China's Sansha 2 Won't Bring Sweeping Change to the South China Sea

Commentary by Scott N. Romaniuk

Scott N. Romaniuk - 10 October 2019

In August, 2019, China's 8,000-ton Sansha 2 was launched to supply China's militarized island assets in the South China Sea (SCS). A complement to CSIC Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry's 7,800-ton Sansha 1 supply ship, the latest ship was commissioned on September 3, 2014 in Huludao, Liaoning. The deployment of a second supply ship of its size is indicative of Beijing's commitment to fortifying its hold on the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam claims in spite of China's military presence, and elevating the SCS dispute to new heights and phases of engagement in order to achieve national aims.

China's Sansha 2 is able to carry civilian and military vehicles and containers, and accommodate sea-based operations such as emergency rescue missions and surveillance with its helicopter landing platform. A third ship of the same class is expected to accompany the two existing ships in the near future as part China's enhanced efforts to reinforce its claims, including its current and future assets. Although the two operative vessels and the soon-to-be third deployment are adequate for civilian logistic support (e.g., in the form of fresh water delivery) may signal Beijing's military logistic support shortcomings in the SCS. Though capable of ferrying supplies to its SCS assets under peacetime conditions, China's additions to its current fleet of cargo ships would prove inadequate during a protracted conflict.

The significance of China's transport vessels shifts when considering several factors. Taking them in chorus, China's short-term tactical position in the SCS has the potential to improve in some measure. What requires sufficient acknowledgement is: (1) China's perceived advantage relative to the United States' (US) capabilities to act and respond in the region in addition to those of other nations (mainly claimants in the SCS), (2) the comparable logistical needs of China's assets relative to those of other states, (3) civilian versus military logistical demands, and (4) similar demands in peacetime versus wartime.

Though less distressing for the US, the deployment of Sansha 2 should spawn direct concern, even alarm, for claimant states. The US has long maintained a security relationship with some of the states in the SCS region. The US Navy (USN) possesses a robust fleet of cargo ships with one of the leading ships of the Shughart-class cargo ship displacing close to 55,000 tons, full load. Others, like the Washington Chambers (T-AKE-11) of the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship, displace over 40,000 tons when fully loaded. Further SCS states - foremost Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei - that are unable to match the logistical faculties of the US, find themselves behind China's maritime support capabilities in the SCS, relying on a collection of smaller and comparably older vessels that can carry only half the load of China's Sansha 2.

The Philippine Navy's Bacolod City class logistic support ship - the most modern transport ship the Philippine Navy is able to deploy - was commissioned in the first half of the 1990s. Vietnam, while possessing several modern warships, lacks sufficient transport vessels to truly maintain its claims in the SCS and is currently exploring avenues to modernize its naval forces as a means of staving-off complex threats that emanate predominantly from China. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with approximately 714 warships, of which 76 are submarines, including one Xia-class and three Jin-class and ballistic missiles submarines, exceeds the size and modern characteristics of any country in East and Southeast Asia.

As China's ability to project its power via the PLAN beyond its near-seas region expands, fulfilling the relative needs of its SCS assets, especially as it seeks to militarize and fortify its holdings to different extents, will remain a challenge for China. Indeed, not all assets are treated equally, with some requiring a larger quantity and assortment of supplies than others. Bases with Chinese military personnel, barracks, and defense installations need to be sustained with special equipment and supplies. With this, the comparable needs of China's SCS assets will demand the production and deployment of more than just a few logistic support ships. Indeed, though China can call on its five type 904(a/b) general store ships, with a full displacement of some 15,000 tons, these ships currently exist in too few numbers to fulfill the role that would be required of them in the event of military conflict in the SCS.

China's ability to supply and fortify its SCS assets are dependent on the quantity of its logistic support ships and the loads that those ships can reliably deliver throughout the disputed region at any given time. Thus, the security of China's SCS assets is subject to the condition of suppliability. China's active logistic support ships bring into focus an immediate tactical advantage that China holds over its SCS rivals and possibly the US, however, China would likely struggle to maintain a faultless flow of supplies to its militarized assets in the event of war with any of its neighbors. This is particularly the case as some key SCS claimant states emphasize their desire to work with foreign governments in an effort to coordinate both civilian and military operations in the region with the broader aim of countering China's expansion across much of the vast region.