Edmonton Journal
Only 18 months ago, China's relations with Canada seemed to be at their best in history.
President Hu Jintao had visited Prime Minister Paul Martin in Ottawa, declaring that a bilateral strategic partnership was established and that the two countries would co-operate in a range of areas from energy security to environment to trade and investment.
Since the Conservatives ousted the Liberals and formed a minority government in early 2006, however, Sino-Canadian relations have entered a period of uncertainty. While the new government in Ottawa underwent a learning curve in formulating its policy toward China, Beijing has displayed no urgency in taking fresh initiatives to manage bilateral relations.
Under the Liberals, from 1993 to 2006, the Canadian government took active measures to promote engagement with China. The "Team Canada" approach, developed by the Chretien cabinet with much hope and hype, was first applied to furthering economic and trade relations with China. The idea of provincial premiers and hundreds of Canadian business executives following the prime minister on a mission to Canada's major trade partners was to demonstrate a new commitment by the federal government to make Canada more competitive in a globalizing world.
The Liberal government managed to further upgrade Canada's political relations with China through a number of important phases.
In 1997, Beijing optimistically labelled its relationship with Ottawa as a "Trans-century Comprehensive Partnership." In response to the Chinese initiative, a Canadian Strategic Working Group, centred on the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade but with the participation of other federal and provincial government agencies and China experts across Canada, was created in early 2004.
When Hu visited Ottawa in the fall of 2005, the two sides officially elevated the bilateral relationship from "co-operative partnership" to "strategic partnership" -- a status reserved for Beijing's most important and trustworthy international partners.
The new Conservative government under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, however, did not display a high-level interest in any of these China policy initiatives implemented by the Liberals in most of 2006.
For months, Foreign Minister Peter MacKay did not respond to the Chinese ambassador's request for a meeting; the Conservatives criticized China's human rights record; the annual bilateral governmental human rights dialogue was assessed to be of little value and suspended, and a senior China policy consultation session did not take place until last October.
The Conservative government stopped using the term "strategic partnership" to characterize bilateral relations.
In his recent and first visit to China, MacKay stated that he was seeking a "constructive and comprehensive relationship" with China.
The Liberals pursued an engagement strategy with China on human rights issues: to avoid open confrontation and adopt more subtle and indirect means to hopefully influence Chinese behaviour.
The Conservatives, during their tenure as the Opposition, often clashed with the Liberals and criticized the government's policy of prioritizing trade over human rights.
After coming to power, the Conservatives signalled a change of course by emphasizing human-rights issues.
The annual bilateral governmental human-rights dialogue, which was celebrated by the Liberals as a major instrument of encouragement, received a critical review as having little impact. While the Conservatives held a series of hearings on China's human-rights record in Parliament, the 2006 dialogue did not take place.
Canadian's rights not honoured
What dominated both the media and government agenda on China's human rights for much of the past year was the case of Huseyin Celil (Yu Shanjiang in Chinese), a Canadian citizen of Xinjiang Uyghur origin. Celil had escaped from a Chinese prison in 2000 and later acquired refugee status and Canadian citizenship. He was wanted in China, however, for terrorist and separatist activities.
When Celil was arrested by Uzbek authorities and extradited to China in June last year, Beijing refused to recognize his Canadian citizenship on the grounds that Celil was a wanted fugitive who belonged to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, which is considered by both China and the UN to be a terrorist organization.
Denying Canada consular access to Celil, a Chinese court tried Celil in April and sentenced him to life in prison for "terrorist activities and plotting to split the country."
Ottawa seemed to have little influence over Beijing on the Celil case, despite the fact that both Harper and MacKay raised the issue with their Chinese counterparts.
Beijing's position clearly reflects its deep concern that it does not offer any compromises that could potentially weaken its control over Xinjiang.
Harper has linked the Celil case with human rights. "I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don't think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values," Harper claimed. "They don't want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar."
Last fall, Harper's meeting with Hu at the sidelines of APEC summit in Hanoi lasted only 15 minutes.
The two met again during the recent G8 summit in Germany. This time, there was no media storm or controversy like the one surrounding the last meeting. Yet the pattern of communication remained more or less the same.
Harper, while acknowledging the positive progress China has made in the past 25 years, again emphasized the issue of human rights, pressing China to improve its image prior to the 2008 Olympics.
He also raised the Celil case again with Hu. Hu politely listened to Harper's concerns regarding the human rights issues, and did not offer any concrete promises of action on the Celil case.
Yet, the issues of human-rights and trade are only two of the numerous problems that exist between China and Canada. There are other contentious issues.
For instance, Beijing has expressed frustration regarding the fact that China's most wanted fugitive, Lai Chang-xing, who was accused of embezzling billions of dollars through an elaborate smuggling ring, has been residing in Canada since 1999 and fighting extradition proceedings in the Canadian legal system for the past seven years.
There are other suspects of financial crimes who have also taken refuge in Canada and whose lawyers are using China's human-rights record and its incomplete legal protection as the first line of defence.
A haven for fugitives
There is a widespread perception that China has not carried out its promise to grant Canada the status of "designated tourist country," primarily because Lai has not been sent back to China. At the same time, there is also a growing Chinese perception that Canada is becoming a safe haven for Chinese fugitives.
Another issue, which has been prominently featured in the media and resulted in a major diplomatic row between the Conservative government and Beijing, pertains to national security concerns. MacKay first mentioned the matter not long after the change of government last year, claiming that the Canadian government was "very concerned about economic espionage" from China.
It appears that his concerns were not based on new evidence. Rather, the Chinese spy charges originated in a 2003-04 report from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS). Beijing has strongly denied these charges.
Still, in a recent appearance before a Senate committee hearing, the head of CSIS, Jim Judd, claimed that China is on the top of Canada's anti-espionage operation, with about half of its agency's total resources devoted to China. The charges seem to be wide-ranging, with Harper claiming that Chinese spies stole $1-billion worth of technological secrets from Canada every month. Even the Chinese efforts to set up Confucius Institutes around the world are viewed by Canada's spy agency as a national security concern.
The Harper government, however, has not abandoned trade and economic considerations in its China policy. After struggling through a precipitous learning curve, Canada has, since last fall, begun to send a number of its ministers to China in the portfolios of agriculture, natural resources, international trade, finance and, most recently, foreign affairs.
In return, China has sent a number of its deputy ministers to visit Canada, the most recent of which was Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai .
China's powerful National Development and Reform Commission, which is in charge of the country's energy policy, is leading a delegation of top Chinese energy companies to participate in the third Canada-China Economic Co-operation Conference: Energy and Beyond.
Organized by University of Alberta's China Institute and starting today in Edmonton, the conference will attract more than 130 senior government officials, private sector executives and academics.
While economic ties continue to grow and many fundamental aspects of the bilateral relationship remain sound, policy adjustments on a range of issues are taking place in both capitals.
Ottawa is now faced with the challenge of developing a coherent strategy toward China that would allow it to reassert its lost influence and effectively achieve its China policy objectives. And the best way to do so may begin with focusing on initiatives that move the bilateral relations toward a positive direction.
Wenran Jiang is acting director of the China Institute at the University of Alberta and the co-ordinator for the third Canada-China Economic Co-operation Conference: Energy and Beyond
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THE CONFERENCE
- The third Canada-China Economic Co-operation Conference: Energy and Beyond runs today through Friday in Edmonton. It brings together government officials, business people and academics from both countries to discuss a wide range of issues in bilateral energy relations.