Professor Landeo's research is conducted at the interface between the Economic Analysis of Law and Industrial Organization. She applies game-theoretic modeling, experimental economics methods, and legal analysis to the assessment and design of market and legal institutions. Her theoretical work on the economic analysis of legal disputes, published in Games and Economic Behavior in 2018, generalizes seminal economic models of litigation, presents the first formal definition of ``access to justice,'' and provides methodological contributions to the economic analysis of law. She presented the findings from this study at the NBER Summer Institute in Law and Economics in July 2016. Professor Landeo discussed her recent theoretical and experimental work on law enforcement with ordered leniency at the Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association in May 2019 and at the NBER Summer Institute in Law and Economics in July 2018. Dr. Landeo has also studied the efficiency properties of bargaining institutions in legal settings including partnership dissolution provisions and pretrial bargaining mechanisms. In addition, her work has provided insights about the use of vertical restraints by incumbent monopolists to exclude potential entrants, and the design of incentive contracts for teams. Professor Landeo is currently working on the design of optimal law enforcement mechanisms for long-term illegal activities, the design of optimal legal systems, and debiasing through law mechanisms.
Areas of Interest
Economic Analysis of Law
Experimental and Behavioral Economics
"Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes" (with M. Nikitin). 2018. Games and Economic Behavior, 109, pp. 625-647.
"Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions." 2018. In K. Zeiler and J. Teitelbaum, eds., The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing.
"Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities" (with K. Spier). 2009. The American Economic Review, 99, pp. 1850-1877.
"Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a Bilateral Bargaining Game" (with L. Babcock). 2004. The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53, pp. 401-417.
"Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts" (with R. Brooks and K. Spier). 2010. The RAND Journal of Economics, 41, pp. 649-673.
"Deterrence, Lawsuits and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors" (with M. Nikitin and S. Baker). 2007. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23, pp. 57-97.
"Shotguns and Deadlocks" (with K. Spier). 2014. The Yale Journal on Regulation, 31, pp. 143-187.
"Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock" (with K. Spier). 2014. The University of Chicago Law Review, 81, pp. 203-229.
Recent Discussion Papers
"Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency" (with K. Spier). 2018. NBER Working Paper w25095.
"Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting" (with K. Spier). 2018. NBER Working Paper w25094.
Work in Progress
"Debiasing through Law: An Experimental Study of Unrealistic Optimism and Consumer Safety Law" (with C. Jolls). University of Alberta and Yale University.
"Optimal Civil Litigation Institutions: A Mechanism-Design Approach" (with M. Nikitin). University of Alberta and International College of Economics and Finance.