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Education	Alberta School of Business, Edmonton, Canada Ph.D. in Marketing Overall GPA: [3.84/4] Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Master of Business Administration (MBA) in Marketing. Overall GPA: [3.81/4] B.Sc. of Mechanical Engineering Related GPA (Calc. 1, Dif. Eq., Eng. Mathematics, Programming): [4/4]	Jan 2021 – Present Sep 2016 – Sep 2019 Sep 2011 – Sep 2016
Research Interests	Game Theory, Leadership, Intellectual Properties, Artificial Intelligence	
Job Market Paper	Who Leads? A Stackelberg Leadership Refinement Co-authored with Prof. Paul R. Messinger (Alberta School of Business) and Prof. Bora Kolfal (Alberta School of Business) There are many sequential-move duopoly game-theoretic models in marketing and other business research where firms are assigned Stackelberg leadership and followership roles without detailed justification. Furthermore, typically one role assignment is assumed for the whole parameter space. To address these issues, we propose an equilibrium refinement that provides a justification for the role assignment decisions and rules out implausible leadership structures when both firms prefer the same Stackelberg role (either leadership or followership). Our refinement applies a criterion, which is adapted by the analyst for their context, that assures a form of congruence between the equilibrium outcomes and the assumed players' roles: we rule out an assumption that a firm has a leader (follower) role if the implied equilibrium performance is very weak (strong) on a preselected measure. We then categorize the refinement outcomes into five cases, some of which may not be present for some models. We also apply our approach to extended models and show that their refinement outcomes are categorized into seven cases. We apply our refinement to four commonly used models in business and economic research: two models where both firms prefer leadership (Cournot and vertical channel) and two models where both firms prefer followership (market-base demand and consumer utility).	
Working Paper	Intellectual Pricing in Duopolies with Asymmetrical Market Bases Co-authored with Prof. Paul R. Messinger (Alberta School of Business) and Prof. Bora Kolfal (Alberta School of Business) This paper develops a theoretical model to identify which firm in a market-base-asymmetrical duopoly has a higher willingness to pay for a cost-reducing patent. Firms compete in prices and offer imperfectly substitutable products. In the main model, the patent is sold to at most one firm through a second-price auction. In an extension, the patent holder is the low-market-base firm, which can use, sell, or hide the patent. We analyse three game structures: a simultaneous-move game and two sequential-move games. In the first sequential case, the high-market-base firm is the Stackelberg leader; in the second, the patent buyer is the leader. Contrary to some prior literature, we find that the parametrically advantaged firm, the high-market-base firm, has a higher willingness to pay and acquires the patent in all three game structures. When firms have equal market bases, their willingness to pay is equal under Nash competition and the second Stackelberg case, while the leader acquires the patent in the first Stackelberg case. Greater market-base asymmetry raises the buyer's willingness to pay but lowers the patent price. Greater product substitutability raises the patent price under Nash competition and the first Stackelberg case, but under the second Stackelberg case the patent price eventually declines to zero. In the extension, the low-market-base firm prefers hiding the patent rather than using it over part of the parameter space; however, selling the patent is always optimal	

Working Paper	Manufacturer's Strategy with Online, Offline, and Direct Channels Co-authored with Prof. Masoud Talebian (Sharif Graduate School of Management and Economics) and Prof. Manoochehr Najmi (Sharif Graduate School of Management and Economics)	
Working Paper	Government's Wholesale Price Discrimination Policies for a Monopolist Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers Co-authored with Prof. Masoud Talebian (Sharif Graduate School of Management and Economics) and Prof. Nasser Karami (Sharif Graduate School of Management and Economics)	
Awards & Honors	Runner-Up Poster Empirical and Theoretical Symposium (ETSYM), Gordon S. Lang School of Business and Economics 2025 Recruitment Scholarship Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta 2021 Top 10% Rank CFA Level 1 Exam 2019 Rank 35 Iran's Nationwide MBA Program Entrance Exam among more than 20,000 participants 2015 Top 0.1% Rank Iran's Nationwide Undergraduate Entrance Exam among more than 252,000 participants. 2011 Fellowship Awards Iran's National Elites Foundation 2010 - Present Awarded Member Iran's National Elites Foundation 2010 Silver Medalist 23rd National Physics Olympiad, Iran 2010 Semifinalist 27th and 28th National Mathematics Olympiad and 19 th and 20 th National Computer Olympiad, Iran 2009 & 2010	
Teaching Experience	Principal Instructor International Marketing , Undergraduate course, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta Winter 2026 Marketing Strategy , Undergraduate course, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta Spring 2024 Introduction to Marketing , Undergraduate course, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta Spring 2025, Winter 2023 Co-instructor Introduction to Marketing, Undergraduate course, with Prof. Dussome, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta Fall 2025 Teaching Assistant Introduction to Marketing, Undergraduate course, Prof. Argo, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta Fall 2022 Retailing, Undergraduate course, Prof. Messinger, Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta Winter 2021 Physics (wave motions, optics, and sound), Engineering Student Success Center, University of Alberta Fall 2022, 2023, 2024 Calculus for Engineering II, Engineering Student Success Center, University of Alberta Winter 2024, 2025 Coordinator and Tutor Ghalamchi Company, for Iran's Undergraduate Entrance Exam's Candidates, Tehran, Iran. 2016 - 2017 High School Teacher Physics Olympiad, prominent high schools, Tehran, Iran 2012 - 2016	
Software Skills	Mathematica, Python, MATLAB, C/C++, and R.	
Languages	English (Fluent), Farsi (Native), French (Basic), Arabic (Basic)	