actors to abandon institutionalized rules of appropriate conduct and to behave in a much more self-interested or politically instrumental manner. Thus the Big Five abandoned their commitment to professional
associations, and began to build political support in their own interests by forming political action committees (Dwyer & Roberts, 2004; McNamee, Dwyer, Schmitt, & Lava Lee, 2000) to deal with state and federal regulators and, thus, usurp a traditional function of the AICPA.

Perhaps most significantly, the Big Five outgrew the social prescriptions of their profession by expanding to unregulated services, such as management consulting, and by becoming multidisciplinary, where institutionalized norms of socialization, training and expectations diminished in importance. Oliver (1992) identifies ‘normative fragmentation’ as a deinstitutionalizing response to social pressures. Normative fragmentation “refers to a loss of cultural consensus or agreement among organizational members to the meanings and interpretations they attach to ongoing organizational tasks and activities” (Oliver, 1992, p. 575). Accompanying the shift in scale and scope of activities of the Big Five was a profound shift in internal values by Big Five accountants. Part of this shift occurred as a result of changes in interaction patterns, where Big Five firms reduced the degree of interaction with professional associations and increased their interaction with clients (Greenwood et al., 2002). More directly, however, representatives of Big Five firms adopted the economic rhetoric of their corporate clients, justifying their expansion to new business services as being in the best interests of the consumer, which ultimately is in the public interest (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Willmott, Cooper, & Puxty, 1993). Conflating public interest with consumer interest is, perhaps, the clearest indication of the degree to which the social norms of professional governance had become displaced within the Big Five.4

Collectively, these actions undermined the power of professional governance in accounting. The growing economic influence of consulting practices and other unregulated activities within Big Five firms blurred the distinction between professional and commercial organizations. The growing identification with clients and consumer interests and the increasing commodification of professional work (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001) raised doubts about the rationalized mythology that commercial competition within the professions was unseemly. And the creation of political action committees to represent the interests of the Big Five indicates a significant breach in the traditional regulatory compact between the profession and the state to mutually reinforce the professional project of accountancy.

The emergence of a new field: transnational professional services

While professional regulatory mechanisms were being deinstitutionalized at the national and state/provincial level, shifts in politics and economics at the transnational level were further weakening the capacity of state governments to regulate both domestic and international economic activity. The emergence of global trading agreements (NAFTA, EC), post Bretton-Woods institutions with quasi-regulatory authority (IMF, WTO) and a mutually reinforcing neo-liberal political ideology dramatically restructured the relationship between state and society, making it difficult for states to use their regulatory power for anything more than supporting policies promulgated by transnational institutions and non-governmental organizations (Ohmae, 1995; Zacher, 1992). In this emerging transnational context, domestic professional regulation became characterized as a key barrier to trade, investment and the global mobility of labour (Arnold, 2005).

It is within this context that a new field of professional business services was emerging at the transnational level.5 Traditional accounts of field emergence commonly invoke the notion of structuration characterized by increasing interaction between field participants, the emergence of inter-

4 Fogarty, Radcliffe, and Campbell (2006) illustrate how these tendencies also operated within the AICPA.

5 Dezalay and Garth (1996) discuss similar processes of the development of new professional fields, in relation to transnational commercial arbitration. More generally, Boli and Thomas (1997, 1999) provide an historical analysis, using institutional theory, to trace the contours of the growth of non-governmental organizations at the transnational level.
organizational governance structures and a growing awareness among field actors that they are engaged in a common enterprise (DiMaggio, 1983). Although structuration is widely accepted as an element of field formation (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 1994) its application in organization theory has been criticized for reducing the concept of field to spatial networks of actors and interactions, without attending to the meanings (Mohr, 2005) and cultural forces (Fligstein, 1997) embedded within them. That is, fields have become inappropriately reduced to their spatial boundaries while the meaning and power structures that define them have gone unexamined.

In the analysis that follows we adopt a proces-sual view of field formation. While we accept and elaborate the understanding that as fields become structurated they adopt spatial boundaries, we extend this by examining the boundary work (Geryn, 1999; Lamont & Molnar, 2002) associated with three additional, but distinct, elements of field formation. In addition to patterns of interaction, fields are defined by common beliefs (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984) or ideology (DiMaggio, 1983; Hoffman, 1999). This perspective views fields as arenas of conflict and what is at stake in the field can help to define the boundaries of the field by examining the forms of capital, economic, cultural and social, in understanding the dynamics of field reproduction (Oakes et al., 1998). We term this the “ideational” element of field emergence. There is also a growing awareness that fields are defined by shared symbols (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), shared identities (Glynn & Abzug, 2002) or mutual identification (Zilber, 2002). We use the term “identification” to describe this element of field definition. Finally, we observe that field creation is contingent on the dynamics of power in the field. DiMaggio (1983) identifies the emergence of “inter-organizational structures of domination”. Bourdieu (1987) adopts a more subtle definition of field emergence based on competing hierarchies of classification, in which power structures are defined by struggles over criteria of legitimacy. These four elements or ‘moments’ of field formation elaborate three different types of boundary work – spatial, ideation and power boundaries – and are elaborated in the balance of the section.

Spatial boundaries

Organizational fields emerge as a result of the mutual enactment of relations between actors (Giddens, 1984). That is, over time, as interactions between disparate actors increase, the actors become increasingly aware of each other as occupying a unique social space (Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980). This view of structuration adopts a strong spatial metaphor in which the emergence of a field is likened to a definable network of activity that emerges in time and space (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Drawing the boundaries of the field, in this sense, involves the process of identifying the actors that interact “frequently and fatefuly” (Scott, 1994, p. 208) with each other in a mutually reinforcing pattern of interactions by which mutual expectations become institutionalized in common routines, shared expectations and a growing awareness of engaging in a common project or activity (DiMaggio, 1983, 1991). Field emergence thus occurs as a result of the introduction of new actors (DiMaggio, 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2005), new practices (Leblebici et al., 1991) or related changes in the institutional structures, that define the spatial terrain of interaction.

At the transnational level, two groups of actors coalesced into a mutually reinforcing pattern of interactions and understandings that helped define the boundaries of the emerging field of professional business services. Foremost were the Big Five accounting firms whose close relationship with their corporate clients has been described as a “key part of the world’s financial structure” (Strange, 1996, p. 135) and a critical element in the trend toward global economic concentration. They sought to influence governments not only by providing consulting services about accounting, tax and management advice, but by developing mechanisms enabling privatizations and giving more general advice about using markets to coordinate economic activity. Even when providing assistance in structuring regulation (e.g., about financial services, international trade, utilities, education and health care) the large accounting firms sought to benefit both their large corporate clients and the Big Five firms themselves (Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Catchpole & Cooper, 1999; Dezalay & Garth, 1995).
Transnational trade organizations joined the Big Five in promoting transnational professional services. Over time, these two groups recognized that they were engaged, *inter alia*, in a common project of removing trade barriers to professional practices. This common project is the outcropping of a more general mission to internationalize the world economy, based on a belief, known as the Washington consensus, in the value of free trade in goods and services (Stiglitz, 2002; Trubek & Dezaelay, 1994). The Washington consensus is a version of neo-liberal values, extolling free trade, the elimination of capital controls, economic restructuring (such as deregulation and privatization) and what have become known as structural adjustment programs, typically requiring reductions in welfare and social spending by the state (Held, 2004).

Although there are multiple transnational organizations concerned with professional services, the World Trade Organization (WTO) plays a dominant role (Arnold, 2005). It has become a powerful agent for change in professional regulation. With a fundamental commitment to liberalizing trade internationally, the organization has recognized the importance of services in general and professional services in particular. In August 1989 the Secretariat produced a discussion paper on “Trade in Professional Service” (WTO, MTN.GNS/W.67). The document was a prelude to a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and ultimately led to the creation of a committee mandated to identify national regulations that restrain trade in professional services. GATS provides the legal framework and the WTO provides the disciplining mechanisms on member states to promote market-led globalization.

The Big Five and transnational trade organizations such as the WTO interacted directly in formulating a common regulatory scheme for the liberalization of trade in professional services. Overlap in key policies and the use of a common economic ideology suggests the emergence of an “epistemic community” (Haas, 1992) or a “symbolic terrain” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) in which actors begin to recognize each other as engaging in a project in which mutual interests may be realized. This is an important element of field formation; actors become mutually aware of each other and define the valued symbolic elements of the field. Perhaps unsurprisingly, their primary tactic in this project was to attack the historical compact between professional associations and state governments for their monopolistic tendencies while they were, themselves, engaged in a similar professional project at the transnational level.

The increasing overlap in interaction and purpose between the Big Five and the WTO illustrate three significant elements of the spatial definition of an emerging organizational field. First, it shows a heightened mutual awareness among participants within a field that they are involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio, 1983; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Second, it shows an increasingly common language shared by field participants (Scott, 1994). In our case, actions are described and justifications are made using economic rather than professional rhetoric (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Third, it shows a growing clarity of field boundaries or relational determinants through which actors establish co-presence (Burke, 1969); i.e., they define which actors are ‘in’ the field and which are not (Scott, 1994). In this case, the Big Five, their multinational clients and the WTO coalesce into a mutually reinforcing project that supports transnational systems of market regulation in which professional services, like any other economic good, are to be governed by ‘laws’ of supply and demand. Traditional professional regulations, such as those historically produced between professional associations and the nation state, are identified as alien to this emerging field and, therefore, outside the spatial boundaries of transnational professional services.

**Ideational boundaries**

In addition to describing the structural relations between actors, fields also circumscribe shared meaning systems (Mohr, 2005). Fields are sites of symbolic and cultural conflict in which the bound-
aries are defined, not only by actors and interactions, but also by the ideas, tastes and assumptions of good practice shared by field actors (Bourdieu, 1996). Underlying any organizational field is a defined ‘ideational template’ based on shared ‘cognitive or normative frameworks’ (Scott, 2001, p. 5). Institutional theorists increasingly use the term institutional logics to capture the ideational component of an organizational field. Institutional logics are defined as “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes [an institutional order’s] organizing principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). Institutional logics define the dominant ideology in a field (Hoffman, 1999) and describe its ideational boundaries.

Ideational processes, or the means by which logics are created and reproduced, serve two seemingly contradictory purposes; they differentiate and integrate organizational actors and actions within the field. Differentiating characteristics ascribe actors within the field with clearly defined identities and normative expectations as to appearance (e.g., appropriate ways of organizing), values and behavior. Social identities are clarified in a number of ways including the increased specialization of actors and an increasing reliance on formal accreditation and certification. Status hierarchies emerge. As the meaning systems of a field crystallize, actors within it formalize their identities and the roles associated with them. Ideational processes thus serve to clarify field boundaries as formal identities increasingly harden and, in turn, help to reproduce the boundaries of the field.

Ideational practices integrate actors by providing formal role structures that outline the relationships between categories of actors and by providing a common ideology or interpretive scheme within the field. In professional settings, this process is the professional “project” (Abbott, 1988; Larson, 1977). In the case of transnational professional services, it is clear that economic capital is a dominant value, but we will show that this value was inflected by other capitals (social and cultural), illustrating the complex process of creating shared meanings and institutions. Three prominent integrative tasks are completed for a professionalization project to be regarded as successful. First, the activities of an occupation will be defined, and the prospective professionals will make strong claims that specialist expertise is required to protect the public (Willmott et al., 1993). Second, these activities will be specified in contrast to other occupations that might seek to control the same work. Finally, the actors engaged in the professionalization project must legitimate their jurisdictional claim with powerful actors (often, the state).

The Working Party on Professional Services, established by the WTO in 1995, adopted a regulatory logic that liberalization of trade and promotion of market-based regulation is crucial for the development of the world economy. It identified three ways by which trade in professional services could be “improved”; removing domestic regulations over profession, increasing and promoting common professional standards, and harmonizing qualification and accreditation standards for professionals across jurisdictions (WTO, 1995a, 1995b). Although not stated directly in this document, the key areas designated for change were directly under the control of professional associations, thus the initial mandate of the Working Party directly conflicted with traditional professional self-regulation. The WTO Council for Trade in Services, which created the Working Party through the adoption of the Decision on Professional Services (WTO S/L/3) in March, 1995, identified accountancy as the key sector that would receive initial attention in efforts to remove professional regulations that restrained trade.

In a series of documents and resolutions, the Working Party made clear its direct assault on the regulatory authority of traditional professional associations. It observed that the regulations produced by professional association placed restrictions on the free movement of professionals between jurisdictions, restricted the use of foreign and international firm names and restricted the legal organizational form for the delivery of

---

7 The Working Party on Professional Services was renamed the Working Party on Domestic Regulation in April 1999.
professional services. Overall, the Working Party argued, professional associations restricted competition within jurisdictions and therefore constituted a significant restriction on free trade.

The areas identified as critical to reforming professional regulation and encouraging transnational trade in professional services was very similar to the political agenda of the Big Five. In fact, the Big Five repeated the Working Party’s economic justifications for a new organizational form, the multidisciplinary practice (MDP), in their own policy documents (Trebilcock & Csorgo, 1999). Moreover, the Big Five were prominent architects of the WTO policy on liberalizing trade in services. Robert Kelly, a former managing partner of international affairs for Arthur Andersen, acknowledged that his firm’s research formed the basis of the Ministerial Decision of Professional Services implemented by the WTO. Newspaper accounts also suggest that it was Arthur Andersen’s lobbying influence, via Robert Kelly and another Andersen partner, Charles Heeter, that made the WTO target accounting as the first professional service to be liberalized (Dobbin, 2002).

The WTO and the international accounting firms shared an underlying assumption that economic logic should outweigh any questions of professional ethics or quality standards that might arise from the removal of geographic and disciplinary barriers between countries and between professions. Another Andersen partner, Charles Heeter Jr., lobbying the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, argued for multidisciplinary practices and the need to liberalize trade in professional services:

“The point is the market is demanding a response to the traditional frameworks for the delivery of professional services and requires a response from both government and professions...The fact is globalization is affecting traditional styles of professional services. The times are a changing and none of us will benefit by missing the boat” (Heeter, 1997, p. 1).

Heeter went on to argue that the ‘public interest’ was best measured by consumer interest and observed that “we haven’t heard much at this workshop from the consumers of professional services, and specifically not from the consumers of the services provided by the professions represented here” (Heeter, 1997, p. 2). He concluded by acknowledging that transnational professional service firms raise potential ethical issues but assured the OECD that professional regulation could be exercised in a variety of ways, including the “discipline of the marketplace” (p. 2). The economic rationality of the Big Five’s emerging regulatory logic is evident in Heeter’s logic, which conflates consumer interest (particularly that of large corporate consumers) with public interest and relies on the ultimate authority of the market to weed out unethical professional service providers.

The new field logics espoused by both the Big Five and the WTO inverted traditional assumptions of professionalism, which are built upon the rationalized myth (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) of publicly separating professional practice from commercial interest, even if members understand and accept the commercial nature of their work (Larson, 1977). In the new logic of the field, professions no longer seek to publicly suppress the commercial elements of professional work. Further, while traditional professional logics reinforced the parallel project of state formation, the new professional logic reinforces the constitution of local and global markets.

**Boundaries of identification**

The construction of new identities is a key form of boundary work linked to the production of new organizational fields because identities and practices of identification form the primary connection between actors and fields (Bourdieu, 1991). As logics and spatial boundaries of fields change, individual and organizational actors feel compelled to adopt new role structures as a means of signifying both understanding of, and compliance with, the revised “rules of the game.”

---

8 The acknowledgement comes from Mr. Kelly’s induction into the Hall of Distinction at his alma mater, Louisiana State University’s College of Business in 1997 (LSU, 1997).
(Oakes et al., 1998, p. 277). So, for example, Zilber (2002) observed a sharp shift in the occupational identities of rape crisis centre workers from an early identification with role structures based in feminism to role structures based in therapeutic psychology. Failure to adopt new logics and rules can result in distinct threats to identity (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).

Identification processes in an emerging field may generate conflict and considerable discursive debate. This we illustrate by an early, but failed, attempt to formulate a professional identity for individual actors engaged in multidisciplinary professional practices. In April 2000, eight national professional institutes indicated their intention to create an international business designation (AICPA, 2000a). The proposed XYZ credential would “enable professionals from a wide range of disciplines to build on their ethical standards, traditional skills and expertise, helping them to provide a broader range of globally relevant services to clients, customers and employers” (AICPA, 2000a). The AICPA stressed that the proposed designation was market, not government, based; they stressed that the credential “should be rooted in intellectual property rights, not government, so that it can be changed nimbly” (AICPA, 2000b).

Robin Hamilton Harding was appointed the Chief Operating Officer of a task force charged with developing the XYZ designation. He explained the new designation:

“International market research indicates a demand for multidisciplinary business advisors who offer far more than the services based on the competencies of a single profession. The aim of the task force is to create a globally recognized designation that would enable professionals to seize the opportunities presented by an increasingly globalized economy.”

Although the task force espoused a multidisciplinary focus for the new designation, the actors behind the project were all accounting professional associations. Two groups were notably absent from the task force. There were no professional associations from law in this project. This is not surprising given that the legal and accounting professions in North America had taken opposing positions on the MDP. Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) document the discourses of the law profession, which stressed conflicts of interest and protection of the public. There were also no representatives of the Big Five. This absence was significant as the Big Five were the primary proponents of the MDP and it was their employees that provided extant examples of “Global Business Professionals” in their day-to-day work.

Ultimately the Global Business Professional designation was unsuccessful. The first association to withdraw from the consortium was the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ireland. Shortly after, both England and Wales and Scotland also withdrew (ICAEW, 2000). After a year-long campaign in which the AICPA championed the concept, a vote of US members fell far short of the two-thirds approval needed to amend the AICPA bylaws and create a separate organization to grant the credential. Members were particularly resistant to the notion that the new credential would be available to non-accountants (Covaleski et al., 2003). Many accountants outside the Big Five also saw the push for market-oriented professionals as undermining traditional professional values of public trusteeship. Without the support of powerful institutes in the US and the UK, the attempt to create a new, institutionally legitimate, identity for a global business advisor failed.

Even though the new designation failed, it provides a useful illustration of both the integrative and differentiating elements of identification practices at the field level. The designation was intended to unite a growing body of international professional activity in a common professional project and language. The idea of a global professional designation originated from a series of

---

9 Covaleski et al. (2003) offer an extensive analysis of the attempt to create the XYZ credential. Our analysis is focused on the attempt to formalize new institutional identities, a feature Covaleski et al. (2003) only refer to in passing.

10 The professional associations behind the project were accounting institutes from the US (AICPA), Canada (CICA), Australia (ICAA), England (ICEW), Ireland (ICAI), New Zealand (ICANZ), Scotland (ICAS) and South Africa (SAICA).
'visioning projects' by the AICPA (Elliott, 2001) in which the professional association sought to map out the future of the profession (Fogarty et al., 2006). It was felt that, because of the increasing heterogeneity of services provided by accountants, many members often disguised their identity as accountants:

“We already hear of CPAs who have a second business card or otherwise downplay their CPA credential in order to appear the right type for a job. Vastly more CPAs (about 90 percent of all CPAs) perform more non-audit work than audits” (Elliott, 2001, p. 1044).

Big Five firms had made a similar observation several years earlier and no longer identified themselves as accountants (Greenwood et al., 2002). The new designation was an attempt to agree on a common language and associated integrative values that would unite traditional work with the emerging multidisciplinary and global nature of contemporary practice.

An important element of identification is the attempt to unite members ideologically. Consistent with the activities of transnational trade organizations, the new global business designation provided a common focus, rejecting professional regulation in favor of economic regulation or governance by the market. In promoting the attributes of the new global business designation to AICPA members, the Global Credential Member Information Center reaffirmed its opposition to local state authority and traditional professional governance:

“Perhaps, most significantly, unlike the state licensed CPA designation, the XYZ will be market-driven and self-regulated, not government regulated” (AICPA, 2001).

The ideology underpinning the new designation was consistent with that of the emerging field of transnational trade organizations and global professional service firms in that the old, trusteeship values of professionalism would be replaced by an economic form of governance in the market place. Only those who pay would benefit from the services of accountants.

The new designation also attempted to differentiate occupational categories in the new field. One focus was to differentiate externally by distinguishing the holders of the designation from MBAs and mainstream management consultants. In its promotional materials the Global Credential Member Information Center acknowledged that entrants to accountancy were declining because the MBA designation could be obtained more quickly and offered higher starting salaries (AICPA, 2001). Further:

“The proposed global credential stands for a breadth of high-quality knowledge and skill, similar to that associated with the MBA. But it would go further than that degree by adding international consistency and recognition, adherence to ethics, continuous learning, a worldwide professional association and access to an exclusive learning platform” (AICPA, 2001).

Robert Elliott, outgoing Chairman of the AICPA’s board of directors, a partner of KPMG and head of an AICPA committee on assurance, acknowledged the intent to make the new designation “more elite” and more difficult to achieve. Members would have to have a degree, pass a special exam, have at least five years of professional experience and receive the attestation of two existing global business professionals (Alexander, 2000). In this sense, the new designation was intended to demarcate status boundaries between accountancy based transnational business professionals and everyone else. It reflected the language of a flexible, knowledge based, market driven, international professional, rather than a nationally recognized, legally defined professional who must operate under traditional professional values.

Although unsuccessful, the movement to delineate a new professional category at the transnational level indicates the degree to which shifts in the spatial and ideational boundaries of the field place pressure on actors within the field to adopt role structures and identities that are consistent with changes at the macro-institutional level. More significantly, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that new role structures are not passively diffused within the field, nor are they passively accepted by the actors that populate the field. Rather, roles and identities are sites of struggle and conflict within
the field, where advocates of field level change actively engage in boundary work designed to promote new identities, and opponents aggressively resist them.

**Power**

As fields become more sharply defined, power relations within the field become more concentrated (Bourdieu, 1991, 1996). For much of institutional theory field level power has been conceptualized as largely, if not exclusively, coercive in nature (Scott, 2001). Thus, DiMaggio (1983) observes that a key indicator of field structuration is the emergence of inter-organizational structures of domination. More recent studies, however, expand the notion of power, particularly in the early stages of field formation, to include its less coercive aspects. In the early stages of field formation, power is manifest through the mutual interdependencies of multiple actors, none of which possesses coercive or ‘hard’ power. Instead power is expressed collectively, through the actions of what Meyer (1996) describes as “soft actors” using tools that Fligstein (1997) terms “social skills”. Soft actors are those without direct coercive power but, because of their structural and socially embedded position within a field, are able to influence the actions of others (Meyer, 1996). Similarly, skilled social actors are able to “interpret the actions of others in the field and, because of the position in their group, use their perceptions of current opportunities or constraints to attain cooperation” (Fligstein, 1997, p. 13). In this view, field power is manifest indirectly, in status competitions (Rao, 1994), socialization practices (Covaleski et al., 1998), the adoption of language that communicates differences in social capital between actors (Oakes et al., 1998) and in procedures for categorizing or segmenting actors within the field (Lawrence, 1999).

As the boundaries of the field of transnational business services become clarified, we observe the evolution of soft and socially skilled actors into more clearly defined structures of domination. Specifically, actors have used the rule system for accounting standards and the advisory status of soft actors such as the WTO to promote a schema of transnational governance with increasingly ‘hard’ rules and regulations and stronger coercive capabilities. We describe this movement in two areas; the use of international trade agreements to erode traditional professional regulation and international accounting standard setting bodies to promote a new regulatory logic.

**The soft power of International trade agreements:** Transnational trade organizations, such as the WTO, are predominantly advisory agencies and have little direct coercive power. As Arnold (2005) points out, however, once a nation signs on to a trade agreement, then the WTO can enforce its continuation. Further, the WTO can use international trade law to enforce agreements. Compliance, in this context, is obtained not by coercion, but by actors’ ongoing motivation to maintain their membership in an economic community. Practices of power, in this sense, are not practices of domination, but occur through actions of defining rule systems that construct or confer identity, grant membership and create status hierarchies within the field (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

Trans-government arrangements have arisen out of international trade agreements between nations; examples include the European Union (perhaps the most advanced and formalized), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Asia Pacific Economic Convention (APEC). These regional trade blocks frequently share the same institutional logics as the Big Five and transnational trade organizations, although they are also concerned with protecting regional interests. Importantly, they have considerable coercive power. In their ‘weakest’ form, these organizations are little more than contractual arrangements to reduce trade tariffs between sovereign states. In their strongest form, as exemplified by the European Union, they represent a macro level of government in which member states share a common currency, uniform laws and increasing socio-cultural homogeneity. Regardless of their form, they increasingly provide a source of legitimate

---

11 But note the critiques of the coercive notion of power in institutional theory by Fligstein (1997) and by Perrow (1986).
coercive power through which the ideology and institutional logic of international professional organizations, such as the Big Five and transnational trade organizations, can be implemented. Trans-government structures provide the coercive mechanism by which the emerging field of transnational professional services can challenge professional associations and state governments.

Transnational governments have been important allies of the Big Five and the WTO in reducing the power of professional associations. This alliance is most apparent in the European Union where a series of laws have reduced mobility barriers between member countries, established common accreditation standards and, generally, have reduced the ability of professional regulators to govern their members (Orzack, 1998). NAFTA, similarly, in Chapter 12, Annex 1210, Section A, establishes a framework for the federal government of member countries to “encourage” the professional associations in each country “to develop mutually acceptable standards and criteria” for a variety of matters that were traditionally under the exclusive jurisdiction of professional associations and state or provincial governments. Such matters include education standards, credentialing, ethics, discipline, scope of practice and consumer protection. Section B of the same annex deals with foreign legal consultants, and provides that each country “shall, in implementing its obligations and commitments regarding foreign legal consultants as set out in its relevant Schedules and subject to any reservations therein, ensure that a national or another Party is permitted to practice or advise on the law of any country in which that national is authorized to practice as a lawyer.” Both Schedules represent a substantial degree of interference with the historical compact between professional associations and local state authorities. Schedule A encourages the federal government in both Canada and the US to intervene in matters that, constitutionally, have been under the jurisdictional authority of the state or province. Section B compromises the authority of professional associations to place residency restrictions on foreign legal consultants who wish to offer professional services and advice relating to their home jurisdiction.

Orzack (1998, p. 28) observes that transnational regulators have attacked traditional professional associations in two key areas; their ability to control education or credentialing, and their capacity to resist consumer pressures. Trade agreements are placing increasing pressure on local professional associations to reciprocally recognize professional education and credentials granted in a foreign jurisdiction. Global trade agreements have adopted a goal of ensuring unencumbered movement of professionals from one jurisdiction to another. This goal requires considerable standardization of education and training and the concomitant limits on local authority to control these processes. Global trade agreements also attack any professional regulation that limits consumer access to professional services. While the justification for this stance is based on removing the monopolistic power of professional associations to protect their members’ self-interest, the result has been to shift the role of professional governance from protecting ‘public interest’ to protecting the interests of ‘consumers’ (Trebilcock & Csorgo, 1999). Professional associations are encouraged to become transparent to consumer choice through the creation of data bases, weakened privacy privileges and other tactics that permit ‘comparative shopping’, often at the expense of professional discretion (Orzack, 1998).

It is important to observe that the power exerted by the WTO is indirect. The WTO has no direct coercive authority over professional associations, nor do the international trade agreements purport to directly regulate professional services. Rather, both the actors and the regulatory tools they employ exert influence by promoting a value scheme based on complex assumptions about the economic interactions of a network of associated nation states. The coercive authority over professional associations remains with the nation state and is triggered by the desire of the nation state to gain membership to the regulatory network embodied by the WTO.

We emphasize two points here. First, the ‘soft’ power exerted by transnational regulators does not depend on a diminished status of the nation state. Rather, it relies on an enhanced ability of the nation state to use its coercive power to intervene
in the self-regulatory status of professional associations.\textsuperscript{12} Second, the soft power exhibited by the WTO is its ability to shape positions, identities and status within the emerging organizational field at the transnational level. Nation states adopt the template of professional regulation promoted by the WTO in order to gain access, status and position within a regulatory network that the WTO has constructed.

\emph{Regulatory logics of accounting standards:} Soft power is also manifest through the process of standard setting. Here, we illustrate the use of soft power through the construction of a new body for setting international accounting standards. The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was formed in 1973 by a group of prominent national professional associations in accounting and grew to include over a hundred professional associations from over eight–six countries.\textsuperscript{13} The IASC was a voluntary committee funded by professional associations and carried many of the regulatory assumptions and values of the traditional professional logic of trusteeship, including the assumption that professional associations were the appropriate governing mechanism for accountancy.

The IASC was replaced by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in 2001. One of the primary forces for abandoning the old IASC came from capital market authorities, particularly the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the International Organization for Governmental Securities Commissions (IOSCO), who promoted a US centric vision of international standardization based on the needs of investors. Unlike its predecessor, the IASB represents the more economic based and organizationally driven regulatory logic of the new field. Whereas the IASC was voluntary and represented professional associations, the IASB board members are employees of a foundation that raises corporate money to support its activities. And while representation on the IASC was largely limited to representatives of professional associations, the IASB board includes positions specifically designated for the Big Four.\textsuperscript{14}

The push for new accounting standards at the transnational level is characterized by a pronounced shift in the dominant governance mechanism for this emerging new field. The old assumption that professional associations, along with the coercive authority of state governments, are the legitimate means of creating rules has been replaced by an assumptive logic that large accounting organizations, with the legitimating authority of capital markets regulators, are the appropriate bodies for creating accounting rules. More significant, perhaps, is the observation that the institutional logic of professionalism as trusteeship and volunteer committees are being supplanted by a corporate logic of paid employees, funded by multinational (and often anonymous) corporate donors.

A series of events demonstrated flaws in the 'corporate' institutional logic underpinning the IASB. Documents produced in the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee investigating the demise of Enron revealed an e-mail from the IASB, which is dependant upon private donations for its operating budget, requesting a donation from the Houston-based energy company. Internal Enron messages showed the company was prepared to donate on condition that the firm would have some input into setting the IASB’s accounting policies.\textsuperscript{15} (Peel, 2002). More recently, the IASB has fallen under criticism for its refusal to divulge the names of five corporate donors and for revelations that the Big Five provided nearly 32% of its overall

\textsuperscript{12} Neu et al. (2006) demonstrate the role of state agencies and financial mechanisms in implementing the soft and hard powers of the World Bank in education reform.

\textsuperscript{13} Much has been written about international accounting standards, the IASB and the IASC (e.g., Wallace, 1990; Zeff, 2002). Our concern is simply to point out their shifting characteristics associated with the move from national regulations based on local traditions and professional associations to an international, corporate sponsored organization, focused on the efficiency of international capital flows and the needs of multinational corporations.

\textsuperscript{14} IASB board members are appointed by Trustees of the IASC Foundation (IASCF). The IASCF Constitution mandates that, of the 19 Trustees nominated to the IASC, five shall be nominated by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Clause 7 of Part A of the Constitution stipulates “two of the five trustees nominated by IFAC shall be from prominent international accounting firms” (IASCF Constitution, Issue date 8 July 2002; www.iasb.org/about/constitution.asp).

\textsuperscript{15} The IASB did not, however, accept a donation from Enron.
budget (Perry, 2002). In testimony before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, John H. Biggs, Chairman and CEO of TIAA-CREF, who was a fund raiser for both the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and IASB, described the inherent problem with the ‘tin cup’ method of funding regulatory bodies: “Those of us asking for money feel compromised. The unspoken question is this: ‘If I give will I have more influence on FASB decisions?’” (Biggs, 2002, p. 16). Collectively, these events question the IASB’s independence from the influence of the Big Four and their corporate clientele (Zeff, 2002).

The transformation of the main body for international accounting standards demonstrates the embedded and indirect nature of power in the early stages of field formation. In this account, power was expressed as a struggle over the dominant frames or meaning systems within the field. The act of creating a new standard setting body, the IASB, included adoption of a new mythology of ‘marketization’ (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) in which ‘free’ markets are believed to be both a natural and superior means of structuring society and allocating resources. Some have further suggested it is a form of American exceptionalism (De Lange & Howieson, forthcoming). This logic stands in contradiction to the professional logic of the standard setting organization which it replaced. The new standard setting body expressed a ‘soft’ form of power – rule adoption is voluntary and the body has no coercive power. Its formal power is expressed through membership and its ability to promote a dominant logic, to grant membership to those who accept that logic and to deny membership to actors that fail to accept it.

**Discussion and theoretical implications**

The foregoing provides a broad overview of the processes by which field level change has occurred at the transnational level in the provision of professional business services. We have described four categories of change by which this process has occurred. First, the field has experienced significant structural change by which the boundaries of membership have been redrawn to demarcate a distinct cluster of actors and to exclude others. Excluded in this process is the old relationship between the nation-state and professional associations. Such traditional actors replaced by large conglomerate professional service firms, particularly the Big Four accounting firms, quasi-regulatory actors such as the WTO and large trading unions such as the EEC. It is important to note, however, that the new actors do not simply displace the old but rather are superimposed on them. Transnational governance structures do not threaten the existence of either nation states or professional associations. Rather, they are reliant upon the coercive authority of the nation state to discipline professional associations to adopt the regulatory logics and practices emerging at the transnational state as a condition of continued membership in the trade networks constructed at the transnational level.

Second, the field has manifest substantial ideational change in which professional logics, constituted by notions of public interest and the suppression of market relations, are replaced by market or economic logics. Again, it is critical to note that neither professional or market logic should be viewed as more natural or privileged than the other. Institutional logics reflect mythologies built upon contradictions (Seo & Creed, 2002). Institutional change can be effected by the skillful manipulation of contradictions inherent in logics (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). In this case, just as the new institutional order exposed the historical compact between professional associations and state governments as essentially elitist and monopolistic, the key actors in the new field are building regulatory structures and institutional logics that are equally elitist and which tend to serve the economic interests of the field’s formative members.

Third, actors within the field are actively experimenting with different identities and different patterns of identification. Identification refers to the process by which field level logics and rules become constitutive of actors. Rules of membership

---

16 The IASB had a total initial budget of $16 million (US) of which $11 million was received from 125 corporations and $5 million was from the Big Five. The five unnamed corporate donors provided a total of $6 million to the Board (Perry, 2002).
characteristics of the dynamics of organizational analysis, thus, helps to illuminate a number of meanings, identity and power. The spatial elements of field boundaries become more sharply defined.

Finally, we describe a shift in the dominant use of power within the field, from coercive might to normative embeddedness. We adopt the term ‘soft’ power to describe the use of status, position and membership within a network of actors as a means of influencing behavior through inclusion rather than disciplinary force. Power, in this context, is not concentrated and dyadic, but is expressed through networks of relations in which large numbers of actors become mutually interdependent.

These observations hold strong implications for institutional theory, particularly with respect to our understanding of organizational fields. Following Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) our intent is to provide a holistic account of the process by which logics and practices evolve over time and to describe the conflicts that serve to shape the structural logic of an emerging organizational field. In doing so, our primary contribution is to take the notion of fields away from its growing functional/structural predispositions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and to re-imbue the construct with its roots in social action and conflict (Bourdieu, 1987). Our analysis, thus, helps to illuminate a number of characteristics of the dynamics of organizational fields.

Perhaps most significant, our research helps to demonstrate the complexity of field boundaries. Fields are demarcated by boundaries of space, meaning, identity and power. The spatial elements of field boundaries are reflected in patterns of interaction. In this account, the Big Four accounting firms occupy a strategic structural position in the emerging field in that not only do they interact with all the key players, but they also remain connected to key players in the ‘old’ field of nation states and professional associations. In the language of network analysis, these actors occupy a ‘structural hole’ in the field (Burt, 1992) by connecting otherwise disparate networks of interaction. Structurally, thus, the Big Four exhibit positional power within their field.

By virtue of their structural position, the Big Four also enjoy a powerful ideational role as translators of meaning systems within the field. In addition to describing boundaries of interaction, organizational fields may be viewed as “abstract algebras” for interpreting “the relations among a number of social sets” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 96). In this role, the Big Four act as advocates and translators (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996) of old and new conceptualizations of professionalism. Thus traditional notions of “public interest” become translated to “consumer interest”, as pre-existing power structures are translated from one field to another while maintaining their status as natural or taken-for-granted social orders (Willmott et al., 1993).

These observations also hold strong implications for our understanding of regulation, particularly with respect to transnational regulation. Foremost, the elements of coercive power which galvanized relations between the nation state and professional associations no longer apply at the transnational level. Instead, regulation is achieved by enticing cooperation through membership in a regulatory network where members become embedded in a web of mutual economic dependence. Governance, in the emerging field of transnational business services, relies on rules of inclusion and membership in which actors voluntarily adopt market logics and disciplines in an effort to participate in international trade agreements. Instead of regulating by prohibition, transnational regulation occurs by adoption and constitution. In this sense, regulation is not external to the actors that constitute the field but, rather, is an endogenous process in which actors accept implicit rules, templates and schemas through their willing adoption of roles and identities in a relational network of transnational actors.

Our analysis reveals an ideational element to regulation which is perhaps apparent only in the early stages of field formation. While the observed shift in the regulatory logic of this field from one based on a logic of professionalism to one based...
on economic logic is not particularly new (see Brint, 1994; Hanlon, 1994), this study offers the additional insight of demonstrating the dynamics by which old logics are rejected in favor of new ones. In this case new logics are adopted as the result of the spatial and power dynamics of the field. The structural position of actors within the field and their power to construct boundaries of inclusion or exclusion create an interaction order (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Goffman, 1983) in which central actors, or those well embedded in the emerging institutional structure, can encode institutional prescriptions and templates in the boundary conditions of the field.

This study provides insights into the growing literature on globalization and transnational regulation. The primary focus of much of this research is to examine the way in which transnational institutions influence and compromise the institutions of nation states (Morgan, Kristensen, & Whitley, 2001). An important corollary in this literature is the assumption that power is a zero sum game in which transnational institutions gain power at the expense of the nation state (Hegarty, 1997; Strange, 1996). Our analysis of the emergence of the field of transnational professional services, however, contradicts this approach. Rather than diminishing the power of the nation state, we find that transnational regulatory structures are dependent upon traditional power structures. We observe that the unique manifestations of power at the transnational level, which include the role of soft actors, incentives and voluntary assumption of roles and rules, is superimposed on traditional (i.e., coercive) power relations that exist between nation states and professional associations. In this regard, our findings are generally consistent with those of Djelic and Quack (2003) who suggest that national regulatory logics and frames continue to exert influence in the emerging institutions of transnational governance.

Finally, these observations carry important implications for theories of professionals. Clearly, the meaning of professionalism is changing. This, again, is not a new observation. Others (Brint, 1994; Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996; Leicht & Fennell, 2001) have commented on the shift in professionalism from assumptions of fiduciary duty and trusteeship to notions of expertise and economic exchange. The espoused logic now emphasizes commercialism and the protection and promotion of capital markets rather than direct concern with citizen’s rights and the public interest. This study adds to this literature by identifying the relative roles of economic institutions and non-governmental organizations in generating these new logics of post-professionalism. We observe how these new logics and new structures of professional regulation emerge from interactions of actors within networks. More significantly, we identify professional firms as significant actors and sites for professional regulation. Prior theories of professionalism (i.e., Abbott, 1988; Friedson, 2001) tend to privilege the role of professional associations in negotiating and constructing the regulatory frameworks for professional work. Our account identifies large, conglomerate professional firms as critical, yet understudied, sites for the creation and interpretation of professional norms and rules (Cooper & Robson, 2006).

Conclusion

The primary contribution of this paper is to our understanding of the process of structuration of organizational fields. Previous accounts of structuration tend to describe a top-down deterministic process in which wide, free-floating social templates become imposed on actors as a result of increasing consolidation and domination within a field (DiMaggio, 1983; Ranson et al., 1980). In this view, organizations are context independent variables that become subject to and penetrated by institutional templates (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). While our account does not directly contradict this, it suggests a more preliminary stage of structuration in which neither the ideational templates nor the structures of domination are yet fully formed. In this regard, we offer a reversal of traditional assumptions of institutional theory, where organizations are context dependent actors who actively shape and interpret organizational fields and institutional processes. Instead of viewing organizations as penetrated by institutional templates, we see organizations as aggressive actors
who shape the boundaries (structural, ideational and power) of organizational fields.

Our analysis also indicates the beginning of an era of post-professional regulation. A regulatory gap has developed between traditional regulators, which are historically tied to the territorial nation state, and global firms which are increasingly influential in new transnational regulatory institutions. Professional regulation, at the transnational level, is now a negotiated product from an increasingly broad and heterogeneous network of actors. The espoused logic promotes commercialism and the protection and promotion of capital markets, rather than a direct concern with citizens’ rights and the public interest. Accounting, particularly the Big Four firms, are at the center of these changes which continue to unfold. While this account identifies the creation of new transnational institutions of professional regulation, we have little insight into how this new and dispersed network of actors collectively or independently interpret and use them nor do we fully understand the implication of such changes for those local and regional actors who continue to occupy roles in the traditional model of professional regulation. Future research should address these issues. In particular, we should revisit theories of professionalism, which did not fully anticipate the shift of professional work to the context of large organizations or the rapid globalization of professional work.

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. Thanks for their financial support to the Killam Foundation (Roy Suddaby), the Certified General Accountants of Alberta (David Cooper) and the Telus Corporation (Royston Greenwood). The authors also acknowledge the helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers, Mike Power, Keith Robson and participants at the Professional Service Firm Conference, University of Oxford, May, 2004, and the Governance without Government Conference, Cardiff University, May, 2005.

References

Fortune (June 1932). Architects of the Balance Sheets (pp. 41–45).
Lawrence, T. B., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutions and institutional work. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, & T. B. Lawrence (Eds.),


Robson, K., Willmott, H., Cooper, D. J., & Puxty, T. (1994). The ideology of professional regulation and the markets for accounting labour: three episodes in the recent history of the


**Documentary references**


