Caught in the Middle: A Glimpse from Jordan into U.S.-China Competition in the Middle East

Editor’s Note

This interview is the second installment in our series on how states caught in the middle of persistent U.S.-China tensions manage the pressures they face. In our first conversation, Professor Wanning Sun explored Australia’s debate over China from the perspective of a liberal democracy and longstanding U.S. ally. In this installment, we extend our attention to the Middle East, where governments confront many of the same strategic pressures but often arrive at different conclusions about great-power competition.

Our guest, Dana Abu-Haltam, brings an unusually rich perspective to these questions. Before pursuing her PhD, she worked at the Chinese Embassy in Jordan for 4 years, an experience that has subsequently informed her research on how the U.S.-China rivalry shapes politics and diplomacy in the Middle East. Her research, which combines firsthand knowledge of Chinese diplomacy with fieldwork, spans international relations and comparative politics, with particular interests in China's rise, Chinese foreign policy, U.S.–China competition, and how Middle Eastern countries responds to that competition.

One of the main cases she examines is Jordan. On one hand, Jordan maintains a close security relationship with the United States as a Major Non-NATO Ally, a status that invites direct pressures from Washington to limit substantial Chinese influence in the country. On the other hand, Jordan has expanded its ties with China, including a strategic partnership, a Memorandum of Understanding attached to the Belt and Road Initiative, and a burgeoning trade relationship.

In this conversation, she explains how Jordan manages competing relationships with Washington and Beijing, illustrating both the opportunities and constraints confronting states caught in between. She discusses why China’s influence often proves more limited than commonly assumed, and how great-power competition finds expression through local economic activities. She also briefly reflects on how larger regional states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, approach similar strategic dilemmas in different ways.

This interview was conducted by Dr. Yanchuan Liu.

Interview Highlights

• Even at the height of Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Jordan managed to turn down Chinese proposals without provoking hostility by avoiding direct confrontation and allowing both sides to save face.
• China’s response to setbacks may be more flexible than commonly assumed. In Jordan’s case, China appeared willing to tolerate setbacks when the local authority’s strategic alignment with the United States leaves little room for Chinese influence, and when coercion would undermine Beijing’s own message of non-interference.
• Middle powers are not a homogenous category. Middle powers in the region do not necessarily share the worldview of their Western counterparts, identifying more closely with BRICS’ vision of multipolarity than with alliances based on shared democratic values.
• Great-power competition often reaches ordinary people through local policy decisions, with businesses and consumers bearing many of the consequences.
• Closer contact with China does not guarantee more favourable perceptions. In Jordan, those who work most closely with Chinese businesses are likely to hold the most critical views of China.

How Jordan navigated great-power rivalry, and who paid the price

Yanchuan Liu: Thank you for taking the time to speak with us. I have not met many scholars in North America who follow Middle Eastern responses to the U.S.-China rivalry. Moreover, your CV shows that you had worked for the Chinese Embassy in Jordan between 2016 and 2019 before starting your PhD. How did your professional experience inform your research interest?

Dana Abu Haltam: My pleasure to be here.

After studying Chinese at the University of Jordan as an undergraduate, I secured a job with the Chinese Embassy as a consular assistant. Even at this level, I observed signs of the U.S.-China competition, which has become the focus of my research.

For instance, the Chinese Embassy viewed its American counterpart as a benchmark. Staff were looking to raise the Chinese Embassy’s prestige in the eyes of the locals to match that of the American embassy. Some colleagues also suspected that American pressure influenced Jordan’s decisions to reject several state-sponsored project proposals from China, even though Jordan was in much need for these projects.

Yanchuan Liu: How valid were the Embassy’s suspicions that American involvement led to China’s setbacks? Could Jordan have turned down Chinese proposals even without American influence?

Dana Abu Haltam: The Jordanian side would never attribute its decisions to American influence. When I interviewed high-ranking decision makers, they refrained from saying that the United States had any influence on their interactions with China. Rather, additional interviews show that there were other ways to justify the rejections while leaving the door open to future proposals from China.

For instance, I conducted several interviews about Jordan’s choice of a 5G provider. Huawei’s 5G technology has drawn strong opposition from the United States, which has urged its partners and allies not to work with the Chinese company. Although Jordan had relied on Huawei for its 2G, 3G, and 4G networks, it ultimately decided not to select Huawei for its 5G rollout. That decision deserved closer examination.

Through my research, I found that Jordan faced pressure from the United States. At the same time, it was concerned about retaliation from China. To navigate this dilemma, Jordan adopted a clever strategy. Rather than banning Huawei outright, it allowed the company to participate in the bidding process. The pricing information was later leaked, however, enabling Huawei’s competitors, Nokia and Ericsson, to submit more competitive bids. This allowed Jordan to avoid a direct confrontation with China while still satisfying the concerns of its longstanding ally, the United States.

A similar pattern emerged with electric vehicles. After the United States imposed a 100 percent tariff on Chinese EVs, Jordan tightened its own EV import regulations without explicitly mentioning China. The new rules required imported electric vehicles to comply with European or U.S. safety standards, effectively excluding new Chinese EVs from the market. Yet specialists in Jordan argued that the policy was inconsistent because it continued to allow imported salvage vehicles from Europe and the United States while excluding new Chinese EVs, despite their comparable safety standards.

Yanchuan Liu: You mentioned that the U.S.-China rivalry was highly noticeable for members of the Embassy. How visible was it to the Jordanian public?

Dana Abu Haltam: Ordinary people don’t observe the competition as directly, but they bear its costs. The owners of Chinese EVs will struggle to find affordable parts because of the import restrictions. Businesspeople who purchased thousands of Chinese EVs are stuck: They will have a hard time selling the imported cars in Jordan.

China knows when to push and when to let go

Yanchuan Liu: We first met when you presented your paper on how Jordan politely said “no” to China without burning bridges, but a stereotypical great power does not easily take “no” for an answer. Did China simply concede? If so, what does that tell us about the limits of China’s influence?

Dana Abu Haltam: China faces two constraints. First, the United States has already enjoyed much more influence on the ground than China, a fact that China appreciates. Second, China does not want to contradict its own narrative about non-interference, which appeals to Middle Eastern states.

Based on the interviews I conducted, China’s bottom line is that as long as Jordan does not challenge its core interests, specifically Taiwan and the one China policy, it is able to live with setbacks on secondary matters.

For instance, Huawei employees told me in interviews that China found Jordan’s response difficult to accept, but they did little more than sending letters to the involved ministries and the Royal Hashemite Court.

Yanchuan Liu: For those of us who are not experts on the Middle East, myself included, could you please tell us how much influence the United States has over Jordan?

Dana Abu Haltam: Jordan is not an oil state, but its security interests align with America’s. Iran is our common concern, the U.S. military operations rely on Jordan’s facilities, and—more importantly—the United States values Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel. The border between Jordan and Israel is more than 300 miles long, and it must be secured. In return for protecting the Israeli border, Jordan receives substantial American foreign aid.

As a result, even though Jordan’s political views are closer to those of China than to those of the United States, Jordan benefits from and values American engagement in the region.

Yanchuan Liu: How important is Jordan to China, beyond being a market for Chinese exports?

Dana Abu Haltam: In my opinion, Jordan is important, though not as much as Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Jordan doesn’t have oil, and it has already developed close ties with the United States. This also helps explain why China can accept setbacks there. If non-interference appeals to the local audience, it is not worthwhile to pressure the Jordanian government at the risk of provoking a backlash.

Yanchuan Liu: It sounds like Jordan’s small size and heavy dependence on the United States have helped reduce the heat of great power competition on the ground.

Dana Abu Haltam: Yes, the dynamics are different in larger states in the region, such as Saudi Arabia. In another project, I examine Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy amid U.S.-China competition. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a very smart strategy: rather than aligning itself with one side, it seeks to avoid choosing between them. More importantly, it is moving beyond simple hedging by actively advocating for a multipolar world in which it can position itself as both a regional power and an emerging global player.

Saudi Arabia is also taking advantage of great power competition by encouraging both Washington and Beijing to offer more attractive partnerships. These external opportunities support the kingdom’s ambitious domestic agenda under Vision 2030. One example is Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), a state-owned company through which the government aims to localize 50 percent of its defense procurement. To achieve this goal, Saudi Arabia is partnering with defense companies from multiple countries rather than relying exclusively on the United States, its longstanding security partner.

Middle powers, different worldviews

Yanchuan Liu: Beyond the Jordanian context, we increasingly hear the phrase “middle powers” in both academic and policy discussions, especially from Canadian, Australian, and European speakers. Do the Middle Eastern states you follow self-identify as middle powers?  

Dana Abu Haltam: There is variation. Jordan sees itself as a small power, but the UAE and Saudi Arabia see themselves as middle powers and believe that, in a multipolar world, they can increase their autonomy and influence the behavior of others.

Yanchuan Liu: Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called for closer collaboration between middle powers in January 2026. His framing implicitly emphasized like-mindedness—similarity in political institutions and respect for human rights. How did non-democratic middle powers in the Middle East respond?

Dana Abu Haltam: The middle powers in the Middle East are not part of the Western bloc. They identify more with the BRICS’s call for multipolarity and the principle of non-interference than with Western values or unipolarity. However, they try not to pick a side.

For instance, the UAE joined the BRICS in 2023, but it has no interest in siding with either China or the United States. Based on interviews conducted by my coauthor, Lawerence Rubin, for another project examining U.S.-China competition in AI technologies, the UAE is diversifying its resources to increase its autonomy and become valuable to everyone.

Saudi Arabia also considered BRICS membership, but it appears to have decided to keep its options open. The Saudis are strengthening ties with a wide range of partners to advance their own interests. They increasingly see themselves as a global player in a multipolar world and aspires to play a constructive role not only in the Middle East but also beyond.

There was not much discussion about Mark Carney’s speech, as far as I observed.

Yanchuan Liu: It sounds like middle powers in the Middle East have a different vision from their counterparts elsewhere.

Dana Abu Haltam: Yes, Middle Eastern states have a different mindset. They see themselves as developing countries, much as China does. More capable states like Saudi Arabia even aspire to play a more constructive role in the global economy, such as by supporting economic growth in Africa and Central Asia. Where possible, they also seek to maximize their gains from great power competition.

The irony of China’s image in Jordan

Yanchuan Liu: Our dialogue has hinted at similarities in political values and outlooks between China and Middle Eastern states. Similarities should facilitate diplomatic relations, but your time at the Chinese Embassy (2016 - 2019) coincided with rising concerns about the so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy.” Did you pick up any signals of Chinese assertiveness toward Jordan or the Middle East in general? 

Dana Abu Haltam: I think wolf warrior diplomacy was primarily aimed at Western audiences. China wasn’t as assertive toward Middle Eastern countries; instead, it wanted to distinguish itself from the United States by emphasizing the principle of non-interference and win-win relationships. In return, China asked other countries not to interfere with China’s core interests, such as Taiwan. Xinjiang is a different case. The Chinese government frames its policy there as an anti-extremism campaign, which resonates with many Middle Eastern governments.

By early 2016, Jordan’s relationship with China was in a very good place. The two governments had just established a strategic partnership, which included a memorandum of understanding to boost investment by about $7 billion. However, some of the follow-up projects never materialized because of American objections.

Yanchuan Liu: China-related discussions within many U.S. allies have become securitized, and hawkish voices seem to enjoy the upper hand over pro-engagement voices. We can observe this tendency in Australia, according to our previous interview with Dr. Wanning Sun. How does Jordan talk about China?

Dana Abu Haltam: Jordanian media do not discuss China much, except when announcing new projects. If you ask ordinary people, their most likely response will be that China does not invade other countries, despite its growing power. So China enjoys a mostly positive image among the ordinary people.

My interviews with elites also suggest that Jordan does not see China as a threat at all. The rhetoric is not securitized, since Jordan’s relationship with the United States prevents China from having a meaningful security presence in the first place.

Ironically, workers who interact regularly with Chinese businesses are less in favor of China playing a larger international role. They see Chinese business or factory owners—the laoban—as overly controlling of employees and worry that this management style might foreshadow China’s behavior as a global leader.

Yanchuan Liu: Thank you for sharing your insights with us!

Dana Abu Haltam: Thank you so much for having me.