PHIL 350

PHIL 350 B1: Foundations of Ethics
Instructor: Howard Nye

Course Description

Are there objective ethical truths? Why should we care about morality? What ultimately is it for an act to be reasonable, virtuous, or morally right? In this course we will explore these most fundamental questions about ethics. We will examine various theories of what we are doing when we make ethical claims, whether there are objective ethical facts, and what sorts of facts these could be. We will also explore the most promising accounts of why we should be moral, and what most fundamentally determines which outcomes are good, what character traits are virtuous, and what we owe to others.

Learning Outcomes

At the end of this course, students should be able to:

  1. Explain centrally important theories in metaethics about the nature of ethical thought and truth, such as non-naturalism, expressivism, quasi-realism, ideal response theory, and metaethical constructivism
  2. Explain the central tenets of normative ethical theories, such as contractarianism, eudaimonism, Kantian constructivism, contractualism, consequentialism, and Rossian pluralism 
  3. Evaluate and critically assess philosophical arguments for and against these different metaethical and normative ethical theories
  4. Apply these metaethical and general normative ethical theories to important practical and theoretical questions of how we should live and interact with other beings.
  5. Construct well-reasoned arguments, orally and in writing, for their own positions in metaethics and general normative ethics, demonstrating fairness and objectivity in the presentation of evidence against rival views.

Course Requirements

15% Class Participation
15% First Paper Due Sunday, Feb. 21 (4-5 pgs / ~ 1,200 words)
35% Second Paper Due Friday, Apr. 16 (7-8 pgs / ~1,800 words)
35% Third Paper Due Friday, Apr. 30 (7-8 pgs / ~1,800 words)

Tentative Schedule of Topics and Readings

The Nature of Ethical Cognition and Truth

The Autonomy of Ethics and Non-Naturalism

  • James Rachels, “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism”
  • G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 5-27

Explanatory Superfluity, Motivation, and Error Theory

  • Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality, pp. 3-10
  • J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, pp. 15-18; 30-46; 48-9

Non-Cognitivism: Emotivism, Expressivism, and Quasi-Realism

  • A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, pp. 102-113
  • Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Selection)
  • Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions, Ch 3, §4-5, pp. 68-83

Ideal Response Theory and Internal Reasons

  • Roderick Firth, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer”
  • Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons”

Constructivism and the Humean Theory of Practical Reasons

  • Sharon Street, “Constructivism About Reasons”
  • James Dreier, “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality”

Moral Theory and Reasons to be Moral: Rationality, Prudence, and Agency 

Contractarianism and the Instrumental Justification of Morality 

  • David Gauthier, “Why Contractarianism?”
  • Holly Smith, “Deriving Morality from Rationality”

Eudaimonism: Virtue and the Good Life

  • Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, Ch 1, Making Sense of My Life as a Whole 
  • Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, Ch. 2, The Virtues (Selection)

Independent Value, Agency, and Autonomy

  • Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value (Selection)
  • Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Chapter 9

Moral Theory and Reasons to be Moral: Rational Intuition 

Rational Intuition, Contractualism, and Consequentialism

  • Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume I (Selection)
  • Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Bk III, Ch xiii and Concluding Ch

Pluralistic Foundations and Special Obligations 

  • W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Ch. II
  • Diane Jeske, Rationality and Moral Theory, Ch. 3

Pluralistic Foundations and Constraints 

  • Frances Howard-Snyder, “Doing vs. Allowing Harm”
  • Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect”

Constraints and the Demands of Morality

  • Shelly Kagan, “Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much?”

Rational Convergence and the Bounds of Moral Agency

  • Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (Selection)
  • Shaun Nichols, “How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism”