How China Sees the World 2026

Report Summary

The 2026 Chinese Citizens’ Global Perception Survey (CCGPS), now in its fourth annual edition, examines how mainland Chinese citizens view the world’s major powers, the role they want China to play internationally, and the information environment that shapes those views. The findings portray a public that is confident, pragmatic and selectively engaged: convinced of China’s arrival as a leading power, firmly attached to Russia, increasingly wary of Japan, and reluctant either to sever economic ties with the West or to export China’s political model abroad.

This year’s data also reveal notable shifts – an erosion of trust in Russia, a hardening of threat perceptions toward Japan, which for the first time overtakes the United States as the most likely source of military conflict, and a continued decline in America’s appeal as a place to settle.

Taken together, these insights offer policymakers, business actors, and global stakeholders a nuanced reference point for engaging a Chinese public whose worldview is more differentiated and pragmatic than geopolitical headlines often suggest.

Major Findings

Part I: General Global Perception

• Chinese citizens overwhelmingly view their nation as the dominant global power, with 68% rating its influence at the highest level, ahead of the United States at 63%. All other powers trail far behind – Russia (23%) and the European Union (18%) form a distant middle tier – while India continues to register only faintly in Chinese perceptions despite its rising global profile.
• Russia remains China’s most trusted global partner, though trust in Moscow has continued to erode, falling from 81% in 2024 to 74% in 2025 and 67% in 2026. Japan remains the least trusted power, with 55% assigning it the lowest possible score, followed by the United States, where just 12% express above-neutral trust against 32% selecting the bottom score.
• For the first time, Japan has overtaken the United States as the country seen as most likely to enter military conflict with China, with 71% rating such conflict likely, compared with 57% for the United States. Russia is regarded as the least likely adversary, reinforcing its standing as a strategic partner.

 Part II: China's Global Roles

• Chinese citizens prioritize global leadership in peace and security (65%) and technology (54%), followed by poverty alleviation, public health, and international trade, reflecting a vision of China as a provider of public goods rather than an ideological standard bearer.
• Russia dominates as the preferred economic partner (76%), with Germany (63%) and the European Union (62%) forming a clear second tier; the United States is met with cautious openness (49%), while Japan sits alone at the bottom (20%).
• Technological collaboration is similarly welcomed with Russia (74%), Germany (70%), and the EU (65%), and even the United States draws 56% despite ongoing restrictions; Japan again ranks last (26%).
• A larger global military footprint enjoys broad public support, with 43% strongly endorsing an expansion of China’s military presence.
• There is little enthusiasm for exporting China’s governance model, just 13% strongly agree, signalling an appetite for capability rather than ideological influence abroad.

Part III: Tourism, Study, Work, and Emigration Preferences

• France leads as the preferred tourism destination, with Russia a striking runner-up; Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and even Japan remain popular despite geopolitical tensions, while India ranks lowest.
• The United States remains the top destination for study, followed closely by the United Kingdom and Germany, underscoring the durable global appeal of Western higher education even amid visa and policy uncertainty.
• Germany and the United States share the lead as preferred work destinations, with Russia and France ranking close behind.
• Australia has become the top emigration choice, followed by Canada and the United Kingdom; interest in settling in the United States has fallen to just 2%, a marked decline from earlier years, while India continues to rank lowest.

 
Part IV: Canada and China Relations

• Public support for cooperation with Canada has climbed across all five measured domains since 2023, holding firm through a period of diplomatic strain and reflecting a reservoir of goodwill more durable than the bilateral news cycle.
• Cultural exchanges enjoy the strongest backing, at 80%. The highest cooperation figure recorded for Canada in the survey.
• Economic cooperation stands at 77% and global security at 76%, with global governance (73%) and environmental cooperation (71%) close behind.
• Respondents attribute the state of Canada-China relations primarily to structural factors –
  China’s expanding power (83%) and Canada’s alignment with the United States (78%) –rather than to differences in values (66%), indicating that the relationship is read substantially through the lens of Washington.

• Chinese citizens report the highest familiarity with the United States, Japan and Russia, yet familiarity does not align with trust: Russia is the most trusted, while Japan and the United States rank lowest.
• The link between knowledge and trust is strongest for Russia, Germany, and France and weakest for Japan and the United States, where greater exposure does little to soften (and may even harden) existing views.
• Social media remains the overwhelmingly dominant source of information about the world across every demographic, while television (now concentrated among older cohorts), newspapers and radio continue their long decline.
• A durable 75% of respondents believe that governments’ actions reflect the will of their people – unchanged from 2025 and broadly stable across the 2023-2026 period – a conviction that tends to harden attitudes toward countries already viewed with suspicion.