Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture

Frank E. Sysyn

In describing the resignation of Vasylo Kochubei as chancellor of the Hetmanate in 1700, the early eighteenth-century historian Samiilo Velychko characterized him as “serving faithfully and diligently God, the great sovereign the Russian tsar, his Little Russian fatherland, and the Zaporozhian Host” (3:41, p. 553). We may assume that this list was an approximate ranking of loyalties for the elite of the Hetmanate, in which religion came first and the sovereign second. We might have expected the Zaporozhian Host, a concept embodying the polity, military structure, and dominant social order of the Hetmanate to be third. Instead we find the Little Russian fatherland. But the careful reader of the voluminous work (or in reality two historical works) that we conventionally call the Velychko Chronicle would merely see one more of numerous mentions of the Ukrainian otchyzna as an object of political loyalty.

There is still no study of early modern Ukrainian political culture that traces the appearance of otchyzna (modern Ukrainian vitchyzna) referring to Ukrainian territories as the inhabitants’ fatherland to which they owed loyalty and in whose interest they should act.

---


2 The Skazanie o voine kozackoi z poliakamy is published in Letopis’ sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke, 4 vols. (Kyiv, 1848–1864). The first volume appeared in a new edition, which corrected the Russified orthography of the nineteenth-century edition, in: Samiila Velychka Skazanie o voine kozatskoi z poliakamy, ed. Kateryna Lazarevs’ka, Monumenta Litterarum Ucrainicarum 16 (Kyiv, 1926). In the present article, section, chapter and page number are given according to the 1926 edition for volume 1 and chapter and page numbers according to the nineteenth-century edition for volumes 2 and 3. There is a modern Ukrainian translation by Valerii Shevchuk, Samiilo Velychko, Litopys, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1991).

3 I am opting for the usual translation of ojczyzna/otchyzna as “fatherland”, though I find much of merit in David Althoen’s suggestion that the proper translation should be motherland because ojczyzna is feminine in gender and frequently referred to as a mother. David Althoen, That Noble Quest: From True Nobility to Enlightened Society in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 1550–1830, 2 vols., vol. 1 (PhD diss. University of Michigan, 2000, revised for DMA Printing and Publishing, 2001), 192–199.
Medieval Ukrainian had used the term to designate an ancestral inheritance or estate and a hereditary ruler’s state or territories. Certainly the new use of the term came from Polish ojczyzna as the equivalent of Latin patria. In the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, ojczyzna was most frequently used for the entire state and country. It could at times still refer to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the Kingdom of Poland as well as to narrower fatherlands. Its use as ancestral lands or estates, patrimony (ojcowizna), was rare.

As the term developed from the original meaning of homeland, its use for the state and its territory and the population inhabiting them evolved so that ojczyzna occupied the highest emotional register in Polish political discourse. Appeals to the inhabitants’ loyalty and patriotism were made more frequently to the ojczyzna than to the Rzeczpospolita, the Commonwealth. Although Polish political discourse became more and more limited to the noble citizenry at the end of the sixteenth century, fatherland remained a concept that could at times include burghers and other non-noble strata. In contrast, Rzeczpospolita, a term for the nobles’ republic that came to designate the united Polish-Lithuanian state, was more clearly the property of the noble citizenry. Just as importantly, ojczyzna contained the meaning of state, but was not

---


*6 For the use of fatherland in the Grand Duchy for both the Grand Duchy and the Commonwealth as a whole, see Arturas Tereskinas, The Imperfect Body of the Community: Formulas of Noblesse, Forms of Nationhood in the Seventeenth-Century Grand Duchy of Lithuania (PhD, diss. Harvard University, 2000), 57–58.


*8 During the interregnum after the death of King Władysław IV in 1648, Adam Kysil’ insisted that it was impossible to negotiate with the Cossacks in the name of the Commonwealth, which meant nothing to them. He maintained the Cossacks only conceived their allegiance as to the king. See Frank E. Sysyn, Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 149.
limited to it. Therefore, as David Althoen has shown, the broader meaning of ojczyzna permitted it to survive the partitions of the Commonwealth, unlike Rzeczpospolita, a designation only for the state. Both terms were much more frequent as the focus of patriotism in the seventeenth century than naród (nation), which was to become dominant as a focus of patriotism in the nineteenth century, or than Polska (Poland).

With fatherland’s encompassing meaning of state, country, and population, its interests could be espoused by many political actors in the Commonwealth. The king or Diet could call for policies in the interest of the ojczyzna, but the nobles could just as frequently resist the monarch or the institutions of state in the name of the ojczyzna. This conceptualization as passed on to the Ukrainians placed loyalty to the fatherland as the inhabitants’ common inheritance that surpassed any loyalty to a given ruler or government.

Only further research can reveal how and when patria, ojczyzna, and otchyzna were first used to refer to Rus’ and the Ukrainian lands in a manner similar to that used for the Commonwealth in the Polish tradition. While instances occurred before 1648 in referring to Ukrainian territories, no Rus’ or Ukrainian political entity existed in the early modern period that could serve as a political fatherland until after the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising. Khmel’nyts’kyi’s references to fatherland were still to the Commonwealth or the Kingdom of Poland.

By the 1670s, a Ukrainian chronicler advocated in his compilation on Ukrainian history

---

9 Althoen, That Noble Quest, vol. 1, 217.
10 In the mid-sixteenth century Stanislaw Orikhovs’kyi (Stanislaw Orzechowski), of mixed Ukrainian-Polish parentage, referred to his patria as Rus’ (Russia). This probably referred to Galicia, the Ruthenian palatinate. See Frank E. Sysyn, “Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 10, no. 3/4 (1986): 397. The first use of otchyzna referring to the Ukrainian or Ruthenian territories as a fatherlands with seemingly a political context is by Zakhariia Kopystens’kyi in the Palinodiia of the 1620s that has the affirmation “in our fatherland, that is in the Rus’ land” (v otchizne nashei, to est’ v zemli Ruskoi), see his “Palinodiia,” in Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, tom 4: Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury v Zapadnoi Rusi (St. Petersburg, 1878), col. 1055. If one presumes his use of “Rus’ land” is taken from the Old Rus’ chronicle tradition, one can see it as based in an appellation of an earlier Ruthenian polity.
that his readers should know the history of their fatherland, *otchyzna*.\(^{12}\) Paraphrasing a quotation from Joachim Bielski’s dedication in 1597 to Sigismund III in publishing the Polish historical work of his father Marcin Bielski, the copyist of the Hustynia Chronicle that covered the history of Ukraine up to the 1590s, Mykhailo Losyts’kyi, declared that every man had an inborn love and attachment to his *otchyzna* similar to that of a lodestone for iron. Because Bielski was originally talking about *Rzeczpospolita*, Losyts’kyi added a sentence in which he called Rus’ the fatherland of the Ruthenian people. Here he used the *Rosia, Rossian* people, the Hellenized terms of that time. Losyts’kyi asserted that this sentiment for the fatherland had motivated the authors of the Rus’ chronicle that he copied since they had wished to preserve history for the Rus’ nation. The chronicle contained a discussion of the origins of the Cossacks in Ukraine, linking them to the history of the Ruthenian nation and depicting them as the defenders of the Rus’ land. By the time Losyts’kyi wrote, the political changes in Ukraine had created a new polity, the Hetmanate, that sought to command the Ukrainian population’s loyalty, often in a struggle against the Commonwealth that had formerly been seen as the Ukrainians’ fatherland in the broadest sense.

While Losyts’kyi made no connection of his discussion of fatherland to the political events of mid-seventeenth century Ukraine, Teodosii Sofonovych made reference to a continuous Ukrainian political history more concretely in writing a chronicle cycle that concluded with the history of the Cossack Hetmanate up to the 1670s. He exhorted his intended readers, the Rus’ sons, to know their history because he who does not know the history of his fatherland (*otchyzna*) and tell it to those who ask about it would be considered ignorant. He alluded to the political revival through his statement that he wished to explain how the Rus’ state or domain (*panstvo*)

---

\(^{12}\) *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 2 (Saint Petersburg, 1908), 233. The attribution of the bulk of the passage to Bielski was pointed out by Oleksii Tolochko in his introduction to *The Hustynja Chronicle*, compiled by Oleksii Tolochko. The Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature. Texts. Vol.11 (Cambridge, Mass., 2013), lii. He does no, however, point out the significance of Losyts’kyi’s adaptation of the text to describe Rus’ and the Rus’ people or nation or include these sentences in his comparison with Bielski.
had arisen and continued to the present day.\(^\text{13}\)

Although the task of tracing the use and development of *otchyzna* in seventeenth-century Ukrainian political discourse remains before us, the term had clearly taken on major significance as a designation for the Ukrainian lands and the Cossack Hetmanate in the Mazepian age and generation. The massive text of the Velychko chronicle, written in the 1710s and 1720s, provides ample evidence of the importance of the concept of fatherland in early eighteenth-century Ukrainian political culture. Yet this text, so replete with observations on Samiilo Velychko’s research problems that it makes us feel as if we knew the author, offers many challenges in interpretation and unresolved questions. The most famous, and almost the only examined, is the quandary about the numerous letters attributed to Khmel’nyts’kyi and his contemporaries that Velychko purported to have copied from the diary of the hetman’s secretary Samiilo Zorka.\(^\text{14}\) The failure to establish the existence of Zorka and the realization that the language and concepts in the texts do not correspond to those in the undisputed letters of the hetman make the authenticity of these documents, and thereby many others in Velychko, highly questionable. Unresolved is whether Velychko was taken in by falsifications (which may even have been literary reworkings of authentic texts) or whether he composed or reworked texts himself. Certainly, the numerous documents in Velychko’s work from the periods after Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi’s hetmancy need to be authenticated. Therefore, except for Velychko’s direct narrative, the numerous documents cited cannot be assumed to have been written in that form by the purported authors and the terms and phrases may derive from a period later than the dates on the documents. When authors, addressees, and dates are mentioned in this discussion, these attributions only indicate that this is the information given in Velychko’s work. But even

\[^{13}\text{Feodosii Sofonovych, Khronika z litopystiv starodavnikh (Kyiv, 1992), 56.}\]
\[^{14}\text{See Mykola Petrovs’kyi, “Psevdodiariush Samiila Zor’ky,” Zapysky Istoryko-filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN, no. 17 (1928): 168–204.}\]

©Copyright 2020 Frank E. Sysyn
assuming that we are dealing with texts penned and recast by various hands that may have evolved over a fifty-year period after the revolt, the direct narrative and the documents illustrate how the concept of fatherland functioned in early eighteenth-century Ukraine in the context of the major historical work of the age.

Another mystery of the Velychko text is why a long-time resident of the Hetmanate and member of its general military chancery devoted so much attention to the Zaporozhian Sich or Kish and cast the Lower Dnipro Cossacks and the letters attributed to them as a moral authority and voice of tradition. This preference of the learned scribe of the Hetmanate’s chancery and servitor of the Hetmanate’s elite poses additional problems for an examination of the uses of “fatherland” in the text because otchyzna frequently occurs in letters from the Sich Cossacks to the hetmans, therefore purportedly sent from the frontier outside the hetman’s control. Although the hetmans claimed authority over the Sich, the Andrusovo Agreement between Muscovy-Russia and the Commonwealth in 1667 had divided Ukraine along the Dnipro, but considered the Sich under a joint condominium. Hence the discussions of “fatherland” in missives purported to be from the Sich to the Hetmanate or the reverse must be carefully examined to ascertain what is meant by fatherland.

The Velychko text demonstrates the shift in the conceptualization of the fatherland from the old Commonwealth to Ukraine and its political structures. Of the scores of uses of fatherland, a few refer to the Commonwealth and occur in letters from Polish kings and officials, with the

---

15 Velychko’s biography is scanty in details outside of what he tells us in the history. He mentions that in 1690, in his teens, he began to serve in the Zaporozhian Host in the home of Kochubei and after fifteen years rose to serve in the General Military Chancellery.

After Mazepa’s execution of Kochubei and going over to the Swedes, Velychko was imprisoned for some years, but we do not know for what reason and what side he was on in those turbulent years. Freed about 1715, he settled in the villages of Zhuky and Dykanka in the Poltava area, where he wrote his history. One possible explanation for the pro-Sich sentiment is that the chancellor wrote his work while residing in the Poltava regiment, which was closely tied to the steppe and the Zaporozhian kish. On Velychko see the introduction in the modern Ukrainian translation by Valerii Shevchuk and Iaroslav Dzyra, “Samiilo Velychko ta ioho litopys,” Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v URSR, no. 6 (1971): 198–223.
texts either in Polish or in Ukrainian translation.\textsuperscript{16} The translations in Velychko are a sign of the increasing cultural estrangement of the Ukrainian elite from the Polish world. In almost all other parts of the text, whether Velychko’s direct narrative or the documents, uses of \textit{otchyzna} refer to Ukraine. They often appear in the context of defending it against the Poles and the Commonwealth and are vivid examples of the political alienation of the Ukrainians from the Commonwealth that had occurred during the Khmel’nyts’kyi Revolution.

This shift and new usage can be seen in the earliest part of the text in the letters ascribed to hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. In a letter to the Crown Hetman, Mikolaj Potocki, at the outset of the revolt, Khmel’nyts’kyi criticizes the Polish lords’ and officials’ (such as Daniel Czapliński’s and “other inconstant Poles”\textsuperscript{17}) depredations as making these good-for-nothings and drunks “traitors to their own fatherland, the Kingdom of Poland” (1:1:5, p. 23).\textsuperscript{17} That the Kingdom and the Commonwealth are no longer the Ukrainians’ fatherland is clear in the Bila Tserkva universal, dated June 1648, the purported full explanation by the hetman of the reasons for the revolt. In it, Khmel’nyts’kyi calls for support from whomever holds “dear the integrity of your fatherland. Little Russian Ukraine” (1:1:17, p. 48). The anachronistic terminology in this phrase for Bohdan Khmel’nyst’kyi’s time as in the entire Bila Tserkva universal was one of the reasons that scholars questioned the reliability of Velychko’s chronicle as a source to mid-seventeenth-century Ukrainian history. But for Velychko and the early eighteenth-century reader, Ukraine was a fatherland and the founder of the Hetmanate would certainly have called for its

\textsuperscript{16} See for example Dominik Stanislav Polubyn’s’kyi’s (Dominik Stanisław Połubiński’s) letter to hetman Mazepa on his political submission to the Russian tsars and hetman because of his return to his ancestral Orthodox faith. In this letter, the Flag-bearer of Smolensk still calls the Commonwealth, the fatherland (\textit{otchyzna}, 1694, text in Ukrainian, 3:35, p. 214). Also see the Galician castellan Władysław Józef Skarbek’s speech in L’viv to the Ruthenians of 1694 (3:35, p. 247). Velychko describes it as given in the Latino-Polish language, but the text is in Ukrainian with Slavonic elements. For uses of \textit{ojczyzna} in the usual Polish way, see the instructions of King August to the pre-Diet dietines (July 3, 1698) (3:38, p. 491).

\textsuperscript{17} The letter is dated 29 December 1648, but as some other letters in this section dated 1648, it belongs to the events of 1647 or early 1648.
defense against the Poles, who are so fulsomely excoriated in the universal for their treatment of the Little Rossians (another anachronistic term for the mid seventeenth-century).

We find many elements of early eighteenth-century Ukrainian conceptualization of fatherland in the statements attributed to Khmel’nyts’kyi in the Bila Tserkva universal. The fatherland had become the land that should serve as the focus of its inhabitants’ identity and loyalty. While no polity existed at the time the Bila Tserkva universal was purportedly issued, in writings on or attributed to later periods the fatherland is the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Hetmanate. The fatherland was frequently called Little Russian Ukraine, which for the eighteenth-century reader meant the territories where Khmel’nyts’kyi had established a new political order. The inhabitants and political elite of that fatherland were to strive to maintain its wholeness, both in terms of unity and well-being. The defense of the interests of the fatherland was a justification for taking up arms. In essence the components of the seventeenth-century Polish conceptualization of the ojczyzna had been adapted to the post-Khmel’nyts’kyi Ukrainian political culture. That political culture arose at a time of instability and shifting borders that make it imperative to examine carefully each of these uses of fatherland in the text.

Numerous instances of otchyzna in the text illustrate that the fatherland was the focus of its inhabitants’ loyalty. Velychko, like the earlier Ukrainian historians, provided an explanation of why he wrote his work and for whom he intended it. He signed his preface as “a true son of Little Rossia” who wishes “to you, a reader of that same fatherland” all good blessings (1, p. 4). His history therefore was intended to inform and inspire the other inhabitants of the fatherland, emphasizing its anthropomorphic nature by calling them its sons. That sentiment appears in hetman Ivan Mazepa’s universal of 28 July 1692 against Ivan Petryk, in which the hetman
maintains that the devastation of the Right Bank would bring tears to the eyes of “every well-wishing son of his fatherland” (3:33, p. 108). The fatherland for which its sons should care was a political entity under the hetman’s authority. In discussing the politics of the Right-Bank hetman Iurii Khmel’nyts’kyi and the Left-Bank hetman Iakiv Somko, Velychko maintains that Khmel’nyts’kyi could have received a revision of the Pereiaslav articles through negotiation with the Russian tsar to the benefit “of the whole Little Russian fatherland” (2:13, p. 26). “For the general good of our Little Russian fatherland”, the Zaporozhian Sich Cossacks claimed they did not wish to question the election of hetman Ivan Vyhovs’kyi, though he, unlike Khmel’nyts’kyi, had been elected without their consent (1:10:12, p. 170).

The fatherland in Velychko’s history was referred to as Ukraine, Little Rossia, and Little Russian Ukraine. Before Khmel’nyts’kyi’s uprising, the geographic name Ukrajina had referred to the borderland that was largely encompassed by the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates. An even greater area, including as well the Chernihiv and Volhynian palatinates, was called the four borderland palatinates. The Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising created a unity for much of the Ukrainian territory and demarcated political and social boundaries. After the revolt, Ukrajina came to be associated with the lands of the emerging Cossack Hetmanate.

Little Rossia in various forms (Malaia Rossia, Rosiia, Rus’ or Rusiia) had been revived at the end of the sixteenth century by the Ruthenian Orthodox clergy to refer to Ukrainian and at times Belarusian territories and was used on occasion in the title of the metropolitans of Kyiv. After the Pereiaslav Agreement, the name, along with Great Rossia, was adopted for the tsar’s

---

title and Little Rossia became standard for the title of the metropolitan of Kyiv. It also came to be associated with the Cossack Hetmanate, though as a geographic name and an ethnonym Little Rossia-Little Rossian was still at times used for Ukrainian and Belarusian territories outside even the territories claimed by the Cossack Hetmanate.\textsuperscript{21}

Although we do not yet have a study of the exact geographic limits for these terms or the reasons for their varied uses in Velychko’s chronicle, one finds frequent mentions of both terms used to describe the Cossack Hetmanate, often with the clarification of “on both sides of the Dnipro.”\textsuperscript{22} Both terms are used to represent the fatherland and in nominal and adjectival forms are associated with the word otchyzna.\textsuperscript{23} One can see the alternation of both terms as synonyms in a letter by hetman Doroshenko writing to the Zaporozhians once about “your fatherland Little Rossia” and once about “your fatherland Ukraine” (2:12, pp. 296, 299).\textsuperscript{24} Velychko combined the two geographic names in “Little Rossian Ukraine,” which is both frequently used as a name for the fatherland or appears in the adjectival form “Ukraino-Little Rossian” before otchyzna\textsuperscript{25}. It would seem that the use of “Little Rossian Ukraine” may have been an affirmation of the unity of the Right Bank and the Left Bank at a time when international treaties and rival administration

\textsuperscript{21} For Velychko’s limiting “Little Russian Ukraine” to the Right and Left-Bank Ukraine, excluding Volhynia and Galicia, see 1, p. 3. Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi’s Bila Tserkva universal was addressed to all Little Russian Ukraine along both banks of the Dnipro and to more distant Ruthenian towns, but included in the provinces it called Sarmatian Cossack all the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories (1:1:17, pp. 46–47). Velychko refers to L’viv as a “Ruthenian-Little Russian city” in discussing the late seventeenth century (3:35, p. 246).

\textsuperscript{22} See vol. 2:17, p. 391 for Little Rossia with the phrase “on both sides of the Dnipro” and of Ukraine divided into two or three. Also see 2:12, p. 296 and 2:9, p. 169.

\textsuperscript{23} We find the Zaporozhians writing in 1662 about “our Little Rossian fatherland” (2:3, p. 36 II). Velychko refers directly to Briukhovetsk’kyi’s “own fatherland Little Rossia” (2:5, p. 84). For uses of Ukraine along with fatherland in nominal and adjectival forms, see, 2:12, pp. 297–298 and 3:34, p. 173. For alternations of Little Rossia and Ukraine, see 2:13, pp. 332–333, in which the fatherland is referred to as Little Rossia and later the term “all Ukraine” is used.

\textsuperscript{24} One sees similar alternation of “our Little Russian fatherland” and “Ukraine, our fatherland” in a letter on the Pereiaslav negotiations from the Zaporozhian Sich to hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1:7:3, p. 94).

\textsuperscript{25} For “our Ukraino-Little Russian fatherland” see 1, p. 3; 2:3, p. 34; 2:25, p. 541. The Zaporozhians write to Doroshenko about “our unfortunate Ukraino-Little Russian fatherland” (2:7, p. 98).
and hetmans were dividing that unity. It is possible that “Ukraine” referred more to the Right Bank and that the term “Little Rossia” was taking hold in the Left Bank, though there are many cases that do not correspond to this divide and in which Ukraine and Little Rossia are synonyms.

The major message Velychko addressed to all the sons of the fatherland was that they should care about its integrity. The Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising had provided a political unity for much of the Ukrainian territory that was breaking down throughout the late seventeenth century. Hence the constant appeals by all sides throughout the text are for the unity of the fatherland. The unity of the fatherland is presented as of the highest value, especially as the chronicle reaches the period of multiple hetmancies and the division of Ukraine along the Dnipro, which was internationally sanctioned by the Andrusovo Truce in 1667. Blaming power hungry hetmans for this situation, Velychko laments: “From such action and such a situation, one Little Rossia that lies along both banks of the Dnipro, the unfortunate and fallen Cossack-Rus’ fatherland” was divided in 1670 into three hetmancies and three parts, and he quoted the Bible on the consequences of a house divided (2:11, p. 238). The theme of the division of the fatherland and its negative consequences is often repeated. Indeed, Velychko explains having undertaken his history after having carried on military campaigns in the Right Bank and being moved by its devastation to explore how this situation had come about. In his introduction to the first work in the chronicle, he laments that the “once flourishing our Ukraino-Little Russian fatherland” had become deserted (1, p. 3) and how he had collected accounts of the fall and decline of “our that-

---

26 Brian Boeck has suggested in an internet discussion that “Little Russian Ukraine” was used to differentiate it from other borderlands, or “Ukraines”, of the Muscovite and Russian state. I find no evidence of this in the Velychko text. There is no mention of any other Ukraine in the entire work. In addition, the use of “Little Russian Ukraine” decreases in the second part of the text on the period after 1658, when contacts with Russia are increasing.

27 Mazepa once refers to the Right Bank as “the fatherland Ukraine, the other bank land” (3:33, p. 108). On the other hand, in writing about his travels on the Right Bank, Velychko referred to it as “our Ukraino-Little Russian fatherland” (1, p. 3) and at times refers to the Left Bank as “this-bank Ukraine” (1, p. 4). For use of Ukraine and Little Rossia as synonyms, with Left-Bank Lokhvytysia as located in Ukraine, see 1:12:1, p. 200.
A universal attributed to Mazepa against the Right-Bank leader Petryk asserts the hetman’s efforts to maintain “the integrity of the whole Little Russian country, the common fatherland of all” (3:33, p. 106).

The sons of the fatherland were to judge their political leaders by whether they acted for the benefit and unity of the fatherland. The Zaporozhians wrote to Vyhos’kyi that they had not opposed his hetmancy expecting good for the Little Russian fatherland, but he had brought about the devastation of their Little Russian Mother, “who has raised you from a miserable dung heap, enriched you, and made you worthy to sit next to princes” (1:11:6, pp. 196–197). In the Bila Tserkva universal, Khmel’nyts’kyi charges Ivan Barabash as being an “enemy and ill-disposed to our fatherland” (1:1:17, p. 51). In contrast Khmel’nyts’kyi is praised as being of “good intention for our fatherland” (1:11:6, pp. 195–196) and in a letter from the Zaporozhian kish to hetman Petro Doroshenko as “our good hetman, a genuinely well-disposed son of our Little Russian fatherland” (2:7, p. 98). In another letter to Doroshenko, the Zaporozhian kish otaman asserts that although a son “of our Little Russian fatherland,” Doroshenko was not behaving in a filial manner in his treatment of the fatherland (2:10, p. 224). In a letter to hetman Ivan Samoilovych the kish otaman Ivan Sirko charges that earlier hetmans had only ostensibly been honestly benevolent builders and protectors of the fatherland (2:19, p. 469). In writing to hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi on his decision to accept the protection of the Russian tsar, the Sich Cossacks advise to do so for the benefit of “our Little Russian fatherland and all the Zaporozhian Host”, but they call on him to make sure that there would be nothing in the pacts harmful to “our fatherland” or ancient liberties (1:7:2, pp. 93–94).

The interests of the fatherland are seen as worthy of the highest loyalty, above all in rising to their defense. Hetman Ivan Vyhos’kyi, in calling on the Zaporozhians for the support they
had given his predecessor Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, asked them to assist in the defense of the Little Russian fatherland, for which they would be rewarded by God and their mother Little Rossia (1:10:12, p. 169).

Loyalty to the fatherland could even justify opposing the existing political order. The Bila Tserkva universal contains a call to take up arms in defense of the fatherland. In Khmel’nyts’kyi’s explanation for this call, the integrity of the fatherland accompanies religion and Cossack rights as a reason for joining the revolt. This justification purportedly occurred in a period before the Cossack Hetmanate existed and when the Polish king was the legitimate ruler. Ukraine as the fatherland was being read back into the mid-seventeenth century in order to justify revolt against the Polish state, which was in fact viewed by many mid-seventeenth century Ukrainians as their fatherland. In texts about later periods, Khmel’nyts’kyi was held up as an example as the liberator of the fatherland.28 Later in Velychko’s work, discussions occur of taking up arms in defense of the new political order that had emerged from the revolt. Hence Velychko describes Hetman Ivan Briukhovets’kyi as calling for all to fight the Poles “for the faith and the fatherland” and then judges his victory in driving King Jan Kazimierz and 100,000 Poles “from his fatherland Little Rossia” as possibly greater than Khmel’nyts’kyi’s (2:5, p. 84).

The interests of the fatherland could also be used to justify changing sovereigns. In a letter to the Zaporozhians defending his seeking Turkish protection, Petro Doroshenko insists that when Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi had gone under the tsar’s high hand he had not intended that their fatherland Little Rossia be divided into two or three, but that at Andrusovo the Russians and the Poles had divided the fatherland Little Rossia in two (with that part from Pereiaslav on going to

28 A letter from the Zaporozhian Cossacks to hetman Ivan Samoilovych declared that Khmel’nyts’kyi “liberated all our fatherland, Little Russian Ukraine” (2:25, p. 541). In contrast Vyhovs’kyi is criticized in a letter from the Zaporozhian Cossacks for returning the Little Russian fatherland, which had been freed by Bohdan Khmel’nys’t’kyi from the Polish Kingdom only through great shedding of blood of the Cossack brothers, to the Kingdom (1:10:12, p. 170).
the former and the part from Chyhyryn on and the holy city of Kyiv going to the Poles (2:12 pp. 298–299).

Velychko’s chronicle and the numerous documents he cited (or created) illustrate how the Cossack Hetmanate had come to substitute for the Commonwealth as the fatherland for early eighteenth-century Ukrainians. The political divides of late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Ukraine make for other shades of use of the term *otchyzna*. For the Left-Bank Hetmanate, the Right Bank, which contained the historic centers of Khmel’nyts’kyi’s revolt and of Cossack history was more and more cut off. The devastation of the Right Bank had resulted in resettlement to the Left Bank. Hence one can find in the mentions of “our that-bank fatherland” indication that fatherland is also being used in the sense of homeland or even “old country”. One also sees this in the attention to Chyhyryn as the old capital of the Hetmanate.29

The second divide was the traditional division between the settled territory and the steppe. It also constituted the divide between the Cossack Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich or kish. The importance of the steppe region to Cossack history and mythology is seen in Khmel’nyts’kyi’s Bila Tserkva universal. He calls Chyhyryn, Terekhtemyriv, Pereiaslav, Poltava, and other “Ukraino-Little Russian cities and villages lying on both banks of the Dnipro” “our furthest borderland and last half-wild lands” “our ancient fatherland”. He also calls them a center of staunch Orthodoxy coming from the times of Saint and equal-to-the-apostles Prince Volodymyr (1:1:17, p. 47). While the southern lands of the Hetmanate were connected with the unsettled steppe, the hetmans exerted less and less control over the Zaporozhian Sich after Khmel’nyts’kyi’s time. After 1667 it even had a separate international status. Nevertheless, the connection between the Hetmanate and the Sich was not only historical. The Sich Cossacks depended on the settled area for replenishing their ranks. Therefore, when they write about the

---

29 See it referred to as the “renowned ancient and brave leaders’ and your hetmans’ capital” (2:17, p. 392).
Ukraino-Little Russian fatherland in the documents attributed to them in Velychko’s work, fatherland at times has the meaning of land of their birth and origin, though also at times simultaneously this usage occurs alongside that of fatherland in the broader sense. The view that the Sich was outside the fatherland emerges most clearly in a letter by hetman Petro Doroshenko to the kish otaman and the Lower Dnipro Cossacks maintaining because they lived in the Lower Dnipro fields “far from their fatherland,” they did not know what was occurring in the world or in their fatherland (2:12, p. 295).30

The fatherland had taken on primary importance as an object of loyalty for the Mazepian generation. For that generation the fatherland was the Cossack Hetmanate and the Ukrainian territory, not the newly forming Russian state and empire.31 The problem that the Ukrainian elite faced in the early eighteenth century was what should happen when the interests of the fatherland and sovereign conflicted. The thorny nature of this problem is clear in the Bila Tserkva universal, where all iniquities that led to Khmel’nyts’kyi’s rising up in defense of the fatherland are attributed to the Poles, not the Polish king. Even in the texts that condemn Russian policy in Ukraine and depict attempts to overthrow or change sovereignty the figure of the sovereign is avoided. Indeed, in the political debate of letters ostensibly between Petryk and the Poltava Cossacks, the Cossacks argue that wrongs could be righted by an appeal to the sovereign. Petrine policies, the division of Ukraine, and the exigencies of war ultimately forced Mazepa to choose

---

30 In a letter from Otaman Sirko to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, he writes of something affecting not only the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, but also the entire Great and Little Russian world, thus differentiating the Sich Cossacks from the Little Russian world (2:19, pp. 469-470). Velychko discusses a call by the Crimean Tatars to the Zaporozhians to join them in a campaign against Little Rossia and an answer by the Zaporozhians that they would not fight against their Little Rossian fatherland (3:33, p. 105).

31 The chronicle has two instances in which “fatherland” appears to mean the Russian state. Dominik Stanisław Połubiński not only called the Commonwealth his otechyńna, but asked to be accepted as a citizen (obyvatel) of the fatherland (otchyńna) of their Tsarist majesties (3:35, p. 214). In a letter in 1695 of Patriarch Adrian to Hetman Ivan Mazepa, the patriarch calls for the need to extend the borders of the “Russian fatherland (otechestvo) and autocracy” (3:36, p. 266). Whether the Russian term otechestvo was synonymous with Ukrainian otechyńna in this period is questionable.
between fatherland and sovereign. Yet as a reading of the Velychko chronicle shows, even after Mazepa’s defeat Ukraine continued to be viewed as the fatherland and a major focus for Ukrainians’ loyalty. How long Ukraine continued to be seen as the fatherland remains to be studied. Certainly, a new conceptualization of the Russian Empire as a fatherland contended with the Ukrainian concept in the eighteenth century. Yet the Ukrainian concept of *otchyzna* may well have survived to the very end of the Hetmanate and served as a basis for the Ukrainian national revival of the early nineteenth century. Even if the concept did not remain vital throughout this period, the attention of the leaders of the national revival to the Cossack chronicles and the publishing of the Velychko manuscript in the 1840s to 1860s ensured that the early eighteenth-century view of fatherland shaped modern Ukrainian identity.

---

32 Although generally favorable to Peter and negative about Mazepa’s “treason”, Velychko condemned the tsar for not fulfilling his promises during the conflict to the Little Russian nation and the Zaporozhian Host to maintain and expand their liberties and for abolishing the office of hetman and erecting the Little Russian College (2:23, pp. 519–520). On the depiction of Russia in the Velychko chronicle, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations in Ukrainian Historiography of the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” in Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn and Mark von Hagen, eds., *Culture, Nation, and Identity. The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600-1945* (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 133–141.