

UKRAINIANS ABROAD: NEWS AND VIEWS #160

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20 February 2023

1. Recent Works.

2. Argentina. “Se cumplen 100 años del té argentino y todo fue por un ucraniano que huía de la guerra” [The Centenary of Argentine Tea Is Being Marked and It Was All Due to a Ukrainian Fleeing the War], *La Nación*, 11 January 2023.

3. Australia. “ACT Rejects Ukrainian Outcry over Russian Performers,” *Australian*, 19 February 2023.

4. Canada. “New Ukrainian-Canadian Association Formed in Yukon,” *Yukon News*, 19 January 2023.

5. Canada. “Ukrainian Scholars Find New Community at UM,” *News.umanitoba.ca*, 30 November 2022.

6. Costa Rica. “Costa Rica’s Ukrainian Community Helps Orphanage with Benefit Concert,” *Tico Times*, 10 January 2023.

7. Estonia. “Tax Authority: 32,000 Ukrainians Were in Employment in Estonia in 2022,” *Baltic Daily - Political/Social News*, 9 February 2023.

8. Italy. “Italy’s La Scala Opens Season to Ukrainian Protests,” *ABC News*, 7 December 2022.

9. Poland. “Tide of Ukrainian Refugees Transforms Polish Society,” *Intellinews.com*, 4 January 2023.

10. Russia. “‘It’s Not Safe to Admit You’re Ukrainian’: How Putin’s Domestic War on Ukrainian Culture Began Years Before the 2022 Invasion,” *Meduza*, 25 January 2023.

11. Russia. “The Kuban: A Real ‘Wedge’ between Russia and Ukraine,” *Jamestown.org*, 24 January 2023.

12. South Africa. “Ukrainians in South Africa Protest Russian Battleship,” *Voice of America*, 15 February 2023.

13. United Kingdom. “The Ukrainian Community in Rochdale Has Hosted a Visit from St. Nicholas, Who Handed Gifts to Children,” *Rochdale Observer*, 24 December 2022.

14. United Kingdom. "Book Shines Spotlight on Ukrainian Stories," *Dumfries and Galloway Standard*, 13 December 2022.

15. United Kingdom. "King Charles Opens New Welcome Centre for Ukrainian Refugees in London," *TheNationalNews.com*, 30 November 2022.

16. USA. "Philadelphia's Ukrainian Diaspora Puts a Unique Spin on Holiday Classic in Solidarity with Ukraine," *TheWorld.org*, 30 December 2022.

1. Recent Works.

ARGENTINA

***Hace 125 años: 1897-2022. Aniversario del arribo de los primeros inmigrantes ucranianos a Apóstoles*, compiled by Serge Cipko, translated by Jeremías M. Taurydzkyj. Buenos Aires: Editorial Antigua, 2022.**

[125 Years Ago: 1897-2022. The Quasiquicentennial of the Arrival of the First Ukrainian Immigrants to Apóstoles.]

A collection of primary sources translated into Spanish, by Jeremías M. Taurydzkyj, from the original Ukrainian (with one exception) pertaining to the first decades of Ukrainian settlement in Apóstoles and nearby areas in Misiones, Argentina.

Zulma Mónica Pittau Sevilla. "La identidad cultural como patrimonio vivo en los inmigrantes polacos, ucranianos, ruso-bielorrusos y alemanes de Misiones, Argentina." Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Extremadura, Spain, 2022.

[Cultural Identity as the Living Heritage of Polish, Ukrainian, Russian-Belarusian, and German Immigrants in Misiones, Argentina.]

Can be accessed at: <https://dehesa.unex.es/handle/10662/14454>.

AUSTRALIA

O. Oleinikova. "Interrogating Diaspora and Cross-Border Politics in Ukrainian Migration to Australia." In *Understanding Diaspora Development*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Eds. M. Phillips and L. Olliff. 187-205.

Abstract:

"This chapter presents a fresh interpretation of the impact modern diasporas have on democratic processes in their home countries and challenges the neglects by broader diaspora and democracy scholarship of the crucial role diasporas play in democratisation. Focusing on the case of Ukrainian migration to Australia, this chapter investigates how migrants from Ukraine

construct their lives in Australia and how the Ukrainian diasporas are actively involved in shaping democracy in their home countries from abroad across and through their political and social activities and in so doing, are themselves becoming increasingly democratised. The chapter posits a different way to conceptualise the relationship between diasporas and democracy, arguing that the attachment of both phenomena to territory requires considered investigation if they are to tackle the challenges posed by the global pandemic, closed borders and the concurrent crises of democracy that are radically transforming our current global order. This paper theoretically discusses and empirically validates how diasporas have become the power in the democratic processes of their country of origin, which goes beyond any territorial constraints within a global media sphere.”

For further information, visit:

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97866-2_9.

BRAZIL

Luciane Trennephol da Costa Doutora and Daiane C. Moreira de Souza. “Sound Characteristics in the Speech of Ukrainian Descendants in Brazil.” *Astraea* 3, no. 1 (2022): 29-44.

Abstract:

“Brazil received many Ukrainian immigrants in the 19th century and most of them were sent to the southern region of the country. The municipality of Prudentópolis, a city of approximately 50,000 inhabitants, located in the Center-South region of the State of Paraná and Southern Brazil, received many of these immigrants, mainly from the regions of Galicia and Bukovina (BORUSZENKO, 1995). The city is known as the Brazilian Ukraine, for preserving traditions, customs, religious rituals and keeping alive the memory and language of the Ukrainian people. This article aims to analyze the pronunciation of rhotics, as the sounds of "r" are called, in Brazilian Portuguese by Ukrainian descendants who live in communities in the interior of the city of Prudentópolis, since the use of r is an important dialect mark for the region's speakers. The theoretical foundation of this research is based on the Labovian quantitative variationist sociolinguistics theory (LABOV, 2008 [1972]). The analyzed sample is part of the speech database Linguistic Variation of Slavic Speech – VARLINFE, which consists of oral interviews with Slav, Polish and Ukrainian descendants, residents of the interior of Paraná. The rhotic sounds produced by eight informants were analyzed, totaling 3.906 data. Such occurrences were submitted to statistical treatment with the Goldvarb program. The results revealed the predominance of the rhotic variant tap and pointed out as conditioning factors the syllabic environment in which the sound occurs in the word, the speaker's education, the morphological class of the word and the sound context prior to the rhotic in the word. This research, still in development, contributes to the knowledge of Brazilian Portuguese spoken within the country and in the communities of Ukrainian descendants.”

Can be accessed at: <https://astraea-journal.org/index.php/journal/article/view/53/61>.

CANADA

Myrna Kostash. *Ghosts in a Photograph: A Chronicle*. Edmonton: Newest Press, 2022.

Publisher's description:

“In *Ghosts in a Photograph*, award-winning nonfiction writer Myrna Kostash delves into the lives of her grandparents, all of whom moved from Galicia, now present-day Ukraine, to Alberta at the turn of the twentieth century. Discovering a packet of family mementos, Kostash begins questioning what she knows about her extended families' pasts and whose narrative is allowed to prevail in Canada.

This memoir, however, is not just a personal story, but a public one of immigration, partisan allegiance, and the stark differences in how two sets of families survive in a new country: one as homesteaders, the other as working-class Edmontonians. Working within the gaps in history—including the unsolved murder in Ukraine of her great uncle—Kostash uses her remarkable acumen as a writer and researcher to craft a probable narrative to interrogate the idea of straightforward and singular-voiced pasts and the stories we tell ourselves about where we come from.

Rich in detail and propelled by vital curiosity, *Ghosts in a Photograph* is a determined, compelling, and multifaceted family chronicle.”

For further information, visit: <https://bookshop.newestpress.com/products/ghosts-in-a-photograph>.

K. Pawliw and Étienne Berthold. “Construction of the Ukrainian Identity in a Neighbourhood: The Role of the Host Society. Example of the Parc de l’Ukraine in Rosemont, Montreal.” *Fennia - International Journal of Geography* 200, no. 1 (2022): 24-40.

Abstract:

“The Parc de l’Ukraine (Ukraine Park) located in the neighbourhood of Rosemont, Montreal, acquired its Ukrainian toponym in 1981 and began its replanning in 2017 which consisted of the upgrading of equipment and of the addition of Ukrainian symbols. These symbols were chosen to bring out the Ukrainian identity of the park and of the neighbourhood. During the replanning, relations were established between the Ukrainian community of Montreal and municipal governing bodies who each enunciated discourses in this context. Based on discourse analysis and using the Ukrainian community of Montreal as an example, this article will focus on the role of the host society at a municipal scale, meaning municipal governing bodies, in immigrant identity construction processes. It will look at the interrelationships between ethnic associations and the representatives and professionals of a city, during the replanning of an urban park. This article will demonstrate that the host society (municipal governing bodies) can instrumentalize

immigrant communities to promote a specific identity of the city that varies according to various spatiotemporal contexts and more specifically that the neighbourhood of Rosemont has been at the centre of construction processes through which it has acquired a symbolic value as the Ukrainian neighbourhood of Montreal. Such processes have relied on the one hand, on Ukrainian associations, and on the other hand, on Montreal's governing bodies."

Can be accessed at: <https://fennia.journal.fi/article/view/116597/75809>.

Ruslan Siromskyi and Volodymyr Kachmar. "Ukrainian Canadian Committee Activities in Information and Analytical Materials of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR," *East European Historical Bulletin*, no. 24 (2022): 205-213.

Abstract:

"The aim of the research is to analyze the activities of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) which attracted chief focus of the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Ukrainian SSR and are accordingly reflected in its information and analytical materials. The research methodology is defined by an interdisciplinary approach and is based on general scientific and special scientific methods, first of all, retrospection and historical comparison. The scientific novelty of the research is that on the basis of declassified documents of the Soviet secret services the problems of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, which were of most interest to the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, have been determined. The intelligence obtained information about the UCC's plans and initiatives was used in campaigns against the Canadian Ukrainians to 'disintegrate' the Ukrainian Diaspora. The Conclusions. The UCC's activities, aimed not only at preserving Ukraine's cultural heritage overseas but also at uniting emigrants around the idea of liberating Ukraine and representing the world, contradicted the official Soviet ideology and undermined Moscow's propaganda efforts. As a result, the UCC's activities came to the forefront of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, whose staff recorded key moments of its actions in the form of information and analytical materials. The greatest interest of the KGB, which had unconditional practical significance, was caused by: the history of the UCC and its structural development; resolutions adopted at congresses; international campaigns (for example, related to systematic human rights violations in the Ukrainian SSR, honoring the victims of the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933, etc.); the participation of the Canadian politicians in the UCC's activities (any support for the Canadian Ukrainians by the government or individual politicians was seen as cooperation with Western intelligence services); existing differences and measures to discredit the organization. Taking into consideration the fact that the UCC consisted of more than three dozen organizations, the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR was interested in deepening the differences between them, and thus complicating the activities of the UCC. The Soviet special services carried out operations to spread disinformation or the so-called "profitable" material in Canada, trying to cause a split among the Canadian Ukrainians, to create the atmosphere of mistrust and mutual suspicion. The KGB's 'active measures' were designed to minimize the effects of the UCC's anti-Soviet measures. The perspective direction of the research is the study of the peculiarities of the work of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign agents and the conduct of special operations aimed at 'disintegrating' the Diaspora."

Can be accessed at: <http://eehb.dspu.edu.ua/article/view/264748>.

CANADA/USA

Volodymyr Kravchenko. *Ukrainian Historical Writing in North America during the Cold War*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2023.

Publisher's description:

“This book is the first comprehensive survey of Ukrainian historical writing in North America during the Cold War. The author describes the development of Ukrainian historical studies in Canada and the United States as an open, sometimes difficult dialogue between the Ukrainian ethnic and academic communities on the one hand and between Ukrainian scholars and Western academic mainstream on the other. He focuses on the institutional and the intellectual issues including various interpretations of major topics related to the Ukrainian national grand narrative, considering them in the evolving academic and political contexts of Slavic, East European, and Soviet studies.”

For further information, visit: <https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793609076/Ukrainian-Historical-Writing-in-North-America-during-the-Cold-War-The-Struggle-for-Recognition>.

GENERAL

Ukraina Moderna, no. 31 2022: “Зарубіжне українство: від еміграції до діаспори” [Ukrainians Abroad: From Emigration to Diaspora].

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Сергій ЦІПКО. Три хвилі української еміграції до Бразилії, 1890-1940-ті рр.: історичний огляд до 130-річчя українського поселення [Three Waves of Ukrainian Immigration to Brazil, 1890s-1940s: A Historical Overview on the 130th Anniversary of Settlement.]

Руслан СІПОМСЬКИЙ. Посіяти недовіру до емігрантських центрів”: заходи КДБ з дискредитації української діаспори в Канаді [“To Sow Distrust in Emigrant Centres”: Measures Conducted by the KGB to Discredit the Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada].

Sonia MYCAK. Transnational Dynamics across the Diaspora: A Chronicle of Ukrainian Literature in Australia.

Ольга ХОМЕНКО. Історія “невидимої” діаспори: Іван Світ та його “Скорочена історія українського руху на Далекому Сході /Азія/” (Харбін, 1938) [The History of an “Invisible” Diaspora: Ivan Svit and His *Short History of the Ukrainian Movement in the Far East (Asia)* (Harbin, 1938)].

Наталія ХАНЕНКО-ФРІЗЕН, Вік ЗАЦЕВИЧ. Іміграція до Канади з незалежної України (1991-2021): історичний контекст і соціологічний портрет [Immigration to Canada from Independent Ukraine (1991-2021): A Historical Context and Sociological Profile].

Юлія ДЗЯБКО. Особливості соціокультурної інтеграції українців у Японії [The Socio-Cultural Integration of Ukrainians in Japan].

Марина ГРИМИЧ. Молоді українські громади та об’єднання експатів на Близькому Сході: особливості та результати дослідження в добу цифри й COVID-19 [New Ukrainian Communities and Expat Associations in the Middle East: Characteristics and Research Findings during the Digital Era and COVID-19].

Вероніка ВАЙСХАЙМЕР. До історії відносин німецького уряду та українських емігрантів-науковців у 1920-40-х рр.: досвід діяльності Українського наукового інституту в Берліні [The Relations between the German Government and Ukrainian Scholars in Exile in the 1920s-1940s: The Case of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin].

Катерина КОБЧЕНКО. “Єдиний український університет у вільному світі”: Український Вільний Університет у Мюнхені в повоєнний час (1945-91) [“The Only Ukrainian University in the Free World”: The Ukrainian Free University in Munich in the Post-War Period (1945-1991)].

Яна МАРТЪЯНОВА, Ігор СРІБНЯК, Анна ХЛІСІНА. “Український Скиталець” (Ліберець-Йозефов-Відень), 1920-23 рр.: до історії видання часопису [Toward a History of the Periodical *Ukrains'kyi Skytalets* (Liberec-Josefov-Vienna), 1920-23].

Ірина СКУБІЙ. “Що американці бачать і не бачать у радянській Україні?” [“What Do the Americans See and Do Not See in Soviet Ukraine?”: A Review of Mendel Osherowitch, *How People Live in Soviet Russia: Impressions from a Journey*, ed. by Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, transl. by Sharon Power. Kingston–Ontario: The Kashtan Press, 2020].

Григорій РІЙ. Листування Ярослава Стецька (президента Антибольшовицького блоку народів) та Гавіва Шибер (генерального секретаря Антикомуністичного голосу Єрусалиму) [Correspondence between Yaroslav Stetsko (President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) and Haviv Shieber (Secretary General of the Anti-Communist Voice in Jerusalem)].

For further information, visit: <https://uamoderna.com/svizhy>.

Alla Korzh, Serhiy Kovalchuk, and Adj Marshall. “Euromaidan Abroad: The Social Movement Motivations of Young Ukrainian Immigrants.” *Nationalities Papers* 50, no. 2 (March 2022): 262-274.

Abstract:

“This article examines the motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants to support the Euromaidan from abroad. Existing research has documented social movements within their national boundaries and the participation of young people in them. However, it has rarely examined the expansion of social movements beyond their national boundaries and the engagement of young immigrants in such movements. Drawing on a larger qualitative study, this article presents the findings about what motivated 24 young Ukrainian immigrants residing in the USA to support the Euromaidan movement of 2013–2014 and compares their motivations to those of the protestors in Ukraine. We argue that motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants to support the Euromaidan from abroad manifest themselves in symbolic or psychological causes. Our findings demonstrate that the individual motivations were driven by an ideological commitment to systemic change in Ukraine, manifested through young Ukrainian immigrants’ (1) desire to end injustice, (2) solidarity with fellow Ukrainians, (3) moral obligation to raise awareness among the US public, and, most prominently, (4) sense of agency to contribute to the long-awaited change in the homeland. Our findings also show that overall, the motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants to join the movement aligned with those of the protestors in Ukraine.”

For further information, visit:

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/euromaidan-abroad-the-social-movement-motivations-of-young-ukrainian-immigrants/C8A2A24A228A7A17FD398603D9975593>.

POLAND

P. Strzelecki, J., Growiec, and R. Wyszynski. “The Contribution of Immigration from Ukraine to Economic Growth in Poland.” *Review of World Economies* 158 (2022): 365-399.

Abstract:

“From 2014 onwards Poland witnessed an unprecedented inflow of immigrant workers from Ukraine. Coupled with strong labour demand, this surge in labour supply provided a major contribution to Poland’s economic growth. However, due to problems with capturing immigration in Labour Force Survey data this contribution has remained hitherto largely unaccounted in official data. This paper uses a range of alternative official data sources to estimate the actual number of immigrants, and survey data on migrant characteristics, collected in four Polish cities, to estimate the effective labour supply of Ukrainian immigrants in terms of productivity-adjusted hours worked. The authors find that the arrival of Ukrainian workers was increasing the effective labour supply in Poland in 2013–2018 by 0.8% per annum. Imputing this additional labour supply in a growth accounting exercise they find that the (previously unaccounted) contribution of Ukrainian workers amounted to about 0.5 pp. per annum, i.e., about 13% of Poland’s GDP growth in 2013–2018. The same figure should be subtracted from the residual contribution of total factor productivity growth, suggesting that recent growth in Poland has been in fact much more labour-intensive than previously interpreted.”

Can be accessed at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10290-021-00437-y>.

USA

Megan Buskey. *Ukraine Is Not Dead Yet: A Family Story of Exile and Return*. Stuttgart and Hannover: ibidem Press, 2023.

From <http://cup.columbia.edu/book/ukraine-is-not-dead-yet/9783838216911>:

“When Megan Buskey’s grandmother Anna dies in Cleveland in 2013, Megan is compelled in her grief to uncover and document her grandmother’s life as a native of Ukraine. A Ukrainian American, Buskey returns to her family’s homeland and enlists her relatives there to help her in her quest—and discovers much more than she expected. The result is an extraordinary journey that traces one woman’s story across Ukraine’s difficult twentieth century, from a Galician village emerging from serfdom, to the “bloodlands” of Eastern Europe during World War II, to the Siberian hinterlands where Anna spent almost two decades in exile before receiving the rare opportunity to emigrate from the Soviet Union in the 1960s. In the course of her research, Megan encounters essential and sometimes disturbing aspects of recent Ukrainian history, such as Nazi collaboration, the rise and persistence of Ukrainian nationalism, and the shattering impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Yet her wide-ranging inquiries keep leading her back to universal questions: What does family mean? How can you forge connections between generations that span different cultures, times, and places? And, perhaps most hauntingly, how can you best remember a complicated past that is at once foreign and personal?”

For further details, visit also: <https://www.ibidem.eu/en/ukraine-is-not-dead-yet-9783838216911.html>.

D. Kravets. “Sovietization of Western Ukraine (1939-1941) in the Public Opinion of the Ukrainians in the USA.” *Сторінки історії: збірник наукових праць*, no. 54 (2022): 188-201.

Abstract:

“The paper deals with the attitude of American Ukrainians in 1939–1940 towards the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine at the beginning of World War II. The public opinion of Western countries regarding the events of 1939–1941 needs additional study and exploration. The research is based on the articles published in the US press and journals (both American and Ukrainian) regarding the issue of the Soviet occupation, as well as the archival documents of the Ukrainian institutions in Northern America, Congressional records of the United States Congress. The article describes the state of the Ukrainian diaspora in America in the 1930s, the international position of the USA at the beginning of World War II especially in the context of the neutrality act and S. Welles’ declaration.”

Can be accessed at: https://ela.kpi.ua/bitstream/123456789/50960/1/SI_54_2022_p188-201.pdf.

2. Argentina. “Se cumplen 100 años del té argentino y todo fue por un ucraniano que huía de la guerra” [The Centenary of Argentine Tea is Being Marked and It Was All Due to a Ukrainian Fleeing the War], *La Nación*, 11 January 2023.

Se cumplen 100 años del té argentino y todo fue por un ucraniano que huía de la guerra
En 1923, Wladimiro Hnatiuk comenzó a producir en Misiones un producto que hoy se vende a 40 países

Martín Boerr
PARA LA NACIÓN

POSADAS, Misiones.- El té argentino cumple en 2023 nada menos que 100 años de historia, gracias a la llegada de un inmigrante ucraniano que se asentó en Tres Capones, un pueblito muy chico de esta provincia, cercano a la frontera con Brasil.

Hacia allí llegó Wladimiro Hnatiuk, inmigrante ucraniano que escapaba de las guerras y tensiones permanentes, principalmente con Rusia.

Hnatiuk se asentó en una chacra en Tres Capones en 1910 y empezó a plantar de todo, hasta que en 1923 su hermano, el pastor Tijón, le trajo unas semillas de té. Así arrancaron las primeras plantaciones de té y la primera industria tealera, muy rudimentaria. Un sector que fue creciendo imparable hasta convertirse hoy en un gran exportador a más de 40 países y especialmente a los Estados Unidos, donde el té argentino tiene incluso mayor inserción que el té proveniente de China o India.

El periodista especializado en temas del agro, Carlos Vedoya, trabajó rescatando la historia muy poco conocida de este inmigrante ucraniano y desde fines del año pasado impulsa un proyecto de ley para que el Congreso Nacional declare a 2023 el año del Té Argentino, una iniciativa que ya fue presentada por el diputado nacional Diego Sartori.

La ley tiene como objetivo “rememorar correctamente lo que sucedía hace 100 años atrás y así mantener viva la memoria de quien fuera el primer plantador y elaborador de té del país: Don Wladimiro Hnatiuk”, dice el proyecto presentado por el legislador.

“H[na]tiuk fue más inmigrante que inversor, más colono que refugiado, hizo su chacra, hizo plantas de mango y nísperos, hizo té hace 100 años, y las primeras plantas semi industriales del país en Misiones, cuando la provincia de la yerba apenas si tenía yerba y todavía se administraba como un Territorio Nacional”, explicó Vedoya Recio a LA NACION.

El periodista reconstruyó la historia del té misionero a partir del testimonio de Jorge Cheroki, nieto de Hnatiuk y otras fuentes como el historiador Alfredo Poenitz y Esteban Snihur y el también periodista y descendiente de ucranianos, Jorge Balanda.

“Es muy poco lo que se sabe de esa historia”, explicó a LA NACION Liliana Rojas, del Centro de Investigaciones Históricas del Instituto Antonio Ruiz de Montoya.

Rojas y otros historiadores han recopilado decenas de testimonios de inmigrantes de Europa Oriental que llegaron el siglo pasado a esta provincia y fundaron ciudades e industrias. Pero sin embargo, pocos conocen en detalle la historia de Hnatiuk, según pudo comprobar este medio tras consultas a especialistas, empresarios del sector e historiadores.

Lo curioso es que Tres Capones, donde hoy está enterrado Hnatiuk, sigue siendo un pueblito tan chico como hace 100 años, mientras la industria próspera del té hizo crecer a ciudades y pueblos como Oberá, Campo Viera, Campo Grande y Alem, en la llamada zona centro de Misiones.

Tres Capones es apenas un pueblo de cinco cuadras donde predomina una iglesia ortodoxa del Manto Sagrado de María, vistosa y algo fuera de lugar. Cerca de ahí está el cementerio, donde está enterrado el héroe ucraniano.

A tan sólo 300 metros está el viejo establecimiento que hacía las veces de hogar y fábrica y que quedó detenida en el tiempo, como todo el pueblo. Sin dudas la iglesia y la historia lo convierten en un lugar con mucho potencial para el turismo, algo que podría recibir un impulso importante si se rescata esta historia centenaria y se divulga.

Según reconstruyó Vedoya Recio, Wladimiro arribó a Tres Capones junto a su hermano Emanuel en 1910 desde la región de Volynia, -siempre disputado por unos y otros, territorio que hoy se reparten Ucrania, Polonia y Bielorrusia-, para acompañar a su otro hermano, el sacerdote ortodoxo Tijón Hnatiuk quien ya estaba en la tierra colorada trabajando con la comunidad local.

Tijón, que sería un actor de reparto fundamental en la historia, había llegado el 30 de agosto de 1908 desde Kiev.

El pastor vuelve a Ucrania cuando estalló la Primera Guerra Mundial hasta 1923, cuando regresa a reencontrarse con su hermano casi 10 años después. Ese viaje dio origen al comienzo del té porque Tijón trajo consigo semillas de té de Crimea, otro territorio codiciado ya por ese entonces por los rusos, que Vladimir Putin volvió a anexarse en 2014.

El Ministerio de Agricultura le reconocería en 1937 a Wladimiro Hnatiuk que el té reunía las características organolépticas adecuadas. El ministro Miguel Cárcano le envió luego un Diploma de Honor reconociéndole la proeza de traer el té a la Argentina. “Los plantines ya tenían 15 años y no menos de 10 zafras consecutivas”, dice Vedoya Recio.

El té argentino hoy

Al igual que la yerba mate, el té argentino solamente se produce en Misiones y Corrientes. Y también como el llamado oro verde, la tierra colorada tiene la enorme mayoría de la producción: 95 por ciento de la *Camellia sinensis*.

La gran mayoría se exporta a más de 40 países y el principal mercado es el de los Estados Unidos. Las exportaciones de té argentino al país del norte, que lo consume como bebida fría, son aún mayores que las de China.

Según datos del Ministerio del Agro de Misiones, durante 2021 se exportaron 72.703 toneladas de té negro y 2415 de té verde. Misiones viene desarrollando fuerte el té orgánico certificado y busca darle mayor agregado a sus envíos, donde predominan los productos de bajo precio por ahora.

Cuando se habla de exportaciones de té, todos mencionan a las cuatro grandes firmas: Don Basilio, Urrutia, Casa Fuentes/Finlays y El Vasco. Pero también hay más de 20 industrias tealeras de diversos tamaños dedicadas a la exportación. Las exportaciones alcanzaron su máximo volumen en 2014 con 110 millones de dólares, pero desde entonces el sector se estancó.

Hoy está atravesando las dificultades del atraso cambiario, sin la posibilidad de poder volcar el grueso de la producción al mercado interno.

[Translation into English follows – S.C.:]

By Martín Boerr

*The centenary of Argentine tea is being marked and it was all due to a Ukrainian fleeing the war
In 1923 Wladimiro Hnatiuk began to produce a product that today is sold to 40 countries*

POSADAS, Misiones.- In 2023 Argentine tea is celebrating no fewer than 100 years of history, thanks to the arrival of a Ukrainian immigrant who settled in Tres Capones, a tiny village in this province [Misiones], close to the border with Brazil.

It is to that settlement that Wladimiro Hnatiuk, a Ukrainian immigrant who was escaping from wars and permanent tensions, mainly with Russia, arrived.

Hnatiuk established a farm in Tres Capones in 1910 and began to plant a variety of crops, until in 1923 his brother, the priest Tijón Hnatiuk, brought him some tea seeds. This led to the rudimentary beginnings of the first tea plantations and the start of a tea industry. It evolved into a sector that grew unstoppably to the degree that today Argentina is a major exporter to more than 40 countries and especially to the United States, where Argentine tea has an even greater insertion than tea from China or India.

Carlos Vedoya, a journalist who specializes in agricultural issues, has endeavoured to rescue the little-known story of this Ukrainian immigrant and since the end of last year has promoted a bill for the National Congress to declare 2023 the “Year of Argentine Tea.” This is an initiative that was already presented by the national deputy [from Misiones], Diego Sartori.

It aims to “recall correctly what occurred 100 years ago and thus keep alive the memory of the person who was the first tea planter and producer in the country: Don Wladimiro Hnatiuk,” reads the presentation by the legislator.

“Hnatiuk was more of an immigrant than an investor, more of a settler than a refugee, he built his farm, cultivated mango and medlar plants, produced tea 100 years ago, and the first semi-

industrial plants in the country in Misiones, when the province of yerba mate barely had yerba and was still administered as a National Territory,” explained Vedoya Recio to *La Nación*.

The journalist reconstructed the history of Misiones tea on the basis of the testimony of Jorge Cherokee, Hnatiuk’s grandson, and other sources such as historians Alfredo Poenitz and Esteban Snihur, and also the journalist and descendant of Ukrainians, Jorge Balanda.

“Very little is known about this history,” explained Liliana Rojas of the Antonio Ruiz de Montoya Institute’s Centre for Historical Research to *La Nación*.

Rojas and other historians have compiled dozens of testimonies from immigrants from eastern Europe who arrived in this province in the previous century and founded urban centres and industries. Yet, after consultations with specialists, entrepreneurs in the sector, and historians, it was evident that few knew the history of Hnatiuk in detail.

Curiously, Tres Capones, where Hnatiuk is interred today, is still as small a village as it was 100 years ago, while the prosperous tea industry made cities and towns like Oberá, Campo Viera, Campo Grande, and [Leandro N.] Alem grow in the so-called central zone of Misiones.

Tres Capones is barely a village with five blocks where the picturesque and imposing Manto Sagrado de María Orthodox church is somewhat out of place. Nearby is the cemetery where the Ukrainian hero is buried.

Only 300 metres away is the old establishment that served as both a home and a factory and became frozen in time, like the rest of the village. Without a doubt the church and the history provide this place with much potential for tourism, which could receive a significant boost if this century-old history is rescued and revealed.

According to Vedoya Recio’s findings, Wladimiro arrived in Tres Capones together with his brother Emanuel in 1910 from the Volhynia region [in Ukraine] - always disputed by one and the other, a territory divided by Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus today - to join his other brother, the Orthodox priest Tijón Hnatiuk, who was already in the red-coloured land working with the local community.

Tijón, who would be a key supporting actor in the story, had arrived in Misiones on 30 August 1908 from Kyiv.

The priest returned to Ukraine when the First World War broke out, until 1923, when he rejoined his brother almost 10 years later. It was that trip which gave origins to the tea because Tijón brought with him tea seeds from Crimea, another territory already coveted by the Russians at that time, which Vladimir Putin annexed again in 2014.

In 1937, the Ministry of Agriculture extended recognition to Wladimiro Hnatiuk, noting that the tea had the appropriate organoleptic characteristics. Minister Miguel Cárcano later sent him a Diploma of Honour recognizing Hnatiuk’s accomplishment of bringing tea to Argentina. “The

seedlings were already 15 years old and no fewer than 10 consecutive harvests had transpired,” says Vedoya Recio.

Argentine tea today

Like yerba mate, Argentine tea is produced only in Misiones and the adjacent province of Corrientes. And also akin to the so-called “green gold,” it is on the red land where the vast majority of tea is produced: 95 percent of the *Camellia sinensis*.

The great majority is exported to more than 40 countries and the main market is the United States. Argentine tea exports to that northern country, which consumes it as a cold drink, are even larger than those of China.

According to data from the Misiones Ministry of Agriculture, during 2021, 72,703 tons of black tea and 2,415 tons of green tea were exported. Misiones has been strongly developing certified organic tea and is seeking to add more to its shipments, in which low-priced products predominate for now.

When tea exports are talked about, the following four big firms are mentioned: Don Basilio, Urrutia, Casa Fuentes/Finlays, and El Vasco. Yet there are also more than 20 tea companies of various sizes dedicated to export. Exports reached their maximum volume in 2014 with a value of 110 million dollars. Since then, this sector has stagnated.

Today, it is going through the difficulties of the exchange rate delay, with no possibility of being able to direct the bulk of the production to the domestic market.

3. Australia. “ACT Rejects Ukrainian Outcry over Russian Performers,” *Australian*, 19 February 2023.

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By Dennis Shanahan

The ACT Labor government has rebuffed Ukrainian community and diplomatic appeals to limit Russian cultural appearances at Canberra’s popular multicultural festival on the weekend of the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia, Vasyl Myroshnychenko, appealed to the ACT government before the multicultural festival began not to allow Russian “weaponisation of culture” at the three-day event.

The ambassador appealed to the ACT’s Minister for Multicultural Affairs, Tara Cheyne, to restrict the Russian presence at the festival after Ukraine community members complained that Russian performers were being given three times the performance time of Ukraine performers and were going to sing Ukrainian songs.

Last week South Australian Premier Peter Malinauskas said he would boycott the Adelaide Writers' Week because a pro-Putin author had been asked to give a presentation.

Mr Myroshnychenko told The Australian he made representations to the ACT government because "now is not the time" to celebrate Russian culture when the Putin regime is destroying Ukrainian cultural and religious centres and churches.

"The Russians use culture as a weapon," he said.

Ms Cheyne told the ambassador and Ukrainian community members that the multicultural festival was "apolitical", adding: "The Russian embassy is not participating in the festival, and nor is any group affiliated with the Russian government.

"The National Multicultural Festival is an event which promotes cultural inclusion. It is an apolitical event that is welcoming for all. In this spirit, the festival accepted representations from both the Ukrainian and Russian communities to participate in the festival."

But Ms Cheyne said the ACT government had noted the objections of the Ukrainian community that the Russians intended singing songs from Ukraine and had asked them to remove the songs.

"In addition, the ACT government has arranged additional security around the stage where the Ukrainian community is performing, along with additional ACT government staff," she told the ambassador.

"To demonstrate our support for the Ukrainian community, the two Ukrainian performance groups will be leading the festival parade.

"I trust this information is useful and hope that the Ukrainian community in Canberra can enjoy this iconic celebration of Australia's multiculturalism."

4. Canada. "New Ukrainian-Canadian Association Formed in Yukon, *Yukon News*, 19 January 2023.

By PATRICK EGWU

A new group, the Ukrainian-Canadian Association of the Yukon (UCAY), has been formed in Whitehorse.

The group held its first founding meeting on Jan. 12 to become an operating non-profit society in the Yukon, according to Jeff Sloychuk, president of the association.

Former premier Tony Penikett currently serves as the acting chair of the association. During the founding meeting, nine directors were elected with five executive officers selected to lead the association.

Sloychuk says UCAY has three objectives of “supporting Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion, providing relief support to those in Ukraine fighting the invasion and raising awareness of Ukrainian culture, food and people.”

The immediate goal of the group is to deliver the relief supplies that have been donated by Yukoners since the fall of 2022, Sloychuk says.

The Yukon hosts a small but growing Ukrainian community of about 100, Sloychuk says. More than 40 Ukrainians have arrived since March 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine. A direct flight between Whitehorse and Frankfurt over the summer made it easier for Ukrainians fleeing the war to arrive in the territory.

Sloychuk says new arrivals have been supported by volunteers helping to secure accommodation, food vouchers, basic translation services and work opportunities.

The new association, which has been operating informally since the invasion, now seeks to collaborate with other Ukrainian groups and communities across Canada to support victims of the war.

“Our local Ukrainian community and our allies have been doing the support work since the latest invasion began,” he said. “This new society allows us to formalize our processes and procedures and expand our organizing efforts, both locally and globally, to an even greater capacity than before.”

On Jan. 23, Sloychuk and members of his team will be flying from Whitehorse to Ukraine to deliver donated supplies. Some of the supplies include warm clothes, underwear, radio sets, blankets, laptops, iPhones, android devices and tablets.

But with winter arriving in Ukraine and Russian missile strikes targeting Ukraine’s power grid and leaving millions in darkness, Sloychuk says more needs to be done.

“We are still collecting donations through Whitehorse Firefighters Charity,” he said. “We need power storage units to help Ukrainian families light up their homes and keep warm during the freezing cold winter.”

Sloychuk said Yukoners can continue to donate through the Whitehorse Firefighters Charity.

5. Canada. “Ukrainian Scholars Find New Community at UM,” *News.umanitoba.ca*, 30 November 2022.

Welcome event provides opportunity to connect with Ukrainian scholars

NOVEMBER 30, 2022—In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, the University of Manitoba committed \$1,755,000 to support scholars and students from Ukraine to come to Manitoba and continue their work or studies that have been disrupted by the war.

This week, the Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies is hosting a welcome event for the Ukrainian scholars within the Faculty of Arts, Faculty of Science, Faculty of Law, Max Rady College of Medicine and other units.

Scholar Olga Khamedova, whose research explores the Ukrainian Press of Canada through gender optics, arrived in Canada with her daughter this past August.

Formerly an Associate Professor of the Department of Journalism and New Media at Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University in Ukraine, Khamedova's life, like that of many Ukrainians, has been forever changed by the war.

Living in constant fear since the invasion began, Khamedova often spent nights huddled in bomb shelters for her and her daughter's safety before being forced to flee to the west of Ukraine. Not knowing what to do next, she searched online and learned about the Canadian government's CUAET program, which has helped many Ukrainians who are seeking safety in Canada.

As she continued her search, Khamedova came across the University of Manitoba's Scholars at Risk program, where she found a place that could not only provide her family with safety, but also a supportive community and an opportunity to expand her research.

"It was a lot of stress, but we were met by volunteers at the Winnipeg airport and immediately felt the support of Manitoba," Khamedova says. "The support of newly arrived Ukrainians by the Congress of Ukrainians of Canada was unprecedented. I am touched by the help that the government of Manitoba provides to Ukrainians."

Through the University of Manitoba's Scholars at Risk program, each Ukrainian scholar will be funded for one-year of teaching or research up to \$50,000 a year. In addition to 20 scholars, the UM waived all application fees for international students who are Ukrainian citizens and provided wrap-around supports for students.

After reaching out to see whether she qualified to come to Manitoba, she said she was encouraged by the attention and support she received from those working at UM who helped her with her transition.

An instructor in the history of Ukrainian journalism, Khamedova says she is immensely grateful and excited to explore all Ukrainian history that Winnipeg has to offer.

"I realized that Winnipeg has always been the center of the Ukrainian diaspora and the Ukrainian press in exile," says Khamedova. "I once dreamed of working here in the archives."

"Thanks to the Ukrainian Scholars program, I have the opportunity to work with the unique collections of periodicals of Canadian Ukrainians, which are stored in Winnipeg libraries," Khamedova says. "Now I can better study the history of Ukrainian emigration to Canada."

Students, faculty and staff are encouraged to attend the welcome event to meet the scholars and welcome them to the UM community.

The Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies is hoping the event will stimulate collaboration between academia and community and encourage interdisciplinary research, says Yuliia Ivaniuk, coordinator at the Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies. CUCS, which is located in the Faculty of Arts, is excited to share more information about the Centre, their offerings and to serve as a resource for scholars in these difficult times.

“This event is an opportunity not only to exchange professional experience and join in scientific cooperation, but as the war in Ukraine rages on, it is, without exaggeration, a chance for a new life for me and my daughter,” says Khamedova.

Scholars from Ukraine Welcome Event

Thursday, December 1, 2022

6:00 pm - 8:00 pm

St. Andrew's College Cafeteria

About the Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies

The Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies' mission is to create, preserve and communicate knowledge related to Ukrainian Canadiana. They offer a Bachelor of Arts degree program as well as interdisciplinary courses in Ukrainian Canadian Heritage Studies, coordinate research, serve as a resource centre for those interested in Ukrainian Canadiana, and work to enhance collaboration between UM and the community. They have recently launched a new Letter of Participation program in Ukrainian Canadian Heritage Studies which includes monthly lecture series and bimonthly book club meetings that are available to anyone who is interested in knowledge of the area.

UM Today Staff

6. Costa Rica. “Costa Rica’s Ukrainian Community Helps Orphanage with Benefit Concert,” *Tico Times*, 10 January 2023.

By Bruce Callow

Last November 5 a benefit concert for Ukraine took place in Calgary, Alberta and communities from several countries including Costa Rica, Poland and Japan rallied to the cause by purchasing tickets on Eventbrite and watching the live stream on Youtube.

St. David's United Church hosted the concert which featured an all star lineup of Ukrainian musical talent including the legendary Ihor Bohdan, and raised \$14,677 Canadian (\$11,000 USD).

An important organizational assist for the concert came from Costa Rica's Ukrainian community. The Tico Ukrainians promoted the concert through ticket purchases, organizing watch parties and contributing a colorfully inspiring greeting video which was screened at the concert.

The first project delivered using the benefit concert proceeds was the purchase of a 14-kilowatt diesel generator for the Lviv State Orphanage which houses 178 kids.

The logistics involved in the purchase and delivery of the generator were administered by Dennis Scraba and Canadian NGO Amigo Relief Missions. The NGO operates with volunteers, allowing all funds from the benefit concert to be spent directly on projects. Dennis Scraba commented:

“We would like to thank everyone involved in the November 5 benefit concert for providing these needed funds as the orphanage was really struggling to keep the building heated.”

One of the Costa Rica organizers, Liudmila Kikisch Martiniuk, is from Lviv. I asked her what the purchase of the generator means for the orphanage this winter.

“When Putin and the Russians are bombing energy infrastructure critical to human survival it means LIFE, (heat, light, water, basic services, food, refrigeration, the possibility of all the important basic activities for human beings, as well as increased communication.

This in turn provides emotional solidarity that supports the ability to resist, survive and WIN. This contributes to the VICTORY of an indomitable and glorious people.”

What follows is a short interview with Tetiana Khomin[i]ch of the Ukrainian Association in Costa Rica.

Can you please introduce yourself and tell us about your involvement with the Ukrainian community in Costa Rica?

My name is Tetiana Khominich, I was born in Kiev, Ukraine but for the past 15 years I have been living between the USA and Costa Rica. I am one of the founding members of the first Ukrainian Association in Central America called Cultural Diplomacy Ukrainians in Costa Rica.

How many Ukrainians currently live in Costa Rica?

I would say between 300 to 400 people from different regions of Ukraine. Interesting fact, that despite living in Costa Rica for many years, we all met and got to know each other only last year after Russia's unprecedented attack on Ukraine in February 2022. It was a year of great sadness for us, but also solidarity and compassion.

Please tell us about the activities of the Ukrainian Association in Costa Rica?

As you can tell from the name of our non profit association “Cultural Diplomacy”, our main purpose is to promote and bring about awareness of the history, culture, traditions and arts of Ukraine, as well as finding ways to help our far away homeland through collecting donations. All donations go to orphans in Ukraine.

I am proud to say that we organized a very successful Ukrainian Independence Day in Museo Calderon Guardia, then we held the First Ukrainian Film Festival in San Jose, as well as a night of Ukrainian Arts in Barrio Amon. There are more interesting events planned, please stay tuned.

Please tell us about the Costa Rica Ukrainian Association's recent involvement in the benefit concert for Ukraine that took place in Calgary last November.

We were very honored to contribute to such a beautiful concert of our colleagues in Calgary, Canada. We purchased tickets as a group, and some of us gathered and watched the show together. It was a great cause to help our country, and we are proud to be a part of it!

For more information about the Ukrainian Association in Costa Rica contact: (506) 8756-0770

7. Estonia. “Tax Authority: 32,000 Ukrainians Were in Employment in Estonia in 2022,” *Baltic Daily - Political/Social News*, 9 February 2023.

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TALLINN, Feb 09, BNS – Approximately 32,000 citizens of Ukraine were in employment in Estonia last year and the taxable income earned by them totaled 363 million euros, the Estonian Tax and Customs Board said at a press conference on Thursday.

Around 24,000 of these Ukrainian citizens are Estonian residents, while others have not yet applied for tax residency, Annika Oja, head of natural person services at the Tax and Customs Board, said.

She said the main focus of the Tax and Customs Board in handling tax returns for 2022 are investments, sale of real estate, platform economy, as well as Ukrainians in Estonia and donations, including donations made in support of Ukraine.

The tax authority expects that many people will want to declare donations made in support of Ukraine in 2022.

“It is important to point out here that, in general, data about donations is all pre-filled, that is, the organizations to which the donations were made have sent data about the donor to the Tax and Customs Board, and we can pre-fill it on the person’s income tax return,” the official said.

Donations made by phone are a concern, however, because the donor’s personal identification code is usually not asked when such donations are made. Therefore, those who have made donations must enter this data in their tax return themselves.

If a person has received income as a result of providing a service through a platform and income tax on said income has not been withheld, the income must also be declared and income tax must be paid.

In 2022, the Tax and Customs Board has worked intensively with the administrators of various platforms, primarily explaining the compliance requirement, Oja said. At the beginning of 2024, platforms will be obliged to provide data on the recipients of income on their platform in 2023, which will finally give the Tax and Customs Board an overview of income earners in the platform economy in Estonia.

The submission of income tax returns for 2022 begins on Feb. 15 and the deadline for submission is May 2. The first refunds of overpaid income tax will be made on Feb. 28.

A total of 753,000 people in Estonia submitted income tax returns for 2021, 96.5 percent of them electronically. Altogether 212 million euros of overpaid income tax was refunded and 106 million euros was subject to payment as unpaid tax.

8. Italy. “Italy’s La Scala Opens Season to Ukrainian Protests,” ABC News, 7 December 2022.

Italy’s premier opera house has opened its new season with the Russian opera “Boris Godunov.”

By COLLEEN BARRY, Associated Press

MILAN -- Italy’s most treasured opera house, Teatro alla Scala, opened its new season Wednesday with the Russian opera “Boris Godunov,” against the backdrop of Ukrainian protests that the cultural event is a propaganda win for the Kremlin during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni, in her first cultural outing since taking office, attended La Scala’s gala premiere in Milan, joining Italian President Sergio Mattarella and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in the royal box.

A group of about 30 Ukrainians gathered outside the theater to protest highlighting Russian culture while President Vladimir Putin wages a war rooted in the denial of a unique Ukrainian culture.

They were kept across the main piazza, far from any interaction with arriving dignitaries and officials, and politics did not enter the theater.

The crowd of mostly prominent figures from Italian business, culture and politics showered the production with 13 minutes of applause. The loudest praise was reserved for Russian bass Ildar Abdrazakov in the title role along with a cascade of flowers for chief conductor Riccardo Chailly.

Asked about Ukrainians’ objection to putting a spotlight on Russian culture as war rages in its tenth month, von der Leyen praised Ukrainians as “fantastic, brave and courageous people,” but said that Russian culture should not be conflated with Putin.

“We should not allow Putin to destroy all this,” von der Leyen said, referring to great Russian writers and composers, including Modest Petrovic Musorgsky, author of “Boris Godunov.” She added: “Full solidarity with our friends in Ukraine, and let’s make sure that we stand together.”

Meloni, who has maintained Italy’s support for Ukraine in defending itself against Russian aggression, also sought to draw a line between culture and politics.

“We don’t have anything against the Russian people, Russian history, Russian culture,” Meloni said. “We have something against those who have made the political choice to invade a sovereign country.”

A letter of protest from Ukraine's consul in Milan and a petition by the Ukrainian diaspora failed to persuade the theater to drop "Boris Godunov." La Scala officials say Chailly chose the opera as the 2022-23 season opener three years ago at Abdrazakov's suggestion, and it was too late to substitute the production.

Abdrazakov was heralded for his sixth La Scala season premiere performance, the first in his native language, leading a mostly Russian cast along with La Scala's chorus.

"I have sung here in Italian, in French, once in Italian, but in Russian, it is another thing entirely. And then, this opera, I adore it very much," Abdrazakov said backstage.

Danish director Kasper Holten's said he sought to emphasize the opera's message about "the cynicism of power," which he said remains relevant more than 150 years after it was written. In Holten's staging, Godunov is haunted by the bloody presence of the child prince he killed to become czar, and then has to confront bloody depictions of his own cherished children, foreshadowing their own fate.

"This is sadly a reminder to us that wherever there's a lust for power, it's also the language of blood," Holten said backstage.

La Scala management have insisted that "Boris Godonov" was not propaganda for Putin. Still, Russian media widely reported on the production, focusing on officials' dismissals of the Ukrainian protests. Russian state TV was also on hand for opening night.

In the piazza, Ukrainian protest organizers were unpersuaded by the attempt to keep politics out of culture.

"I don't know why Italians tend to think Russian culture does not have anything to do with Russian government or the Russian people. It is all intertwined with the medieval mentality that created Putin," said Valeriya Kalchenko, a native of the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv and long-time Milan resident who organized a protest.

She noted that the Polish National Opera in Warsaw canceled its scheduled April performances of the same opera just days after Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, citing the suffering of the Ukrainian people. It said it would consider staging the opera in peacetime.

"They could have reacted in the same way, because La Scala at the beginning of the war had nine months to substitute the opera with an Italian opera. There is no shortage of them; it is an Italian art form," Kalchenko said.

Other Ukrainian organizations, including a youth association, decided against physically joining the protest despite objections to the Russian production. Instead, they gathered silently, holding sheet music written by a Ukrainian composer.

Zoia Stankovska said that "muting" Russian culture during the war "would be a gesture, a sign of solidarity, with Ukrainians, and a clear message as long as the aggression is ongoing."

La Scala management has emphasized its support of Ukraine, including a benefit concert that raised 400,000 euros (\$421,000). La Scala was also the first theater in the West to cut off relations with Russian conductor Valery Gergiev, who was engaged at the Milan theater when the war broke out, after he failed to express a desire for a peaceful solution.

The gala season opener, which is held on the Dec. 7 holiday for Milan's patron St. Ambrose, is one of the top events on the European cultural calendar, and often attracts protests aimed at grabbing the attention of Italian movers and shakers in attendance.

In that tradition, climate protesters early Wednesday threw paint on the opera house's columns to promote more urgent actions to curb climate change. The paint was quickly removed. And union protesters set up near the Ukrainian protest, adding "no war" to their manifold slogans.

[<https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/wireStory/italys-la-scala-opens-season-ukrainian-protests-94680140>]

9. Poland. "Tide of Ukrainian Refugees Transforms Polish Society," *Intellinews.com*, 4 January 2023.

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By Wojciech Kosciuszko in Warsaw

Nearly immediately after Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine on February 24 last year, there was a forced exodus across Poland's 535-kilometre long border on a scale not seen since World War Two.

To date, nearly 8.1mn Ukrainians have crossed into Poland – the main refugee exit route – according to the Polish Border Guard's daily reports. Almost 6.2mn have since crossed back. Of the remaining 1.9mn, some have moved on elsewhere in the European Union, but Poland estimates that more than one million have made Poland their more or less permanent home, attracted by existing Ukrainian communities in the country and linguistic affinities between Ukrainian and Polish.

These migrants have been encouraged to stay the winter by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelinskiy, as constant Russian bombardments of infrastructure make life in the country increasingly difficult.

This influx should be compared with 7.8mn registered refugees across the whole of Europe, including 4.5mn in the EU. Poland has received by far the largest number in total in the EU, although Czechia has received more in relation to its normal population.

Such an influx over just a few months – the bulk of the arrivals came in the first weeks and months of the war – have had a profound impact on Poland's society and economy.

Poland predicts that by the end of 2022, it will have spent PLN18bn (€3.83bn) to help Ukrainian refugees, including welfare payouts, organising education for Ukrainian children, or providing refugees with health care – all that and more on a par with what Poles receive.

Poles have, in fact, spent much more helping refugees, as hundreds of thousands – if not millions – rolled out privately-funded relief efforts, ranging from one-off donations of money and essentials to long-time renting out of apartments or rooms in their own homes.

Ukrainians are not just receivers, however. Over one million new consumers have helped prop up retail sales, which have declined as inflation ate away household incomes.

While the average Polish consumer cut spending because of the diminishing purchasing power of his or her income, Ukrainians kept on shopping.

Ukrainian spending on clothing, food and other essentials boosted Poland's retail sales figures in March and April, just after the invasion. For example, sales of textiles, clothing and shoes jumped 41.9% year on year in March before going up by 121.4% y/y in April, data from Poland's statistical office GUS show.

It took until October for inflation and the creeping economic slowdown to significantly affect spending, and refugees apparently still drove sales of textiles, clothing and footwear, as well as of pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.

Since the early months of the exodus, Ukrainians have moved on from just finding a refuge to seeking to earn a living, though as many refugees are mothers with young children they are often constrained in how much work they can do. Some 71% of the refugees are women and 47% are children under 18, according to the EBRD Transition Report.

A recent study carried out by the University of Lodz, covering the period between the outbreak of the war and the end of September, showed that half of refugees worked while 25% were seeking employment.

Ukrainians have therefore also become significant contributors to the tax system through social security payments.

Some are even active as small businesspeople, a recent report by ZPP, a business lobby, showed. Only until the end of September, Ukrainians in Poland started close to 10,000 businesses, the report said.

Most – over 1,100 – were hairdressers and beauty parlours, typically owned by women. But Ukrainians also set up software service companies as well as firms offering construction and renovation services.

With more sophistication in life comes more sophistication in using services, such as banking. Ukrainians' loans in Polish banks made up an estimated 0.8% of Polish banks' entire loan portfolio and are worth PLN6.34bn – four times the figure in 2018, BIK, a market analysis company, reported in late November (data includes Ukrainians who lived in Poland before the war).

Over three quarters of Ukrainian loans in Polish banks are housing loans, with 18% cash loans, BIK data also showed.

The influx of over one million more people could help alleviate Poland's problems with the tight labour market and – if they stay longer term – its low birth rates and ageing society.

According to the Transition Report, this refugee inflow could increase the EU's labour force by 0.5% by the end of 2022, twice the impact of the flow of migrants across the bloc's southern borders in 2015-6.

These refugees are also well educated. The University of Lodz study showed that as much as half of Ukrainian refugees have higher education.

“People who leave their counties are ‘positively self-selected’ as economists say,” EBRD Chief Economist Beata Javorcik told bne IntelliNews in November. “They are better educated, more entrepreneurial. They provide a benefit to their recipient countries.”

The Ukrainian influx has already improved the hitherto hostile Polish attitudes to refugees, which had attracted criticism during the 2015-16 wave from Syria. Positive attitudes have increased by 19 percentage points compared to 2021, according to an Ipsos poll in April and May quoted in the EBRD's Transition Report. The percentage of Poles supporting people's right to seek refuge in another country rose from 66% to 85%.

However, the pretty picture of a great mass of people settling in a friendly country after a brutal war forced them out of their homes is marred a little by research suggesting that Poles may be overwhelmingly in support of Ukraine but not necessarily like Ukrainian refugees next door. There are also fears that the Polish welcome to refugees may soon wear out.

“Ukrainians have become victims of dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic situation of Poles, fears related to the paralysis of the state and the low level of public services, rampant inflation and skyrocketing energy prices,” a report “Poles for Ukraine but against Ukrainians,” claimed after in-depth interviews with several dozen Poles and a representative poll of 1,000 people.

“Most of the respondents, and in some groups all of them, especially in the working class, believe that refugees are privileged, demanding and treated better than Poles,” the authors of the report, sociologists Przemyslaw Sadura and Slawomir Sierakowski wrote.

“There is concern about the loss of priority in access to benefits and public services like health, education, or care) ... Refugees are accused of pushing in and getting what the patiently waiting Poles can only dream of: a place in a nursery or kindergarten, a visit to a specialist, an upcoming surgery appointment.”

10. Russia. “‘It’s Not Safe to Admit You’re Ukrainian’: How Putin’s Domestic War on Ukrainian Culture Began Years Before the 2022 Invasion,” *Meduza*, 25 January 2023.

Report by Sonya Savina from iStories. Abridged translation by Sam Breazeale.

Data from Russia's 2021 census showed a record decrease in the country's Ukrainian population: according to the survey, the number of Ukrainians living in Russia dropped by half between 2010 and 2021. And while experts have cast doubt on the census's accuracy, the same pattern has been found by multiple other surveys, demographers, and Ukrainian diaspora members themselves. The reasons might seem obvious — Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014 — but Ukrainian activists in Russia say the decline is part of a story that goes back decades. The independent outlet iStories dug into how Vladimir Putin's efforts to stamp out Ukrainian identity in Russia began long before his full-scale war. In English, Meduza summarizes what they learned.

A record decline

Ukrainians have historically been one of the most highly represented nationalities in Russia: just a decade ago, they were the third largest group (about two million people), after ethnic Russians and Tatars, according to census data. By 2021, however, they'd fallen to the eighth spot (about 884,000 people).

While Russia's Ukrainian population has been gradually shrinking for decades, this sudden decline of more than half was unprecedented. Other data sources show the same pattern: according to the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey conducted by Moscow's Higher School of Economics, while Ukrainians made up almost 2 percent of Russia's population in the 2000s, they made up less than 1 percent in 2021.

Demographer Alexey Raksha believes the most likely reason for the apparent decline in Russia's Ukrainian population is that Ukrainians, especially young ones, tend to start self-identifying as Russians sooner after moving to Russia than people of other ethnicities do. It may also be the case that Ukrainians are leaving Russia faster than they're immigrating there, Raksha said, though reliable data here are scarce.

According to members of Russia's Ukrainian diaspora, the shift hasn't been a natural process, regardless of whether the decrease is due to emigration or a change in how people self-identify. They say the Russian authorities have been working to reduce the country's Ukrainian population for years, namely by discouraging expressions of Ukrainian identity and shutting down organizations that represent Ukrainians' interests in Russia.

'There was this euphoria. And then a switch flipped.'

"It's become uncomfortable to be an ethnic Ukrainian in Russia," said Viktor Girzhov, the former deputy chairman of the Association of Ukrainians in Russia. Though Girzhov lived in Russia for more than 20 years, in 2015, the Russian FSB banned him from entering the country for five years. The official reason was that he violated border-crossing procedures, but Girzhov believes the real reason was that he told the truth about Russia's actions in Ukraine on Russian television.

In Girzhov's view, the rapid decrease in Russia's Ukrainian population is largely a result of Russian state policies intended to purge all things Ukrainian. He says this began in 2004, when Ukrainians launched the Orange Revolution in opposition to Putin-backed presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich, and some Ukrainian organizations in Russia openly supported the uprising.

"After the collapse of the [Soviet] Union, Ukrainian organizations started popping up like mushrooms after a rainstorm. There was this euphoria, this feeling that under Gorbachev, under Yeltsin, we would have some freedoms," Girzhov told iStories. "And then a switch flipped, and it all started to fall apart. That was under Putin."

In 2010 and 2012, Girzhov recalls, two Ukrainian diaspora organizations that aimed to preserve and share Ukrainian culture in Russia were shut down. Then, in 2018, the Russian authorities closed the Moscow Library of Ukrainian Literature, claiming the director had "distributed extremist materials." The following year, the largest association of Ukrainians outside of Ukraine, the Ukrainian World Congress, was banned as an "undesirable organization" in Russia.

By the mid-2000s, says Girzhov, it was effectively impossible to study the Ukrainian language in Russia:

"In Ukraine [at that time], there were very many schools where Russian was taught. But in Russia, there wasn't a single school, not even a single Ukrainian class, for the two-million-person Ukrainian diaspora. In Russia, there are no places where you can speak Ukrainian; there are neither schools nor libraries [of Ukrainian literature]."

Girzhov and some other diaspora members tried to open Moscow's first Ukrainian school, but the Russian authorities "continually made unrealistic demands, and [the project] petered out." Today, according to Russia's 2021 census, only 33 percent of ethnic Ukrainians living in Russia speak Ukrainian.

And while, on paper, there are still some organizations that support Ukrainian culture in Russia, Girzhov said they exist solely to promote what he calls "Ukrainian fakelore": "They're funded by the [Russian] state and by presidential grants. [...] These organizations participate in city events and festivals, people dance and sing, but there's no politics, no social activism, no rights for Ukrainians. The Russian government creates these caricatures of Ukrainians. But as soon as you start to support Ukraine — not even the Maidan [Revolution], just independence, culture, language — it's over."

According to Girzhov, the official decline in Russia's Ukrainian population might be the result of ethnic Ukrainians in Russia self-identifying as Russians in official surveys:

"People are afraid because it's not safe to admit that you're Ukrainian right now. For example, the [Federal Security Service] has questioned people who appeared on the Library of Ukrainian Literature's list of readers. Older people are worried about their children and grandchildren. Younger people are worried about losing their jobs. Everybody who could leave left before the war. Now it's difficult, because until the war ends, everybody who's left is trying not to emphasize their 'Ukrainianness.'"

‘Why don’t you sing in Russian?’

Valery Semenenko moved from Ukraine to Moscow for graduate school in 1978, and he ended up settling down there. He’s one of the founders of the Association of Ukrainians in Russia, and he served as the organization’s co-chair until 2012, when the authorities shut it down:

“At first, in the late 2000s and the 2010s, we would write letters, appeals to Putin: we called for mutual understanding [between Russia and Ukrainian]. [...] They shut us down for that: after the Orange Revolution, the Russian authorities got nervous. And two months after closing us, they created a puppet federal organization of Ukrainians whose representatives now say on TV that [Ukrainians] are Russians.”

Semenenko has since gone “underground”: he now leads an unregistered organization for Russia’s Ukrainian diaspora. “We know Russia’s laws: we can only write about the pain and suffering of Ukrainians. As far as military activities, let alone discussing the [Russian] army, that’s off the table.”

And politics isn’t the only realm that scares the Russian authorities:

“We can’t even sing. In the fall of 2022, there was an annual concert in St. Petersburg. Each group — Kalmyks, Chuvash, [etc.] — performs one song. They invited Ukrainians as well. Then they thought better of it: ‘Actually, how about you sing in Russian?’ But [the Ukrainians] insisted: ‘Either we sing in Ukrainian, or we don’t sing at all.’”

Semenenko said he has little confidence in the 2021 census data, especially since he never received a survey. Still, he has no doubt Russia’s Ukrainian population is indeed shrinking.

“If the Russian state is still in one piece [after the war], and if all of these patterns continue, the number of Ukrainians here will fall to zero,” he said. Even he wants to leave, he adds: “But I have ties here: my home, my family. My wife is a native Muscovite. Where is she supposed to go? We should have left sooner. At least my children can go.”

‘Mom, I’m not going to fascist Russia’

Anna (whose name iStories changed at her request) is from the Ukrainian city of Chernihiv but has been living in Russia for more than two decades. She currently leads an organization for Ukrainian women living in Russia. Every time air raid sirens sound in Chernihiv, she told iStories, she “hears” it from her home outside Moscow. She says she keeps the notifications activated on her cell phone because her daughter still lives in the city.

When the February 2022 invasion began, Anna tried to convince her daughter to move to Russia. “I told her, ‘Come here.’ And she responded, ‘No, Mom, I’m not going to fascist Russia,’” she said.

According to Anna, things were “booming” for the Ukrainian community when she first moved to Russia in 2000; she and other diaspora leaders even met with government officials to discuss opening a Ukrainian school:

“It seemed to us that Russia was so big, there was so much to be done, so much to create; our countries could communicate, there could be student exchanges, artist exchanges. We thought that’s how the future would be, but things turned out completely differently. The Ukrainian diaspora is in such a sorry state now. If you say what local authorities tell you to say, then of course they’ll support you. But I don’t know how you can say things that aren’t true.”

Since the war began, some of Anna’s acquaintances in Ukraine have cut off contact with her simply because she lives in Russia. “But what can I do here alone?” she said. “Recently, some caring people left flowers at the monument to [Ukrainian writer] Lesya Ukrainka [in Moscow], and all of them were arrested. Now, there will probably be police stationed at all of the Ukrainian monuments.”

It’s difficult to live in Russia knowing Russians support the war in such large numbers, Anna reflected. “When you start talking about what’s happening [in Ukraine], you see the aggression; people’s eyes fill up with blood, they’re ready to devour you,” she says. “But there are some [Russians] who are just sympathetic, and they come up to me and say, ‘Tell us the truth, because, outside of what we see on TV, we don’t see anything. We don’t know anything.’”

Like Valery Semenenko, Anna doesn’t believe any Ukrainians will stay in Russia after the war ends. “I know a lot of people who are waiting for the end of the war to leave Russia, because it’s impossible to live here knowing what [Russia] did [in Ukraine]. My daughter is in Chernihiv; how could I keep living here in peace?” she says, worrying that it could even become unsafe to remain in Russia:

“I lived there for 40 years, worked in a school; my students are there, my classmates, my relatives, and my parents’ graves. The ‘liberators’ came and destroyed everything; 70 percent of Chernihiv is gone. How else am I supposed to view that? Morally, I just can’t live here. For now, it’s just ‘morally’ impossible; later, it might reach the point of physical massacres [of Ukrainians in Russia]. I wouldn’t rule it out.”

11. Russia. “The Kuban: A Real ‘Wedge’ between Russia and Ukraine,” *Jamestown.org*, 24 January 2023.

The Kuban: A Real ‘Wedge’ Between Russia and Ukraine
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 14

By Paul Goble

Moscow is increasingly concerned about Kyiv’s increased attention not only to the non-Russian republics and regions within the current borders of the Russian Federation but also, and particularly, to parts of the country that have, or at least had, significant ethnic Ukrainian populations (see EDM, July 28, 2022). The last of these regions—and there are perhaps a dozen—are known in Ukrainian parlance as “wedges,” and any mention of them is enough to

outrage Russian leaders who have arrogated to themselves the exclusive right to determine borders and identities within the post-Soviet space (see EDM, January 18). Of them, the “green” wedge in the Russian Far East, historically, has attracted the most attention. Yet, the “crimson” one in the Kuban, a region that includes Krasnodar Krai and parts of Stavropol Krai and is situated between Ukraine and the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus, represents the most immediate explosive case.

The Kuban’s history is complicated, reflecting both general trends in Russian history and the specific features of the region. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, the national republics and the accompanying ethnic self-identification were not opposed by the government, and after 1917, when republic borders were established, they were frequently shifted to meet the needs of the Soviet state rather than the desires or characteristics of the population (Window on Eurasia, May 21, 2021). This means that neither the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) nor the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic existed and that ethnic identities competed with other identifications, including social strata of the kind the Russian authorities always pinned on the Cossacks. The Kuban was thus not part of either Russia or Ukraine and became part of the RSFSR only in 1924 after a period of indeterminate status, during which some of its people sought independence and others union with Ukraine (Russian7.ru; Russia-ukraine.com, accessed January 23).

Equally, identities were fluid with some of the people in the Kuban, having a long tradition of identifying as Ukrainians (Babel.ua, February 16, 2022; Apn.ru, September 30, 2022). And others have assumed that identity for tactical reasons—as when many of the Cossacks there reidentified as Ukrainians (significantly, not as Russians) so as not to be subject to the Soviet fratricide against them (Russian7.ru, accessed January 23). These two situations meant that, by 1926, more than 60 percent of the Kuban’s population was ethnic Ukrainians, a figure that declined to less than 5 percent in 1939 due to Stalinist actions, including both the Holodomor (“Terror Famine”) and forcible re-identification (Postivka.com, December 31, 2019). The large number of Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers there in the 1920s pushed Moscow to retain Ukrainian as an official language in the Kuban until 1932.

In Soviet times, any public discussion of the Ukrainian wedges was prohibited. But with glasnost and the re-emergence of a Ukrainian state, it became an increasingly hot issue. Kyiv commentators and politicians spoke more frequently on the need for Ukraine to support the wedges, including the one in the Kuban. Russians, up to and including President Vladimir Putin, countered with an insistence that Ukrainians had no right to do so because these were Russian areas now and forever.

As relations between Kyiv and Moscow deteriorated, such exchanges became ever-more heated. In 2013, for example, Ukrainian activists explicitly called for reuniting the Kuban with Ukraine (Window on Eurasia, September 1, 2013); these calls increased in frequency and volume following Putin’s Anschluss of Crimea in 2014. In response, ever-more Moscow commentators and officials denounced the idea, which ironically only attracted more attention to the issue (Window on Eurasia, September 15, 2014).

Between 2014 and Putin's expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the issue continued to mushroom, with ever-more Ukrainians supporting the region's inclusion in Ukraine; ever-more Kuban residents backing that idea or even complete independence; and ever-more Russians expressing outrage about either possibility. The situation gained new prominence in 2020 when a group of Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) deputies formed a group calling for the return of the Kuban to Ukraine under the slogan "Kuban is Ukraine" (Nvo.ng.ru, March 27, 2020; Glavcom.ua, December 9, 2022). Their actions caused Russian commentators to respond with articles explaining "why Kuban is not Ukraine" (Apn.ru, September 30, 2022).

Since the invasion, however, Ukrainian talk about recovering the Kuban has only intensified, with ever-more deputies, and even some senior officials, calling for that. Perhaps most scandalously from Moscow's point of view, Kirill Budanov, who heads Ukraine's intelligence operations, now has a map on the wall behind his desk that shows Kuban as part of Ukraine—and the rest of what is now the Russian Federation divided up into smaller states (Ura.news, December 26, 2022). The display of such a map by a Ukrainian official would have been unthinkable a year ago, but now it is a reflection of resentment against Russia for invading Ukraine and a widespread view that Moscow, by questioning the legitimacy of the borders of other countries, has opened the door for discussions on the legitimacy of its own.

As for the people of the Kuban, some are indeed thinking about independence, but many favor becoming part of Ukraine, according to Dmitry Dorovskikh, an activist of the Crimson Wedge Group. He says that Kubantsy, a regional group most Russians deny exists, up until recently, had hoped for autonomy and thus did not think about other alternatives (Apn.ru, February 9, 2015). But Russia's invasion of Ukraine has changed that (Apostrophe, November 8, 2022). At the same time, although the Crimson Wedge activist does not mention this, many people in the Kuban have shown interest in the revival of a Cossack state, Cossackia (see EDM, February 21, 2019).

Putin, of course, is unalterably opposed to all of this. He believes that Russia gave land to Ukraine rather than, as history shows, Russia took land that should have been part of Ukraine from the beginning. But as ever-more people are concluding, what Putin wants may not determine what happens next. As a result, the Kuban may soon pass from being an object of history to a subject of its own and go its own way, either toward independence or alternatively become part of a larger Cossack state or Ukraine itself, any of which would make it truly "a wedge"—not only between Ukraine and Russia but also between the past and the future.

12. South Africa. "Ukrainians in South Africa Protest Russian Battleship," *Voice of America*, 15 February 2023.

By Vicky Stark

A group of Ukrainian protesters have sailed a yacht close to a Russian warship docked in Cape Town ahead of South Africa-hosted wargames with the Russian and Chinese navies. Critics say South Africa's hosting of Russian warships for drills at the one-year anniversary of its ongoing invasion of Ukraine pokes holes in its claim to neutrality.

Military men in uniform stood on the deck of Russia's Admiral Gorshkov frigate Tuesday and watched protesters aboard a yacht, which bore the Ukrainian flag.

Fearless, the group of eight, mostly women, shouted and held signs reading Stop the War.

The Russian news agency Tass quoted an unnamed official saying the hypersonic Zircon missiles carried by the Admiral Gorshkov will be test-fired during the drills.

Because of their speed, the missiles cannot be detected by existing missile defense systems.

The South African National Defense Force did not reply to requests to confirm the test firing.

Protester Dzvinka Kuchar of the Ukrainian Association of South Africa says human rights activists and environmentalists are begging the South African government to stop the war games.

"Russian state media which is fully controlled by Russian government has already said that they are planning to fire Zircon missiles during those trainings (sic)," said Kuchar. "We understand that this is pure propaganda to take attention away from what Russia is doing in Ukraine. And what Russia is doing they're killing civilians, they're destroying hospitals, they're destroying the lives of millions of people."

Kuchar says South Africa, which has chosen to take a neutral stance in Russia's war on Ukraine and abstained on several United Nations resolutions condemning the onslaught, is simply being used by Vladimir Putin.

"I know South Africa says we are a sovereign country, and we can be friends with any country that we want. And this is true," said Kuchar. "But if you choose to be friends with a country that is running a war, it also sends a message about yourself. You can be friends but at least say to your friend that is causing gender-based violence 'Stop beating your wife.'"

The mayor of Cape Town, Geordin Hill-Lewis, who belongs to the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, replied to a tweet by the Russian Consulate in Cape Town and told the ship to "Voetsek." That is an impolite Afrikaans word that means go away.

He said the ship is not welcome and that the city would not be complicit in Russia's evil war.

Political analyst Daniel Silke, Director of the Political Futures consultancy, says if South Africa keeps making decisions to side with Russia, there could be consequences in terms of its global standing.

"I think South Africa is entering a mine field of attempting to find a balancing act here," said Silke. "But I do think that when it comes to assistance and aid from the United States perhaps from even some Western countries, I think there may well be a reluctance, there may well be a frowning on South Africa's stance on this particular issue."

The Admiral Gorshkov left Cape Town harbor Wednesday and is making its way to the site of the military drills off the coast of South Africa's KwaZulu Natal province.

The exercise is scheduled to take place from February 17 to 27.

This is the second naval exercise South Africa is carrying out with Russia and China - which are two of its four partners in the BRICS alliance. The first took place in 2019.

Several anti-war protests against the drills are planned.

13. United Kingdom. “The Ukrainian Community in Rochdale Has Hosted a Visit from St. Nicholas, Who Handed Gifts to Children,” *Rochdale Observer*, 24 December 2022.

More than 100 people from the borough’s Ukrainian community attended the event held at the Ukraine cultural centre on Mere Street.

The event was held on St Nicholas Day, December 19, the traditional day of present giving in Ukraine with Christmas celebrations beginning on January 6, according to the Julian calendar. A mixture of children born to Ukrainian heritage and refugee children who fled the war this year and received chocolates and teddy bears from St Nicholas.

Olga Kurtianyk, chair of the Rochdale branch of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (AUGB), said: “We had a Christmas party so the children had food, they played and parents mingled.

Every child went home with lots of gifts. It was very enjoyable and it was nice to see them all singing together and playing.

“It was a lovely atmosphere, very friendly and a bit loud at times but it is children so what can you expect!”

There was also a concert where some of the children from Ukraine recited a poem about St Nicholas coming to visit and wishing everyone well.

Before the event the centre also hosted a Christmas Fair which raised more than £700 to help the war effort in Ukraine, with £200 going to an orphanage in Sambir, Ukraine that the community has supported for the past 10 years and £500 going towards the Help Ukraine appeal.

Olga said: “The deputy minister of energy and the situation in Ukraine at the moment is dire with 40% of the electricity supply out of action because the power stations substations have been deliberately hit by Russian missiles.

“It’s really important we support and get funding so they can get the power back on.

“Water supply has been hit too so it’s important we continue to support the war effort in Ukraine.”

14. United Kingdom. “Book Shines Spotlight on Ukrainian Stories,” *Dumfries and Galloway Standard*, 13 December 2022.

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By SHARON LIPTROTT

A former Dumfries head teacher has collated a pictorial history of more than 70 years of Ukrainian communities in Scotland.

Peter Kormylo’s book was launched at Moat Brae in Dumfries with the author giving a packed-out audience in the Garden Room a presentation summarising its main features.

Scotland’s Ukrainians - Their Story was also launched in Edinburgh where Peter is librarian and archivist for the Ukrainian Community Centre in Royal Terrace.

Peter, 71, said: “The topic will be of interest to anyone who wants to be informed about the Ukrainian diaspora in Scotland - a community that has been here in great numbers since the end of WWII.

“Dumfries and Galloway has traditionally been home to many Ukrainian families over the last 76 years and the book will appeal especially to the children and grandchildren of those first displaced persons and prisoners of war who were domiciled in various camps and hostels scattered across this region and Scotland.”

Many came to the region in 1946 and 1947 to live and work at Hallmuir near Lockerbie and at a camp at the Barony near Dumfries after WWII.

Peter’s late father, Michael, was a prisoner of war who settled in Annan and married local lass, June.

Born in Annan, Peter was educated at St Joseph’s College and became head teacher at Loreburn and Penpont Primary Schools.

As well as his work at the Ukrainian Community Centre in Edinburgh, he is involved in other initiatives which maintain links between families in the Ukraine and the UK which have been stepped up since the Russian invasion this year.

He is also involved with the preservation of the Hallmuir Ukrainian POW Chapel and with the Midsteeple Quarter Project in Dumfries.

Anyone interested in buying the book should contact Peter on kormylo.pl@btinternet.com.

15. United Kingdom. “King Charles Opens New Welcome Centre for Ukrainian Refugees in London,” *TheNationalNews.com*, 30 November 2022.

By Soraya Ebrahimi | Laura O’Callaghan

British monarch tours building with Ukraine's first lady Olena Zelenska

King Charles III opened a new welcome centre for Ukrainian refugees in London on Wednesday. The monarch, 74, toured the venue, at the Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral of the Holy Family in Exile, with Ukraine's first lady Olena Zelenska.

On his second visit to the cathedral since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February, the king was given a traditional Ukrainian welcome of bread and salt before being invited to meet staff, volunteers and refugees.

Bishop Kenneth Nowakowski, head of the cathedral, told *The National* that the joint visit had given an "incredible morale boost" to those who fled the invasion and were establishing new lives in the UK.

He said Mrs Zelenska's appearance at the centre also showed refugees "they have not been forgotten" by those in their homeland.

"This was the second visit of his majesty to our cathedral since the full-scale invasion and it has shown us how much we mean to the royal family," the bishop said.

He said Ukrainians had taken the opportunity to thank the king for "the openness and the kindness" shown by the people of Britain.

The Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of the Holy Family in London and the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain work together to offer assistance to refugees fleeing the war at the centre.

Vadym Prystaiko, Ukraine's UK ambassador, was among those who met the king and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's wife during the visit.

Bishop Nowakowski showed King Charles a religious icon painted on an ammunition box that had come to the cathedral from Ukraine.

The head of Britain's royal family was also shown how Ukrainians are benefiting from English language classes, art therapy and a mother and toddlers' club.

Khrystyna Kazarian, who volunteers at the welcome centre, said the king showed great interest in the work being done.

She told the PA news agency that her daughter tried to jump on the monarch when he approached her for a chat.

"He asked what we are doing now," she said. "My daughter actually tried to jump on him several times.

“He said, ‘I can’t imagine how you are doing this’.”

“He was very nice and warm,” she added.

Mrs Zelenska also toured the centre, speaking to attendees and volunteers.

After circling the room, King Charles was brought to the front to unveil a plaque commemorating the opening.

Bishop Nowakowski thanked him for his support.

“Your majesty, I have the great pleasure of welcoming you to our Ukrainian Welcome Centre,” he said.

“I also want to express my gratitude to you, sir, for being here right after the invasion of Ukraine in the first days of March, with her majesty the Queen Consort.

“This really inspired us, this really gave us a lot of assistance.”

He said he hoped that the next time the king visited would be after Ukraine had won the war. King Charles unveiled the plaque, which read: “To commemorate the official opening of the Ukrainian Welcome Centre by His Majesty King Charles III.”

He then wished the attendees a Happy Christmas in Ukrainian.

Bishop Nowakowski also presented the king with a gift — a framed photograph of him dancing the traditional Ukrainian Hopak dance in 1981 with a group of folk dancers in Derby.

“We have a picture that has become famous worldwide,” the bishop told the king. “I have to say that throughout the Ukrainian diaspora this is one of our most cherished pictures and I would like you to have it.”

The monarch responded by bursting into laughter and graciously accepting the present.

[<https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/uk-news/2022/11/30/king-charles-opens-new-welcome-centre-for-ukrainian-refugees-in-london/>]

16. USA. “Philadelphia’s Ukrainian Diaspora Puts a Unique Spin on Holiday Classic in Solidarity with Ukraine,” *TheWorld.org*, 30 December 2022.

The Ukrainian community in Philadelphia is the second-largest in the United States. As members of the diaspora celebrated the holidays with a special Ukrainian version of “The Nutcracker,” they reflected on a year of worry and solidarity.

By Ashley Westerman

For Larysa Spisic, a Ukrainian American whose family is from Lviv, Ukraine, it's been hard watching the war in Ukraine from afar.

"You definitely feel helpless at times because we are over here and we can give support and prayers and good wishes, but physically, we really cannot do much," said Spisic, who lives in the Philadelphia area, which has the second-largest Ukrainian community in the United States.

Spisic, the director of the Voloshky School of Ukrainian Dance in Jenkintown, Pennsylvania, wanted to find a way to showcase Ukrainian culture and raise money for the cause.

So, she decided to stage the holiday classic, "The Nutcracker" — with a Ukrainian twist, set in a small, Ukrainian village with Ukrainian folk dancing, decorations, dolls and food on prominent display throughout. The production had a two-show run on Dec. 23 at the Josephine Muller Auditorium in Jenkintown.

Because of Russia's invasion, she said the classic ballet by Pyotr Tchaikovsky has a special impact. The famous composer was born in Russia, but his great-grandfather was from Ukraine's central Poltava region, according to researchers.

"Ukrainians feel very strongly that we do have some personal connection to him as well, and we wanted to embrace that," Spisic said.

It's just one way that the community has been resilient and strong throughout the 10 months of the invasion, said Ulana Dubas of Dresher, Pennsylvania.

Dubas' family is also from Lviv and her husband's family is from the Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine, small parts of which are still occupied by Russian forces.

"We did a lot of drives for clothing and food, monetary donations that really brought the community together in many ways," she said. "And that's continuing now because it has to."

Dubas' 10-year-old daughter, Mila, was one of some 50 dancers from the Voloshky School of Ukrainian Dance. The school, now in its 50th year, is considered to be a staple of the Ukrainian American community in Philadelphia.

A handful of other Philadelphia organizations and guest dancers also chipped in and donated their time to help make the production happen, including community veterans of Ukrainian folk dance, the Metropolitan Ballet Company and one of Philadelphia Ballet's Principal Ballerinas, Oksana Maslova.

This collaboration, the leaders of the production say, is a testament to the overall support Ukrainian Americans say they've received since Russia invaded Ukraine earlier this year.

[<https://theworld.org/stories/2022-12-30/philadelphias-ukrainian-diaspora-puts-unique-spin-holiday-classic-solidarity>]

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