The first three months of 2017 have seen tumultuous developments on the Korean Peninsula, from the launch of multiple Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) medium-range ballistic missiles, the impeachment of the South Korean President, the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Defence (THAAD) system in the Republic of Korea (ROK), to more robust language about the potential use of force by the Trump Administration against North Korean nuclear and missile capacity.
Each of these developments has influence on the complex multi-state dynamics that shape the strategic situation of the Korean Peninsula. Let us examine the four developments individually.
- The gradual improvement in the DPRK's capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and to simultaneously grow the range, accuracy and reliability of the DPRK missiles, whether short- or medium-range, has not been smooth. There have been lengthy periods of experimentation and, in the case of ballistic missiles, repeated launch failures. These set-backs may have been simply design flaws, but may also have been influenced by external factors such as the introduction of computer viruses into DPRK laboratories as recently alleged by the New York Times.
But the successful multiple launches of medium-range ballistic missiles earlier this month showed an increasing confidence of the DPRK military in their delivery systems. The successful test of a DPRK underwater launch of a ballistic missile in 2016, testing of solid fuel rocket engines, and ongoing work on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that has the capacity to reach North America have also heightened US concerns that the DPRK's latent threat to the US homeland was fast becoming realized.
- The successful impeachment and removal of ROK President Park in March removed a champion of a tough approach to Pyongyang and a supporter of the deployment of the THAAD missile defence system. The disappearance of Park from the Seoul Blue House also creates uncertainly whether the hardline approach towards the DPRK adopted by Park will be sustained, or whether the next President will opt for a renewal of some variant of the past "Sunshine Policy" of seeking détente with Pyongyang.
- The March deployment of the THAAD system, over strenuous People's Republic of China (PRC) objections, represents a significant defence upgrade for US forces in the ROK and other key ROK installations. The deployment has had the auxiliary effects of damaging PRC-ROK relations, and the swift emergence of economic retaliation against ROK business interests. However, with many thousands of DPRK artillery tubes in close proximity to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Seoul, the THAAD system in itself would not prevent devastating damage to the economic centre of gravity of the ROK should war break out. It is noteworthy that, perhaps due to considerations related to the upcoming US-China Summit, Chinese criticism of the US, as opposed to the much more robust criticism of the ROK, was muted.
- The election campaign of President Trump was characterized by a range of radical policy proposals with relation to East Asia, including the possible development of Japanese and South Korean nuclear weapons, tough trade sanctions on China, and ambivalence regarding the almost half-century-old "one-China policy" that helped unlock normalized Sino-American relations. While President Trump has driven a spike through the economic component of President Obama's "rebalancing" of US forces towards the Western Pacific (e.g. the Trans-Pacific Partnership), it is not yet clear how the new Administration will manage the Asian circumstances that they have inherited.
What Comes Next?
Predicting the course of the tight knot that the Korean Peninsula represents is probably a fool's errand, but there are some developments that can be discerned.
- China will make a sustained effort to steer the new ROK President towards positions that are more compatible with Chinese views on the Koreas. These are likely to include efforts to convince Seoul to remove the THAAD system, a re-launch of some form of renewed South Korean efforts towards even a partial re-engagement of political dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul, as well as some manner of contact, either aid or trade, between the two Koreas (how this could be squared with the extensive United Nations Security Council sanctions on the DPRK now in place is unclear).
- The DPRK will continue to make incremental and qualitative upgrades to its missile and nuclear weapons arsenal, facilitated by the DPRK's large cadre of skilled scientists and engineers in both sectors. While the North Korean economy is weak, command economies of even modest scale can muster sufficient resources to advance such programmes provided they have time, talent and resources.It is improbable that the strident language used by DPRK's leadership will be tempered.
- It is unlikely that even a new ROK Administration that seeks an exit from the strategic squeeze that Seoul faces, with economic dependence on China, military dependence on the US, and an evolving military threat from North Korea, can find that exit. The Chinese dream of a ROK cut loose from the US Pacific alliance would require acceptance by Seoul of Chinese leadership, and would not eliminate the need for a robust defence against a future DPRK attack.This does not preclude the possibility of efforts by the next ROK President to reduce peninsular tensions by overtures to Pyongyang, with PRC support.
- The US faces tough decisions regarding the DPRK in the coming months and years. It has been my experience that longstanding and intractable security challenges, both of which conditions apply to the Korean Peninsula, tend to be left to fester, until either the fundamental underlying conditions change, or, the danger increases to a point where action appears less hazardous than procrastination.
I am convinced that despite the rhetoric of Pyongyang extolling the capacity of its military to devastate South Korea, Japan, US bases in the region, and even the continental United States, the DPRK leadership wants to die in bed of old age. Pyongyang's experience of economic failure, but a demonstrated capacity to develop and even export a range of military hardware is unlikely to be unlearned. As well, periodic suspension of nuclear weapons development has yielded both political (formalized dialogue with adversaries - "face" in a Confucian context) and economic benefits (aid).
But the ground has shifted. Threats to attack its neighbours were one thing when the North Korean nuclear weapons programme had not yielded a demonstrated capacity to produce a viable nuclear warhead, but quite another when a proven DPRK nuclear arsenal is steadily growing. The prospect of nuclear warheads married to capable medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles generates deep concern for US military planners, even if the US retains the ready capacity to deliver a devastating conventional or nuclear response.
If someone points a loaded weapon at you, and if you lack confidence regarding their state of mind, or their intentions, the temptation to fire first comes to the fore. In 2017, the still modest size of the North Korean nuclear forces and missile stocks can boost the attractiveness of an early strike before the size and sophistication of the North Korean strategic capacity advances to a point where a first strike can no longer have a good prospect of the elimination of the DRPK capacity either to wage nuclear war, or to strike distant targets.
What then restrains the United States?
- Opening a conflict, even with a successful first strike (presumably on both weapons systems and the DPRK leadership) does not 100% guarantee a successful and sustainable result. The North Koreans are superb tunnelers, and accurate intelligence with regards to DPRK capabilities is unlikely to be perfect.
- Taking out the forest of artillery pieces that target Seoul is probably impossible, at least in short order.Significant damage to Seoul would be a serious blow to the regional economies, and could be the opening round to a nuclear face-off or a ground campaign. The latter scenario we have seen before - almost 68 years ago.
- What would be the Chinese reaction? It might be possible for US and PLA forces to coordinate an attack, but this would seem to be a long shot, given the conservative Chinese views on the use of force, and deep Chinese wariness regarding any prospect of advancing US military forces closer to Chinese borders. China's responses could range from indirect military assistance to the DPRK (assuming that the political and military leadership remained intact) to a PLA occupation of part or all of North Korea in order to preserve a buffer state between China and US/ROK forces.
- The economic cost of even a limited Korean war to the US would be significant, and to the ROK crushing. For a US Administration that has been critical of the costly Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, such a war would put at risk the growth that President Trump has promised the American people
The simplest way to attempt to predict the future is generally to posit "more of the same". In the Korean case this would mean more US sanctions (but not so easy where these would be brought to bear on China directly), upgraded missile defences in the ROK and Japan, and more North Korean nuclear tests and missile test launches.
The scenario that many in the West have pinned their hopes is the collapse of the DPRK either through a leadership coup or popular revolt. These theories became especially popular around 1990 with the implosion of the Soviet Union, but almost 30 years on these prospects may be a chimera. The leadership, against all odds, has been able to weather two generations of change (Grandfather Kim Il Song, to son Kim Jong Il, to grandson Kim Jong Un). The durability of the draconian, but clearly effective, controls on the populace remains in place, and is extraordinary, particularly given the economic conditions in North Korea, which in most states would provoke popular revolt.
Given the potential costs, and the profound uncertainties, it is likely that the longstanding strategic standoff on the Korean Peninsula will be sustained for some time yet. However, as with the faults along tectonic plates, the latent pressures can continue to build until some event triggers their release. Whether this will be a military conflict or some grand political settlement between the Koreas, and/or the US and China is not yet knowable. While not imminent, in my view, the risks of the former are significant and growing.